<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/fs, branch v4.4.275</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.4.275</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.4.275'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:49:38+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>nilfs2: fix memory leak in nilfs_sysfs_delete_device_group</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:49:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pavel Skripkin</name>
<email>paskripkin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-25T01:39:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=7bbb84c72484db9f95c63d523425c2189fb06b29'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7bbb84c72484db9f95c63d523425c2189fb06b29</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8fd0c1b0647a6bda4067ee0cd61e8395954b6f28 ]

My local syzbot instance hit memory leak in nilfs2.  The problem was in
missing kobject_put() in nilfs_sysfs_delete_device_group().

kobject_del() does not call kobject_cleanup() for passed kobject and it
leads to leaking duped kobject name if kobject_put() was not called.

Fail log:

  BUG: memory leak
  unreferenced object 0xffff8880596171e0 (size 8):
  comm "syz-executor379", pid 8381, jiffies 4294980258 (age 21.100s)
  hex dump (first 8 bytes):
    6c 6f 6f 70 30 00 00 00                          loop0...
  backtrace:
     kstrdup+0x36/0x70 mm/util.c:60
     kstrdup_const+0x53/0x80 mm/util.c:83
     kvasprintf_const+0x108/0x190 lib/kasprintf.c:48
     kobject_set_name_vargs+0x56/0x150 lib/kobject.c:289
     kobject_add_varg lib/kobject.c:384 [inline]
     kobject_init_and_add+0xc9/0x160 lib/kobject.c:473
     nilfs_sysfs_create_device_group+0x150/0x800 fs/nilfs2/sysfs.c:999
     init_nilfs+0xe26/0x12b0 fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c:637

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210612140559.20022-1-paskripkin@gmail.com
Fixes: da7141fb78db ("nilfs2: add /sys/fs/nilfs2/&lt;device&gt; group")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin &lt;paskripkin@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Ryusuke Konishi &lt;konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Michael L. Semon &lt;mlsemon35@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>gfs2: Fix use-after-free in gfs2_glock_shrink_scan</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:49:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hillf Danton</name>
<email>hdanton@sina.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-18T08:46:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=38ce329534500bf4ae71f81df6a37a406cf187b4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:38ce329534500bf4ae71f81df6a37a406cf187b4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1ab19c5de4c537ec0d9b21020395a5b5a6c059b2 ]

The GLF_LRU flag is checked under lru_lock in gfs2_glock_remove_from_lru() to
remove the glock from the lru list in __gfs2_glock_put().

On the shrink scan path, the same flag is cleared under lru_lock but because
of cond_resched_lock(&amp;lru_lock) in gfs2_dispose_glock_lru(), progress on the
put side can be made without deleting the glock from the lru list.

Keep GLF_LRU across the race window opened by cond_resched_lock(&amp;lru_lock) to
ensure correct behavior on both sides - clear GLF_LRU after list_del under
lru_lock.

Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzbot+34ba7ddbf3021981a228@syzkaller.appspotmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hillf Danton &lt;hdanton@sina.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher &lt;agruenba@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: only require mm_struct for writing</title>
<updated>2021-06-16T09:34:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-15T16:26:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=0646b0f9f31cce61823ef9fcdcee4a3b9c6117b8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0646b0f9f31cce61823ef9fcdcee4a3b9c6117b8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 94f0b2d4a1d0c52035aef425da5e022bd2cb1c71 upstream.

Commit 591a22c14d3f ("proc: Track /proc/$pid/attr/ opener mm_struct") we
started using __mem_open() to track the mm_struct at open-time, so that
we could then check it for writes.

But that also ended up making the permission checks at open time much
stricter - and not just for writes, but for reads too.  And that in turn
caused a regression for at least Fedora 29, where NIC interfaces fail to
start when using NetworkManager.

Since only the write side wanted the mm_struct test, ignore any failures
by __mem_open() at open time, leaving reads unaffected.  The write()
time verification of the mm_struct pointer will then catch the failure
case because a NULL pointer will not match a valid 'current-&gt;mm'.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/YMjTlp2FSJYvoyFa@unreal/
Fixes: 591a22c14d3f ("proc: Track /proc/$pid/attr/ opener mm_struct")
Reported-and-tested-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leon@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: Andrea Righi &lt;andrea.righi@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>NFSv4: nfs4_proc_set_acl needs to restore NFS_CAP_UIDGID_NOMAP on error.</title>
<updated>2021-06-16T09:34:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dai Ngo</name>
<email>dai.ngo@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-19T21:15:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=4ec682250dc20574792ba85f030fdbe6a0dd1af7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4ec682250dc20574792ba85f030fdbe6a0dd1af7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f8849e206ef52b584cd9227255f4724f0cc900bb upstream.

Currently if __nfs4_proc_set_acl fails with NFS4ERR_BADOWNER it
re-enables the idmapper by clearing NFS_CAP_UIDGID_NOMAP before
retrying again. The NFS_CAP_UIDGID_NOMAP remains cleared even if
the retry fails. This causes problem for subsequent setattr
requests for v4 server that does not have idmapping configured.

This patch modifies nfs4_proc_set_acl to detect NFS4ERR_BADOWNER
and NFS4ERR_BADNAME and skips the retry, since the kernel isn't
involved in encoding the ACEs, and return -EINVAL.

Steps to reproduce the problem:

 # mount -o vers=4.1,sec=sys server:/export/test /tmp/mnt
 # touch /tmp/mnt/file1
 # chown 99 /tmp/mnt/file1
 # nfs4_setfacl -a A::unknown.user@xyz.com:wrtncy /tmp/mnt/file1
 Failed setxattr operation: Invalid argument
 # chown 99 /tmp/mnt/file1
 chown: changing ownership of ‘/tmp/mnt/file1’: Invalid argument
 # umount /tmp/mnt
 # mount -o vers=4.1,sec=sys server:/export/test /tmp/mnt
 # chown 99 /tmp/mnt/file1
 #

v2: detect NFS4ERR_BADOWNER and NFS4ERR_BADNAME and skip retry
       in nfs4_proc_set_acl.
Signed-off-by: Dai Ngo &lt;dai.ngo@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>NFS: Fix a potential NULL dereference in nfs_get_client()</title>
<updated>2021-06-16T09:34:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-03T12:37:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=fab8bfdfb4aac9e4e8363666333adfdf21e89106'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fab8bfdfb4aac9e4e8363666333adfdf21e89106</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 09226e8303beeec10f2ff844d2e46d1371dc58e0 ]

None of the callers are expecting NULL returns from nfs_get_client() so
this code will lead to an Oops.  It's better to return an error
pointer.  I expect that this is dead code so hopefully no one is
affected.

Fixes: 31434f496abb ("nfs: check hostname in nfs_get_client")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: return value from btrfs_mark_extent_written() in case of error</title>
<updated>2021-06-16T09:34:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ritesh Harjani</name>
<email>riteshh@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-30T14:54:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=39b6d3368d30048123d963543b64452c0ac63afb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:39b6d3368d30048123d963543b64452c0ac63afb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e7b2ec3d3d4ebeb4cff7ae45cf430182fa6a49fb upstream.

We always return 0 even in case of an error in btrfs_mark_extent_written().
Fix it to return proper error value in case of a failure. All callers
handle it.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Ritesh Harjani &lt;riteshh@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: Track /proc/$pid/attr/ opener mm_struct</title>
<updated>2021-06-16T09:34:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-08T17:12:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=bd354c01cb175c50533899743e0e5736e3e36ab0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bd354c01cb175c50533899743e0e5736e3e36ab0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 591a22c14d3f45cc38bd1931c593c221df2f1881 upstream.

Commit bfb819ea20ce ("proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener")
tried to make sure that there could not be a confusion between the opener of
a /proc/$pid/attr/ file and the writer. It used struct cred to make sure
the privileges didn't change. However, there were existing cases where a more
privileged thread was passing the opened fd to a differently privileged thread
(during container setup). Instead, use mm_struct to track whether the opener
and writer are still the same process. (This is what several other proc files
already do, though for different reasons.)

Reported-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Reported-by: Andrea Righi &lt;andrea.righi@canonical.com&gt;
Tested-by: Andrea Righi &lt;andrea.righi@canonical.com&gt;
Fixes: bfb819ea20ce ("proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: fixup error handling in fixup_inode_link_counts</title>
<updated>2021-06-10T10:41:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josef Bacik</name>
<email>josef@toxicpanda.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-19T17:13:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=9d20683fb38d7e990a03d7c4423f1bae72139520'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9d20683fb38d7e990a03d7c4423f1bae72139520</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 011b28acf940eb61c000059dd9e2cfcbf52ed96b upstream.

This function has the following pattern

	while (1) {
		ret = whatever();
		if (ret)
			goto out;
	}
	ret = 0
out:
	return ret;

However several places in this while loop we simply break; when there's
a problem, thus clearing the return value, and in one case we do a
return -EIO, and leak the memory for the path.

Fix this by re-arranging the loop to deal with ret == 1 coming from
btrfs_search_slot, and then simply delete the

	ret = 0;
out:

bit so everybody can break if there is an error, which will allow for
proper error handling to occur.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ocfs2: fix data corruption by fallocate</title>
<updated>2021-06-10T10:41:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Junxiao Bi</name>
<email>junxiao.bi@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-05T03:01:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=624fa7baa3788dc9e57840ba5b94bc22b03cda57'/>
<id>urn:sha1:624fa7baa3788dc9e57840ba5b94bc22b03cda57</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6bba4471f0cc1296fe3c2089b9e52442d3074b2e upstream.

When fallocate punches holes out of inode size, if original isize is in
the middle of last cluster, then the part from isize to the end of the
cluster will be zeroed with buffer write, at that time isize is not yet
updated to match the new size, if writeback is kicked in, it will invoke
ocfs2_writepage()-&gt;block_write_full_page() where the pages out of inode
size will be dropped.  That will cause file corruption.  Fix this by
zero out eof blocks when extending the inode size.

Running the following command with qemu-image 4.2.1 can get a corrupted
coverted image file easily.

    qemu-img convert -p -t none -T none -f qcow2 $qcow_image \
             -O qcow2 -o compat=1.1 $qcow_image.conv

The usage of fallocate in qemu is like this, it first punches holes out
of inode size, then extend the inode size.

    fallocate(11, FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE|FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE, 2276196352, 65536) = 0
    fallocate(11, 0, 2276196352, 65536) = 0

v1: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-fsdevel/msg193999.html
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20210525093034.GB4112@quack2.suse.cz/T/

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210528210648.9124-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi &lt;junxiao.bi@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi &lt;joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Cc: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Mark Fasheh &lt;mark@fasheh.com&gt;
Cc: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Cc: Changwei Ge &lt;gechangwei@live.cn&gt;
Cc: Gang He &lt;ghe@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Jun Piao &lt;piaojun@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: fix bug on in ext4_es_cache_extent as ext4_split_extent_at failed</title>
<updated>2021-06-10T10:41:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ye Bin</name>
<email>yebin10@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-06T14:10:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=e33bafad30d34cfa5e9787cb099cab05e2677fcb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e33bafad30d34cfa5e9787cb099cab05e2677fcb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 082cd4ec240b8734a82a89ffb890216ac98fec68 upstream.

We got follow bug_on when run fsstress with injecting IO fault:
[130747.323114] kernel BUG at fs/ext4/extents_status.c:762!
[130747.323117] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
......
[130747.334329] Call trace:
[130747.334553]  ext4_es_cache_extent+0x150/0x168 [ext4]
[130747.334975]  ext4_cache_extents+0x64/0xe8 [ext4]
[130747.335368]  ext4_find_extent+0x300/0x330 [ext4]
[130747.335759]  ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x74/0x1178 [ext4]
[130747.336179]  ext4_map_blocks+0x2f4/0x5f0 [ext4]
[130747.336567]  ext4_mpage_readpages+0x4a8/0x7a8 [ext4]
[130747.336995]  ext4_readpage+0x54/0x100 [ext4]
[130747.337359]  generic_file_buffered_read+0x410/0xae8
[130747.337767]  generic_file_read_iter+0x114/0x190
[130747.338152]  ext4_file_read_iter+0x5c/0x140 [ext4]
[130747.338556]  __vfs_read+0x11c/0x188
[130747.338851]  vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[130747.339110]  ksys_read+0x74/0xf0

This patch's modification is according to Jan Kara's suggestion in:
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/linux-ext4/patch/20210428085158.3728201-1-yebin10@huawei.com/
"I see. Now I understand your patch. Honestly, seeing how fragile is trying
to fix extent tree after split has failed in the middle, I would probably
go even further and make sure we fix the tree properly in case of ENOSPC
and EDQUOT (those are easily user triggerable).  Anything else indicates a
HW problem or fs corruption so I'd rather leave the extent tree as is and
don't try to fix it (which also means we will not create overlapping
extents)."

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin &lt;yebin10@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506141042.3298679-1-yebin10@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
