<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/fs/smb, branch v6.6.143</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.6.143</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.6.143'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2026-06-19T11:39:38+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>smb: client: require net admin for CIFS SWN netlink</title>
<updated>2026-06-19T11:39:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Bommarito</name>
<email>michael.bommarito@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-29T16:51:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=969bc6370334a5b4720c5470783295d6484bbc95'/>
<id>urn:sha1:969bc6370334a5b4720c5470783295d6484bbc95</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d1ebfce2c1d161186a82e77590bf7da2ea1bce91 ]

CIFS_GENL_CMD_SWN_NOTIFY is the userspace witness-notify command.  The
intended sender is the cifs.witness helper, but the generic-netlink
operation currently has no capability flag, so any local process can send
RESOURCE_CHANGE or CLIENT_MOVE notifications to the in-kernel witness
handler.

The same family exposes CIFS_GENL_MCGRP_SWN without multicast-group
capability flags.  Register messages sent to that group include the witness
registration id and, for NTLM-authenticated mounts, the username, domain,
and password attributes copied from the CIFS session.  An unprivileged
local process should not be able to join that group and receive those
messages.

Require CAP_NET_ADMIN for incoming SWN_NOTIFY commands with
GENL_ADMIN_PERM, and require CAP_NET_ADMIN over the network namespace for
joining the SWN multicast group with GENL_MCAST_CAP_NET_ADMIN.  The
cifs.witness service runs with the privileges needed for both operations.

Fixes: fed979a7e082 ("cifs: Set witness notification handler for messages from userspace daemon")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito &lt;michael.bommarito@gmail.com&gt;
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ksmbd: fix OOB write in QUERY_INFO for compound requests</title>
<updated>2026-06-19T11:39:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada</name>
<email>manizada@pm.me</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-25T00:14:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=850452af77f55d185f9445e1f7a1db53c5e4aad4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:850452af77f55d185f9445e1f7a1db53c5e4aad4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fda9522ed6afaec45cabc198d8492270c394c7bc upstream.

When a compound request such as READ + QUERY_INFO(Security) is received,
and the first command (READ) consumes most of the response buffer,
ksmbd could write beyond the allocated buffer while building a security
descriptor.

The root cause was that smb2_get_info_sec() checked buffer space using
ppntsd_size from xattr, while build_sec_desc() often synthesized a
significantly larger descriptor from POSIX ACLs.

This patch introduces smb_acl_sec_desc_scratch_len() to accurately
compute the final descriptor size beforehand, performs proper buffer
checking with smb2_calc_max_out_buf_len(), and uses exact-sized
allocation + iov pinning.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e2b76ab8b5c9 ("ksmbd: add support for read compound")
Signed-off-by: Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada &lt;manizada@pm.me&gt;
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon &lt;linkinjeon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
[ In v6.6, replace KSMBD_DEFAULT_GFP with GFP_KERNEL per
commit 0066f623bce8 ("ksmbd: use __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL"). ]
Signed-off-by: Alva Lan &lt;alvalan9@foxmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ksmbd: fix use-after-free of a deferred file_lock on double SMB2_CANCEL</title>
<updated>2026-06-19T11:39:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gil Portnoy</name>
<email>dddhkts1@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-31T23:27:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=0da2e073f9cbf4985a0fd9acb71bc5ff599f8afd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0da2e073f9cbf4985a0fd9acb71bc5ff599f8afd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f580d27e8928828693df44ba2db0fffdbe11dfea upstream.

A deferred byte-range lock (an SMB2_LOCK that blocks) registers an async work on
conn-&gt;async_requests via setup_async_work(), with cancel_fn =
smb2_remove_blocked_lock and cancel_argv[0] pointing at the struct file_lock.

When the request is cancelled, the worker frees the file_lock with
locks_free_lock() and takes the cancelled early-exit, which "goto out"s and never
reaches release_async_work() -- the only site that unlinks the work from
conn-&gt;async_requests and clears cancel_fn/cancel_argv. The work therefore stays
matchable on async_requests with a live cancel_fn pointing at the freed file_lock,
until connection teardown finally runs release_async_work().

smb2_cancel() fires cancel_fn unconditionally with no state guard, so a second
SMB2_CANCEL for the same AsyncId, arriving in that window, re-runs
smb2_remove_blocked_lock() on the freed file_lock -- a slab use-after-free:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __locks_delete_block
    __locks_delete_block
    locks_delete_block
    ksmbd_vfs_posix_lock_unblock
    smb2_remove_blocked_lock
    smb2_cancel                 &lt;- 2nd SMB2_CANCEL fires cancel_fn
    handle_ksmbd_work
  Allocated by ...: locks_alloc_lock &lt;- smb2_lock
  Freed by ...:     locks_free_lock  &lt;- smb2_lock (cancelled branch)
  ... cache file_lock_cache of size 192

Reproduced on mainline with KASAN by an authenticated SMB client.

Skip a work whose state is already KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED so its cancel callback
cannot be fired a second time.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gil Portnoy &lt;dddhkts1@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon &lt;linkinjeon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ksmbd: fix NULL-deref of opinfo-&gt;conn in oplock/lease break notifiers</title>
<updated>2026-06-19T11:39:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gil Portnoy</name>
<email>dddhkts1@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-28T00:00:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=945a86b21b40fb17183f5b27461baa6f03e2467f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:945a86b21b40fb17183f5b27461baa6f03e2467f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b003086d76968298f22e7cf62239833b5a3a06b1 ]

smb2_oplock_break_noti() and smb2_lease_break_noti() read opinfo-&gt;conn
into a local with neither READ_ONCE() nor a NULL check.  Both run from
oplock_break() after opinfo_get_list() has dropped ci-&gt;m_lock, so a
concurrent SMB2 LOGOFF (session_fd_check()) can set op-&gt;conn = NULL
under ci-&gt;m_lock within that window.  ksmbd_conn_r_count_inc(conn) then
writes through NULL at offset 0xc4 -- a remotely triggerable oops.

Guard both reads the way compare_guid_key() already does: read
opinfo-&gt;conn with READ_ONCE() and return early if it is NULL, before
allocating the work struct so nothing leaks.  A NULL conn means the
client is gone and the break is moot, so return 0; oplock_break() treats
that as success and runs the normal teardown.

Fixes: c8efcc786146 ("ksmbd: add support for durable handles v1/v2")
Assisted-by: Henry (Claude):claude-opus-4
Signed-off-by: Gil Portnoy &lt;dddhkts1@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon &lt;linkinjeon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ksmbd: OOB read regression in smb_check_perm_dacl() ACE-walk loops</title>
<updated>2026-06-19T11:39:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ali Ganiyev</name>
<email>ali.qaniyev@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-25T01:23:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=0fe08c5776a798f46df1fd74b331be26bdd644d6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0fe08c5776a798f46df1fd74b331be26bdd644d6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0e60dafe97eca61721f3db456f97d97a80c6c8ae upstream.

Commit d07b26f39246 ("ksmbd: require minimum ACE size in
smb_check_perm_dacl()") introduced a transposed bounds check:

    if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + aces_size &lt; CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE)

Since offsetof(..sid) is 8 and CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE is 8, this evaluates
to `aces_size &lt; 0`. Because `aces_size` is always non-negative, this
check becomes dead code and never breaks the loop.

Worse, that commit removed the old 4-byte guard, meaning the loop now
reads `ace-&gt;size` (offset 2) even when `aces_size` is 0-3 bytes. This
re-opens a 2-byte heap out-of-bounds (OOB) read past the pntsd allocation
during subsequent SMB2_CREATE operations.

Fix this by properly transposing the comparison to require at least
16 bytes (8-byte offset + 8-byte SID base), matching the correct form
used in smb_inherit_dacl().

Fixes: d07b26f39246 ("ksmbd: require minimum ACE size in smb_check_perm_dacl()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ganiyev &lt;ali.qaniyev@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon &lt;linkinjeon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ksmbd: fix FSCTL permission bypass by adding a permission check for FSCTL_SET_SPARSE</title>
<updated>2026-06-19T11:39:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sean Shen</name>
<email>grayhat@foxmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-26T13:07:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3127a884525dc8ca4def73254bfcd3ccef0bf812'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3127a884525dc8ca4def73254bfcd3ccef0bf812</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit cc57232cae23c0df91b4a59d0f519141ce9b5b02 ]

FSCTL_SET_SPARSE in fsctl_set_sparse() modifies the file's sparse
attribute and saves it through xattr without any permission checks.

This exposes two issues:

1) A client on a read-only share can change the sparse attribute
   on files it opened, even though the share is read-only.
   Other FSCTL write operations already check
   test_tree_conn_flag(work-&gt;tcon, KSMBD_TREE_CONN_FLAG_WRITABLE),
   but FSCTL_SET_SPARSE does not.

2) Even on writable shares, clients without FILE_WRITE_DATA or
   FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES access should not modify the sparse
   attribute. Similar handle-level checks exist in other functions
   but are missing here.

Add both share-level writable check and per-handle access check.
Use goto out on error to avoid leaking file references.

Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3")
Cc: Namjae Jeon &lt;linkinjeon@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky &lt;sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sean Shen &lt;grayhat@foxmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon &lt;linkinjeon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cifs: Fix busy dentry used after unmounting</title>
<updated>2026-06-01T15:43:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zhihao Cheng</name>
<email>chengzhihao1@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-19T09:18:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=bdc349a87f1fb02c18c4071858a06542bfea783d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bdc349a87f1fb02c18c4071858a06542bfea783d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c68337442f03953237a94577beb468ab2662a851 upstream.

Since commit 340cea84f691c ("cifs: open files should not hold ref on
superblock"), cifs file only holds the dentry ref_cnt, the cifs file
close work(cfile-&gt;deferred) could be executed after unmounting, which
will trigger a warning in generic_shutdown_super:
 BUG: Dentry 00000000a14a6845{i=c,n=file}  still in use (1) [unmount of
 cifs cifs]

The detailed processs is:
   process A           process B           kworker
 fd = open(PATH)
  vfs_open
   file-&gt;__f_path = *path // dentry-&gt;d_lockref.count = 1
   cifs_open
    cifs_new_fileinfo
     cfile-&gt;dentry = dget(dentry) // dentry-&gt;d_lockref.count = 2
 close(fd)
  __fput
  cifs_close
   queue_delayed_work(deferredclose_wq, cfile-&gt;deferred)
  dput(dentry) // dentry-&gt;d_lockref.count = 1
			                 smb2_deferred_work_close
					  _cifsFileInfo_put
					   list_del(&amp;cifs_file-&gt;flist)
                    umount
		     cleanup_mnt
		      deactivate_super
		       cifs_kill_sb
		        cifs_close_all_deferred_files_sb
			 cifs_close_all_deferred_files
			  // cannot find cfile, skip _cifsFileInfo_put
			kill_anon_super
			 generic_shutdown_super
			  shrink_dcache_for_umount
			   umount_check
			    WARN ! // dentry-&gt;d_lockref.count = 1
					   cifsFileInfo_put_final
					    dput(cifs_file-&gt;dentry)
		                            // dentry-&gt;d_lockref.count = 0

Fix it by flushing 'deferredclose_wq' before calling kill_anon_super.

Fetch a reproducer in https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=221548.

Fixes: 340cea84f691c ("cifs: open files should not hold ref on superblock")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N &lt;sprasad@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng &lt;chengzhihao1@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>smb/server: promote S_DEL_ON_CLS to S_DEL_PENDING when close</title>
<updated>2026-06-01T15:43:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>ChenXiaoSong</name>
<email>chenxiaosong@kylinos.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-18T15:23:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=adcfb16ae402dbd6ebb71ec558dd6a3833c3d49e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:adcfb16ae402dbd6ebb71ec558dd6a3833c3d49e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4ec9c8e023c79f613fe4d5ad8cc737112efb2e44 upstream.

Reproducer:

  1. server: systemctl start ksmbd
  2. client: mount -t cifs //${server_ip}/export /mnt
  3. client: C program: openat(AT_FDCWD, "/mnt", O_RDWR | O_TMPFILE, 0600)

Do not treat `FILE_DELETE_ON_CLOSE_LE` as delete pending while files
remain open.

This patch fixes xfstests generic/004.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://chenxiaosong.com/en/smb-xfstests-generic-004.html
Co-developed-by: Huiwen He &lt;hehuiwen@kylinos.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Huiwen He &lt;hehuiwen@kylinos.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: ChenXiaoSong &lt;chenxiaosong@kylinos.cn&gt;
Tested-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon &lt;linkinjeon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>smb: client: protect tc_count increment in smb2_find_smb_sess_tcon_unlocked()</title>
<updated>2026-06-01T15:43:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Henrique Carvalho</name>
<email>henrique.carvalho@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-14T23:18:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=7df1df6f40c0720d30206aa35c0343b962350e0d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7df1df6f40c0720d30206aa35c0343b962350e0d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4d8690dace005a38e6dbde9ecce2da3ad85c7c41 upstream.

Commit 96c4af418586 ("cifs: Fix locking usage for tcon fields")
refactored cifs code to change cifs_tcp_ses_lock for tc_lock around
tc_count changes.

There was missing lock around tc_count increment inside
smb2_find_smb_sess_tcon_unlocked().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 96c4af418586 ("cifs: Fix locking usage for tcon fields")
Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N &lt;sprasad@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Henrique Carvalho &lt;henrique.carvalho@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ksmbd: fix SID memory leak in set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() on overflow</title>
<updated>2026-06-01T15:43:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ferry Meng</name>
<email>mengferry@linux.alibaba.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-11T13:18:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=9d378e17c864da08c3a4df41dae92cfa6468b00a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9d378e17c864da08c3a4df41dae92cfa6468b00a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit af92ee994cc7f7e83a41c2025f32257a2f82a7ef upstream.

Commit 299f962c0b02 ("ksmbd: use check_add_overflow() to prevent u16
DACL size overflow") added check_add_overflow() guards that break out
of the ACE-building loops in set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() when the
accumulated DACL size would wrap past 65535.

However, each iteration allocates a struct smb_sid via kmalloc_obj()
at the top of the loop and relies on the kfree(sid) call at the end
of the loop body (the 'pass_same_sid' label in the first loop, and
the explicit kfree at the tail of the second loop) to release it.
The newly introduced 'break' statements bypass those kfree() calls,
leaking the sid buffer every time an overflow is detected.

A malicious or malformed file with enough POSIX ACL entries to trip
the overflow check will leak one or more struct smb_sid allocations
on every request that touches the file's DACL, providing a trivial
kernel memory exhaustion vector.

Free sid before breaking out of the loops to plug the leak.

Fixes: 299f962c0b02 ("ksmbd: use check_add_overflow() to prevent u16 DACL size overflow")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ferry Meng &lt;mengferry@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon &lt;linkinjeon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
