kernel/linux.git/fs/proc/kcore.c, branch linux-6.0.y

fs/proc/kcore.c: remove check of list iterator against head past the loop body

2022-04-29T21:37:59+00:00

When list_for_each_entry() completes the iteration over the whole list without breaking the loop, the iterator value will be a bogus pointer computed based on the head element. While it is safe to use the pointer to determine if it was computed based on the head element, either with list_entry_is_head() or &pos->member == head, using the iterator variable after the loop should be avoided. In preparation to limit the scope of a list iterator to the list traversal loop, use a dedicated pointer to point to the found element [1]. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: reduce scope of `iter'] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHk-=wgRr_D8CB-D9Kg-c=EHreAsk5SqXPwr9Y7k9sA6cWXJ6w@mail.gmail.com/ [1] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220331223700.902556-1-jakobkoschel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakob Koschel Cc: Mike Rapoport Cc: David Hildenbrand Cc: Oscar Salvador Cc: "Brian Johannesmeyer" Cc: Cristiano Giuffrida Cc: "Bos, H.J." Cc: Alexey Dobriyan Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton

fs/proc/kcore: use page_offline_(freeze|thaw)

2021-07-01T03:47:28+00:00

Let's properly synchronize with drivers that set PageOffline(). Unfreeze/thaw every now and then, so drivers that want to set PageOffline() can make progress. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526093041.8800-7-david@redhat.com Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand Acked-by: Mike Rapoport Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador Cc: Aili Yao Cc: Alexey Dobriyan Cc: Alex Shi Cc: Haiyang Zhang Cc: Jason Wang Cc: Jiri Bohac Cc: "K. Y. Srinivasan" Cc: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: Mike Kravetz Cc: Naoya Horiguchi Cc: Roman Gushchin Cc: Stephen Hemminger Cc: Steven Price Cc: Wei Liu Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

fs/proc/kcore: don't read offline sections, logically offline pages and hwpoisoned pages

2021-07-01T03:47:28+00:00

Let's avoid reading: 1) Offline memory sections: the content of offline memory sections is stale as the memory is effectively unused by the kernel. On s390x with standby memory, offline memory sections (belonging to offline storage increments) are not accessible. With virtio-mem and the hyper-v balloon, we can have unavailable memory chunks that should not be accessed inside offline memory sections. Last but not least, offline memory sections might contain hwpoisoned pages which we can no longer identify because the memmap is stale. 2) PG_offline pages: logically offline pages that are documented as "The content of these pages is effectively stale. Such pages should not be touched (read/write/dump/save) except by their owner.". Examples include pages inflated in a balloon or unavailble memory ranges inside hotplugged memory sections with virtio-mem or the hyper-v balloon. 3) PG_hwpoison pages: Reading pages marked as hwpoisoned can be fatal. As documented: "Accessing is not safe since it may cause another machine check. Don't touch!" Introduce is_page_hwpoison(), adding a comment that it is inherently racy but best we can really do. Reading /proc/kcore now performs similar checks as when reading /proc/vmcore for kdump via makedumpfile: problematic pages are exclude. It's also similar to hibernation code, however, we don't skip hwpoisoned pages when processing pages in kernel/power/snapshot.c:saveable_page() yet. Note 1: we can race against memory offlining code, especially memory going offline and getting unplugged: however, we will properly tear down the identity mapping and handle faults gracefully when accessing this memory from kcore code. Note 2: we can race against drivers setting PageOffline() and turning memory inaccessible in the hypervisor. We'll handle this in a follow-up patch. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526093041.8800-4-david@redhat.com Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador Cc: Aili Yao Cc: Alexey Dobriyan Cc: Alex Shi Cc: Haiyang Zhang Cc: Jason Wang Cc: Jiri Bohac Cc: "K. Y. Srinivasan" Cc: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: Mike Kravetz Cc: Naoya Horiguchi Cc: Roman Gushchin Cc: Stephen Hemminger Cc: Steven Price Cc: Wei Liu Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

fs/proc/kcore: pfn_is_ram check only applies to KCORE_RAM

2021-07-01T03:47:28+00:00

Let's resturcture the code, using switch-case, and checking pfn_is_ram() only when we are dealing with KCORE_RAM. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526093041.8800-3-david@redhat.com Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport Cc: Aili Yao Cc: Alexey Dobriyan Cc: Alex Shi Cc: Haiyang Zhang Cc: Jason Wang Cc: Jiri Bohac Cc: "K. Y. Srinivasan" Cc: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: Mike Kravetz Cc: Naoya Horiguchi Cc: Oscar Salvador Cc: Roman Gushchin Cc: Stephen Hemminger Cc: Steven Price Cc: Wei Liu Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

fs/proc/kcore: drop KCORE_REMAP and KCORE_OTHER

2021-07-01T03:47:28+00:00

Patch series "fs/proc/kcore: don't read offline sections, logically offline pages and hwpoisoned pages", v3. Looking for places where the kernel might unconditionally read PageOffline() pages, I stumbled over /proc/kcore; turns out /proc/kcore needs some more love to not touch some other pages we really don't want to read -- i.e., hwpoisoned ones. Examples for PageOffline() pages are pages inflated in a balloon, memory unplugged via virtio-mem, and partially-present sections in memory added by the Hyper-V balloon. When reading pages inflated in a balloon, we essentially produce unnecessary load in the hypervisor; holes in partially present sections in case of Hyper-V are not accessible and already were a problem for /proc/vmcore, fixed in makedumpfile by detecting PageOffline() pages. In the future, virtio-mem might disallow reading unplugged memory -- marked as PageOffline() -- in some environments, resulting in undefined behavior when accessed; therefore, I'm trying to identify and rework all these (corner) cases. With this series, there is really only access via /dev/mem, /proc/vmcore and kdb left after I ripped out /dev/kmem. kdb is an advanced corner-case use case -- we won't care for now if someone explicitly tries to do nasty things by reading from/writing to physical addresses we better not touch. /dev/mem is a use case we won't support for virtio-mem, at least for now, so we'll simply disallow mapping any virtio-mem memory via /dev/mem next. /proc/vmcore is really only a problem when dumping the old kernel via something that's not makedumpfile (read: basically never), however, we'll try sanitizing that as well in the second kernel in the future. Tested via kcore_dump: https://github.com/schlafwandler/kcore_dump This patch (of 6): Commit db779ef67ffe ("proc/kcore: Remove unused kclist_add_remap()") removed the last user of KCORE_REMAP. Commit 595dd46ebfc1 ("vfs/proc/kcore, x86/mm/kcore: Fix SMAP fault when dumping vsyscall user page") removed the last user of KCORE_OTHER. Let's drop both types. While at it, also drop vaddr in "struct kcore_list", used by KCORE_REMAP only. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526093041.8800-1-david@redhat.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526093041.8800-2-david@redhat.com Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" Cc: Jason Wang Cc: Alexey Dobriyan Cc: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" Cc: Oscar Salvador Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: Roman Gushchin Cc: Alex Shi Cc: Steven Price Cc: Mike Kravetz Cc: Aili Yao Cc: Jiri Bohac Cc: "K. Y. Srinivasan" Cc: Haiyang Zhang Cc: Stephen Hemminger Cc: Wei Liu Cc: Naoya Horiguchi Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

arm: remove CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_HOLES_MEMORYMODEL

2020-12-15T20:13:42+00:00

ARM is the only architecture that defines CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_HOLES_MEMORYMODEL which in turn enables memmap_valid_within() function that is intended to verify existence of struct page associated with a pfn when there are holes in the memory map. However, the ARCH_HAS_HOLES_MEMORYMODEL also enables HAVE_ARCH_PFN_VALID and arch-specific pfn_valid() implementation that also deals with the holes in the memory map. The only two users of memmap_valid_within() call this function after a call to pfn_valid() so the memmap_valid_within() check becomes redundant. Remove CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_HOLES_MEMORYMODEL and memmap_valid_within() and rely entirely on ARM's implementation of pfn_valid() that is now enabled unconditionally. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201101170454.9567-9-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport Cc: Alexey Dobriyan Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven Cc: Greg Ungerer Cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz Cc: Jonathan Corbet Cc: Matt Turner Cc: Meelis Roos Cc: Michael Schmitz Cc: Russell King Cc: Tony Luck Cc: Vineet Gupta Cc: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

maccess: rename probe_kernel_{read,write} to copy_{from,to}_kernel_nofault

2020-06-17T17:57:41+00:00

Better describe what these functions do. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

proc: convert everything to "struct proc_ops"

2020-02-04T03:05:26+00:00

The most notable change is DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE macro split in seq_file.h. Conversion rule is: llseek => proc_lseek unlocked_ioctl => proc_ioctl xxx => proc_xxx delete ".owner = THIS_MODULE" line [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix drivers/isdn/capi/kcapi_proc.c] [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix kernel/sched/psi.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200122180545.36222f50@canb.auug.org.au Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191225172546.GB13378@avx2 Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages

2019-08-20T04:54:17+00:00

Print the content of current->comm in messages generated by lockdown to indicate a restriction that was hit. This makes it a bit easier to find out what caused the message. The message now patterned something like: Lockdown: : is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7 Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: James Morris

lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore

2019-08-20T04:54:16+00:00

Disallow access to /proc/kcore when the kernel is locked down to prevent access to cryptographic data. This is limited to lockdown confidentiality mode and is still permitted in integrity mode. Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: James Morris