<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/fs/overlayfs, branch v6.6.155</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.6.155</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.6.155'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2026-08-19T16:13:12+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>ovl: don't warn when the mount is completed from another user namespace</title>
<updated>2026-08-19T16:13:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>brauner@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-02T18:00:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=513478092966dc9818d96dd2b3ed613fd2f6e30e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:513478092966dc9818d96dd2b3ed613fd2f6e30e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 63981fc786daaa626cb14d9be1406f674d79f98f upstream.

fsopen() records the caller's user namespace in fc-&gt;user_ns and hands
back an ordinary file descriptor. Nothing ties the task that calls
fsconfig(FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE) to the task that created the context. The
fd is inherited across fork() and exec() and it can be passed over a
unix socket.

Completing a context from another user namespace is allowed on purpose.
vfs_cmd_create() authorizes the create with mount_capable(), which for
FS_USERNS_MOUNT checks ns_capable(fc-&gt;user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN), and that
succeeds for a task holding CAP_SYS_ADMIN in an ancestor of fc-&gt;user_ns.
So an unprivileged task can reach the WARN_ON() in ovl_fill_super():
create a user and a mount namespace in a child, call fsopen("overlay")
there, send the fscontext fd to the parent and let the parent issue
FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE. Both namespaces come from a plain unshare(1) and no
capability is needed anywhere:

  WARNING: fs/overlayfs/super.c:1551 at ovl_fill_super+0x7b9/0x1e20 [overlay]
  CPU: 3 UID: 1000 PID: 3243376 Comm: fswarn
  Call Trace:
   get_tree_nodev+0x71/0xa0
   ovl_get_tree+0x15/0x20 [overlay]
   vfs_get_tree+0x2a/0x100
   vfs_cmd_create+0x60/0xf0
   __do_sys_fsconfig+0x4b2/0x500

The child needs the mount namespace because fsopen() itself gates on
may_mount(), which asks for CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the user namespace owning
the caller's mount namespace. fsconfig() doesn't repeat that check.

It is a WARN_ON() and not a WARN_ON_ONCE(), so the condition can be
raised in a loop to taint the kernel and flood the log, and it panics a
kernel booted with panic_on_warn.

Keep refusing the mount and stop warning about it. ovl_parse_param()
already spells a user namespace check this way for Opt_override_creds.

Fixes: 1784fbc2ed9c ("ovl: port to new mount api")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.5+
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260802-work-fill_super-warn-v1-1-4e987911a39a@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ovl: use linked upper dentry in copy-up tmpfile</title>
<updated>2026-08-03T09:15:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Souvik Banerjee</name>
<email>souvik@amlalabs.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-27T15:41:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=45ead2e598cc87b16127638b6e7de9888eca49dc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:45ead2e598cc87b16127638b6e7de9888eca49dc</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e348eecd4d8fa8d18a5157ff59f7be1dc59c5928 ]

ovl_copy_up_tmpfile() stores the disconnected O_TMPFILE dentry as the
overlay's upper dentry reference via ovl_inode_update().  vfs_tmpfile()
allocated this dentry via d_alloc(parentpath-&gt;dentry, &amp;slash_name), so
d_name is "/" and d_parent is c-&gt;workdir.  Local upper filesystems
(ext4, btrfs, xfs, ...) immediately rename it to "#&lt;inum&gt;" via
d_mark_tmpfile() inside their -&gt;tmpfile() op; FUSE and virtiofs do
not, so both fields stay that way.  Neither identifies the destination
directory and filename where ovl_do_link() actually linked the file.

When the upper filesystem implements -&gt;d_revalidate() (e.g. FUSE or
virtiofs), ovl_revalidate_real() calls it with the dentry's parent
inode and a snapshot of d_name.  The server tries to look up "/" inside
c-&gt;workdir, fails, and overlayfs reports -ESTALE.

This causes persistent ESTALE errors for any file that was copied up via
the tmpfile path, breaking dpkg, apt, and other tools that do
rename-over-existing on overlayfs with a FUSE/virtiofs upper.

Before commit 6b52243f633e ("ovl: fold copy-up helpers into callers"),
the tmpfile copy-up path used a dedicated helper ovl_link_tmpfile()
that captured the linked destination dentry returned by ovl_do_link():

    err = ovl_do_link(temp, udir, upper);
    ...
    if (!err)
        *newdentry = dget(upper);

and published it via ovl_inode_update(d_inode(c-&gt;dentry), newdentry).
The fold inlined ovl_do_link() into ovl_copy_up_tmpfile() but dropped
the dget(upper) capture, and rewrote the publish line as
ovl_inode_update(d_inode(c-&gt;dentry), dget(temp)) — where temp is the
disconnected O_TMPFILE dentry.

Fix by keeping a reference to the linked destination dentry after
ovl_do_link() succeeds, and publishing that dentry at the existing
ovl_inode_update() call site.  The non-tmpfile/workdir path continues to
publish the renamed temporary dentry.

Reproducer:
  - Mount overlayfs with virtiofs (or a FUSE fs whose server advertises
    FUSE_TMPFILE) as upper
  - Run: dpkg -i &lt;any .deb&gt;
  - Observe: "error installing new file '...': Stale file handle"

Fixes: 6b52243f633e ("ovl: fold copy-up helpers into callers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.20+
Signed-off-by: Souvik Banerjee &lt;souvik@amlalabs.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260501232735.2610824-1-souvik@amlalabs.com
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
[ adapted scoped credential and creation helpers to explicit credential, locking, lookup, and cleanup handling ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks</title>
<updated>2026-07-04T11:42:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>paul@paul-moore.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-27T06:57:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=41c5b269af8b1f0bffcab7766a793f294ae6764e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:41c5b269af8b1f0bffcab7766a793f294ae6764e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6af36aeb147a06dea47c49859cd6ca5659aeb987 ]

Stacked filesystems such as overlayfs do not currently provide the
necessary mechanisms for LSMs to properly enforce access controls on the
mmap() and mprotect() operations.  In order to resolve this gap, a LSM
security blob is being added to the backing_file struct and the following
new LSM hooks are being created:

 security_backing_file_alloc()
 security_backing_file_free()
 security_mmap_backing_file()

The first two hooks are to manage the lifecycle of the LSM security blob
in the backing_file struct, while the third provides a new mmap() access
control point for the underlying backing file.  It is also expected that
LSMs will likely want to update their security_file_mprotect() callback
to address issues with their mprotect() controls, but that does not
require a change to the security_file_mprotect() LSM hook.

There are a three other small changes to support these new LSM hooks:
* Pass the user file associated with a backing file down to
alloc_empty_backing_file() so it can be included in the
security_backing_file_alloc() hook.
* Add getter and setter functions for the backing_file struct LSM blob
as the backing_file struct remains private to fs/file_table.c.
* Constify the file struct field in the LSM common_audit_data struct to
better support LSMs that need to pass a const file struct pointer into
the common LSM audit code.

Thanks to Arnd Bergmann for identifying the missing EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL()
and supplying a fixup.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-erofs@lists.ozlabs.org
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
[1. Mainline uses call_int_hook(FUNC, ...) with the default IRC baked
into the macro. Linux 6.6.y uses call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) requiring
an explicit default return value.

2. fs/backing-file.c does not exist in LTS
Linux 6.6.y places backing_file_open() in fs/open.c and lacks a
dedicated fs/backing-file.c.  The backing_file_mmap() function and
scoped_with_creds() do not exist in 6.6.y.  Therefore the LTS patch calls
security_mmap_backing_file() directly in ovl_mmap() in
fs/overlayfs/file.c rather than modifying backing_file_mmap().

3. Missing filesystems/modules
Linux 6.6.y does not have backing_tmpfile_open(), fs/fuse/passthrough.c,
or the erofs ishare mmap path that the mainline patch touches.  These hunks
are dropped in the 6.6 LTS backport.

4. Use macro backing_file to replace inline function to eliminate the
const warning.]
Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen &lt;caixinchen1@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ovl: Fix uninit-value in ovl_fill_real</title>
<updated>2026-03-04T12:20:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Qing Wang</name>
<email>wangqing7171@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-28T13:24:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=43b6f69e18063ae01911990f8726e9927e070ebf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:43b6f69e18063ae01911990f8726e9927e070ebf</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1992330d90dd766fcf1730fd7bf2d6af65370ac4 ]

Syzbot reported a KMSAN uninit-value issue in ovl_fill_real.

This iusse's call chain is:
__do_sys_getdents64()
    -&gt; iterate_dir()
        ...
            -&gt; ext4_readdir()
                -&gt; fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer() // alloc
                -&gt; fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr // write without tail '\0'
                -&gt; dir_emit()
                    -&gt; ovl_fill_real() // read by strcmp()

The string is used to store the decrypted directory entry name for an
encrypted inode. As shown in the call chain, fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr()
write it without null-terminate. However, ovl_fill_real() uses strcmp() to
compare the name against "..", which assumes a null-terminated string and
may trigger a KMSAN uninit-value warning when the buffer tail contains
uninit data.

Reported-by: syzbot+d130f98b2c265fae5297@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d130f98b2c265fae5297
Fixes: 4edb83bb1041 ("ovl: constant d_ino for non-merge dirs")
Signed-off-by: Qing Wang &lt;wangqing7171@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260128132406.23768-2-amir73il@gmail.com
Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ovl: Check for NULL d_inode() in ovl_dentry_upper()</title>
<updated>2025-07-06T09:00:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>kees@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-21T23:15:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=2cbeb47ea983cb79ca6464c5fd1abcb1372a7532'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2cbeb47ea983cb79ca6464c5fd1abcb1372a7532</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8a39f1c870e9d6fbac5638f3a42a6a6363829c49 ]

In ovl_path_type() and ovl_is_metacopy_dentry() GCC notices that it is
possible for OVL_E() to return NULL (which implies that d_inode(dentry)
may be NULL). This would result in out of bounds reads via container_of(),
seen with GCC 15's -Warray-bounds -fdiagnostics-details. For example:

In file included from arch/x86/include/generated/asm/rwonce.h:1,
                 from include/linux/compiler.h:339,
                 from include/linux/export.h:5,
                 from include/linux/linkage.h:7,
                 from include/linux/fs.h:5,
                 from fs/overlayfs/util.c:7:
In function 'ovl_upperdentry_dereference',
    inlined from 'ovl_dentry_upper' at ../fs/overlayfs/util.c:305:9,
    inlined from 'ovl_path_type' at ../fs/overlayfs/util.c:216:6:
include/asm-generic/rwonce.h:44:26: error: array subscript 0 is outside array bounds of 'struct inode[7486503276667837]' [-Werror=array-bounds=]
   44 | #define __READ_ONCE(x)  (*(const volatile __unqual_scalar_typeof(x) *)&amp;(x))
      |                         ~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/asm-generic/rwonce.h:50:9: note: in expansion of macro '__READ_ONCE'
   50 |         __READ_ONCE(x);                                                 \
      |         ^~~~~~~~~~~
fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h:195:16: note: in expansion of macro 'READ_ONCE'
  195 |         return READ_ONCE(oi-&gt;__upperdentry);
      |                ^~~~~~~~~
  'ovl_path_type': event 1
  185 |         return inode ? OVL_I(inode)-&gt;oe : NULL;
  'ovl_path_type': event 2

Avoid this by allowing ovl_dentry_upper() to return NULL if d_inode() is
NULL, as that means the problematic dereferencing can never be reached.
Note that this fixes the over-eager compiler warning in an effort to
being able to enable -Warray-bounds globally. There is no known
behavioral bug here.

Suggested-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ovl: don't allow datadir only</title>
<updated>2025-04-25T08:45:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-02-10T14:11:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=0874b629f65320778e7e3e206177770666d9db18'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0874b629f65320778e7e3e206177770666d9db18</id>
<content type='text'>
commit eb3a04a8516ee9b5174379306f94279fc90424c4 upstream.

In theory overlayfs could support upper layer directly referring to a data
layer, but there's no current use case for this.

Originally, when data-only layers were introduced, this wasn't allowed,
only introduced by the "datadir+" feature, but without actually handling
this case, resulting in an Oops.

Fix by disallowing datadir without lowerdir.

Reported-by: Giuseppe Scrivano &lt;gscrivan@redhat.com&gt;
Fixes: 24e16e385f22 ("ovl: add support for appending lowerdirs one by one")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v6.7
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexander Larsson &lt;alexl@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ovl: remove unused forward declaration</title>
<updated>2025-04-25T08:45:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Giuseppe Scrivano</name>
<email>gscrivan@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-02-10T12:07:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=4f7b6029ae8e22169c8a002ca0431865e63011c5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4f7b6029ae8e22169c8a002ca0431865e63011c5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a6eb9a4a69cc360b930dad9dc8513f8fd9b3577f ]

The ovl_get_verity_xattr() function was never added, only its declaration.

Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Scrivano &lt;gscrivan@redhat.com&gt;
Fixes: 184996e92e86 ("ovl: Validate verity xattr when resolving lowerdata")
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexander Larsson &lt;alexl@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ovl: fix UAF in ovl_dentry_update_reval by moving dput() in ovl_link_up</title>
<updated>2025-03-07T15:45:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasiliy Kovalev</name>
<email>kovalev@altlinux.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-02-14T21:51:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=64455c8051c3aedc71abb7ec8d47c80301f99f00'/>
<id>urn:sha1:64455c8051c3aedc71abb7ec8d47c80301f99f00</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c84e125fff2615b4d9c259e762596134eddd2f27 ]

The issue was caused by dput(upper) being called before
ovl_dentry_update_reval(), while upper-&gt;d_flags was still
accessed in ovl_dentry_remote().

Move dput(upper) after its last use to prevent use-after-free.

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ovl_dentry_remote fs/overlayfs/util.c:162 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ovl_dentry_update_reval+0xd2/0xf0 fs/overlayfs/util.c:167

Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:114
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
 print_report+0xc3/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:488
 kasan_report+0xd9/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:601
 ovl_dentry_remote fs/overlayfs/util.c:162 [inline]
 ovl_dentry_update_reval+0xd2/0xf0 fs/overlayfs/util.c:167
 ovl_link_up fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c:610 [inline]
 ovl_copy_up_one+0x2105/0x3490 fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c:1170
 ovl_copy_up_flags+0x18d/0x200 fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c:1223
 ovl_rename+0x39e/0x18c0 fs/overlayfs/dir.c:1136
 vfs_rename+0xf84/0x20a0 fs/namei.c:4893
...
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

Fixes: b07d5cc93e1b ("ovl: update of dentry revalidate flags after copy up")
Reported-by: syzbot+316db8a1191938280eb6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=316db8a1191938280eb6
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kovalev &lt;kovalev@altlinux.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250214215148.761147-1-kovalev@altlinux.org
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: relax assertions on failure to encode file handles</title>
<updated>2025-01-23T16:21:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Amir Goldstein</name>
<email>amir73il@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-12-19T11:53:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f47c834a9131ae64bee3c462f4e610c67b0a000f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f47c834a9131ae64bee3c462f4e610c67b0a000f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 974e3fe0ac61de85015bbe5a4990cf4127b304b2 upstream.

Encoding file handles is usually performed by a filesystem &gt;encode_fh()
method that may fail for various reasons.

The legacy users of exportfs_encode_fh(), namely, nfsd and
name_to_handle_at(2) syscall are ready to cope with the possibility
of failure to encode a file handle.

There are a few other users of exportfs_encode_{fh,fid}() that
currently have a WARN_ON() assertion when -&gt;encode_fh() fails.
Relax those assertions because they are wrong.

The second linked bug report states commit 16aac5ad1fa9 ("ovl: support
encoding non-decodable file handles") in v6.6 as the regressing commit,
but this is not accurate.

The aforementioned commit only increases the chances of the assertion
and allows triggering the assertion with the reproducer using overlayfs,
inotify and drop_caches.

Triggering this assertion was always possible with other filesystems and
other reasons of -&gt;encode_fh() failures and more particularly, it was
also possible with the exact same reproducer using overlayfs that is
mounted with options index=on,nfs_export=on also on kernels &lt; v6.6.
Therefore, I am not listing the aforementioned commit as a Fixes commit.

Backport hint: this patch will have a trivial conflict applying to
v6.6.y, and other trivial conflicts applying to stable kernels &lt; v6.6.

Reported-by: syzbot+ec07f6f5ce62b858579f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+ec07f6f5ce62b858579f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/671fd40c.050a0220.4735a.024f.GAE@google.com/
Reported-by: Dmitry Safonov &lt;dima@arista.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/CAGrbwDTLt6drB9eaUagnQVgdPBmhLfqqxAf3F+Juqy_o6oP8uw@mail.gmail.com/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241219115301.465396-1-amir73il@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ovl: support encoding fid from inode with no alias</title>
<updated>2025-01-23T16:21:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Amir Goldstein</name>
<email>amir73il@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-01-05T16:24:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f0c0ac84de17c37e6e84da65fb920f91dada55ad'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f0c0ac84de17c37e6e84da65fb920f91dada55ad</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c45beebfde34aa71afbc48b2c54cdda623515037 upstream.

Dmitry Safonov reported that a WARN_ON() assertion can be trigered by
userspace when calling inotify_show_fdinfo() for an overlayfs watched
inode, whose dentry aliases were discarded with drop_caches.

The WARN_ON() assertion in inotify_show_fdinfo() was removed, because
it is possible for encoding file handle to fail for other reason, but
the impact of failing to encode an overlayfs file handle goes beyond
this assertion.

As shown in the LTP test case mentioned in the link below, failure to
encode an overlayfs file handle from a non-aliased inode also leads to
failure to report an fid with FAN_DELETE_SELF fanotify events.

As Dmitry notes in his analyzis of the problem, ovl_encode_fh() fails
if it cannot find an alias for the inode, but this failure can be fixed.
ovl_encode_fh() seldom uses the alias and in the case of non-decodable
file handles, as is often the case with fanotify fid info,
ovl_encode_fh() never needs to use the alias to encode a file handle.

Defer finding an alias until it is actually needed so ovl_encode_fh()
will not fail in the common case of FAN_DELETE_SELF fanotify events.

Fixes: 16aac5ad1fa9 ("ovl: support encoding non-decodable file handles")
Reported-by: Dmitry Safonov &lt;dima@arista.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/CAOQ4uxiie81voLZZi2zXS1BziXZCM24nXqPAxbu8kxXCUWdwOg@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250105162404.357058-3-amir73il@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
