<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/fs/isofs, branch v6.18.33</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.18.33</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.18.33'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2026-05-14T13:30:19+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>isofs: validate block number from NFS file handle in isofs_export_iget</title>
<updated>2026-05-14T13:30:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Bommarito</name>
<email>michael.bommarito@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-19T21:21:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=afbafeddf23db13fe2edb2d5c0bf4bbb13d7881b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:afbafeddf23db13fe2edb2d5c0bf4bbb13d7881b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 24376458138387fb251e782e624c7776e9826796 upstream.

isofs_fh_to_dentry() and isofs_fh_to_parent() pass an attacker-
controlled block number (ifid-&gt;block or ifid-&gt;parent_block) from
the NFS file handle to isofs_export_iget(), which only rejects
block == 0 before calling isofs_iget() and ultimately sb_bread().
A crafted file handle with fh_len sufficient to pass the check
added by commit 0405d4b63d08 ("isofs: Prevent the use of too small
fid") can still drive the server to read any in-range block on the
backing device as if it were an iso_directory_record.  That earlier
fix was assigned CVE-2025-37780.

sb_bread() on an out-of-range block returns NULL cleanly via the
EIO path, so there is no memory-safety violation.  For in-range
reads of adjacent-partition data on the same block device, the
unrelated bytes end up in iso_inode_info fields that reach the NFS
client as dentry metadata.  The deployment surface (isofs exported
over NFS from loop-mounted images) is narrow and requires an
authenticated NFS peer, but the malformed-file-handle class is
reportable as hardening next to the existing CVE-2025-37780 fix.

Reject block &gt;= ISOFS_SB(sb)-&gt;s_nzones in isofs_export_iget() so
the check covers both isofs_fh_to_dentry() and isofs_fh_to_parent()
call sites with a single line.

Fixes: 0405d4b63d08 ("isofs: Prevent the use of too small fid")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito &lt;michael.bommarito@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260419212155.2169382-3-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>isofs: validate Rock Ridge CE continuation extent against volume size</title>
<updated>2026-05-14T13:30:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Bommarito</name>
<email>michael.bommarito@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-19T21:21:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=e69da8eeab74b4f4505024c38a17bce060fe7df8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e69da8eeab74b4f4505024c38a17bce060fe7df8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a36d990f591320e9dd379ab30063ebfe91d47e1f upstream.

rock_continue() reads rs-&gt;cont_extent verbatim from the Rock Ridge CE
record and passes it to sb_bread() without checking that the block
number is within the mounted ISO 9660 volume.  commit e595447e177b
("[PATCH] rock.c: handle corrupted directories") added cont_offset
and cont_size rejection for the CE continuation but did not validate
the extent block number itself.  commit f54e18f1b831 ("isofs: Fix
infinite looping over CE entries") later capped the CE chain length
at RR_MAX_CE_ENTRIES = 32 but again left the block number unchecked.

With a crafted ISO mounted via udisks2 (desktop optical auto-mount)
or via CAP_SYS_ADMIN mount, rs-&gt;cont_extent can therefore point at
an out-of-range block or at blocks belonging to an adjacent
filesystem on the same block device.  sb_bread() on an out-of-range
block returns NULL cleanly via the block layer EIO path, so there
is no memory-safety violation.  For in-range reads of adjacent-
filesystem data, the CE buffer is parsed as Rock Ridge records and
only the text of SL sub-records reaches userspace through
readlink(), which makes the info-leak channel narrow and difficult
to exploit; still, rejecting the malformed CE outright matches the
rejection shape already present in the same function for
cont_offset and cont_size.

Add an ISOFS_SB(sb)-&gt;s_nzones bounds check to rock_continue() next
to the existing offset/size rejection, printing the same
corrupted-directory-entry notice.

Fixes: f54e18f1b831 ("isofs: Fix infinite looping over CE entries")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito &lt;michael.bommarito@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260419212155.2169382-2-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>isofs: check the return value of sb_min_blocksize() in isofs_fill_super</title>
<updated>2025-11-05T13:00:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yongpeng Yang</name>
<email>yangyongpeng@xiaomi.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-11-04T12:50:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=e106e269c5cb38315eb0a0e7e38f71e9b20c8c66'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e106e269c5cb38315eb0a0e7e38f71e9b20c8c66</id>
<content type='text'>
sb_min_blocksize() may return 0. Check its return value to avoid
opt-&gt;blocksize and sb-&gt;s_blocksize is 0.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.15
Fixes: 1b17a46c9243e9 ("isofs: convert isofs to use the new mount API")
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yongpeng Yang &lt;yangyongpeng@xiaomi.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251104125009.2111925-4-yangyongpeng.storage@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'pull-dcache' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2025-07-28T16:17:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-28T16:17:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=11fe69fbd56f63ad0749303d2e014ef1c17142a6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:11fe69fbd56f63ad0749303d2e014ef1c17142a6</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull dentry d_flags updates from Al Viro:
 "The current exclusion rules for dentry-&gt;d_flags stores are rather
  unpleasant. The basic rules are simple:

   - stores to dentry-&gt;d_flags are OK under dentry-&gt;d_lock

   - stores to dentry-&gt;d_flags are OK in the dentry constructor, before
     becomes potentially visible to other threads

  Unfortunately, there's a couple of exceptions to that, and that's
  where the headache comes from.

  The main PITA comes from d_set_d_op(); that primitive sets -&gt;d_op of
  dentry and adjusts the flags that correspond to presence of individual
  methods. It's very easy to misuse; existing uses _are_ safe, but proof
  of correctness is brittle.

  Use in __d_alloc() is safe (we are within a constructor), but we might
  as well precalculate the initial value of 'd_flags' when we set the
  default -&gt;d_op for given superblock and set 'd_flags' directly instead
  of messing with that helper.

  The reasons why other uses are safe are bloody convoluted; I'm not
  going to reproduce it here. See [1] for gory details, if you care. The
  critical part is using d_set_d_op() only just prior to
  d_splice_alias(), which makes a combination of d_splice_alias() with
  setting -&gt;d_op, etc a natural replacement primitive.

  Better yet, if we go that way, it's easy to take setting -&gt;d_op and
  modifying 'd_flags' under -&gt;d_lock, which eliminates the headache as
  far as 'd_flags' exclusion rules are concerned. Other exceptions are
  minor and easy to deal with.

  What this series does:

   - d_set_d_op() is no longer available; instead a new primitive
     (d_splice_alias_ops()) is provided, equivalent to combination of
     d_set_d_op() and d_splice_alias().

   - new field of struct super_block - 's_d_flags'. This sets the
     default value of 'd_flags' to be used when allocating dentries on
     this filesystem.

   - new primitive for setting 's_d_op': set_default_d_op(). This
     replaces stores to 's_d_op' at mount time.

     All in-tree filesystems converted; out-of-tree ones will get caught
     by the compiler ('s_d_op' is renamed, so stores to it will be
     caught). 's_d_flags' is set by the same primitive to match the
     's_d_op'.

   - a lot of filesystems had sb-&gt;s_d_op-&gt;d_delete equal to
     always_delete_dentry; that is equivalent to setting
     DCACHE_DONTCACHE in 'd_flags', so such filesystems can bloody well
     set that bit in 's_d_flags' and drop 'd_delete()' from
     dentry_operations.

     In quite a few cases that results in empty dentry_operations, which
     means that we can get rid of those.

   - kill simple_dentry_operations - not needed anymore

   - massage d_alloc_parallel() to get rid of the other exception wrt
     'd_flags' stores - we can set DCACHE_PAR_LOOKUP as soon as we
     allocate the new dentry; no need to delay that until we commit to
     using the sucker.

  As the result, 'd_flags' stores are all either under -&gt;d_lock or done
  before the dentry becomes visible in any shared data structures"

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250224010624.GT1977892@ZenIV/ [1]

* tag 'pull-dcache' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (21 commits)
  configfs: use DCACHE_DONTCACHE
  debugfs: use DCACHE_DONTCACHE
  efivarfs: use DCACHE_DONTCACHE instead of always_delete_dentry()
  9p: don't bother with always_delete_dentry
  ramfs, hugetlbfs, mqueue: set DCACHE_DONTCACHE
  kill simple_dentry_operations
  devpts, sunrpc, hostfs: don't bother with -&gt;d_op
  shmem: no dentry retention past the refcount reaching zero
  d_alloc_parallel(): set DCACHE_PAR_LOOKUP earlier
  make d_set_d_op() static
  simple_lookup(): just set DCACHE_DONTCACHE
  tracefs: Add d_delete to remove negative dentries
  set_default_d_op(): calculate the matching value for -&gt;d_flags
  correct the set of flags forbidden at d_set_d_op() time
  split d_flags calculation out of d_set_d_op()
  new helper: set_default_d_op()
  fuse: no need for special dentry_operations for root dentry
  switch procfs from d_set_d_op() to d_splice_alias_ops()
  new helper: d_splice_alias_ops()
  procfs: kill -&gt;proc_dops
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>isofs: Verify inode mode when loading from disk</title>
<updated>2025-07-11T09:39:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-09T09:55:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=0a9e7405131380b57e155f10242b2e25d2e51852'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0a9e7405131380b57e155f10242b2e25d2e51852</id>
<content type='text'>
Verify that the inode mode is sane when loading it from the disk to
avoid complaints from VFS about setting up invalid inodes.

Reported-by: syzbot+895c23f6917da440ed0d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250709095545.31062-2-jack@suse.cz
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>new helper: set_default_d_op()</title>
<updated>2025-06-11T02:21:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2025-02-24T00:39:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=05fb0e666495cda068c068a681ecbbf8e57324d0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:05fb0e666495cda068c068a681ecbbf8e57324d0</id>
<content type='text'>
... to be used instead of manually assigning to -&gt;s_d_op.
All in-tree filesystem converted (and field itself is renamed,
so any out-of-tree ones in need of conversion will be caught
by compiler).

Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>isofs: fix Y2038 and Y2156 issues in Rock Ridge TF entry</title>
<updated>2025-04-15T09:56:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jonas 'Sortie' Termansen</name>
<email>sortie@maxsi.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-11T14:50:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=5ea45f54c8d6ca2a95b7bd450ee9eb253310bfd3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5ea45f54c8d6ca2a95b7bd450ee9eb253310bfd3</id>
<content type='text'>
This change implements the Rock Ridge TF entry LONG_FORM bit, which uses
the ISO 9660 17-byte date format (up to year 9999, with 10ms precision)
instead of the 7-byte date format (up to year 2155, with 1s precision).

Previously the LONG_FORM bit was ignored; and isofs would entirely
misinterpret the date as the wrong format, resulting in garbage
timestamps on the filesystem.

The Y2038 issue in iso_date() is fixed by returning a struct timespec64
instead of an int.

parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal() is fixed so it does proper bounds
checks of the TF entry timestamps.

Signed-off-by: Jonas 'Sortie' Termansen &lt;sortie@maxsi.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250411145022.2292255-1-sortie@maxsi.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>isofs: Prevent the use of too small fid</title>
<updated>2025-04-04T10:28:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Edward Adam Davis</name>
<email>eadavis@qq.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-04T05:31:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=0405d4b63d082861f4eaff9d39c78ee9dc34f845'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0405d4b63d082861f4eaff9d39c78ee9dc34f845</id>
<content type='text'>
syzbot reported a slab-out-of-bounds Read in isofs_fh_to_parent. [1]

The handle_bytes value passed in by the reproducing program is equal to 12.
In handle_to_path(), only 12 bytes of memory are allocated for the structure
file_handle-&gt;f_handle member, which causes an out-of-bounds access when
accessing the member parent_block of the structure isofs_fid in isofs,
because accessing parent_block requires at least 16 bytes of f_handle.
Here, fh_len is used to indirectly confirm that the value of handle_bytes
is greater than 3 before accessing parent_block.

[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in isofs_fh_to_parent+0x1b8/0x210 fs/isofs/export.c:183
Read of size 4 at addr ffff0000cc030d94 by task syz-executor215/6466
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6466 Comm: syz-executor215 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc7-syzkaller-ga2392f333575 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025
Call trace:
 show_stack+0x2c/0x3c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:466 (C)
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0xe4/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:408 [inline]
 print_report+0x198/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:521
 kasan_report+0xd8/0x138 mm/kasan/report.c:634
 __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x20/0x2c mm/kasan/report_generic.c:380
 isofs_fh_to_parent+0x1b8/0x210 fs/isofs/export.c:183
 exportfs_decode_fh_raw+0x2dc/0x608 fs/exportfs/expfs.c:523
 do_handle_to_path+0xa0/0x198 fs/fhandle.c:257
 handle_to_path fs/fhandle.c:385 [inline]
 do_handle_open+0x8cc/0xb8c fs/fhandle.c:403
 __do_sys_open_by_handle_at fs/fhandle.c:443 [inline]
 __se_sys_open_by_handle_at fs/fhandle.c:434 [inline]
 __arm64_sys_open_by_handle_at+0x80/0x94 fs/fhandle.c:434
 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
 invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49
 el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132
 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151
 el0_svc+0x54/0x168 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:744
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0x108 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:762
 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:600

Allocated by task 6466:
 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
 kasan_save_track+0x40/0x78 mm/kasan/common.c:68
 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:562
 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc+0xac/0xc4 mm/kasan/common.c:394
 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]
 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4294 [inline]
 __kmalloc_noprof+0x32c/0x54c mm/slub.c:4306
 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline]
 handle_to_path fs/fhandle.c:357 [inline]
 do_handle_open+0x5a4/0xb8c fs/fhandle.c:403
 __do_sys_open_by_handle_at fs/fhandle.c:443 [inline]
 __se_sys_open_by_handle_at fs/fhandle.c:434 [inline]
 __arm64_sys_open_by_handle_at+0x80/0x94 fs/fhandle.c:434
 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
 invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49
 el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132
 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151
 el0_svc+0x54/0x168 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:744
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0x108 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:762
 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:600

Reported-by: syzbot+4d7cd7dd0ce1aa8d5c65@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4d7cd7dd0ce1aa8d5c65
Tested-by: syzbot+4d7cd7dd0ce1aa8d5c65@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis &lt;eadavis@qq.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/tencent_9C8CB8A7E7C6C512C7065DC98B6EDF6EC606@qq.com
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>isofs: fix KMSAN uninit-value bug in do_isofs_readdir()</title>
<updated>2025-02-12T13:25:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Qasim Ijaz</name>
<email>qasdev00@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-02-11T19:59:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=81a82e8f33880793029cd6f8a766fb13b737e6a7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:81a82e8f33880793029cd6f8a766fb13b737e6a7</id>
<content type='text'>
In do_isofs_readdir() when assigning the variable
"struct iso_directory_record *de" the b_data field of the buffer_head
is accessed and an offset is added to it, the size of b_data is 2048
and the offset size is 2047, meaning
"de = (struct iso_directory_record *) (bh-&gt;b_data + offset);"
yields the final byte of the 2048 sized b_data block.

The first byte of the directory record (de_len) is then read and
found to be 31, meaning the directory record size is 31 bytes long.
The directory record is defined by the structure:

	struct iso_directory_record {
		__u8 length;                     // 1 byte
		__u8 ext_attr_length;            // 1 byte
		__u8 extent[8];                  // 8 bytes
		__u8 size[8];                    // 8 bytes
		__u8 date[7];                    // 7 bytes
		__u8 flags;                      // 1 byte
		__u8 file_unit_size;             // 1 byte
		__u8 interleave;                 // 1 byte
		__u8 volume_sequence_number[4];  // 4 bytes
		__u8 name_len;                   // 1 byte
		char name[];                     // variable size
	} __attribute__((packed));

The fixed portion of this structure occupies 33 bytes. Therefore, a
valid directory record must be at least 33 bytes long
(even without considering the variable-length name field).
Since de_len is only 31, it is insufficient to contain
the complete fixed header.

The code later hits the following sanity check that
compares de_len against the sum of de-&gt;name_len and
sizeof(struct iso_directory_record):

	if (de_len &lt; de-&gt;name_len[0] + sizeof(struct iso_directory_record)) {
		...
	}

Since the fixed portion of the structure is
33 bytes (up to and including name_len member),
a valid record should have de_len of at least 33 bytes;
here, however, de_len is too short, and the field de-&gt;name_len
(located at offset 32) is accessed even though it lies beyond
the available 31 bytes.

This access on the corrupted isofs data triggers a KASAN uninitialized
memory warning. The fix would be to first verify that de_len is at least
sizeof(struct iso_directory_record) before accessing any
fields like de-&gt;name_len.

Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzbot+812641c6c3d7586a1613@syzkaller.appspotmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: syzbot &lt;syzbot+812641c6c3d7586a1613@syzkaller.appspotmail.com&gt;
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=812641c6c3d7586a1613
Fixes: 2deb1acc653c ("isofs: fix access to unallocated memory when reading corrupted filesystem")
Signed-off-by: Qasim Ijaz &lt;qasdev00@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250211195900.42406-1-qasdev00@gmail.com
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>isofs: Partially convert zisofs_read_folio to use a folio</title>
<updated>2024-12-05T12:52:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)</name>
<email>willy@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-11-25T18:01:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=5c44aa21f0863270efbf03a4d5bd6b75fec4134c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5c44aa21f0863270efbf03a4d5bd6b75fec4134c</id>
<content type='text'>
Remove several hidden calls to compound_head() and references
to page-&gt;index.  More needs to be done to use folios throughout
the zisofs code.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241125180117.2914311-1-willy@infradead.org
</content>
</entry>
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