kernel/linux.git/fs/internal.h, branch v7.1-rc5

Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20260410' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm

2026-04-13T22:17:28+00:00

Pull LSM updates from Paul Moore: "We only have five patches in the LSM tree, but three of the five are for an important bugfix relating to overlayfs and the mmap() and mprotect() access controls for LSMs. Highlights below: - Fix problems with the mmap() and mprotect() LSM hooks on overlayfs As we are dealing with problems both in mmap() and mprotect() there are essentially two components to this fix, spread across three patches with all marked for stable. The simplest portion of the fix is the creation of a new LSM hook, security_mmap_backing_file(), that is used to enforce LSM mmap() access controls on backing files in the stacked/overlayfs case. The existing security_mmap_file() does not have visibility past the user file. You can see from the associated SELinux hook callback the code is fairly straightforward. The mprotect() fix is a bit more complicated as there is no way in the mprotect() code path to inspect both the user and backing files, and bolting on a second file reference to vm_area_struct wasn't really an option. The solution taken here adds a LSM security blob and associated hooks to the backing_file struct that LSMs can use to capture and store relevant information from the user file. While the necessary SELinux information is relatively small, a single u32, I expect other LSMs to require more than that, and a dedicated backing_file LSM blob provides a storage mechanism without negatively impacting other filesystems. I want to note that other LSMs beyond SELinux have been involved in the discussion of the fixes presented here and they are working on their own related changes using these new hooks, but due to other issues those patches will be coming at a later date. - Use kstrdup_const()/kfree_const() for securityfs symlink targets - Resolve a handful of kernel-doc warnings in cred.h" * tag 'lsm-pr-20260410' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks fs: prepare for adding LSM blob to backing_file securityfs: use kstrdup_const() to manage symlink targets cred: fix kernel-doc warnings in cred.h

lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks

2026-04-03T20:53:50+00:00

Stacked filesystems such as overlayfs do not currently provide the necessary mechanisms for LSMs to properly enforce access controls on the mmap() and mprotect() operations. In order to resolve this gap, a LSM security blob is being added to the backing_file struct and the following new LSM hooks are being created: security_backing_file_alloc() security_backing_file_free() security_mmap_backing_file() The first two hooks are to manage the lifecycle of the LSM security blob in the backing_file struct, while the third provides a new mmap() access control point for the underlying backing file. It is also expected that LSMs will likely want to update their security_file_mprotect() callback to address issues with their mprotect() controls, but that does not require a change to the security_file_mprotect() LSM hook. There are a three other small changes to support these new LSM hooks: * Pass the user file associated with a backing file down to alloc_empty_backing_file() so it can be included in the security_backing_file_alloc() hook. * Add getter and setter functions for the backing_file struct LSM blob as the backing_file struct remains private to fs/file_table.c. * Constify the file struct field in the LSM common_audit_data struct to better support LSMs that need to pass a const file struct pointer into the common LSM audit code. Thanks to Arnd Bergmann for identifying the missing EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL() and supplying a fixup. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-erofs@lists.ozlabs.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

fs: pass on FTRUNCATE_* flags to do_truncate

2026-03-23T11:41:57+00:00

Pass the flags one level down to replace the somewhat confusing small argument, and clean up do_truncate as a result. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260323070205.2939118-3-hch@lst.de Reviewed-by: Jan Kara Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner

fs: fix archiecture-specific compat_ftruncate64

2026-03-23T11:41:57+00:00

The "small" argument to do_sys_ftruncate indicates if > 32-bit size should be reject, but all the arch-specific compat ftruncate64 implementations get this wrong. Merge do_sys_ftruncate and ksys_ftruncate, replace the integer as boolean small flag with a descriptive one about LFS semantics, and use it correctly in the architecture-specific ftruncate64 implementations. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Fixes: 3dd681d944f6 ("arm64: 32-bit (compat) applications support") Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260323070205.2939118-2-hch@lst.de Reviewed-by: Jan Kara Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner

Merge tag 'pull-filename' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs

2026-02-10T00:58:28+00:00

Pull vfs 'struct filename' updates from Al Viro: "[Mostly] sanitize struct filename handling" * tag 'pull-filename' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (68 commits) sysfs(2): fs_index() argument is _not_ a pathname alpha: switch osf_mount() to strndup_user() ksmbd: use CLASS(filename_kernel) mqueue: switch to CLASS(filename) user_statfs(): switch to CLASS(filename) statx: switch to CLASS(filename_maybe_null) quotactl_block(): switch to CLASS(filename) chroot(2): switch to CLASS(filename) move_mount(2): switch to CLASS(filename_maybe_null) namei.c: switch user pathname imports to CLASS(filename{,_flags}) namei.c: convert getname_kernel() callers to CLASS(filename_kernel) do_f{chmod,chown,access}at(): use CLASS(filename_uflags) do_readlinkat(): switch to CLASS(filename_flags) do_sys_truncate(): switch to CLASS(filename) do_utimes_path(): switch to CLASS(filename_uflags) chdir(2): unspaghettify a bit... do_fchownat(): unspaghettify a bit... fspick(2): use CLASS(filename_flags) name_to_handle_at(): use CLASS(filename_uflags) vfs_open_tree(): use CLASS(filename_uflags) ...

Merge tag 'vfs-7.0-rc1.namespace' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs

2026-02-09T22:43:47+00:00

Pull vfs mount updates from Christian Brauner: - statmount: accept fd as a parameter Extend struct mnt_id_req with a file descriptor field and a new STATMOUNT_BY_FD flag. When set, statmount() returns mount information for the mount the fd resides on — including detached mounts (unmounted via umount2(MNT_DETACH)). For detached mounts the STATMOUNT_MNT_POINT and STATMOUNT_MNT_NS_ID mask bits are cleared since neither is meaningful. The capability check is skipped for STATMOUNT_BY_FD since holding an fd already implies prior access to the mount and equivalent information is available through fstatfs() and /proc/pid/mountinfo without privilege. Includes comprehensive selftests covering both attached and detached mount cases. - fs: Remove internal old mount API code (1 patch) Now that every in-tree filesystem has been converted to the new mount API, remove all the legacy shim code in fs_context.c that handled unconverted filesystems. This deletes ~280 lines including legacy_init_fs_context(), the legacy_fs_context struct, and associated wrappers. The mount(2) syscall path for userspace remains untouched. Documentation references to the legacy callbacks are cleaned up. - mount: add OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE to open_tree() Container runtimes currently use CLONE_NEWNS to copy the caller's entire mount namespace — only to then pivot_root() and recursively unmount everything they just copied. With large mount tables and thousands of parallel container launches this creates significant contention on the namespace semaphore. OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE copies only the specified mount tree (like OPEN_TREE_CLONE) but returns a mount namespace fd instead of a detached mount fd. The new namespace contains the copied tree mounted on top of a clone of the real rootfs. This functions as a combined unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) + pivot_root() in a single syscall. Works with user namespaces: an unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) followed by OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE creates a mount namespace owned by the new user namespace. Mount namespace file mounts are excluded from the copy to prevent cycles. Includes ~1000 lines of selftests" * tag 'vfs-7.0-rc1.namespace' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: selftests/open_tree: add OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE tests mount: add OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE fs: Remove internal old mount API code selftests: statmount: tests for STATMOUNT_BY_FD statmount: accept fd as a parameter statmount: permission check should return EPERM

Merge tag 'vfs-7.0-rc1.nullfs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs

2026-02-09T21:41:34+00:00

Pull vfs nullfs update from Christian Brauner: "Add a completely catatonic minimal pseudo filesystem called "nullfs" and make pivot_root() work in the initramfs. Currently pivot_root() does not work on the real rootfs because it cannot be unmounted. Userspace has to recursively delete initramfs contents manually before continuing boot, using the fragile switch_root sequence (overmount + chroot). Add nullfs, a minimal immutable filesystem that serves as the true root of the mount hierarchy. The mutable rootfs (tmpfs/ramfs) is mounted on top of it. This allows userspace to simply: chdir(new_root); pivot_root(".", "."); umount2(".", MNT_DETACH); without the traditional switch_root workarounds. systemd already handles this correctly. It tries pivot_root() first and falls back to MS_MOVE only when that fails. This also means rootfs mounts in unprivileged namespaces no longer need MNT_LOCKED, since the immutable nullfs guarantees nothing can be revealed by unmounting the covering mount. nullfs is a single-instance filesystem (get_tree_single()) marked SB_NOUSER | SB_I_NOEXEC | SB_I_NODEV with an immutable empty root directory. This means sooner or later it can be used to overmount other directories to hide their contents without any additional protection needed. We enable it unconditionally. If we see any real regression we'll hide it behind a boot option. nullfs has extensions beyond this in the future. It will serve as a concept to support the creation of completely empty mount namespaces - which is work coming up in the next cycle" * tag 'vfs-7.0-rc1.nullfs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: fs: use nullfs unconditionally as the real rootfs docs: mention nullfs fs: add immutable rootfs fs: add init_pivot_root() fs: ensure that internal tmpfs mount gets mount id zero

mount: add OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE

2026-01-16T18:21:40+00:00

When creating containers the setup usually involves using CLONE_NEWNS via clone3() or unshare(). This copies the caller's complete mount namespace. The runtime will also assemble a new rootfs and then use pivot_root() to switch the old mount tree with the new rootfs. Afterward it will recursively umount the old mount tree thereby getting rid of all mounts. On a basic system here where the mount table isn't particularly large this still copies about 30 mounts. Copying all of these mounts only to get rid of them later is pretty wasteful. This is exacerbated if intermediary mount namespaces are used that only exist for a very short amount of time and are immediately destroyed again causing a ton of mounts to be copied and destroyed needlessly. With a large mount table and a system where thousands or ten-thousands of containers are spawned in parallel this quickly becomes a bottleneck increasing contention on the semaphore. Extend open_tree() with a new OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE flag. Similar to OPEN_TREE_CLONE only the indicated mount tree is copied. Instead of returning a file descriptor referring to that mount tree OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE will cause open_tree() to return a file descriptor to a new mount namespace. In that new mount namespace the copied mount tree has been mounted on top of a copy of the real rootfs. The caller can setns() into that mount namespace and perform any additionally required setup such as move_mount() detached mounts in there. This allows OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE to function as a combined unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) and pivot_root(). A caller may for example choose to create an extremely minimal rootfs: fd_mntns = open_tree(-EBADF, "/var/lib/containers/wootwoot", OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE); This will create a mount namespace where "wootwoot" has become the rootfs mounted on top of the real rootfs. The caller can now setns() into this new mount namespace and assemble additional mounts. This also works with user namespaces: unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER); fd_mntns = open_tree(-EBADF, "/var/lib/containers/wootwoot", OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE); which creates a new mount namespace owned by the earlier created user namespace with "wootwoot" as the rootfs mounted on top of the real rootfs. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251229-work-empty-namespace-v1-1-bfb24c7b061f@kernel.org Tested-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Aleksa Sarai Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Suggested-by: Christian Brauner Suggested-by: Aleksa Sarai Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner

non-consuming variants of do_{unlinkat,rmdir}()

2026-01-16T17:51:50+00:00

similar to previous commit; replacements are filename_{unlinkat,rmdir}() Signed-off-by: Al Viro

non-consuming variant of do_mknodat()

2026-01-16T17:49:26+00:00

similar to previous commit; replacement is filename_mknodat() Signed-off-by: Al Viro