kernel/linux.git/fs/fuse, branch v5.15.210

use less confusing names for iov_iter direction initializers

2026-06-19T11:33:46+00:00

[ Upstream commit de4eda9de2d957ef2d6a8365a01e26a435e958cb ] READ/WRITE proved to be actively confusing - the meanings are "data destination, as used with read(2)" and "data source, as used with write(2)", but people keep interpreting those as "we read data from it" and "we write data to it", i.e. exactly the wrong way. Call them ITER_DEST and ITER_SOURCE - at least that is harder to misinterpret... Signed-off-by: Al Viro Stable-dep-of: a4f0b001782b ("vsock/virtio: reset connection on receiving queue overflow") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fuse: reject fuse_notify() pagecache ops on directories

2026-06-19T11:33:37+00:00

commit 9c954499d43aefac01c5dfb57a82b13d2dcf4b94 upstream. The operations FUSE_NOTIFY_STORE and FUSE_NOTIFY_RETRIEVE allow the FUSE daemon to actively write/read pagecache contents. For directories with FOPEN_CACHE_DIR, the pagecache is used as kernel-internal cache storage, and userspace is not supposed to have direct access to this cache - in particular, fuse_parse_cache() will hit WARN_ON() if the cache contains bogus data. Reject FUSE_NOTIFY_STORE and FUSE_NOTIFY_RETRIEVE on anything other than regular files with -EINVAL. Fixes: 5d7bc7e8680c ("fuse: allow using readdir cache") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260519-fuse-dir-pagecache-v2-1-5428fa48e175@google.com Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fuse: quiet down complaints in fuse_conn_limit_write

2026-06-01T15:35:12+00:00

commit 129a45f9755a89f573c6a513a6b9e3d234ce89b0 upstream. gcc 15 complains about an uninitialized variable val that is passed by reference into fuse_conn_limit_write: control.c: In function ‘fuse_conn_congestion_threshold_write’: include/asm-generic/rwonce.h:55:37: warning: ‘val’ may be used uninitialized [-Wmaybe-uninitialized] 55 | *(volatile typeof(x) *)&(x) = (val); \ | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~ include/asm-generic/rwonce.h:61:9: note: in expansion of macro ‘__WRITE_ONCE’ 61 | __WRITE_ONCE(x, val); \ | ^~~~~~~~~~~~ control.c:178:9: note: in expansion of macro ‘WRITE_ONCE’ 178 | WRITE_ONCE(fc->congestion_threshold, val); | ^~~~~~~~~~ control.c:166:18: note: ‘val’ was declared here 166 | unsigned val; | ^~~ Unfortunately there's enough macro spew involved in kstrtoul_from_user that I think gcc gives up on its analysis and sprays the above warning. AFAICT it's not actually a bug, but we could just zero-initialize the variable to enable using -Wmaybe-uninitialized to find real problems. Previously we would use some weird uninitialized_var annotation to quiet down the warnings, so clearly this code has been like this for quite some time. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.9 Fixes: 3f649ab728cda8 ("treewide: Remove uninitialized_var() usage") Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fuse: reject oversized dirents in page cache

2026-06-01T15:35:12+00:00

commit 51a8de6c50bf947c8f534cd73da4c8f0a13e7bed upstream. fuse_add_dirent_to_cache() computes a serialized dirent size from the server-controlled namelen field and copies the dirent into a single page-cache page. The existing logic only checks whether the dirent fits in the remaining space of the current page and advances to a fresh page if not. It never checks whether the dirent itself exceeds PAGE_SIZE. As a result, a malicious FUSE server can return a dirent with namelen=4095, producing a serialized record size of 4120 bytes. On 4 KiB page systems this causes memcpy() to overflow the cache page by 24 bytes into the following kernel page. Reject dirents that cannot fit in a single page before copying them into the readdir cache. Fixes: 69e34551152a ("fuse: allow caching readdir") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.16+ Assisted-by: Bynario AI Signed-off-by: Samuel Page Reported-by: Qi Tang Reported-by: Zijun Hu Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260420090139.662772-1-mszeredi@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fuse: fix readahead reclaim deadlock

2026-01-19T12:10:08+00:00

[ Upstream commit bd5603eaae0aabf527bfb3ce1bb07e979ce5bd50 ] Commit e26ee4efbc79 ("fuse: allocate ff->release_args only if release is needed") skips allocating ff->release_args if the server does not implement open. However in doing so, fuse_prepare_release() now skips grabbing the reference on the inode, which makes it possible for an inode to be evicted from the dcache while there are inflight readahead requests. This causes a deadlock if the server triggers reclaim while servicing the readahead request and reclaim attempts to evict the inode of the file being read ahead. Since the folio is locked during readahead, when reclaim evicts the fuse inode and fuse_evict_inode() attempts to remove all folios associated with the inode from the page cache (truncate_inode_pages_range()), reclaim will block forever waiting for the lock since readahead cannot relinquish the lock because it is itself blocked in reclaim: >>> stack_trace(1504735) folio_wait_bit_common (mm/filemap.c:1308:4) folio_lock (./include/linux/pagemap.h:1052:3) truncate_inode_pages_range (mm/truncate.c:336:10) fuse_evict_inode (fs/fuse/inode.c:161:2) evict (fs/inode.c:704:3) dentry_unlink_inode (fs/dcache.c:412:3) __dentry_kill (fs/dcache.c:615:3) shrink_kill (fs/dcache.c:1060:12) shrink_dentry_list (fs/dcache.c:1087:3) prune_dcache_sb (fs/dcache.c:1168:2) super_cache_scan (fs/super.c:221:10) do_shrink_slab (mm/shrinker.c:435:9) shrink_slab (mm/shrinker.c:626:10) shrink_node (mm/vmscan.c:5951:2) shrink_zones (mm/vmscan.c:6195:3) do_try_to_free_pages (mm/vmscan.c:6257:3) do_swap_page (mm/memory.c:4136:11) handle_pte_fault (mm/memory.c:5562:10) handle_mm_fault (mm/memory.c:5870:9) do_user_addr_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1338:10) handle_page_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1481:3) exc_page_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1539:2) asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x27 Fix this deadlock by allocating ff->release_args and grabbing the reference on the inode when preparing the file for release even if the server does not implement open. The inode reference will be dropped when the last reference on the fuse file is dropped (see fuse_file_put() -> fuse_release_end()). Fixes: e26ee4efbc79 ("fuse: allocate ff->release_args only if release is needed") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong Reported-by: Omar Sandoval Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fuse: fix livelock in synchronous file put from fuseblk workers

2025-10-29T13:03:14+00:00

[ Upstream commit 26e5c67deb2e1f42a951f022fdf5b9f7eb747b01 ] I observed a hang when running generic/323 against a fuseblk server. This test opens a file, initiates a lot of AIO writes to that file descriptor, and closes the file descriptor before the writes complete. Unsurprisingly, the AIO exerciser threads are mostly stuck waiting for responses from the fuseblk server: # cat /proc/372265/task/372313/stack [<0>] request_wait_answer+0x1fe/0x2a0 [fuse] [<0>] __fuse_simple_request+0xd3/0x2b0 [fuse] [<0>] fuse_do_getattr+0xfc/0x1f0 [fuse] [<0>] fuse_file_read_iter+0xbe/0x1c0 [fuse] [<0>] aio_read+0x130/0x1e0 [<0>] io_submit_one+0x542/0x860 [<0>] __x64_sys_io_submit+0x98/0x1a0 [<0>] do_syscall_64+0x37/0xf0 [<0>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 But the /weird/ part is that the fuseblk server threads are waiting for responses from itself: # cat /proc/372210/task/372232/stack [<0>] request_wait_answer+0x1fe/0x2a0 [fuse] [<0>] __fuse_simple_request+0xd3/0x2b0 [fuse] [<0>] fuse_file_put+0x9a/0xd0 [fuse] [<0>] fuse_release+0x36/0x50 [fuse] [<0>] __fput+0xec/0x2b0 [<0>] task_work_run+0x55/0x90 [<0>] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xe9/0x100 [<0>] do_syscall_64+0x43/0xf0 [<0>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 The fuseblk server is fuse2fs so there's nothing all that exciting in the server itself. So why is the fuse server calling fuse_file_put? The commit message for the fstest sheds some light on that: "By closing the file descriptor before calling io_destroy, you pretty much guarantee that the last put on the ioctx will be done in interrupt context (during I/O completion). Aha. AIO fgets a new struct file from the fd when it queues the ioctx. The completion of the FUSE_WRITE command from userspace causes the fuse server to call the AIO completion function. The completion puts the struct file, queuing a delayed fput to the fuse server task. When the fuse server task returns to userspace, it has to run the delayed fput, which in the case of a fuseblk server, it does synchronously. Sending the FUSE_RELEASE command sychronously from fuse server threads is a bad idea because a client program can initiate enough simultaneous AIOs such that all the fuse server threads end up in delayed_fput, and now there aren't any threads left to handle the queued fuse commands. Fix this by only using asynchronous fputs when closing files, and leave a comment explaining why. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.38 Fixes: 5a18ec176c934c ("fuse: fix hang of single threaded fuseblk filesystem") Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fuse: allocate ff->release_args only if release is needed

2025-10-29T13:03:14+00:00

[ Upstream commit e26ee4efbc79610b20e7abe9d96c87f33dacc1ff ] This removed the need to pass isdir argument to fuse_put_file(). Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Stable-dep-of: 26e5c67deb2e ("fuse: fix livelock in synchronous file put from fuseblk workers") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fuse: prevent overflow in copy_file_range return value

2025-10-02T11:39:01+00:00

commit 1e08938c3694f707bb165535df352ac97a8c75c9 upstream. The FUSE protocol uses struct fuse_write_out to convey the return value of copy_file_range, which is restricted to uint32_t. But the COPY_FILE_RANGE interface supports a 64-bit size copies. Currently the number of bytes copied is silently truncated to 32-bit, which may result in poor performance or even failure to copy in case of truncation to zero. Reported-by: Florian Weimer Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/lhuh5ynl8z5.fsf@oldenburg.str.redhat.com/ Fixes: 88bc7d5097a1 ("fuse: add support for copy_file_range()") Cc: # v4.20 Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fuse: check if copy_file_range() returns larger than requested size

2025-10-02T11:39:01+00:00

commit e5203209b3935041dac541bc5b37efb44220cc0b upstream. Just like write(), copy_file_range() should check if the return value is less or equal to the requested number of bytes. Reported-by: Chunsheng Luo Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250807062425.694-1-luochunsheng@ustc.edu/ Fixes: 88bc7d5097a1 ("fuse: add support for copy_file_range()") Cc: # v4.20 Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

virtiofs: add filesystem context source name check

2025-05-02T05:44:14+00:00

commit a94fd938df2b1628da66b498aa0eeb89593bc7a2 upstream. In certain scenarios, for example, during fuzz testing, the source name may be NULL, which could lead to a kernel panic. Therefore, an extra check for the source name should be added. Fixes: a62a8ef9d97d ("virtio-fs: add virtiofs filesystem") Cc: # all LTS kernels Signed-off-by: Xiangsheng Hou Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250407115111.25535-1-xiangsheng.hou@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman