<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/fs/btrfs/inode.c, branch linux-5.3.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=linux-5.3.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=linux-5.3.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2019-12-17T19:07:35+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: record all roots for rename exchange on a subvol</title>
<updated>2019-12-17T19:07:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josef Bacik</name>
<email>josef@toxicpanda.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-15T20:43:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=de5638d891c61bb57b6cba2bf9408b1f421258bd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:de5638d891c61bb57b6cba2bf9408b1f421258bd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3e1740993e43116b3bc71b0aad1e6872f6ccf341 upstream.

Testing with the new fsstress support for subvolumes uncovered a pretty
bad problem with rename exchange on subvolumes.  We're modifying two
different subvolumes, but we only start the transaction on one of them,
so the other one is not added to the dirty root list.  This is caught by
btrfs_cow_block() with a warning because the root has not been updated,
however if we do not modify this root again we'll end up pointing at an
invalid root because the root item is never updated.

Fix this by making sure we add the destination root to the trans list,
the same as we do with normal renames.  This fixes the corruption.

Fixes: cdd1fedf8261 ("btrfs: add support for RENAME_EXCHANGE and RENAME_WHITEOUT")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Btrfs: fix metadata space leak on fixup worker failure to set range as delalloc</title>
<updated>2019-12-17T19:07:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Filipe Manana</name>
<email>fdmanana@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-09T16:43:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=9d15a6722fa049c13f3f34e37feae37c84db76d5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9d15a6722fa049c13f3f34e37feae37c84db76d5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 536870071dbc4278264f59c9a2f5f447e584d139 upstream.

In the fixup worker, if we fail to mark the range as delalloc in the io
tree, we must release the previously reserved metadata, as well as update
the outstanding extents counter for the inode, otherwise we leak metadata
space.

In pratice we can't return an error from btrfs_set_extent_delalloc(),
which is just a wrapper around __set_extent_bit(), as for most errors
__set_extent_bit() does a BUG_ON() (or panics which hits a BUG_ON() as
well) and returning an -EEXIST error doesn't happen in this case since
the exclusive bits parameter always has a value of 0 through this code
path. Nevertheless, just fix the error handling in the fixup worker,
in case one day __set_extent_bit() can return an error to this code
path.

Fixes: f3038ee3a3f101 ("btrfs: Handle btrfs_set_extent_delalloc failure in fixup worker")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nborisov@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Btrfs: fix log context list corruption after rename exchange operation</title>
<updated>2019-11-20T15:49:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Filipe Manana</name>
<email>fdmanana@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-08T16:11:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3fdb261cdeff93dc9e36d10708996895d36f97d7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3fdb261cdeff93dc9e36d10708996895d36f97d7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e6c617102c7e4ac1398cb0b98ff1f0727755b520 upstream.

During rename exchange we might have successfully log the new name in the
source root's log tree, in which case we leave our log context (allocated
on stack) in the root's list of log contextes. However we might fail to
log the new name in the destination root, in which case we fallback to
a transaction commit later and never sync the log of the source root,
which causes the source root log context to remain in the list of log
contextes. This later causes invalid memory accesses because the context
was allocated on stack and after rename exchange finishes the stack gets
reused and overwritten for other purposes.

The kernel's linked list corruption detector (CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST=y) can
detect this and report something like the following:

  [  691.489929] ------------[ cut here ]------------
  [  691.489947] list_add corruption. prev-&gt;next should be next (ffff88819c944530), but was ffff8881c23f7be4. (prev=ffff8881c23f7a38).
  [  691.489967] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 28933 at lib/list_debug.c:28 __list_add_valid+0x95/0xe0
  (...)
  [  691.489998] CPU: 2 PID: 28933 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 5.4.0-rc6-btrfs-next-62 #1
  [  691.490001] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-0-ga698c8995f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
  [  691.490003] RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid+0x95/0xe0
  (...)
  [  691.490007] RSP: 0018:ffff8881f0b3faf8 EFLAGS: 00010282
  [  691.490010] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88819c944530 RCX: 0000000000000000
  [  691.490011] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffffa2c497e0
  [  691.490013] RBP: ffff8881f0b3fe68 R08: ffffed103eaa4115 R09: ffffed103eaa4114
  [  691.490015] R10: ffff88819c944000 R11: ffffed103eaa4115 R12: 7fffffffffffffff
  [  691.490016] R13: ffff8881b4035610 R14: ffff8881e7b84728 R15: 1ffff1103e167f7b
  [  691.490019] FS:  00007f4b25ea2e80(0000) GS:ffff8881f5500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  [  691.490021] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  [  691.490022] CR2: 00007fffbb2d4eec CR3: 00000001f2a4a004 CR4: 00000000003606e0
  [  691.490025] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  [  691.490027] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  [  691.490029] Call Trace:
  [  691.490058]  btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x667/0x2730 [btrfs]
  [  691.490083]  ? join_transaction+0x24a/0xce0 [btrfs]
  [  691.490107]  ? btrfs_end_log_trans+0x80/0x80 [btrfs]
  [  691.490111]  ? dget_parent+0xb8/0x460
  [  691.490116]  ? lock_downgrade+0x6b0/0x6b0
  [  691.490121]  ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90
  [  691.490127]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x142/0x220
  [  691.490151]  btrfs_log_dentry_safe+0x65/0x90 [btrfs]
  [  691.490172]  btrfs_sync_file+0x9f1/0xc00 [btrfs]
  [  691.490195]  ? btrfs_file_write_iter+0x1800/0x1800 [btrfs]
  [  691.490198]  ? rcu_read_lock_any_held.part.11+0x20/0x20
  [  691.490204]  ? __do_sys_newstat+0x88/0xd0
  [  691.490207]  ? cp_new_stat+0x5d0/0x5d0
  [  691.490218]  ? do_fsync+0x38/0x60
  [  691.490220]  do_fsync+0x38/0x60
  [  691.490224]  __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x32/0x40
  [  691.490228]  do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x540
  [  691.490233]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
  [  691.490235] RIP: 0033:0x7f4b253ad5f0
  (...)
  [  691.490239] RSP: 002b:00007fffbb2d6078 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004b
  [  691.490242] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f4b253ad5f0
  [  691.490244] RDX: 00007fffbb2d5fe0 RSI: 00007fffbb2d5fe0 RDI: 0000000000000003
  [  691.490245] RBP: 000000000000000d R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007fffbb2d608c
  [  691.490247] R10: 00000000000002e8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000001f4
  [  691.490248] R13: 0000000051eb851f R14: 00007fffbb2d6120 R15: 00005635a498bda0

This started happening recently when running some test cases from fstests
like btrfs/004 for example, because support for rename exchange was added
last week to fsstress from fstests.

So fix this by deleting the log context for the source root from the list
if we have logged the new name in the source root.

Reported-by: Su Yue &lt;Damenly_Su@gmx.com&gt;
Fixes: d4682ba03ef618 ("Btrfs: sync log after logging new name")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Tested-by: Su Yue &lt;Damenly_Su@gmx.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: save i_size to avoid double evaluation of i_size_read in compress_file_range</title>
<updated>2019-11-12T18:26:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josef Bacik</name>
<email>josef@toxicpanda.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-11T13:03:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=49a9b4896e2e6424346ca175543874d7b4797edb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:49a9b4896e2e6424346ca175543874d7b4797edb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d98da49977f67394db492f06c00b1fb1cc090c05 upstream.

We hit a regression while rolling out 5.2 internally where we were
hitting the following panic

  kernel BUG at mm/page-writeback.c:2659!
  RIP: 0010:clear_page_dirty_for_io+0xe6/0x1f0
  Call Trace:
   __process_pages_contig+0x25a/0x350
   ? extent_clear_unlock_delalloc+0x43/0x70
   submit_compressed_extents+0x359/0x4d0
   normal_work_helper+0x15a/0x330
   process_one_work+0x1f5/0x3f0
   worker_thread+0x2d/0x3d0
   ? rescuer_thread+0x340/0x340
   kthread+0x111/0x130
   ? kthread_create_on_node+0x60/0x60
   ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

This is happening because the page is not locked when doing
clear_page_dirty_for_io.  Looking at the core dump it was because our
async_extent had a ram_size of 24576 but our async_chunk range only
spanned 20480, so we had a whole extra page in our ram_size for our
async_extent.

This happened because we try not to compress pages outside of our
i_size, however a cleanup patch changed us to do

actual_end = min_t(u64, i_size_read(inode), end + 1);

which is problematic because i_size_read() can evaluate to different
values in between checking and assigning.  So either an expanding
truncate or a fallocate could increase our i_size while we're doing
writeout and actual_end would end up being past the range we have
locked.

I confirmed this was what was happening by installing a debug kernel
that had

  actual_end = min_t(u64, i_size_read(inode), end + 1);
  if (actual_end &gt; end + 1) {
	  printk(KERN_ERR "KABOOM\n");
	  actual_end = end + 1;
  }

and installing it onto 500 boxes of the tier that had been seeing the
problem regularly.  Last night I got my debug message and no panic,
confirming what I expected.

[ dsterba: the assembly confirms a tiny race window:

    mov    0x20(%rsp),%rax
    cmp    %rax,0x48(%r15)           # read
    movl   $0x0,0x18(%rsp)
    mov    %rax,%r12
    mov    %r14,%rax
    cmovbe 0x48(%r15),%r12           # eval

  Where r15 is inode and 0x48 is offset of i_size.

  The original fix was to revert 62b37622718c that would do an
  intermediate assignment and this would also avoid the doulble
  evaluation but is not future-proof, should the compiler merge the
  stores and call i_size_read anyway.

  There's a patch adding READ_ONCE to i_size_read but that's not being
  applied at the moment and we need to fix the bug. Instead, emulate
  READ_ONCE by two barrier()s that's what effectively happens. The
  assembly confirms single evaluation:

    mov    0x48(%rbp),%rax          # read once
    mov    0x20(%rsp),%rcx
    mov    $0x20,%edx
    cmp    %rax,%rcx
    cmovbe %rcx,%rax
    mov    %rax,(%rsp)
    mov    %rax,%rcx
    mov    %r14,%rax

  Where 0x48(%rbp) is inode-&gt;i_size stored to %eax.
]

Fixes: 62b37622718c ("btrfs: Remove isize local variable in compress_file_range")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.1+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
[ changelog updated ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: qgroup: Always free PREALLOC META reserve in btrfs_delalloc_release_extents()</title>
<updated>2019-11-06T12:07:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Qu Wenruo</name>
<email>wqu@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-14T06:34:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=437c09d9b774247cce8885102efa69b329f0da8b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:437c09d9b774247cce8885102efa69b329f0da8b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8702ba9396bf7bbae2ab93c94acd4bd37cfa4f09 ]

[Background]
Btrfs qgroup uses two types of reserved space for METADATA space,
PERTRANS and PREALLOC.

PERTRANS is metadata space reserved for each transaction started by
btrfs_start_transaction().
While PREALLOC is for delalloc, where we reserve space before joining a
transaction, and finally it will be converted to PERTRANS after the
writeback is done.

[Inconsistency]
However there is inconsistency in how we handle PREALLOC metadata space.

The most obvious one is:
In btrfs_buffered_write():
	btrfs_delalloc_release_extents(BTRFS_I(inode), reserve_bytes, true);

We always free qgroup PREALLOC meta space.

While in btrfs_truncate_block():
	btrfs_delalloc_release_extents(BTRFS_I(inode), blocksize, (ret != 0));

We only free qgroup PREALLOC meta space when something went wrong.

[The Correct Behavior]
The correct behavior should be the one in btrfs_buffered_write(), we
should always free PREALLOC metadata space.

The reason is, the btrfs_delalloc_* mechanism works by:
- Reserve metadata first, even it's not necessary
  In btrfs_delalloc_reserve_metadata()

- Free the unused metadata space
  Normally in:
  btrfs_delalloc_release_extents()
  |- btrfs_inode_rsv_release()
     Here we do calculation on whether we should release or not.

E.g. for 64K buffered write, the metadata rsv works like:

/* The first page */
reserve_meta:	num_bytes=calc_inode_reservations()
free_meta:	num_bytes=0
total:		num_bytes=calc_inode_reservations()
/* The first page caused one outstanding extent, thus needs metadata
   rsv */

/* The 2nd page */
reserve_meta:	num_bytes=calc_inode_reservations()
free_meta:	num_bytes=calc_inode_reservations()
total:		not changed
/* The 2nd page doesn't cause new outstanding extent, needs no new meta
   rsv, so we free what we have reserved */

/* The 3rd~16th pages */
reserve_meta:	num_bytes=calc_inode_reservations()
free_meta:	num_bytes=calc_inode_reservations()
total:		not changed (still space for one outstanding extent)

This means, if btrfs_delalloc_release_extents() determines to free some
space, then those space should be freed NOW.
So for qgroup, we should call btrfs_qgroup_free_meta_prealloc() other
than btrfs_qgroup_convert_reserved_meta().

The good news is:
- The callers are not that hot
  The hottest caller is in btrfs_buffered_write(), which is already
  fixed by commit 336a8bb8e36a ("btrfs: Fix wrong
  btrfs_delalloc_release_extents parameter"). Thus it's not that
  easy to cause false EDQUOT.

- The trans commit in advance for qgroup would hide the bug
  Since commit f5fef4593653 ("btrfs: qgroup: Make qgroup async transaction
  commit more aggressive"), when btrfs qgroup metadata free space is slow,
  it will try to commit transaction and free the wrongly converted
  PERTRANS space, so it's not that easy to hit such bug.

[FIX]
So to fix the problem, remove the @qgroup_free parameter for
btrfs_delalloc_release_extents(), and always pass true to
btrfs_inode_rsv_release().

Reported-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Fixes: 43b18595d660 ("btrfs: qgroup: Use separate meta reservation type for delalloc")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: allocate new inode in NOFS context</title>
<updated>2019-10-17T20:47:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josef Bacik</name>
<email>josef@toxicpanda.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-09T14:12:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=03fc8cdc5b99a16e0bde44515139efe8053c6772'/>
<id>urn:sha1:03fc8cdc5b99a16e0bde44515139efe8053c6772</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 11a19a90870ea5496a8ded69b86f5b476b6d3355 upstream.

A user reported a lockdep splat

 ======================================================
 WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 5.2.11-gentoo #2 Not tainted
 ------------------------------------------------------
 kswapd0/711 is trying to acquire lock:
 000000007777a663 (sb_internal){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x3a8/0x500

but task is already holding lock:
 000000000ba86300 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x0/0x30

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-&gt; #1 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}:
 kmem_cache_alloc+0x1f/0x1c0
 btrfs_alloc_inode+0x1f/0x260
 alloc_inode+0x16/0xa0
 new_inode+0xe/0xb0
 btrfs_new_inode+0x70/0x610
 btrfs_symlink+0xd0/0x420
 vfs_symlink+0x9c/0x100
 do_symlinkat+0x66/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1c0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

-&gt; #0 (sb_internal){.+.+}:
 __sb_start_write+0xf6/0x150
 start_transaction+0x3a8/0x500
 btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode+0x59/0x110
 btrfs_evict_inode+0x19e/0x4c0
 evict+0xbc/0x1f0
 inode_lru_isolate+0x113/0x190
 __list_lru_walk_one.isra.4+0x5c/0x100
 list_lru_walk_one+0x32/0x50
 prune_icache_sb+0x36/0x80
 super_cache_scan+0x14a/0x1d0
 do_shrink_slab+0x131/0x320
 shrink_node+0xf7/0x380
 balance_pgdat+0x2d5/0x640
 kswapd+0x2ba/0x5e0
 kthread+0x147/0x160
 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

 CPU0 CPU1
 ---- ----
 lock(fs_reclaim);
 lock(sb_internal);
 lock(fs_reclaim);
 lock(sb_internal);
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: fix allocation of free space cache v1 bitmap pages</title>
<updated>2019-10-05T13:12:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christophe Leroy</name>
<email>christophe.leroy@c-s.fr</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-21T15:05:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=d6122f68dd50650b7468107e2103bb3e2084e7a0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d6122f68dd50650b7468107e2103bb3e2084e7a0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3acd48507dc43eeeb0a1fe965b8bad91cab904a7 upstream.

Various notifications of type "BUG kmalloc-4096 () : Redzone
overwritten" have been observed recently in various parts of the kernel.
After some time, it has been made a relation with the use of BTRFS
filesystem and with SLUB_DEBUG turned on.

[   22.809700] BUG kmalloc-4096 (Tainted: G        W        ): Redzone overwritten

[   22.810286] INFO: 0xbe1a5921-0xfbfc06cd. First byte 0x0 instead of 0xcc
[   22.810866] INFO: Allocated in __load_free_space_cache+0x588/0x780 [btrfs] age=22 cpu=0 pid=224
[   22.811193] 	__slab_alloc.constprop.26+0x44/0x70
[   22.811345] 	kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xf0/0x2ec
[   22.811588] 	__load_free_space_cache+0x588/0x780 [btrfs]
[   22.811848] 	load_free_space_cache+0xf4/0x1b0 [btrfs]
[   22.812090] 	cache_block_group+0x1d0/0x3d0 [btrfs]
[   22.812321] 	find_free_extent+0x680/0x12a4 [btrfs]
[   22.812549] 	btrfs_reserve_extent+0xec/0x220 [btrfs]
[   22.812785] 	btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x178/0x5f4 [btrfs]
[   22.813032] 	__btrfs_cow_block+0x150/0x5d4 [btrfs]
[   22.813262] 	btrfs_cow_block+0x194/0x298 [btrfs]
[   22.813484] 	commit_cowonly_roots+0x44/0x294 [btrfs]
[   22.813718] 	btrfs_commit_transaction+0x63c/0xc0c [btrfs]
[   22.813973] 	close_ctree+0xf8/0x2a4 [btrfs]
[   22.814107] 	generic_shutdown_super+0x80/0x110
[   22.814250] 	kill_anon_super+0x18/0x30
[   22.814437] 	btrfs_kill_super+0x18/0x90 [btrfs]
[   22.814590] INFO: Freed in proc_cgroup_show+0xc0/0x248 age=41 cpu=0 pid=83
[   22.814841] 	proc_cgroup_show+0xc0/0x248
[   22.814967] 	proc_single_show+0x54/0x98
[   22.815086] 	seq_read+0x278/0x45c
[   22.815190] 	__vfs_read+0x28/0x17c
[   22.815289] 	vfs_read+0xa8/0x14c
[   22.815381] 	ksys_read+0x50/0x94
[   22.815475] 	ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x38

Commit 69d2480456d1 ("btrfs: use copy_page for copying pages instead of
memcpy") changed the way bitmap blocks are copied. But allthough bitmaps
have the size of a page, they were allocated with kzalloc().

Most of the time, kzalloc() allocates aligned blocks of memory, so
copy_page() can be used. But when some debug options like SLAB_DEBUG are
activated, kzalloc() may return unaligned pointer.

On powerpc, memcpy(), copy_page() and other copying functions use
'dcbz' instruction which provides an entire zeroed cacheline to avoid
memory read when the intention is to overwrite a full line. Functions
like memcpy() are writen to care about partial cachelines at the start
and end of the destination, but copy_page() assumes it gets pages. As
pages are naturally cache aligned, copy_page() doesn't care about
partial lines. This means that when copy_page() is called with a
misaligned pointer, a few leading bytes are zeroed.

To fix it, allocate bitmaps through kmem_cache instead of using kzalloc()
The cache pool is created with PAGE_SIZE alignment constraint.

Reported-by: Erhard F. &lt;erhard_f@mailbox.org&gt;
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=204371
Fixes: 69d2480456d1 ("btrfs: use copy_page for copying pages instead of memcpy")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@c-s.fr&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
[ rename to btrfs_free_space_bitmap ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: inode: Don't compress if NODATASUM or NODATACOW set</title>
<updated>2019-07-17T15:03:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Qu Wenruo</name>
<email>wqu@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-01T05:12:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=42c16da6d684391db83788eb680accd84f6c2083'/>
<id>urn:sha1:42c16da6d684391db83788eb680accd84f6c2083</id>
<content type='text'>
As btrfs(5) specified:

	Note
	If nodatacow or nodatasum are enabled, compression is disabled.

If NODATASUM or NODATACOW set, we should not compress the extent.

Normally NODATACOW is detected properly in run_delalloc_range() so
compression won't happen for NODATACOW.

However for NODATASUM we don't have any check, and it can cause
compressed extent without csum pretty easily, just by:
  mkfs.btrfs -f $dev
  mount $dev $mnt -o nodatasum
  touch $mnt/foobar
  mount -o remount,datasum,compress $mnt
  xfs_io -f -c "pwrite 0 128K" $mnt/foobar

And in fact, we have a bug report about corrupted compressed extent
without proper data checksum so even RAID1 can't recover the corruption.
(https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199707)

Running compression without proper checksum could cause more damage when
corruption happens, as compressed data could make the whole extent
unreadable, so there is no need to allow compression for
NODATACSUM.

The fix will refactor the inode compression check into two parts:

- inode_can_compress()
  As the hard requirement, checked at btrfs_run_delalloc_range(), so no
  compression will happen for NODATASUM inode at all.

- inode_need_compress()
  As the soft requirement, checked at btrfs_run_delalloc_range() and
  compress_file_range().

Reported-by: James Harvey &lt;jamespharvey20@gmail.com&gt;
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: migrate the delalloc space stuff to it's own home</title>
<updated>2019-07-04T15:26:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josef Bacik</name>
<email>josef@toxicpanda.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-19T19:12:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=867363429d706984915cb4b1f299ce05f8413e23'/>
<id>urn:sha1:867363429d706984915cb4b1f299ce05f8413e23</id>
<content type='text'>
We have code for data and metadata reservations for delalloc.  There's
quite a bit of code here, and it's used in a lot of places so I've
separated it out to it's own file.  inode.c and file.c are already
pretty large, and this code is complicated enough to live in its own
space.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: run delayed iput at unlink time</title>
<updated>2019-07-02T10:30:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josef Bacik</name>
<email>josef@toxicpanda.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-18T14:59:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=63611e738a62bfb186a61e4b16b9fb72657144e5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:63611e738a62bfb186a61e4b16b9fb72657144e5</id>
<content type='text'>
We have been seeing issues in production where a cleaner script will end
up unlinking a bunch of files that have pending iputs.  This means they
will get their final iput's run at btrfs-cleaner time and thus are not
throttled, which impacts the workload.

Since we are unlinking these files we can just drop the delayed iput at
unlink time.  We are already holding a reference to the inode so this
will not be the final iput and thus is completely safe to do at this
point.  Doing this means we are more likely to be doing the final iput
at unlink time, and thus will get the IO charged to the caller and get
throttled appropriately without affecting the main workload.

Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nborisov@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
