kernel/linux.git/fs/binfmt_misc.c, branch v6.18.48

binfmt_misc: don't leak the user namespace when the mount fails

2026-08-23T12:27:05+00:00

[ Upstream commit b8206f516fe7cbe785cf44bf09c17c438d7c3cad ] bm_get_tree() takes a reference to the user namespace and hands it to get_tree_keyed() as the sget key. sget_fc() moves that reference into sb->s_fs_info and clears fc->s_fs_info, so from that point on the superblock owns it and bm_free() doesn't see it anymore. The superblock drops it in ->put_super(). But generic_shutdown_super() only calls ->put_super() from inside the if (sb->s_root) branch, so nothing releases it when bm_fill_super() fails: - The kzalloc_obj() failure leaves s_root NULL and the whole branch is skipped. - A simple_fill_super() failure in the file loop leaves s_root set, but s_op still points at simple_super_operations, which has no ->put_super(). bm_fill_super() installs s_ops only once simple_fill_super() returned success, and installing it earlier wouldn't help either because simple_fill_super() overwrites s_op. Either way vfs_get_super() calls deactivate_locked_super() and the reference is gone for good. binfmt_misc mounts are available in a user namespace and both the inode and the dentry cache are SLAB_ACCOUNT, so an unprivileged caller under a tight memory cgroup can fail simple_fill_super() on demand and leak one user namespace per attempt. Drop the reference in ->kill_sb() instead, which runs unconditionally, the same way nfsd and rpc_pipefs release their keyed s_fs_info. That also stops ->put_super() from clearing s_fs_info while the superblock is still on @fs_supers. generic_shutdown_super() leaves it there on purpose so that sget_fc() keeps finding it until kill_sb() has run, but a NULL s_fs_info makes test_keyed_super() miss it, so a concurrent mount for the same user namespace skips the grab_super() wait and creates a second superblock for a namespace that is still being torn down. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728-work-binfmt_misc-usernsleak-v1-1-dbd8d5e626e7@kernel.org Fixes: 21ca59b365c0 ("binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

binfmt_misc: don't warn when the mount is completed from another user namespace

2026-08-19T16:18:18+00:00

commit 79fdf39f1a31f88cb3833b6f8091fbf6acdca2c6 upstream. fsopen() records the caller's user namespace in fc->user_ns and hands back an ordinary file descriptor. Nothing ties the task that calls fsconfig(FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE) to the task that created the context. The fd is inherited across fork() and exec() and it can be passed over a unix socket. Completing a context from another user namespace is allowed on purpose. vfs_cmd_create() authorizes the create with mount_capable(), which for FS_USERNS_MOUNT checks ns_capable(fc->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN), and that succeeds for a task holding CAP_SYS_ADMIN in an ancestor of fc->user_ns. So an unprivileged task can reach the WARN_ON() in bm_fill_super(): create a user and a mount namespace in a child, call fsopen("binfmt_misc") there, send the fscontext fd to the parent and let the parent issue FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE. Both namespaces come from a plain unshare(1) and no capability is needed anywhere: WARNING: fs/binfmt_misc.c:938 at bm_fill_super+0xa2/0xc0 [binfmt_misc] CPU: 15 UID: 1000 PID: 3243382 Comm: fswarn Call Trace: get_tree_keyed+0x7d/0xb0 bm_get_tree+0x34/0x90 [binfmt_misc] vfs_get_tree+0x2a/0x100 vfs_cmd_create+0x60/0xf0 __do_sys_fsconfig+0x4b2/0x500 The child needs the mount namespace because fsopen() itself gates on may_mount(), which asks for CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the user namespace owning the caller's mount namespace. fsconfig() doesn't repeat that check. It is a WARN_ON() and not a WARN_ON_ONCE(), so the condition can be raised in a loop to taint the kernel and flood the log, and it panics a kernel booted with panic_on_warn. Keep refusing the mount and stop warning about it. Nothing in bm_fill_super() depends on the two namespaces matching, it derives everything from sb->s_user_ns. Fixes: 21ca59b365c0 ("binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.7+ Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260802-work-fill_super-warn-v1-2-4e987911a39a@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Jan Kara Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

binfmt_misc: don't let an 'F' entry pin its own instance

2026-08-09T18:25:16+00:00

commit 79055d82772b9584f259b747fe40ff56a076678d upstream. An entry registered with 'F' opens its interpreter at registration time and holds that file until the entry is freed. Any entry nobody removes by hand only gets closed once the binfmt_misc superblock is shut down. If the interpreter lives on a mount that keeps that superblock alive the two pin each other: binfmt_misc sb -> inode -> entry -> interp_file -> vfsmount -> binfmt_misc sb TL;DR the file is never closed. Once the mount namespace is gone there is nothing left to unregister through either. There are two ways to trigger this bug: - Point the interpreter at the instance itself. Its files are regular files owned by the mounter and both bm_get_inode() and simple_fill_super() leave i_op at empty_iops. So notify_change() falls back to simple_setattr() and chmod +x works. We never set SB_I_NOEXEC and so open_exec() accepts it. - Use the instance as an overlayfs lower layer. The overlay superblock holds a clone_private_mount() of every layer until it is destroyed and that clone is in no namespace. So umount_tree() never reaches it. That's a DoS. And it isn't only the superblock that leaks. It pins the user namespace it was mounted in, so every iteration permanently eats one of the caller's user namespace charges. So let's just do the sane thing. SB_I_NOEXEC makes open_exec() fail on the instance's own files and s_stack_depth makes overlayfs reject the layer before it ever takes a clone. That also covers the ecryptfs and fuse passthrough variants. What 'F' promises is unchanged. The stable tag is narrower than the Fixes tags on purpose. Before sandboxed mounts this needed global root against the single instance everyone shares, and the change doesn't apply to those trees anyway. Note that SB_I_NODEV is implicitly raised for userns mounts but raise it explicitly here as well. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728-work-binfmt_misc-selfpin-v1-1-74df5daeca5b@kernel.org Fixes: 948b701a607f ("binfmt_misc: add persistent opened binary handler for containers") Fixes: 21ca59b365c0 ("binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.7+ Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

binfmt_misc: reject a flag character as the field delimiter

2026-08-09T18:25:16+00:00

commit 8e85d50ba1117fd446bf9a250bd8a97d48384bdc upstream. The registration string starts with a user chosen delimiter that separates the individual fields. So that the field parsers terminate even on a truncated string create_entry() pads the buffer with that same delimiter: memset(buf + count, del, 8); Most fields are scanned for the delimiter with strchr()/scanarg() and happily stop on the padding. The flags field is different: instead of scanning for the delimiter check_special_flags() consumes the flag characters 'P', 'O', 'C' and 'F' and stops at the first byte that is none of them, relying on the trailing delimiter to end the scan. If the delimiter is itself a flag character the padding no longer acts as a terminator. The scan swallows all eight padding bytes and keeps reading past the end of the allocation until it hits a byte that is not a flag character. For example registering PaPEPPxPPiP with 'P' as the delimiter (name "a", type extension, magic "x", interpreter "i", empty flags) leaves the flag scan running off the end of the buffer. The registration is rejected in the end because the parser does not stop exactly at buf + count, but only after the out of bounds read has already happened. With an unlucky allocation layout the scan can walk into an unmapped page; under KASAN it is reported as a slab out of bounds read. binfmt_misc mounts are available to unprivileged users in a user namespace so the read is reachable without privileges. Reject a delimiter that is one of the flag characters up front. Such a registration was always rejected anyway, only after the out of bounds read, so no valid registration string changes meaning. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260710-work-binfmt_misc-locking-v3-3-a162f7cb58d6@kernel.org Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

binfmt_misc: use exe_file_deny_write_access() for the interpreter clone

2026-08-09T18:25:16+00:00

commit fa5990ca8fd917003e526036bcc50413edb9722c upstream. For MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE entries load_misc_binary() clones the registered interpreter file and denies write access to the clone via plain deny_write_access(). The clone is installed as bprm->interpreter and later released by the exec machinery through exe_file_allow_write_access() which skips the i_writecount increment for files with FMODE_FSNOTIFY_HSM set. The deny and allow side can therefore come to different conclusions when pre-content watches are in play: if a pre-content watch is added to the interpreter after registration every subsequent exec through that entry takes a write denial on the clone that is never paired with a write allowance, driving the interpreter inode's i_writecount further down with each exec and leaving the interpreter unwritable even after the entry and all its users are gone. Take the write denial via exe_file_deny_write_access() so both sides of the pairing base their decision on the same file mode, and propagate failure instead of silently ignoring it: an interpreter that is concurrently open for writing now fails the exec with ETXTBSY, exactly like an interpreter freshly opened via open_exec() would. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260710-work-binfmt_misc-locking-v3-2-a162f7cb58d6@kernel.org Fixes: 0357ef03c94e ("fs: don't block write during exec on pre-content watched files") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

binfmt_misc: restore write access when removing an entry

2026-08-09T18:25:16+00:00

commit db1856ea9196cf6e015d12199a34c0b9313c7bfa upstream. Registering an entry with the MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE flag opens the interpreter via open_exec() which denies write access to it for as long as the entry exists. Removing the entry closes the interpreter file via filp_close() but never restores write access, leaving the inode's i_writecount permanently negative. Opening the interpreter for writing keeps failing with ETXTBSY long after the entry is gone until the inode is evicted from the inode cache. Commit 90f601b497d7 ("binfmt_misc: restore write access before closing files opened by open_exec()") fixed the same imbalance in the error path of bm_register_write() but the actual removal path has been leaking the write denial since the introduction of the flag. Restore write access in put_binfmt_handler() before closing the interpreter file. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260710-work-binfmt_misc-locking-v3-1-a162f7cb58d6@kernel.org Fixes: 948b701a607f ("binfmt_misc: add persistent opened binary handler for containers") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

binfmt_misc: set have_execfd only once the interpreter is opened

2026-08-03T09:21:58+00:00

commit bbf5f639918dc011aaf60aab8480218758ee68c5 upstream. load_misc_binary() raises bprm->have_execfd as soon as it sees the 'O' (or 'C') flag. This happens well before it opens the interpreter. If that open fails the flag stays set on the bprm. binfmt_misc is at the head of the format list so an interpreter open failure that returns -ENOEXEC lets the search fall through to a later format. This means it runs the matched binary directly having never staged an interpreter. So bprm->executable is NULL while have_execfd falsely claims a descriptor is present. Consequently, begin_new_exec() dereferences the missing executable: would_dump(bprm, bprm->executable); and NULL derefs. Had it not, the hand-off later in the same function would have failed anyway. FD_ADD(0, bprm->executable) rejects a NULL file with -ENOMEM. Both sites are past the point of no return so the exec cannot be unwound either way. This can be reached by unprivileged users as binfmt_misc can be mounted in user namespaces. So a user can register an 'O' entry whose interpreter lives on a FUSE mount, have the FUSE server fail the open with -ENOEXEC and execute a native ELF file that matches the entry. have_execfd only means anything alongside the executable it describes which is not set until the interpreter has been opened and staged. So lets raise it there, next to execfd_creds, which is already set at that point. An open failure now leaves it clear, so the fallback format derives credentials from the binary and emits no AT_EXECFD, as it would for any native exec. The argv rewrite load_misc_binary() performs before the open is still not undone. This means the binary sees the interpreter path in argv[0] and its own path in argv[1] but that predates this change and only became observable once the exec stopped faulting. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260720-beglichen-kognitiv-organismus-5e1e55326c56@brauner Fixes: bc2bf338d54b ("exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

binfmt_misc: restore write access before closing files opened by open_exec()

2025-11-05T13:00:16+00:00

bm_register_write() opens an executable file using open_exec(), which internally calls do_open_execat() and denies write access on the file to avoid modification while it is being executed. However, when an error occurs, bm_register_write() closes the file using filp_close() directly. This does not restore the write permission, which may cause subsequent write operations on the same file to fail. Fix this by calling exe_file_allow_write_access() before filp_close() to restore the write permission properly. Fixes: e7850f4d844e ("binfmt_misc: fix possible deadlock in bm_register_write") Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251105022923.1813587-1-zilin@seu.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner

binfmt_misc: switch to locked_recursive_removal()

2025-07-03T02:36:51+00:00

... fixing a mount leak, strictly speaking. Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner Signed-off-by: Al Viro

VFS: rename lookup_one_len family to lookup_noperm and remove permission check

2025-04-08T09:24:36+00:00

The lookup_one_len family of functions is (now) only used internally by a filesystem on itself either - in a context where permission checking is irrelevant such as by a virtual filesystem populating itself, or xfs accessing its ORPHANAGE or dquota accessing the quota file; or - in a context where a permission check (MAY_EXEC on the parent) has just been performed such as a network filesystem finding in "silly-rename" file in the same directory. This is also the context after the _parentat() functions where currently lookup_one_qstr_excl() is used. So the permission check is pointless. The name "one_len" is unhelpful in understanding the purpose of these functions and should be changed. Most of the callers pass the len as "strlen()" so using a qstr and QSTR() can simplify the code. This patch renames these functions (include lookup_positive_unlocked() which is part of the family despite the name) to have a name based on "lookup_noperm". They are changed to receive a 'struct qstr' instead of separate name and len. In a few cases the use of QSTR() results in a new call to strlen(). try_lookup_noperm() takes a pointer to a qstr instead of the whole qstr. This is consistent with d_hash_and_lookup() (which is nearly identical) and useful for lookup_noperm_unlocked(). The new lookup_noperm_common() doesn't take a qstr yet. That will be tidied up in a subsequent patch. Signed-off-by: NeilBrown Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250319031545.2999807-5-neil@brown.name Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner