Linux kernel stable tree (mirror) https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.18.21 2025-11-05T13:00:16+00:00 2025-11-05T13:00:16+00:00 Zilin Guan zilin@seu.edu.cn 2025-11-05T02:29:23+00:00 urn:sha1:90f601b497d76f40fa66795c3ecf625b6aced9fd bm_register_write() opens an executable file using open_exec(), which internally calls do_open_execat() and denies write access on the file to avoid modification while it is being executed. However, when an error occurs, bm_register_write() closes the file using filp_close() directly. This does not restore the write permission, which may cause subsequent write operations on the same file to fail. Fix this by calling exe_file_allow_write_access() before filp_close() to restore the write permission properly. Fixes: e7850f4d844e ("binfmt_misc: fix possible deadlock in bm_register_write") Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan <zilin@seu.edu.cn> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251105022923.1813587-1-zilin@seu.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> 2025-07-03T02:36:51+00:00 Al Viro viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk 2025-03-09T00:54:09+00:00 urn:sha1:eacb58fdcaefac63d32c3c095152e97dc9425ea8 ... fixing a mount leak, strictly speaking. Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> 2025-04-08T09:24:36+00:00 NeilBrown neil@brown.name 2025-03-19T03:01:35+00:00 urn:sha1:fa6fe07d1536361a227d655e69ca270faf28fdbe The lookup_one_len family of functions is (now) only used internally by a filesystem on itself either - in a context where permission checking is irrelevant such as by a virtual filesystem populating itself, or xfs accessing its ORPHANAGE or dquota accessing the quota file; or - in a context where a permission check (MAY_EXEC on the parent) has just been performed such as a network filesystem finding in "silly-rename" file in the same directory. This is also the context after the _parentat() functions where currently lookup_one_qstr_excl() is used. So the permission check is pointless. The name "one_len" is unhelpful in understanding the purpose of these functions and should be changed. Most of the callers pass the len as "strlen()" so using a qstr and QSTR() can simplify the code. This patch renames these functions (include lookup_positive_unlocked() which is part of the family despite the name) to have a name based on "lookup_noperm". They are changed to receive a 'struct qstr' instead of separate name and len. In a few cases the use of QSTR() results in a new call to strlen(). try_lookup_noperm() takes a pointer to a qstr instead of the whole qstr. This is consistent with d_hash_and_lookup() (which is nearly identical) and useful for lookup_noperm_unlocked(). The new lookup_noperm_common() doesn't take a qstr yet. That will be tidied up in a subsequent patch. Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neil@brown.name> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250319031545.2999807-5-neil@brown.name Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> 2025-01-20T21:27:58+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2025-01-20T21:27:58+00:00 urn:sha1:fadc3ed9ce1cd9ecc5c8be8875f7ec11ab3a7ebe Pull execve updates from Kees Cook: - fix up /proc/pid/comm in the execveat(AT_EMPTY_PATH) case (Tycho Andersen, Kees Cook) - binfmt_misc: Fix comment typos (Christophe JAILLET) - move empty argv[0] warning closer to actual logic (Nir Lichtman) - remove legacy custom binfmt modules autoloading (Nir Lichtman) - Make sure set_task_comm() always NUL-terminates - binfmt_flat: Fix integer overflow bug on 32 bit systems (Dan Carpenter) - coredump: Do not lock when copying "comm" - MAINTAINERS: add auxvec.h and set myself as maintainer * tag 'execve-v6.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: binfmt_flat: Fix integer overflow bug on 32 bit systems selftests/exec: add a test for execveat()'s comm exec: fix up /proc/pid/comm in the execveat(AT_EMPTY_PATH) case exec: Make sure task->comm is always NUL-terminated exec: remove legacy custom binfmt modules autoloading exec: move warning of null argv to be next to the relevant code fs: binfmt: Fix a typo MAINTAINERS: exec: Mark Kees as maintainer MAINTAINERS: exec: Add auxvec.h UAPI coredump: Do not lock during 'comm' reporting 2024-11-30T03:35:58+00:00 Christophe JAILLET christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr 2024-11-02T09:25:04+00:00 urn:sha1:b6709dcd87ac85d56e7cd574a7b21f3a8727d942 A 't' is missing in "binfm_misc". Add it. Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr> Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/34b8c52b67934b293a67558a9a486aea7ba08951.1730539498.git.christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> 2024-11-27T11:51:30+00:00 Christian Brauner brauner@kernel.org 2024-11-27T11:45:02+00:00 urn:sha1:3b832035387ff508fdcf0fba66701afc78f79e3d This reverts commit 2a010c41285345da60cece35575b4e0af7e7bf44. Rui Ueyama <rui314@gmail.com> writes: > I'm the creator and the maintainer of the mold linker > (https://github.com/rui314/mold). Recently, we discovered that mold > started causing process crashes in certain situations due to a change > in the Linux kernel. Here are the details: > > - In general, overwriting an existing file is much faster than > creating an empty file and writing to it on Linux, so mold attempts to > reuse an existing executable file if it exists. > > - If a program is running, opening the executable file for writing > previously failed with ETXTBSY. If that happens, mold falls back to > creating a new file. > > - However, the Linux kernel recently changed the behavior so that > writing to an executable file is now always permitted > (https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=2a010c412853). > > That caused mold to write to an executable file even if there's a > process running that file. Since changes to mmap'ed files are > immediately visible to other processes, any processes running that > file would almost certainly crash in a very mysterious way. > Identifying the cause of these random crashes took us a few days. > > Rejecting writes to an executable file that is currently running is a > well-known behavior, and Linux had operated that way for a very long > time. So, I don’t believe relying on this behavior was our mistake; > rather, I see this as a regression in the Linux kernel. Quoting myself from commit 2a010c412853 ("fs: don't block i_writecount during exec") > Yes, someone in userspace could potentially be relying on this. It's not > completely out of the realm of possibility but let's find out if that's > actually the case and not guess. It seems we found out that someone is relying on this obscure behavior. So revert the change. Link: https://github.com/rui314/mold/issues/1361 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4a2bc207-76be-4715-8e12-7fc45a76a125@leemhuis.info Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> 2024-07-15T18:14:59+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2024-07-15T18:14:59+00:00 urn:sha1:7d156879ffd6c48428c2f46d5c2b4b80d9c9ee79 Pull vfs module description updates from Christian Brauner: "This contains patches to add module descriptions to all modules under fs/ currently lacking them" * tag 'vfs-6.11.module.description' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: openpromfs: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() macro fs: nls: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() macros fs: autofs: add MODULE_DESCRIPTION() fs: fat: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() macros fs: binfmt: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() macros fs: cramfs: add MODULE_DESCRIPTION() fs: hfs: add MODULE_DESCRIPTION() fs: hpfs: add MODULE_DESCRIPTION() qnx4: add MODULE_DESCRIPTION() qnx6: add MODULE_DESCRIPTION() fs: sysv: add MODULE_DESCRIPTION() fs: efs: add MODULE_DESCRIPTION() fs: minix: add MODULE_DESCRIPTION() 2024-06-03T13:52:10+00:00 Christian Brauner brauner@kernel.org 2024-05-31T13:01:43+00:00 urn:sha1:2a010c41285345da60cece35575b4e0af7e7bf44 Back in 2021 we already discussed removing deny_write_access() for executables. Back then I was hesistant because I thought that this might cause issues in userspace. But even back then I had started taking some notes on what could potentially depend on this and I didn't come up with a lot so I've changed my mind and I would like to try this. Here are some of the notes that I took: (1) The deny_write_access() mechanism is causing really pointless issues such as [1]. If a thread in a thread-group opens a file writable, then writes some stuff, then closing the file descriptor and then calling execve() they can fail the execve() with ETXTBUSY because another thread in the thread-group could have concurrently called fork(). Multi-threaded libraries such as go suffer from this. (2) There are userspace attacks that rely on overwriting the binary of a running process. These attacks are _mitigated_ but _not at all prevented_ from ocurring by the deny_write_access() mechanism. I'll go over some details. The clearest example of such attacks was the attack against runC in CVE-2019-5736 (cf. [3]). An attack could compromise the runC host binary from inside a _privileged_ runC container. The malicious binary could then be used to take over the host. (It is crucial to note that this attack is _not_ possible with unprivileged containers. IOW, the setup here is already insecure.) The attack can be made when attaching to a running container or when starting a container running a specially crafted image. For example, when runC attaches to a container the attacker can trick it into executing itself. This could be done by replacing the target binary inside the container with a custom binary pointing back at the runC binary itself. As an example, if the target binary was /bin/bash, this could be replaced with an executable script specifying the interpreter path #!/proc/self/exe. As such when /bin/bash is executed inside the container, instead the target of /proc/self/exe will be executed. That magic link will point to the runc binary on the host. The attacker can then proceed to write to the target of /proc/self/exe to try and overwrite the runC binary on the host. However, this will not succeed because of deny_write_access(). Now, one might think that this would prevent the attack but it doesn't. To overcome this, the attacker has multiple ways: * Open a file descriptor to /proc/self/exe using the O_PATH flag and then proceed to reopen the binary as O_WRONLY through /proc/self/fd/<nr> and try to write to it in a busy loop from a separate process. Ultimately it will succeed when the runC binary exits. After this the runC binary is compromised and can be used to attack other containers or the host itself. * Use a malicious shared library annotating a function in there with the constructor attribute making the malicious function run as an initializor. The malicious library will then open /proc/self/exe for creating a new entry under /proc/self/fd/<nr>. It'll then call exec to a) force runC to exit and b) hand the file descriptor off to a program that then reopens /proc/self/fd/<nr> for writing (which is now possible because runC has exited) and overwriting that binary. To sum up: the deny_write_access() mechanism doesn't prevent such attacks in insecure setups. It just makes them minimally harder. That's all. The only way back then to prevent this is to create a temporary copy of the calling binary itself when it starts or attaches to containers. So what I did back then for LXC (and Aleksa for runC) was to create an anonymous, in-memory file using the memfd_create() system call and to copy itself into the temporary in-memory file, which is then sealed to prevent further modifications. This sealed, in-memory file copy is then executed instead of the original on-disk binary. Any compromising write operations from a privileged container to the host binary will then write to the temporary in-memory binary and not to the host binary on-disk, preserving the integrity of the host binary. Also as the temporary, in-memory binary is sealed, writes to this will also fail. The point is that deny_write_access() is uselss to prevent these attacks. (3) Denying write access to an inode because it's currently used in an exec path could easily be done on an LSM level. It might need an additional hook but that should be about it. (4) The MAP_DENYWRITE flag for mmap() has been deprecated a long time ago so while we do protect the main executable the bigger portion of the things you'd think need protecting such as the shared libraries aren't. IOW, we let anyone happily overwrite shared libraries. (5) We removed all remaining uses of VM_DENYWRITE in [2]. That means: (5.1) We removed the legacy uselib() protection for preventing overwriting of shared libraries. Nobody cared in 3 years. (5.2) We allow write access to the elf interpreter after exec completed treating it on a par with shared libraries. Yes, someone in userspace could potentially be relying on this. It's not completely out of the realm of possibility but let's find out if that's actually the case and not guess. Link: https://github.com/golang/go/issues/22315 [1] Link: 49624efa65ac ("Merge tag 'denywrite-for-5.15' of git://github.com/davidhildenbrand/linux") [2] Link: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/breaking-docker-via-runc-explaining-cve-2019-5736 [3] Link: https://lwn.net/Articles/866493 Link: https://github.com/golang/go/issues/22220 Link: https://github.com/golang/go/blob/5bf8c0cf09ee5c7e5a37ab90afcce154ab716a97/src/cmd/go/internal/work/buildid.go#L724 Link: https://github.com/golang/go/blob/5bf8c0cf09ee5c7e5a37ab90afcce154ab716a97/src/cmd/go/internal/work/exec.go#L1493 Link: https://github.com/golang/go/blob/5bf8c0cf09ee5c7e5a37ab90afcce154ab716a97/src/cmd/go/internal/script/cmds.go#L457 Link: https://github.com/golang/go/blob/5bf8c0cf09ee5c7e5a37ab90afcce154ab716a97/src/cmd/go/internal/test/test.go#L1557 Link: https://github.com/golang/go/blob/5bf8c0cf09ee5c7e5a37ab90afcce154ab716a97/src/os/exec/lp_linux_test.go#L61 Link: https://github.com/buildkite/agent/pull/2736 Link: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/114554 Link: https://bugs.openjdk.org/browse/JDK-8068370 Link: https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/issues/58964 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240531-vfs-i_writecount-v1-1-a17bea7ee36b@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> 2024-05-28T10:06:51+00:00 Jeff Johnson quic_jjohnson@quicinc.com 2024-05-27T18:57:52+00:00 urn:sha1:2c2a3f622e400a58cb53eac633b8102da0600102 Fix the 'make W=1' warnings: WARNING: modpost: missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() in fs/binfmt_misc.o WARNING: modpost: missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() in fs/binfmt_script.o Signed-off-by: Jeff Johnson <quic_jjohnson@quicinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240527-md-fs-binfmt-v1-1-f9dc1745cb67@quicinc.com Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> 2023-10-31T05:28:19+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2023-10-31T05:28:19+00:00 urn:sha1:d82c0a37d431ada0d1dae9a2665fcfe17b0f9e14 Pull execve updates from Kees Cook: - Support non-BSS ELF segments with zero filesz Eric Biederman and I refactored ELF segment loading to handle the case where a segment has a smaller filesz than memsz. Traditionally linkers only did this for .bss and it was always the last segment. As a result, the kernel only handled this case when it was the last segment. We've had two recent cases where linkers were trying to use these kinds of segments for other reasons, and the were in the middle of the segment list. There was no good reason for the kernel not to support this, and the refactor actually ends up making things more readable too. - Enable namespaced binfmt_misc Christian Brauner has made it possible to use binfmt_misc with mount namespaces. This means some traditionally root-only interfaces (for adding/removing formats) are now more exposed (but believed to be safe). - Remove struct tag 'dynamic' from ELF UAPI Alejandro Colomar noticed that the ELF UAPI has been polluting the struct namespace with an unused and overly generic tag named "dynamic" for no discernible reason for many many years. After double-checking various distro source repositories, it has been removed. - Clean up binfmt_elf_fdpic debug output (Greg Ungerer) * tag 'execve-v6.7-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts binfmt_misc: cleanup on filesystem umount binfmt_elf_fdpic: clean up debug warnings mm: Remove unused vm_brk() binfmt_elf: Only report padzero() errors when PROT_WRITE binfmt_elf: Use elf_load() for library binfmt_elf: Use elf_load() for interpreter binfmt_elf: elf_bss no longer used by load_elf_binary() binfmt_elf: Support segments with 0 filesz and misaligned starts elf, uapi: Remove struct tag 'dynamic'