kernel/linux.git/drivers, branch v6.1.44

xen/netback: Fix buffer overrun triggered by unusual packet

2023-08-08T18:03:51+00:00

commit 534fc31d09b706a16d83533e16b5dc855caf7576 upstream. It is possible that a guest can send a packet that contains a head + 18 slots and yet has a len <= XEN_NETBACK_TX_COPY_LEN. This causes nr_slots to underflow in xenvif_get_requests() which then causes the subsequent loop's termination condition to be wrong, causing a buffer overrun of queue->tx_map_ops. Rework the code to account for the extra frag_overflow slots. This is CVE-2023-34319 / XSA-432. Fixes: ad7f402ae4f4 ("xen/netback: Ensure protocol headers don't fall in the non-linear area") Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant Reviewed-by: Wei Liu Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation

2023-08-08T18:03:50+00:00

Upstream commit: fb3bd914b3ec28f5fb697ac55c4846ac2d542855 Add a mitigation for the speculative return address stack overflow vulnerability found on AMD processors. The mitigation works by ensuring all RET instructions speculate to a controlled location, similar to how speculation is controlled in the retpoline sequence. To accomplish this, the __x86_return_thunk forces the CPU to mispredict every function return using a 'safe return' sequence. To ensure the safety of this mitigation, the kernel must ensure that the safe return sequence is itself free from attacker interference. In Zen3 and Zen4, this is accomplished by creating a BTB alias between the untraining function srso_untrain_ret_alias() and the safe return function srso_safe_ret_alias() which results in evicting a potentially poisoned BTB entry and using that safe one for all function returns. In older Zen1 and Zen2, this is accomplished using a reinterpretation technique similar to Retbleed one: srso_untrain_ret() and srso_safe_ret(). Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigation

2023-08-08T18:03:48+00:00

commit 8974eb588283b7d44a7c91fa09fcbaf380339f3a upstream Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in vector registers. Intel processors that support AVX2 and AVX512 have gather instructions that fetch non-contiguous data elements from memory. On vulnerable hardware, when a gather instruction is transiently executed and encounters a fault, stale data from architectural or internal vector registers may get transiently stored to the destination vector register allowing an attacker to infer the stale data using typical side channel techniques like cache timing attacks. This mitigation is different from many earlier ones for two reasons. First, it is enabled by default and a bit must be set to *DISABLE* it. This is the opposite of normal mitigation polarity. This means GDS can be mitigated simply by updating microcode and leaving the new control bit alone. Second, GDS has a "lock" bit. This lock bit is there because the mitigation affects the hardware security features KeyLocker and SGX. It needs to be enabled and *STAY* enabled for these features to be mitigated against GDS. The mitigation is enabled in the microcode by default. Disable it by setting gather_data_sampling=off or by disabling all mitigations with mitigations=off. The mitigation status can be checked by reading: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

dma-buf: fix an error pointer vs NULL bug

2023-08-03T08:24:19+00:00

commit 00ae1491f970acc454be0df63f50942d94825860 upstream. Smatch detected potential error pointer dereference. drivers/gpu/drm/drm_syncobj.c:888 drm_syncobj_transfer_to_timeline() error: 'fence' dereferencing possible ERR_PTR() The error pointer comes from dma_fence_allocate_private_stub(). One caller expected error pointers and one expected NULL pointers. Change it to return NULL and update the caller which expected error pointers, drm_syncobj_assign_null_handle(), to check for NULL instead. Fixes: f781f661e8c9 ("dma-buf: keep the signaling time of merged fences v3") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Reviewed-by: Christian König Reviewed-by: Sumit Semwal Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/b09f1996-3838-4fa2-9193-832b68262e43@moroto.mountain Cc: Jindong Yue Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

dma-buf: keep the signaling time of merged fences v3

2023-08-03T08:24:19+00:00

commit f781f661e8c99b0cb34129f2e374234d61864e77 upstream. Some Android CTS is testing if the signaling time keeps consistent during merges. v2: use the current time if the fence is still in the signaling path and the timestamp not yet available. v3: improve comment, fix one more case to use the correct timestamp Signed-off-by: Christian König Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230630120041.109216-1-christian.koenig@amd.com Cc: Jindong Yue Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

cpufreq: intel_pstate: Drop ACPI _PSS states table patching

2023-08-03T08:24:18+00:00

commit e8a0e30b742f76ebd0f3b196973df4bf65d8fbbb upstream. After making acpi_processor_get_platform_limit() use the "no limit" value for its frequency QoS request when _PPC returns 0, it is not necessary to replace the frequency corresponding to the first _PSS return package entry with the maximum turbo frequency of the given CPU in intel_pstate_init_acpi_perf_limits() any more, so drop the code doing that along with the comment explaining it. Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Tested-by: Hagar Hemdan Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ACPI: processor: perflib: Avoid updating frequency QoS unnecessarily

2023-08-03T08:24:18+00:00

commit 99387b016022c29234c4ebf9abd34358c6e56532 upstream. Modify acpi_processor_get_platform_limit() to avoid updating its frequency QoS request when the _PPC return value has not changed by comparing that value to the previous _PPC return value stored in the performance_platform_limit field of the struct acpi_processor corresponding to the given CPU. While at it, do the _PPC return value check against the state count earlier, to avoid setting performance_platform_limit to an invalid value, and make acpi_processor_ppc_init() use FREQ_QOS_MAX_DEFAULT_VALUE as the "no limit" frequency QoS for consistency. Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Tested-by: Hagar Hemdan Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ACPI: processor: perflib: Use the "no limit" frequency QoS

2023-08-03T08:24:18+00:00

commit c02d5feb6e2f60affc6ba8606d8d614c071e2ba6 upstream. When _PPC returns 0, it means that the CPU frequency is not limited by the platform firmware, so make acpi_processor_get_platform_limit() update the frequency QoS request used by it to "no limit" in that case. This addresses a problem with limiting CPU frequency artificially on some systems after CPU offline/online to the frequency that corresponds to the first entry in the _PSS return package. Reported-by: Pratyush Yadav Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Reviewed-by: Pratyush Yadav Tested-by: Pratyush Yadav Tested-by: Hagar Hemdan Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

drm/amd/display: Write to correct dirty_rect

2023-08-03T08:24:18+00:00

commit 751281c55579f0cb0e56c9797d4663f689909681 upstream. When FB_DAMAGE_CLIPS are provided in a non-MPO scenario, the loop does not use the counter i. This causes the fill_dc_dity_rect() to always fill dirty_rects[0], causing graphical artifacts when a damage clip aware DRM client sends more than 1 damage clip. Instead, use the flip_addrs->dirty_rect_count which is incremented by fill_dc_dirty_rect() on a successful fill. Fixes: 30ebe41582d1 ("drm/amd/display: add FB_DAMAGE_CLIPS support") Bug: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/2453 Signed-off-by: Benjamin Cheng Signed-off-by: Hamza Mahfooz Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1.x Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

drm/amd/display: perform a bounds check before filling dirty rectangles

2023-08-03T08:24:18+00:00

commit af22d6a869cc26b519bfdcd54293c53f2e491870 upstream. Currently, it is possible for us to access memory that we shouldn't. Since, we acquire (possibly dangling) pointers to dirty rectangles before doing a bounds check to make sure we can actually accommodate the number of dirty rectangles userspace has requested to fill. This issue is especially evident if a compositor requests both MPO and damage clips at the same time, in which case I have observed a soft-hang. So, to avoid this issue, perform the bounds check before filling a single dirty rectangle and WARN() about it, if it is ever attempted in fill_dc_dirty_rect(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Fixes: 30ebe41582d1 ("drm/amd/display: add FB_DAMAGE_CLIPS support") Reviewed-by: Leo Li Signed-off-by: Hamza Mahfooz Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman