<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/drivers/xen, branch v6.1.87</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.1.87</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.1.87'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2024-03-06T14:45:20+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>xen/events: close evtchn after mapping cleanup</title>
<updated>2024-03-06T14:45:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maximilian Heyne</name>
<email>mheyne@amazon.de</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-24T16:31:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=585a344af6bcac222608a158fc2830ff02712af5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:585a344af6bcac222608a158fc2830ff02712af5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fa765c4b4aed2d64266b694520ecb025c862c5a9 upstream.

shutdown_pirq and startup_pirq are not taking the
irq_mapping_update_lock because they can't due to lock inversion. Both
are called with the irq_desc-&gt;lock being taking. The lock order,
however, is first irq_mapping_update_lock and then irq_desc-&gt;lock.

This opens multiple races:
- shutdown_pirq can be interrupted by a function that allocates an event
  channel:

  CPU0                        CPU1
  shutdown_pirq {
    xen_evtchn_close(e)
                              __startup_pirq {
                                EVTCHNOP_bind_pirq
                                  -&gt; returns just freed evtchn e
                                set_evtchn_to_irq(e, irq)
                              }
    xen_irq_info_cleanup() {
      set_evtchn_to_irq(e, -1)
    }
  }

  Assume here event channel e refers here to the same event channel
  number.
  After this race the evtchn_to_irq mapping for e is invalid (-1).

- __startup_pirq races with __unbind_from_irq in a similar way. Because
  __startup_pirq doesn't take irq_mapping_update_lock it can grab the
  evtchn that __unbind_from_irq is currently freeing and cleaning up. In
  this case even though the event channel is allocated, its mapping can
  be unset in evtchn_to_irq.

The fix is to first cleanup the mappings and then close the event
channel. In this way, when an event channel gets allocated it's
potential previous evtchn_to_irq mappings are guaranteed to be unset already.
This is also the reverse order of the allocation where first the event
channel is allocated and then the mappings are setup.

On a 5.10 kernel prior to commit 3fcdaf3d7634 ("xen/events: modify internal
[un]bind interfaces"), we hit a BUG like the following during probing of NVMe
devices. The issue is that during nvme_setup_io_queues, pci_free_irq
is called for every device which results in a call to shutdown_pirq.
With many nvme devices it's therefore likely to hit this race during
boot because there will be multiple calls to shutdown_pirq and
startup_pirq are running potentially in parallel.

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  blkfront: xvda: barrier or flush: disabled; persistent grants: enabled; indirect descriptors: enabled; bounce buffer: enabled
  kernel BUG at drivers/xen/events/events_base.c:499!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
  CPU: 44 PID: 375 Comm: kworker/u257:23 Not tainted 5.10.201-191.748.amzn2.x86_64 #1
  Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.11.amazon 08/24/2006
  Workqueue: nvme-reset-wq nvme_reset_work
  RIP: 0010:bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0
  Code: 5d 41 5e c3 cc cc cc cc 44 89 f7 e8 2b 55 ad ff 49 89 c5 48 85 c0 0f 84 64 ff ff ff 4c 8b 68 30 41 83 fe ff 0f 85 60 ff ff ff &lt;0f&gt; 0b 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 0f 1f 44 00 00
  RSP: 0000:ffffc9000d533b08 EFLAGS: 00010046
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000006
  RDX: 0000000000000028 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: 00000000ffffffff
  RBP: ffff888107419680 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff82d72b00
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000000001ed
  R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: 0000000000000002
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88bc8b500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000002610001 CR4: 00000000001706e0
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  Call Trace:
   ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c1/0x2d9
   ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c1/0x2d9
   ? set_affinity_irq+0xdc/0x1c0
   ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd
   ? die+0x2b/0x50
   ? do_trap+0x90/0x110
   ? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0
   ? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80
   ? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0
   ? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70
   ? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0
   ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x12/0x20
   ? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0
   ? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xc5/0xf0
   set_affinity_irq+0xdc/0x1c0
   irq_do_set_affinity+0x1d7/0x1f0
   irq_setup_affinity+0xd6/0x1a0
   irq_startup+0x8a/0xf0
   __setup_irq+0x639/0x6d0
   ? nvme_suspend+0x150/0x150
   request_threaded_irq+0x10c/0x180
   ? nvme_suspend+0x150/0x150
   pci_request_irq+0xa8/0xf0
   ? __blk_mq_free_request+0x74/0xa0
   queue_request_irq+0x6f/0x80
   nvme_create_queue+0x1af/0x200
   nvme_create_io_queues+0xbd/0xf0
   nvme_setup_io_queues+0x246/0x320
   ? nvme_irq_check+0x30/0x30
   nvme_reset_work+0x1c8/0x400
   process_one_work+0x1b0/0x350
   worker_thread+0x49/0x310
   ? process_one_work+0x350/0x350
   kthread+0x11b/0x140
   ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
   ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
  Modules linked in:
  ---[ end trace a11715de1eee1873 ]---

Fixes: d46a78b05c0e ("xen: implement pirq type event channels")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Co-debugged-by: Andrew Panyakin &lt;apanyaki@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Maximilian Heyne &lt;mheyne@amazon.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124163130.31324-1-mheyne@amazon.de
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Maximilian Heyne &lt;mheyne@amazon.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/gntdev: Fix the abuse of underlying struct page in DMA-buf import</title>
<updated>2024-02-05T20:12:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleksandr Tyshchenko</name>
<email>oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-07T10:34:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=52e7f0554952b7088dea1b15dab9e80e73052530'/>
<id>urn:sha1:52e7f0554952b7088dea1b15dab9e80e73052530</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2d2db7d40254d5fb53b11ebd703cd1ed0c5de7a1 ]

DO NOT access the underlying struct page of an sg table exported
by DMA-buf in dmabuf_imp_to_refs(), this is not allowed.
Please see drivers/dma-buf/dma-buf.c:mangle_sg_table() for details.

Fortunately, here (for special Xen device) we can avoid using
pages and calculate gfns directly from dma addresses provided by
the sg table.

Suggested-by: Daniel Vetter &lt;daniel@ffwll.ch&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko &lt;oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian König &lt;christian.koenig@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Vetter &lt;daniel@ffwll.ch&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240107103426.2038075-1-olekstysh@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen: simplify evtchn_do_upcall() call maze</title>
<updated>2023-12-08T07:51:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-24T15:34:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=00bc8b2cf44cc59c1177a167b2551294c6ed91eb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:00bc8b2cf44cc59c1177a167b2551294c6ed91eb</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 37510dd566bdbff31a769cde2fa6654bccdb8b24 ]

There are several functions involved for performing the functionality
of evtchn_do_upcall():

- __xen_evtchn_do_upcall() doing the real work
- xen_hvm_evtchn_do_upcall() just being a wrapper for
  __xen_evtchn_do_upcall(), exposed for external callers
- xen_evtchn_do_upcall() calling __xen_evtchn_do_upcall(), too, but
  without any user

Simplify this maze by:

- removing the unused xen_evtchn_do_upcall()
- removing xen_hvm_evtchn_do_upcall() as the only left caller of
  __xen_evtchn_do_upcall(), while renaming __xen_evtchn_do_upcall() to
  xen_evtchn_do_upcall()

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Stable-dep-of: db2832309a82 ("x86/xen: fix percpu vcpu_info allocation")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen: Allow platform PCI interrupt to be shared</title>
<updated>2023-12-08T07:51:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Woodhouse</name>
<email>dwmw@amazon.co.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-18T12:22:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=9311a0ff388aa4f05d448edb656f308122694c03'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9311a0ff388aa4f05d448edb656f308122694c03</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3e8cd711c3da6c3d724076048038cd666bdbb2b5 ]

When we don't use the per-CPU vector callback, we ask Xen to deliver event
channel interrupts as INTx on the PCI platform device. As such, it can be
shared with INTx on other PCI devices.

Set IRQF_SHARED, and make it return IRQ_HANDLED or IRQ_NONE according to
whether the evtchn_upcall_pending flag was actually set. Now I can share
the interrupt:

 11:         82          0   IO-APIC  11-fasteoi   xen-platform-pci, ens4

Drop the IRQF_TRIGGER_RISING. It has no effect when the IRQ is shared,
and besides, the only effect it was having even beforehand was to trigger
a debug message in both I/OAPIC and legacy PIC cases:

[    0.915441] genirq: No set_type function for IRQ 11 (IO-APIC)
[    0.951939] genirq: No set_type function for IRQ 11 (XT-PIC)

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/f9a29a68d05668a3636dd09acd94d970269eaec6.camel@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Stable-dep-of: db2832309a82 ("x86/xen: fix percpu vcpu_info allocation")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>swiotlb-xen: provide the "max_mapping_size" method</title>
<updated>2023-12-03T06:32:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Keith Busch</name>
<email>kbusch@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-11-06T17:12:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=354d162ba527c6d935b59c53c644722d533607cd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:354d162ba527c6d935b59c53c644722d533607cd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bff2a2d453a1b683378b4508b86b84389f551a00 upstream.

There's a bug that when using the XEN hypervisor with bios with large
multi-page bio vectors on NVMe, the kernel deadlocks [1].

The deadlocks are caused by inability to map a large bio vector -
dma_map_sgtable always returns an error, this gets propagated to the block
layer as BLK_STS_RESOURCE and the block layer retries the request
indefinitely.

XEN uses the swiotlb framework to map discontiguous pages into contiguous
runs that are submitted to the PCIe device. The swiotlb framework has a
limitation on the length of a mapping - this needs to be announced with
the max_mapping_size method to make sure that the hardware drivers do not
create larger mappings.

Without max_mapping_size, the NVMe block driver would create large
mappings that overrun the maximum mapping size.

Reported-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki &lt;marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/stable/ZTNH0qtmint%2FzLJZ@mail-itl/ [1]
Tested-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki &lt;marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch &lt;kbusch@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka &lt;mpatocka@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/151bef41-e817-aea9-675-a35fdac4ed@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/events: fix delayed eoi list handling</title>
<updated>2023-11-28T17:07:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-25T15:54:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ceae93d76a51855aafa85b02e05f02a0f3eacc66'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ceae93d76a51855aafa85b02e05f02a0f3eacc66</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 47d970204054f859f35a2237baa75c2d84fcf436 ]

When delaying eoi handling of events, the related elements are queued
into the percpu lateeoi list. In case the list isn't empty, the
elements should be sorted by the time when eoi handling is to happen.

Unfortunately a new element will never be queued at the start of the
list, even if it has a handling time lower than all other list
elements.

Fix that by handling that case the same way as for an empty list.

Fixes: e99502f76271 ("xen/events: defer eoi in case of excessive number of events")
Reported-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko &lt;oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen-pciback: Consider INTx disabled when MSI/MSI-X is enabled</title>
<updated>2023-11-20T10:52:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marek Marczykowski-Górecki</name>
<email>marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-16T13:13:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=5671bed3c0c8f1bd94e8cea43d808a51ed5c90db'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5671bed3c0c8f1bd94e8cea43d808a51ed5c90db</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2c269f42d0f382743ab230308b836ffe5ae9b2ae ]

Linux enables MSI-X before disabling INTx, but keeps MSI-X masked until
the table is filled. Then it disables INTx just before clearing MASKALL
bit. Currently this approach is rejected by xen-pciback.
According to the PCIe spec, device cannot use INTx when MSI/MSI-X is
enabled (in other words: enabling MSI/MSI-X implicitly disables INTx).

Change the logic to consider INTx disabled if MSI/MSI-X is enabled. This
applies to three places:
 - checking currently enabled interrupts type,
 - transition to MSI/MSI-X - where INTx would be implicitly disabled,
 - clearing INTx disable bit - which can be allowed even if MSI/MSI-X is
   enabled, as device should consider INTx disabled anyway in that case

Fixes: 5e29500eba2a ("xen-pciback: Allow setting PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_MASKALL too")
Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki &lt;marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com&gt;
Acked-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231016131348.1734721-1-marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xenbus: fix error exit in xenbus_init()</title>
<updated>2023-11-20T10:52:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-22T09:11:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=934747e2f807b9d2b13a6a05e2970eb3537a3179'/>
<id>urn:sha1:934747e2f807b9d2b13a6a05e2970eb3537a3179</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 44961b81a9e9059b5c0443643915386db7035227 ]

In case an error occurs in xenbus_init(), xen_store_domain_type should
be set to XS_UNKNOWN.

Fix one instance where this action is missing.

Fixes: 5b3353949e89 ("xen: add support for initializing xenstore later as HVM domain")
Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;error27@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202304200845.w7m4kXZr-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko &lt;oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230822091138.4765-1-jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/events: replace evtchn_rwlock with RCU</title>
<updated>2023-10-10T20:00:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-28T06:09:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=a4cc925e2e12c3bbffb0860acdb9f9c1abde47dd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a4cc925e2e12c3bbffb0860acdb9f9c1abde47dd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 87797fad6cce28ec9be3c13f031776ff4f104cfc upstream.

In unprivileged Xen guests event handling can cause a deadlock with
Xen console handling. The evtchn_rwlock and the hvc_lock are taken in
opposite sequence in __hvc_poll() and in Xen console IRQ handling.
Normally this is no problem, as the evtchn_rwlock is taken as a reader
in both paths, but as soon as an event channel is being closed, the
lock will be taken as a writer, which will cause read_lock() to block:

CPU0                     CPU1                CPU2
(IRQ handling)           (__hvc_poll())      (closing event channel)

read_lock(evtchn_rwlock)
                         spin_lock(hvc_lock)
                                             write_lock(evtchn_rwlock)
                                                 [blocks]
spin_lock(hvc_lock)
    [blocks]
                        read_lock(evtchn_rwlock)
                            [blocks due to writer waiting,
                             and not in_interrupt()]

This issue can be avoided by replacing evtchn_rwlock with RCU in
xen_free_irq(). Note that RCU is used only to delay freeing of the
irq_info memory. There is no RCU based dereferencing or replacement of
pointers involved.

In order to avoid potential races between removing the irq_info
reference and handling of interrupts, set the irq_info pointer to NULL
only when freeing its memory. The IRQ itself must be freed at that
time, too, as otherwise the same IRQ number could be allocated again
before handling of the old instance would have been finished.

This is XSA-441 / CVE-2023-34324.

Fixes: 54c9de89895e ("xen/events: add a new "late EOI" evtchn framework")
Reported-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki &lt;marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall &lt;jgrall@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen: speed up grant-table reclaim</title>
<updated>2023-08-03T08:24:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Demi Marie Obenour</name>
<email>demi@invisiblethingslab.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-07-26T16:52:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=cd1a8952ff529adc210e62306849fd6f256608c0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cd1a8952ff529adc210e62306849fd6f256608c0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c04e9894846c663f3278a414f34416e6e45bbe68 upstream.

When a grant entry is still in use by the remote domain, Linux must put
it on a deferred list.  Normally, this list is very short, because
the PV network and block protocols expect the backend to unmap the grant
first.  However, Qubes OS's GUI protocol is subject to the constraints
of the X Window System, and as such winds up with the frontend unmapping
the window first.  As a result, the list can grow very large, resulting
in a massive memory leak and eventual VM freeze.

To partially solve this problem, make the number of entries that the VM
will attempt to free at each iteration tunable.  The default is still
10, but it can be overridden via a module parameter.

This is Cc: stable because (when combined with appropriate userspace
changes) it fixes a severe performance and stability problem for Qubes
OS users.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour &lt;demi@invisiblethingslab.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230726165354.1252-1-demi@invisiblethingslab.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
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