kernel/linux.git/drivers/xen/privcmd.c, branch v6.6.134

xen/privcmd: add boot control for restricted usage in domU

2026-03-25T10:06:10+00:00

commit 1613462be621ad5103ec338a7b0ca0746ec4e5f1 upstream. When running in an unprivileged domU under Xen, the privcmd driver is restricted to allow only hypercalls against a target domain, for which the current domU is acting as a device model. Add a boot parameter "unrestricted" to allow all hypercalls (the hypervisor will still refuse destructive hypercalls affecting other guests). Make this new parameter effective only in case the domU wasn't started using secure boot, as otherwise hypercalls targeting the domU itself might result in violating the secure boot functionality. This is achieved by adding another lockdown reason, which can be tested to not being set when applying the "unrestricted" option. This is part of XSA-482 Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

xen/privcmd: restrict usage in unprivileged domU

2026-03-25T10:06:10+00:00

commit 453b8fb68f3641fea970db88b7d9a153ed2a37e8 upstream. The Xen privcmd driver allows to issue arbitrary hypercalls from user space processes. This is normally no problem, as access is usually limited to root and the hypervisor will deny any hypercalls affecting other domains. In case the guest is booted using secure boot, however, the privcmd driver would be enabling a root user process to modify e.g. kernel memory contents, thus breaking the secure boot feature. The only known case where an unprivileged domU is really needing to use the privcmd driver is the case when it is acting as the device model for another guest. In this case all hypercalls issued via the privcmd driver will target that other guest. Fortunately the privcmd driver can already be locked down to allow only hypercalls targeting a specific domain, but this mode can be activated from user land only today. The target domain can be obtained from Xenstore, so when not running in dom0 restrict the privcmd driver to that target domain from the beginning, resolving the potential problem of breaking secure boot. This is XSA-482 Reported-by: Teddy Astie Fixes: 1c5de1939c20 ("xen: add privcmd driver") Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

xen: privcmd: Fix possible access to a freed kirqfd instance

2024-09-12T09:11:35+00:00

[ Upstream commit 611ff1b1ae989a7bcce3e2a8e132ee30e968c557 ] Nothing prevents simultaneous ioctl calls to privcmd_irqfd_assign() and privcmd_irqfd_deassign(). If that happens, it is possible that a kirqfd created and added to the irqfds_list by privcmd_irqfd_assign() may get removed by another thread executing privcmd_irqfd_deassign(), while the former is still using it after dropping the locks. This can lead to a situation where an already freed kirqfd instance may be accessed and cause kernel oops. Use SRCU locking to prevent the same, as is done for the KVM implementation for irqfds. Reported-by: Al Viro Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9e884af1f1f842eacbb7afc5672c8feb4dea7f3f.1718703669.git.viresh.kumar@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

xen: privcmd: Switch from mutex to spinlock for irqfds

2024-08-14T11:58:42+00:00

[ Upstream commit 1c682593096a487fd9aebc079a307ff7a6d054a3 ] irqfd_wakeup() gets EPOLLHUP, when it is called by eventfd_release() by way of wake_up_poll(&ctx->wqh, EPOLLHUP), which gets called under spin_lock_irqsave(). We can't use a mutex here as it will lead to a deadlock. Fix it by switching over to a spin lock. Reported-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a66d7a7a9001424d432f52a9fc3931a1f345464f.1718703669.git.viresh.kumar@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

xen: Make struct privcmd_irqfd's layout architecture independent

2023-11-20T10:59:12+00:00

[ Upstream commit 8dd765a5d769c521d73931850d1c8708fbc490cb ] Using indirect pointers in an ioctl command argument means that the layout is architecture specific, in particular we can't use the same one from 32-bit compat tasks. The general recommendation is to have __u64 members and use u64_to_user_ptr() to access it from the kernel if we are unable to avoid the pointers altogether. Fixes: f8941e6c4c71 ("xen: privcmd: Add support for irqfd") Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/268a2031-63b8-4c7d-b1e5-8ab83ca80b4a@app.fastmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a4ef0d4a68fc858b34a81fd3f9877d9b6898eb77.1697439990.git.viresh.kumar@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

xen: privcmd: Add support for irqfd

2023-08-22T10:12:50+00:00

Xen provides support for injecting interrupts to the guests via the HYPERVISOR_dm_op() hypercall. The same is used by the Virtio based device backend implementations, in an inefficient manner currently. Generally, the Virtio backends are implemented to work with the Eventfd based mechanism. In order to make such backends work with Xen, another software layer needs to poll the Eventfds and raise an interrupt to the guest using the Xen based mechanism. This results in an extra context switch. This is not a new problem in Linux though. It is present with other hypervisors like KVM, etc. as well. The generic solution implemented in the kernel for them is to provide an IOCTL call to pass the interrupt details and eventfd, which lets the kernel take care of polling the eventfd and raising of the interrupt, instead of handling this in user space (which involves an extra context switch). This patch adds support to inject a specific interrupt to guest using the eventfd mechanism, by preventing the extra context switch. Inspired by existing implementations for KVM, etc.. Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8e724ac1f50c2bc1eb8da9b3ff6166f1372570aa.1692697321.git.viresh.kumar@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross

mm: ptep_get() conversion

2023-06-19T23:19:25+00:00

Convert all instances of direct pte_t* dereferencing to instead use ptep_get() helper. This means that by default, the accesses change from a C dereference to a READ_ONCE(). This is technically the correct thing to do since where pgtables are modified by HW (for access/dirty) they are volatile and therefore we should always ensure READ_ONCE() semantics. But more importantly, by always using the helper, it can be overridden by the architecture to fully encapsulate the contents of the pte. Arch code is deliberately not converted, as the arch code knows best. It is intended that arch code (arm64) will override the default with its own implementation that can (e.g.) hide certain bits from the core code, or determine young/dirty status by mixing in state from another source. Conversion was done using Coccinelle: ---- // $ make coccicheck \ // COCCI=ptepget.cocci \ // SPFLAGS="--include-headers" \ // MODE=patch virtual patch @ depends on patch @ pte_t *v; @@ - *v + ptep_get(v) ---- Then reviewed and hand-edited to avoid multiple unnecessary calls to ptep_get(), instead opting to store the result of a single call in a variable, where it is correct to do so. This aims to negate any cost of READ_ONCE() and will benefit arch-overrides that may be more complex. Included is a fix for an issue in an earlier version of this patch that was pointed out by kernel test robot. The issue arose because config MMU=n elides definition of the ptep helper functions, including ptep_get(). HUGETLB_PAGE=n configs still define a simple huge_ptep_clear_flush() for linking purposes, which dereferences the ptep. So when both configs are disabled, this caused a build error because ptep_get() is not defined. Fix by continuing to do a direct dereference when MMU=n. This is safe because for this config the arch code cannot be trying to virtualize the ptes because none of the ptep helpers are defined. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230612151545.3317766-4-ryan.roberts@arm.com Reported-by: kernel test robot Link: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202305120142.yXsNEo6H-lkp@intel.com/ Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts Cc: Adrian Hunter Cc: Alexander Potapenko Cc: Alexander Shishkin Cc: Alex Williamson Cc: Al Viro Cc: Andrey Konovalov Cc: Andrey Ryabinin Cc: Christian Brauner Cc: Christoph Hellwig Cc: Daniel Vetter Cc: Dave Airlie Cc: Dimitri Sivanich Cc: Dmitry Vyukov Cc: Ian Rogers Cc: Jason Gunthorpe Cc: Jérôme Glisse Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Johannes Weiner Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes Cc: Mark Rutland Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Miaohe Lin Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: Mike Kravetz Cc: Mike Rapoport (IBM) Cc: Muchun Song Cc: Namhyung Kim Cc: Naoya Horiguchi Cc: Oleksandr Tyshchenko Cc: Pavel Tatashin Cc: Roman Gushchin Cc: SeongJae Park Cc: Shakeel Butt Cc: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) Cc: Vincenzo Frascino Cc: Yu Zhao Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton

mm: replace vma->vm_flags direct modifications with modifier calls

2023-02-10T00:51:39+00:00

Replace direct modifications to vma->vm_flags with calls to modifier functions to be able to track flag changes and to keep vma locking correctness. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix drivers/misc/open-dice.c, per Hyeonggon Yoo] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230126193752.297968-5-surenb@google.com Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan Acked-by: Michal Hocko Acked-by: Mel Gorman Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) Acked-by: Sebastian Reichel Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett Reviewed-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Arjun Roy Cc: Axel Rasmussen Cc: David Hildenbrand Cc: David Howells Cc: Davidlohr Bueso Cc: David Rientjes Cc: Eric Dumazet Cc: Greg Thelen Cc: Hugh Dickins Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Jann Horn Cc: Joel Fernandes Cc: Johannes Weiner Cc: Kent Overstreet Cc: Laurent Dufour Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Minchan Kim Cc: Paul E. McKenney Cc: Peter Oskolkov Cc: Peter Xu Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Punit Agrawal Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Cc: Shakeel Butt Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh Cc: Song Liu Cc: Vlastimil Babka Cc: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton

xen/privcmd: Fix a possible warning in privcmd_ioctl_mmap_resource()

2022-12-05T12:54:29+00:00

As 'kdata.num' is user-controlled data, if user tries to allocate memory larger than(>=) MAX_ORDER, then kcalloc() will fail, it creates a stack trace and messes up dmesg with a warning. Call trace: -> privcmd_ioctl --> privcmd_ioctl_mmap_resource Add __GFP_NOWARN in order to avoid too large allocation warning. This is detected by static analysis using smatch. Fixes: 3ad0876554ca ("xen/privcmd: add IOCTL_PRIVCMD_MMAP_RESOURCE") Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221126050745.778967-1-harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross

xen: use vma_lookup() in privcmd_ioctl_mmap()

2022-09-27T02:46:16+00:00

vma_lookup() walks the VMA tree for a specific value, find_vma() will search the tree after walking to a specific value. It is more efficient to only walk to the requested value since privcmd_ioctl_mmap() will exit the loop if vm_start != msg->va. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220906194824.2110408-20-Liam.Howlett@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Liam R. Howlett Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka Tested-by: Yu Zhao Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: David Hildenbrand Cc: David Howells Cc: Davidlohr Bueso Cc: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" Cc: SeongJae Park Cc: Sven Schnelle Cc: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton