<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/drivers/virt/Kconfig, branch v6.12.80</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.12.80</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.12.80'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2024-04-27T00:38:34+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>virt: vmgenid: add support for devicetree bindings</title>
<updated>2024-04-27T00:38:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sudan Landge</name>
<email>sudanl@amazon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-04-17T10:40:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=7b1bcd6b50a615671d4dcb0ad0378a2660a1a368'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7b1bcd6b50a615671d4dcb0ad0378a2660a1a368</id>
<content type='text'>
Extend the vmgenid platform driver to support devicetree bindings. With
this support, hypervisors can send vmgenid notifications to the virtual
machine without the need to enable ACPI. The bindings are located at:
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/rng/microsoft,vmgenid.yaml

Since this is no longer ACPI-dependent, remove the dependency from
Kconfig and protect the ACPI code with a single ifdef.

Signed-off-by: Sudan Landge &lt;sudanl@amazon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexander Graf &lt;graf@amazon.com&gt;
Tested-by: Babis Chalios &lt;bchalios@amazon.es&gt;
[Jason: - Small style cleanups and refactoring.
        - Re-work ACPI conditionalization. ]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>virt: coco: Add a coco/Makefile and coco/Kconfig</title>
<updated>2023-10-20T01:11:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Williams</name>
<email>dan.j.williams@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-13T00:21:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ec51ffcf263016111f090b9440a3c5a8338648e8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ec51ffcf263016111f090b9440a3c5a8338648e8</id>
<content type='text'>
In preparation for adding another coco build target, relieve
drivers/virt/Makefile of the responsibility to track new compilation
unit additions to drivers/virt/coco/, and do the same for
drivers/virt/Kconfig.

Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan &lt;sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan &lt;sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>virt: Add TDX guest driver</title>
<updated>2022-11-17T19:04:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan</name>
<email>sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-16T22:38:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=6c8c1406a6d6a3f2e61ac590f5c0994231bc6be7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6c8c1406a6d6a3f2e61ac590f5c0994231bc6be7</id>
<content type='text'>
TDX guest driver exposes IOCTL interfaces to service TDX guest
user-specific requests. Currently, it is only used to allow the user to
get the TDREPORT to support TDX attestation.

Details about the TDX attestation process are documented in
Documentation/x86/tdx.rst, and the IOCTL details are documented in
Documentation/virt/coco/tdx-guest.rst.

Operations like getting TDREPORT involves sending a blob of data as
input and getting another blob of data as output. It was considered
to use a sysfs interface for this, but it doesn't fit well into the
standard sysfs model for configuring values. It would be possible to
do read/write on files, but it would need multiple file descriptors,
which would be somewhat messy. IOCTLs seem to be the best fitting
and simplest model for this use case. The AMD sev-guest driver also
uses the IOCTL interface to support attestation.

[Bagas Sanjaya: Ack is for documentation portion]
Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan &lt;sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Bagas Sanjaya &lt;bagasdotme@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mika Westerberg &lt;mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kai Huang &lt;kai.huang@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Wander Lairson Costa &lt;wander@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221116223820.819090-3-sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy%40linux.intel.com
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86_sev_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2022-05-24T00:38:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-24T00:38:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=eb39e37d5cebdf0f63ee2a315fc23b035d81b4b0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:eb39e37d5cebdf0f63ee2a315fc23b035d81b4b0</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull AMD SEV-SNP support from Borislav Petkov:
 "The third AMD confidential computing feature called Secure Nested
  Paging.

  Add to confidential guests the necessary memory integrity protection
  against malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data replay, memory
  remapping and others, thus achieving a stronger isolation from the
  hypervisor.

  At the core of the functionality is a new structure called a reverse
  map table (RMP) with which the guest has a say in which pages get
  assigned to it and gets notified when a page which it owns, gets
  accessed/modified under the covers so that the guest can take an
  appropriate action.

  In addition, add support for the whole machinery needed to launch a
  SNP guest, details of which is properly explained in each patch.

  And last but not least, the series refactors and improves parts of the
  previous SEV support so that the new code is accomodated properly and
  not just bolted on"

* tag 'x86_sev_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (60 commits)
  x86/entry: Fixup objtool/ibt validation
  x86/sev: Mark the code returning to user space as syscall gap
  x86/sev: Annotate stack change in the #VC handler
  x86/sev: Remove duplicated assignment to variable info
  x86/sev: Fix address space sparse warning
  x86/sev: Get the AP jump table address from secrets page
  x86/sev: Add missing __init annotations to SEV init routines
  virt: sevguest: Rename the sevguest dir and files to sev-guest
  virt: sevguest: Change driver name to reflect generic SEV support
  x86/boot: Put globals that are accessed early into the .data section
  x86/boot: Add an efi.h header for the decompressor
  virt: sevguest: Fix bool function returning negative value
  virt: sevguest: Fix return value check in alloc_shared_pages()
  x86/sev-es: Replace open-coded hlt-loop with sev_es_terminate()
  virt: sevguest: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement
  virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
  virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key
  virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
  x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device
  x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>virt: sevguest: Rename the sevguest dir and files to sev-guest</title>
<updated>2022-04-27T11:29:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Lendacky</name>
<email>thomas.lendacky@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-20T14:14:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=d63670d23e60f00210635ca7c62bce27bec55f1b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d63670d23e60f00210635ca7c62bce27bec55f1b</id>
<content type='text'>
Rename the drivers/virt/coco/sevguest directory and files to sev-guest
so as to match the driver name.

  [ bp: Rename Documentation/virt/coco/sevguest.rst too, as reported by sfr:
    https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427101059.3bf55262@canb.auug.org.au ]

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2f5c9cb16e3a67599c8e3170f6c72c8712c47d53.1650464054.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets</title>
<updated>2022-04-13T17:11:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dov Murik</name>
<email>dovmurik@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-12T21:21:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=cbabf03c3ef3cce74a97f140cf57611a9e8a21bc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cbabf03c3ef3cce74a97f140cf57611a9e8a21bc</id>
<content type='text'>
The new efi_secret module exposes the confidential computing (coco)
EFI secret area via securityfs interface.

When the module is loaded (and securityfs is mounted, typically under
/sys/kernel/security), a "secrets/coco" directory is created in
securityfs.  In it, a file is created for each secret entry.  The name
of each such file is the GUID of the secret entry, and its content is
the secret data.

This allows applications running in a confidential computing setting to
read secrets provided by the guest owner via a secure secret injection
mechanism (such as AMD SEV's LAUNCH_SECRET command).

Removing (unlinking) files in the "secrets/coco" directory will zero out
the secret in memory, and remove the filesystem entry.  If the module is
removed and loaded again, that secret will not appear in the filesystem.

Signed-off-by: Dov Murik &lt;dovmurik@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann &lt;kraxel@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220412212127.154182-3-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver</title>
<updated>2022-04-07T14:47:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Brijesh Singh</name>
<email>brijesh.singh@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-07T21:33:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=fce96cf0443083e37455eff8f78fd240c621dae3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fce96cf0443083e37455eff8f78fd240c621dae3</id>
<content type='text'>
The SEV-SNP specification provides the guest a mechanism to communicate
with the PSP without risk from a malicious hypervisor who wishes to
read, alter, drop or replay the messages sent. The driver uses
snp_issue_guest_request() to issue GHCB SNP_GUEST_REQUEST or
SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST NAE events to submit the request to PSP.

The PSP requires that all communication should be encrypted using key
specified through a struct snp_guest_platform_data descriptor.

Userspace can use SNP_GET_REPORT ioctl() to query the guest attestation
report.

See SEV-SNP spec section Guest Messages for more details.

  [ bp: Remove the "what" from the commit message, massage. ]

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh &lt;brijesh.singh@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-44-brijesh.singh@amd.com
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>virt: vmgenid: notify RNG of VM fork and supply generation ID</title>
<updated>2022-03-13T01:00:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-02-23T12:46:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=af6b54e2b5baa54c844573b6d49cc91157bcdd7e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:af6b54e2b5baa54c844573b6d49cc91157bcdd7e</id>
<content type='text'>
VM Generation ID is a feature from Microsoft, described at
&lt;https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=260709&gt;, and supported by
Hyper-V and QEMU. Its usage is described in Microsoft's RNG whitepaper,
&lt;https://aka.ms/win10rng&gt;, as:

    If the OS is running in a VM, there is a problem that most
    hypervisors can snapshot the state of the machine and later rewind
    the VM state to the saved state. This results in the machine running
    a second time with the exact same RNG state, which leads to serious
    security problems.  To reduce the window of vulnerability, Windows
    10 on a Hyper-V VM will detect when the VM state is reset, retrieve
    a unique (not random) value from the hypervisor, and reseed the root
    RNG with that unique value.  This does not eliminate the
    vulnerability, but it greatly reduces the time during which the RNG
    system will produce the same outputs as it did during a previous
    instantiation of the same VM state.

Linux has the same issue, and given that vmgenid is supported already by
multiple hypervisors, we can implement more or less the same solution.
So this commit wires up the vmgenid ACPI notification to the RNG's newly
added add_vmfork_randomness() function.

It can be used from qemu via the `-device vmgenid,guid=auto` parameter.
After setting that, use `savevm` in the monitor to save the VM state,
then quit QEMU, start it again, and use `loadvm`. That will trigger this
driver's notify function, which hands the new UUID to the RNG. This is
described in &lt;https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob;f=docs/specs/vmgenid.txt&gt;.
And there are hooks for this in libvirt as well, described in
&lt;https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html#general-metadata&gt;.

Note, however, that the treatment of this as a UUID is considered to be
an accidental QEMU nuance, per
&lt;https://github.com/libguestfs/virt-v2v/blob/master/docs/vm-generation-id-across-hypervisors.txt&gt;,
so this driver simply treats these bytes as an opaque 128-bit binary
blob, as per the spec. This doesn't really make a difference anyway,
considering that's how it ends up when handed to the RNG in the end.

Cc: Alexander Graf &lt;graf@amazon.com&gt;
Cc: Adrian Catangiu &lt;adrian@parity.io&gt;
Cc: Daniel P. Berrangé &lt;berrange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Cc: Wei Yongjun &lt;weiyongjun1@huawei.com&gt;
Tested-by: Souradeep Chakrabarti &lt;souradch.linux@gmail.com&gt; # With Hyper-V's virtual hardware
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek &lt;lersek@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>virt: acrn: Introduce ACRN HSM basic driver</title>
<updated>2021-02-09T09:58:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Shuo Liu</name>
<email>shuo.a.liu@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-02-07T03:10:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=666834c47d3b41da550bbcbc709148e5fc14879c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:666834c47d3b41da550bbcbc709148e5fc14879c</id>
<content type='text'>
ACRN Hypervisor Service Module (HSM) is a kernel module in Service VM
which communicates with ACRN userspace through ioctls and talks to ACRN
Hypervisor through hypercalls.

Add a basic HSM driver which allows Service VM userspace to communicate
with ACRN. The following patches will add more ioctls, guest VM memory
mapping caching, I/O request processing, ioeventfd and irqfd into this
module. HSM exports a char device interface (/dev/acrn_hsm) to userspace.

Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Zhi Wang &lt;zhi.a.wang@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Zhenyu Wang &lt;zhenyuw@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Yu Wang &lt;yu1.wang@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Reinette Chatre &lt;reinette.chatre@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre &lt;reinette.chatre@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shuo Liu &lt;shuo.a.liu@intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210207031040.49576-6-shuo.a.liu@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nitro_enclaves: Add Kconfig for the Nitro Enclaves driver</title>
<updated>2020-09-22T11:58:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andra Paraschiv</name>
<email>andraprs@amazon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-21T12:17:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=07499cc661a926eb4ca19604502e3f0bda2aa4bf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:07499cc661a926eb4ca19604502e3f0bda2aa4bf</id>
<content type='text'>
Add kernel config entry for Nitro Enclaves, including dependencies.

Changelog

v9 -&gt; v10

* Update commit message to include the changelog before the SoB tag(s).

v8 -&gt; v9

* No changes.

v7 -&gt; v8

* No changes.

v6 -&gt; v7

* Remove, for now, the dependency on ARM64 arch. x86 is currently
  supported, with Arm to come afterwards. The NE kernel driver can be
  built for aarch64 arch.

v5 -&gt; v6

* No changes.

v4 -&gt; v5

* Add arch dependency for Arm / x86.

v3 -&gt; v4

* Add PCI and SMP dependencies.

v2 -&gt; v3

* Remove the GPL additional wording as SPDX-License-Identifier is
  already in place.

v1 -&gt; v2

* Update path to Kconfig to match the drivers/virt/nitro_enclaves
  directory.
* Update help in Kconfig.

Reviewed-by: Alexander Graf &lt;graf@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andra Paraschiv &lt;andraprs@amazon.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200921121732.44291-15-andraprs@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
