kernel/linux.git/drivers/thunderbolt, branch v6.18.35

thunderbolt: property: Cap recursion depth in __tb_property_parse_dir()

2026-06-09T10:28:53+00:00

[ Upstream commit 928abe19fbf0127003abcb1ea69cabc1c897d0ab ] A DIRECTORY entry's value field is used as the dir_offset for a recursive call into __tb_property_parse_dir() with no depth counter. A crafted peer that chains DIRECTORY entries into a back-reference loop drives the parser until the kernel stack is exhausted and the guard page fires. Any untrusted XDomain peer (cable, dock, in-line inspector, adjacent host) that reaches the PROPERTIES_REQUEST control-plane exchange can trigger this without authentication. Thread a depth counter through tb_property_parse() and __tb_property_parse_dir(), and reject blocks that exceed TB_PROPERTY_MAX_DEPTH = 8. That is comfortably larger than any observed legitimate XDomain layout. Operators who do not need XDomain host-to-host discovery can disable the path entirely with thunderbolt.xdomain=0 on the kernel command line. Fixes: cdae7c07e3e3 ("thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain properties") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6 Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-4 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

thunderbolt: property: Reject dir_len < 4 to prevent size_t underflow

2026-06-09T10:28:46+00:00

commit de21b59c29e31c5108ddc04210631bbfab81b997 upstream. On the non-root path, __tb_property_parse_dir() takes dir_len from entry->length (u16 widened to size_t). Two distinct OOB conditions follow when entry->length < 4: 1. The non-root path begins with kmemdup(&block[dir_offset], sizeof(*dir->uuid), ...) which always reads 4 dwords from dir_offset. tb_property_entry_valid() only enforces dir_offset + entry->length <= block_len, so a crafted entry with dir_offset close to the end of the property block and entry->length in 0..3 passes that gate but lets the UUID copy run off the block (e.g. dir_offset = 497, dir_len = 3 in a 500-dword block reads block[497..501]). 2. After the kmemdup, content_len = dir_len - 4 underflows size_t to ~SIZE_MAX, nentries becomes SIZE_MAX / 4, and the entry walk runs OOB on each iteration until an entry fails validation or the kernel oopses on an unmapped page. Reject dir_len < 4 on the non-root path *before* the UUID kmemdup, which closes both holes. Also move INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dir->properties) up to immediately after the dir allocation so the new error-return path (and the existing uuid-alloc failure path) calling tb_property_free_dir() sees a walkable list rather than the zero-initialized NULL next/prev that list_for_each_entry_safe() would oops on. Fixes: cdae7c07e3e3 ("thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain properties") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6 Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-4 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

thunderbolt: property: Reject u32 wrap in tb_property_entry_valid()

2026-06-09T10:28:46+00:00

commit 01deda0152066c6c955f0619114ea6afa070aaec upstream. entry->value is u32 and entry->length is u16; the sum is performed in u32 and wraps. A malicious XDomain peer can pick value = 0xffffff00, length = 0x100 so the sum 0x100000000 wraps to 0 and passes the > block_len check. tb_property_parse() then passes entry->value to parse_dwdata() as a dword offset into the property block, reading attacker-directed memory far past the allocation. For TEXT-typed entries with the "deviceid" or "vendorid" keys this lands in xd->device_name / xd->vendor_name and is readable back via the per-XDomain device_name / vendor_name sysfs attributes; the leak is NUL-bounded (kstrdup() stops at the first zero byte) and untargeted (the attacker picks a delta, not an absolute address). DATA-typed entries are parsed into property->value.data but not generically surfaced to userspace. Use check_add_overflow() so a wrapped sum is rejected. Fixes: cdae7c07e3e3 ("thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain properties") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6 Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-4 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

thunderbolt: Fix property read in nhi_wake_supported()

2026-04-11T12:26:48+00:00

commit 73a505dc48144ec72e25874e2b2a72487b02d3bc upstream. device_property_read_foo() returns 0 on success and only then modifies 'val'. Currently, val is left uninitialized if the aforementioned function returns non-zero, making nhi_wake_supported() return true almost always (random != 0) if the property is not present in device firmware. Invert the check to make it make sense. Fixes: 3cdb9446a117 ("thunderbolt: Add support for Intel Ice Lake") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Konrad Dybcio Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

thunderbolt: Add support for Intel Wildcat Lake

2025-10-20T06:20:34+00:00

Intel Wildcat Lake derives its Thunderbolt/USB4 controller from Lunar Lake platform. Add Wildcat Lake PCI ID to the driver list of supported devices. Signed-off-by: Alan Borzeszkowski Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg

thunderbolt: Fix use-after-free in tb_dp_dprx_work

2025-09-23T15:16:38+00:00

The original code relies on cancel_delayed_work() in tb_dp_dprx_stop(), which does not ensure that the delayed work item tunnel->dprx_work has fully completed if it was already running. This leads to use-after-free scenarios where tb_tunnel is deallocated by tb_tunnel_put(), while tunnel->dprx_work remains active and attempts to dereference tb_tunnel in tb_dp_dprx_work(). A typical race condition is illustrated below: CPU 0 | CPU 1 tb_dp_tunnel_active() | tb_deactivate_and_free_tunnel()| tb_dp_dprx_start() tb_tunnel_deactivate() | queue_delayed_work() tb_dp_activate() | tb_dp_dprx_stop() | tb_dp_dprx_work() //delayed worker cancel_delayed_work() | tb_tunnel_put(tunnel); | | tunnel = container_of(...); //UAF | tunnel-> //UAF Replacing cancel_delayed_work() with cancel_delayed_work_sync() is not feasible as it would introduce a deadlock: both tb_dp_dprx_work() and the cleanup path acquire tb->lock, and cancel_delayed_work_sync() would wait indefinitely for the work item that cannot proceed. Instead, implement proper reference counting: - If cancel_delayed_work() returns true (work is pending), we release the reference in the stop function. - If it returns false (work is executing or already completed), the reference is released in delayed work function itself. This ensures the tb_tunnel remains valid during work item execution while preventing memory leaks. This bug was found by static analysis. Fixes: d6d458d42e1e ("thunderbolt: Handle DisplayPort tunnel activation asynchronously") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg

thunderbolt: Update xdomain.c function documentation

2025-09-17T05:33:00+00:00

Make xdomain.c function documentation compliant with current kernel-doc standards. No functional changes. Signed-off-by: Alan Borzeszkowski Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg

thunderbolt: Update usb4_port.c function documentation

2025-09-17T05:33:00+00:00

Make usb4_port.c function documentation compliant with current kernel-doc standards. No functional changes. Signed-off-by: Alan Borzeszkowski Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg

thunderbolt: Update usb4.c function documentation

2025-09-17T05:33:00+00:00

Make usb4.c function documentation compliant with current kernel-doc standards. No functional changes. Signed-off-by: Alan Borzeszkowski Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg

thunderbolt: Update tunnel.h function documentation

2025-09-17T05:33:00+00:00

Make tunnel.h function documentation compliant with current kernel-doc standards. No functional changes. Signed-off-by: Alan Borzeszkowski Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg