kernel/linux.git/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs, branch v7.1.6

staging: rtl8723bs: fix inverted HT40 secondary channel offset

2026-08-03T09:25:51+00:00

commit 30d49cba27f8905bc288cef5846963f0004f644c upstream. rtw_get_chan_type() maps the driver's channel offset to nl80211 channel types the wrong way around. In this driver HAL_PRIME_CHNL_OFFSET_LOWER means the primary channel is the lower 20 MHz half of the 40 MHz pair, i.e. the secondary channel is above the primary one: rtw_get_center_ch() computes the center channel as "channel + 2" for OFFSET_LOWER, and bwmode_update_check() sets OFFSET_LOWER when the AP's HT operation IE announces SCA (secondary channel above). In nl80211 terms that is NL80211_CHAN_HT40PLUS, not HT40MINUS. Because of the inversion, cfg80211_rtw_get_channel() reports an HT40+ association as HT40-. For an HT40+ AP on a low channel (e.g. channel 3) the resulting chandef spans below the 2.4 GHz band edge and is invalid, so the regulatory core tears the connection down 60 seconds (REG_ENFORCE_GRACE_MS) after the AP's country IE triggers a regdomain change: reg_check_chans_work() considers the reported chandef unusable and calls cfg80211_leave(). The supplicant then reconnects, the country IE changes the regdomain again, and the cycle repeats, causing a disconnect/reconnect loop every ~65 seconds for as long as the link is up. Observed on a TECLAST X80 Power tablet (RTL8723BS) associated to an HT40+ AP on channel 3 with a KR country IE; a kprobe trace showed cfg80211_disconnect() being invoked from reg_check_chans_work(). With the mapping fixed, "iw dev wlan0 info" reports the correct "width: 40 MHz, center1: 2432 MHz" and the periodic disconnects stop. Fixes: 5402cc178c5d ("staging: rtl8723bs: add get_channel cfg80211 implementation") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude-Code:claude-fable-5 bpftrace Signed-off-by: MinJea Kim Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260714131421.3980-1-qndkdrnl@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in rtw_get_wps_ie()

2026-08-03T09:25:51+00:00

commit 0e95ff792ae0aa6fbad9455943e9e1e4062670e9 upstream. rtw_get_wps_ie() iterates over IE data from network frames without validating that the IE header and payload fit within the remaining buffer before reading them. Specifically: - in_ie[cnt + 1] is read without checking cnt + 1 < in_len - memcmp(&in_ie[cnt + 2], ...) accesses cnt + 2 without bounds check - in_ie[cnt + 1] is used as length without verifying payload fits Add bounds checks at the top of the loop body to break early if fewer than 2 bytes remain for the IE header, or if the declared payload extends past the end of the buffer. Also require at least 4 bytes of payload before comparing the WPS OUI. Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Moksh Panicker Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260625202911.26782-1-mokshpanicker.7@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

staging: rtl8723bs: fix stainfo check in rtw_aes_decrypt

2026-07-24T14:19:58+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9a3f9b3c47d8f071b0eb9e63906ac0448058278d ] The null-pointer-guard was incorrect, returning _FAIL on valid pointer. Invert the guard, so it returns _FAIL on invalid pointer. Fixes: e23ad1570028 ("staging: rtl8723bs: use guard clause for stainfo check") Reported-by: Luka Gejak Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-staging/E4BF62EF-C6F6-431F-8EDC-77C1E613E66B@linux.dev/ Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Maksym Pikhotskyi Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260417095452.23440-1-mpikhotskyi@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB write in HT_caps_handler()

2026-07-18T14:55:26+00:00

commit f8001e1a516ba3b495728c65b61f799cbfad6bd0 upstream. HT_caps_handler() iterates pIE->length bytes and writes into HT_caps.u.HT_cap[], which is a fixed 26-byte array (sizeof struct HT_caps_element). Because pIE->length is a raw u8 from an over-the-air 802.11 AssocResponse frame and is never validated, a malicious AP can set it up to 255, causing up to 229 bytes of out-of-bounds writes into adjacent fields of struct mlme_ext_info. Truncate the iteration count to the size of HT_caps.u.HT_cap using umin() so that data from a longer-than-expected IE is silently ignored rather than written out of bounds, preserving interoperability with APs that pad the element. An early return on oversized IEs was considered but rejected: it would bypass the pmlmeinfo->HT_caps_enable = 1 assignment that precedes the loop, silently disabling HT mode for APs that append extra bytes to the HT Capabilities IE. Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-5-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in rtw_get_sec_ie(), rtw_get_wapi_ie(), and rtw_get_wps_attr()

2026-07-18T14:55:26+00:00

commit 1463ca3ec6601cbb097d8d87dbf5dcf1cb86a344 upstream. Three IE/attribute parsing functions have missing bounds checks. rtw_get_sec_ie() and rtw_get_wapi_ie() iterate over a raw IE buffer without verifying that the header bytes (tag + length) are within the remaining buffer before reading them. Additionally, rtw_get_sec_ie() compares the 4-byte WPA OUI at cnt+2 without checking that at least 6 bytes remain, and rtw_get_wapi_ie() compares a 4-byte WAPI OUI at cnt+6 without checking that at least 10 bytes remain. rtw_get_wps_attr() reads wps_ie[0] and wps_ie+2 unconditionally at entry, before verifying that wps_ielen is large enough to contain the 6-byte WPS IE header (element_id + length + 4-byte OUI). Inside the attribute loop, get_unaligned_be16() is called on attr_ptr and attr_ptr+2 without checking that 4 bytes remain in the buffer. Add a cnt+2 bounds check before each loop body in rtw_get_sec_ie() and rtw_get_wapi_ie(), guard each multi-byte comparison with a minimum IE length requirement, add a wps_ielen < 6 early return in rtw_get_wps_attr(), and add a 4-byte bounds check in its inner loop. Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-8-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in is_ap_in_tkip() IE loop

2026-07-18T14:55:26+00:00

commit 3bf39f711ff27c64be8680a8938bcc5001982e81 upstream. The loop in is_ap_in_tkip() iterates over IEs without verifying that enough bytes remain before dereferencing the IE header or its payload: - pIE->element_id and pIE->length are read without checking that i + sizeof(*pIE) <= ie_length, so a truncated IE at the end of the buffer causes an OOB read. - For WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC the code compares pIE->data + 12, which requires pIE->length >= 16. For WLAN_EID_RSN it compares pIE->data + 8, requiring pIE->length >= 12. Neither requirement is checked. Add the missing IE header and payload bounds checks and guard each data access with an explicit pIE->length minimum, matching the pattern established in update_beacon_info(). Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-7-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in IE loops in issue_assocreq() and join_cmd_hdl()

2026-07-18T14:55:26+00:00

commit ef61d628dfad38fead1fd2e08979ae9126d011d5 upstream. Two IE parsing loops are missing the header bounds checks before they dereference pIE->length: - issue_assocreq() walks pmlmeinfo->network.ies to build the association request. If the stored IE data ends with only an element_id byte and no length byte, pIE->length is read one byte past the end of the buffer. - join_cmd_hdl() walks pnetwork->ies during station join and has the same problem under the same conditions. Both buffers are filled from AP beacon and probe-response frames, so a malicious AP that sends a truncated final IE can trigger the issue. Apply the two-guard pattern established in update_beacon_info(): 1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain. 2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past the buffer end. Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-3-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in update_beacon_info() IE loop

2026-07-18T14:55:26+00:00

commit ed51de4a86e173c3b0ef78e039c2e49e08b11f16 upstream. The IE parsing loop in update_beacon_info() advances by (pIE->length + 2) each iteration but only guards on i < len. When a malicious AP sends a Beacon whose last IE has only one byte remaining in the frame (the element_id byte lands at len-1), the loop reads pIE->length from one byte past the allocated receive buffer. Additionally, even when the header bytes are in bounds, pIE->length itself can extend the data window beyond len, passing a truncated IE to the handler functions. Add two guards at the top of the loop body: 1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain (can't read header). 2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past len. Also replace i += (pIE->length + 2) with i += sizeof(*pIE) + pIE->length for consistency with the sizeof(*pIE) guards added above. Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-2-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in OnAssocRsp() IE loop

2026-07-18T14:55:26+00:00

commit f9654207e92283e0acac5d64fe5f8835383b5a23 upstream. The IE parsing loop in OnAssocRsp() advances by (pIE->length + 2) each iteration but only guards on i < pkt_len. When a malicious AP sends an AssocResponse whose last IE has only one byte remaining in the frame (the element_id byte lands at pkt_len-1), the loop reads pIE->length from pframe[pkt_len], which is one byte past the allocated receive buffer. Additionally, even when the header bytes are in bounds, pIE->length itself can extend the data window beyond pkt_len, silently passing a truncated IE to the handler functions. Add two guards at the top of the loop body: 1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain (can't read header). 2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past pkt_len. Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-6-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

staging: rtl8723bs: fix WEP length underflow and OOB read in OnAuth()

2026-07-18T14:55:26+00:00

commit a1fc19d61f661d47204f095b593de507884849f7 upstream. OnAuth() has two bugs in the shared-key authentication path. When the Privacy bit is set, rtw_wep_decrypt() is called without verifying that the frame is long enough to contain a valid WEP IV and ICV. Inside rtw_wep_decrypt(), length is computed as: length = len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN - iv_len and then passed as (length - 4) to crc32_le(). If len is less than WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + iv_len + icv_len (32 bytes), length - 4 is negative and, after the implicit cast to size_t, causes crc32_le() to read far beyond the frame buffer. Add a minimum length check before accessing the IV field and calling the decryption path. When processing a seq=3 response, rtw_get_ie() stores the Challenge Text IE length in ie_len, but the subsequent memcmp() always reads 128 bytes regardless of ie_len. IEEE 802.11 mandates a challenge text of exactly 128 bytes; reject any IE whose length field differs, matching the check already applied to OnAuthClient(). Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004605.1039209-1-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman