kernel/linux.git/drivers/s390/crypto, branch v6.18.44

s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA ECC private key requests

2026-08-09T18:25:20+00:00

commit a9ae0f6dd45c3ccc1d69363f7aea8af179122730 upstream. cca_ecc2protkey() derives the copy length for the CPRB parameter block directly from the length field in the key token. Reject the request early if the token length exceeds the available space in the parameter block. Fixes: fa6999e326fe ("s390/pkey: support CCA and EP11 secure ECC private keys") Signed-off-by: Holger Dengler Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+ Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA AES cipher key requests

2026-08-09T18:25:20+00:00

commit 06afe425d5283b9764303de47f554da5a808ce8a upstream. cca_cipher2protkey() derives the copy length for the CPRB parameter block directly from the length field in the key token. Reject the request early if the token length exceeds the available space in the parameter block. Fixes: 4bc123b18ce6 ("s390/zcrypt: Add low level functions for CCA AES cipher keys") Signed-off-by: Holger Dengler Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

s390/zcrypt: Fix missing mem scrub at clear key import in cca_clr2cipherkey()

2026-08-09T18:25:19+00:00

commit 01476391aecef36a3b789ee844357b22fbc90665 upstream. The helper function _ip_cprb_helper() uses internal buffer memory for building and processing CPRBs. After use this buffer was never scrubbed which could lead to leaving for example clear key material in memory which could be exposed via tricky reuse of this same memory. Extend the _ip_cprb_helper() function with another parameter 'scrub' used to steer scrubbing of this buffer. So now the caller has the opportunity to decide if scrubbing is needed or not. Extend the clear key to secure key token import process in function cca_clr2cipherkey() to tell the helper function from above to scrub the cprb buffer when the clear key value is part of the request data. Add explicit scrubbing on return from function cca_clr2cipherkey() for the random EXOR buffer and the cprb buffer. Overall this cleans the internal used buffer in case of clear key import to prevent sensitive data to get exposed. Fixes: 4bc123b18ce6 ("s390/zcrypt: Add low level functions for CCA AES cipher keys") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

s390/zcrypt: Fix buffer over-read in cca_cipher2protkey

2026-08-09T18:25:19+00:00

commit 36b230835b8a008266aad22168ca52afacc8a58d upstream. Add validation of both the actual key buffer size and token length fields in all the cca_check_sec*token() functions. Additionally check in cca_gencipherkey() for possible underflow with returned key size. The CCA token structures contain user-controlled len fields that were used in operations without proper validation against both the actual buffer size and minimum token structure size. An attacker could set this field larger than the actual buffer size, leading to reading beyond buffer boundaries. This may result in a kernel crash or exposure of memory via sending this as part of a request down to the crypto card. Also an attacker could have used a very small len value and thus enforce a buffer under-run which may produce similar effects as a over-read. So now a key must - key buf length must be at least sizeof the token struct - the key len field inside the token must fit into the range of sizeof key token struct ... key buf length Fixes: 4bc123b18ce6 ("s390/zcrypt: Add low level functions for CCA AES cipher keys") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

s390/zcrypt: Fix wrong domain value verification with EP11 CPRBs

2026-08-09T18:25:19+00:00

commit 983279d7f86ade73db86f886e09172dd567031b5 upstream. There is a wrong upper limit check for the domain value when an EP11 CPRB is processed for sending to a crypto card. This check is only active on custom device nodes but may lead to access heap memory behind perms->adm when an administrative CPRB is sent. Add correct limit (AP_DOMAINS = 256) checking to fix this. Fixes: cfd68b33094e ("s390/zcrypt: Filter admin CPRBs on custom devices") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Finn Callies Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

pkey: Move keytype check from pkey api to handler

2026-07-24T14:17:05+00:00

commit 754e9e49b76fd5be339172aa98544182ed3ca75e upstream. The PKEY_VERIFYPROTK ioctl takes data from user-space and verifies the contained protected key. While checking the integrity of the ioctl request structure is the responsibility of the generic pkey_api code, the verification of the contained protected key is the responsibility of the pkey handler. The keytype verification (based on the calculated bitsize of the key) is part of the protected key verification and therefore the responsibility of the pkey handler (which already verifies it). Therefore the keytype verification is removed from the generic pkey_api code. As the calculation of the key bitsize is currently wrong, the removal of the keytype check in pkey_api also removes this wrong calculation. For this reason, the commit is flagged with the Fixes: tag. Cc: stable@kernel.org # 6.12+ Fixes: 8fcc231ce3be ("s390/pkey: Introduce pkey base with handler registry and handler modules") Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger Signed-off-by: Holger Dengler Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

s390/pkey: Check length in pkey_pckmo handler implementation

2026-07-24T14:17:03+00:00

commit 1ac287e2af9a9112fe271427ef45eceb26bce8b4 upstream. Explicitly check the length of the target buffer in the pkey_pckmo implementation of the key_to_protkey() handler function. The handler function fails, if the generated output data exceeds the length of the provided target buffer. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 8fcc231ce3be ("s390/pkey: Introduce pkey base with handler registry and handler modules") Reported-by: Christian Borntraeger Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger Signed-off-by: Holger Dengler Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

s390/pkey: Check length in PKEY_VERIFYPROTK ioctl

2026-07-24T14:17:03+00:00

commit b3d4ab2d7df9426f7f1d3671d7e2108f2ca6e970 upstream. Explicitly check the buffer length request structure provided by user-space and fail, if it exceeds the buffer size. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 8fcc231ce3be ("s390/pkey: Introduce pkey base with handler registry and handler modules") Reported-by: Christian Borntraeger Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki Signed-off-by: Holger Dengler Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

s390/zcrypt: Remove the empty file

2026-07-24T14:16:50+00:00

[ Upstream commit 575f87b9d4882b0d621192fdd754d7e09dbd5789 ] The files has no real user because CEX2 and CEX3 device drivers are removed, also remove these empty files. Fixes: 5ac8c72462cd ("s390/zcrypt: remove CEX2 and CEX3 device drivers") Signed-off-by: Rongguang Wei Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

s390/zcrypt: Fix memory leak with CCA cards used as accelerator

2026-04-11T12:26:45+00:00

commit c8d46f17c2fc7d25c18e60c008928aecab26184d upstream. Tests showed that there is a memory leak if CCA cards are used as accelerator for clear key RSA requests (ME and CRT). With the last rework for the memory allocation the AP messages are allocated by ap_init_apmsg() but for some reason on two places (ME and CRT) the older allocation was still in place. So the first allocation simple was never freed. Fixes: 57db62a130ce ("s390/ap/zcrypt: Rework AP message buffer allocation") Reported-by: Yi Zhang Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-s390/CAHj4cs9H67Uz0iVaRQv447p7JFPRPy3TKAT4=Y6_e=wSHCZM5w@mail.gmail.com/ Reported-by: Nadja Hariz Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler Acked-by: Heiko Carstens Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman