kernel/linux.git/drivers/pci/proc.c, branch linux-5.9.y

treewide: Use fallthrough pseudo-keyword

2020-08-23T22:36:59+00:00

Replace the existing /* fall through */ comments and its variants with the new pseudo-keyword macro fallthrough[1]. Also, remove unnecessary fall-through markings when it is the case. [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.7/process/deprecated.html?highlight=fallthrough#implicit-switch-case-fall-through Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva

proc: convert everything to "struct proc_ops"

2020-02-04T03:05:26+00:00

The most notable change is DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE macro split in seq_file.h. Conversion rule is: llseek => proc_lseek unlocked_ioctl => proc_ioctl xxx => proc_xxx delete ".owner = THIS_MODULE" line [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix drivers/isdn/capi/kcapi_proc.c] [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix kernel/sched/psi.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200122180545.36222f50@canb.auug.org.au Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191225172546.GB13378@avx2 Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

PCI: Add PCI_STD_NUM_BARS for the number of standard BARs

2019-10-14T15:22:26+00:00

Code that iterates over all standard PCI BARs typically uses PCI_STD_RESOURCE_END. However, that requires the unusual test "i <= PCI_STD_RESOURCE_END" rather than something the typical "i < PCI_STD_NUM_BARS". Add a definition for PCI_STD_NUM_BARS and change loops to use the more idiomatic C style to help avoid fencepost errors. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190927234026.23342-1-efremov@linux.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190927234308.23935-1-efremov@linux.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190916204158.6889-3-efremov@linux.com Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas Acked-by: Sebastian Ott # arch/s390/ Acked-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz # video/fbdev/ Acked-by: Gustavo Pimentel # pci/controller/dwc/ Acked-by: Jack Wang # scsi/pm8001/ Acked-by: Martin K. Petersen # scsi/pm8001/ Acked-by: Ulf Hansson # memstick/

Merge branch 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

2019-09-28T15:14:15+00:00

Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris: "This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others. From the original description: This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature, intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel. When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted. Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand. The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer to not requiring external patches. There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline: - Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/ - Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven, rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism. The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be permitted. The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line: lockdown={integrity|confidentiality} Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract confidential information from the kernel are also disabled. This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and overriden by kernel configuration. New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in include/linux/security.h for details. The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way. Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf42 ("bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing this under category (c) of the DCO" * 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits) kexec: Fix file verification on S390 security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down ...

PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down

2019-08-20T04:54:15+00:00

Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code, allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing. Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices. Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas Reviewed-by: Kees Cook cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris

PCI: Use seq_puts() instead of seq_printf() in show_device()

2019-07-02T23:38:51+00:00

The driver name in /proc/bus/pci/devices can be printed without a printf format specification, so use seq_puts() instead of seq_printf(). This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a6b110cb-0d0e-5dc3-9ca1-9041609cf74c@web.de Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring [bhelgaas: commit log] Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas

PCI: Mark expected switch fall-throughs

2019-03-20T20:11:11+00:00

In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch cases where we are expecting to fall through. This patch fixes the following warnings: drivers/pci/proc.c: In function ‘proc_bus_pci_ioctl’: drivers/pci/proc.c:216:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] if (arch_can_pci_mmap_wc()) { ^ drivers/pci/proc.c:225:2: note: here default: ^~~~~~~ drivers/pci/xen-pcifront.c: In function ‘pcifront_backend_changed’: drivers/pci/xen-pcifront.c:1105:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] if (xdev->state == XenbusStateClosed) ^ drivers/pci/xen-pcifront.c:1108:2: note: here case XenbusStateClosing: ^~~~ Notice that, in this particular case, the /* fall through */ comment is placed at the very bottom of the case statement, which is what GCC is expecting to find. Warning level 3 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=3 This patch is part of the ongoing efforts to enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough. Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas

Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function

2019-01-04T02:57:57+00:00

Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand. It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact. A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's just get this done once and for all. This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form. There were a couple of notable cases: - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias. - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing really used it) - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch. I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

proc: introduce proc_create_seq{,_data}

2018-05-16T05:23:35+00:00

Variants of proc_create{,_data} that directly take a struct seq_operations argument and drastically reduces the boilerplate code in the callers. All trivial callers converted over. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig

PCI: Tidy comments

2018-03-19T19:20:43+00:00

Remove pointless comments that tell us the file name, remove blank line comments, follow multi-line comment conventions. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas