kernel/linux.git/drivers/net, branch v6.1.176

r8152: Hold the rtnl_lock for all of reset

2026-06-19T11:37:32+00:00

commit e62adaeecdc6a1e8ae86e7f3f9f8223a3ede94f5 upstream. As of commit d9962b0d4202 ("r8152: Block future register access if register access fails") there is a race condition that can happen between the USB device reset thread and napi_enable() (not) getting called during rtl8152_open(). Specifically: * While rtl8152_open() is running we get a register access error that's _not_ -ENODEV and queue up a USB reset. * rtl8152_open() exits before calling napi_enable() due to any reason (including usb_submit_urb() returning an error). In that case: * Since the USB reset is perform in a separate thread asynchronously, it can run at anytime USB device lock is not held - even before rtl8152_open() has exited with an error and caused __dev_open() to clear the __LINK_STATE_START bit. * The rtl8152_pre_reset() will notice that the netif_running() returns true (since __LINK_STATE_START wasn't cleared) so it won't exit early. * rtl8152_pre_reset() will then hang in napi_disable() because napi_enable() was never called. We can fix the race by making sure that the r8152 reset routines don't run at the same time as we're opening the device. Specifically we need the reset routines in their entirety rely on the return value of netif_running(). The only way to reliably depend on that is for them to hold the rntl_lock() mutex for the duration of reset. Grabbing the rntl_lock() mutex for the duration of reset seems like a long time, but reset is not expected to be common and the rtnl_lock() mutex is already held for long durations since the core grabs it around the open/close calls. Fixes: d9962b0d4202 ("r8152: Block future register access if register access fails") Reviewed-by: Grant Grundler Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

hv_netvsc: use kmap_local_page in netvsc_copy_to_send_buf

2026-06-19T11:37:29+00:00

[ Upstream commit 004e9ecfe6c5384f9e0b2f6f6389d42ec22789af ] netvsc_copy_to_send_buf() copies page buffer entries into the VMBus send buffer using phys_to_virt() on the entry PFN. Entries for the RNDIS header and the skb linear data come from kmalloc'd memory and are always in the kernel direct map, but entries for skb fragments reference page cache or user pages, which on 32-bit x86 with CONFIG_HIGHMEM=y can live above the LOWMEM boundary. For such a page phys_to_virt() returns an address outside the direct map and the subsequent memcpy() faults on the transmit softirq path, which is fatal. Map the pages with kmap_local_page() instead, handling two properties of the page buffer entries: - pb[i].pfn is a Hyper-V PFN at HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE (4K) granularity, not a native PFN. Reconstruct the physical address first and derive the native page from it, so the mapping stays correct where PAGE_SIZE > HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE (e.g. arm64 with 64K pages). - Since commit 41a6328b2c55 ("hv_netvsc: Preserve contiguous PFN grouping in the page buffer array"), an entry describes a full physically contiguous fragment and pb[i].len can exceed PAGE_SIZE, while kmap_local_page() maps a single page. Copy page by page, splitting at native page boundaries. The copy path only handles packets smaller than the send section size (6144 bytes by default); larger packets take the cp_partial path where only the RNDIS header is copied. So entries here are bounded by the section size and a copy is split at most once on 4K-page systems. On !CONFIG_HIGHMEM configs kmap_local_page() folds to page_address() and no mapping work is added. Fixes: c25aaf814a63 ("hyperv: Enable sendbuf mechanism on the send path") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Anton Leontev Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260604165938.32033-1-leontyevantony@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni [ adapted `phys_to_page(paddr)` to `pfn_to_page(PHYS_PFN(paddr))` ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

octeontx2-pf: avoid double free of pool->stack on AQ init failure

2026-06-19T11:37:27+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9b244c242bec48b37e82b89787afd6a4c43457e1 ] otx2_pool_aq_init() frees pool->stack when mailbox sync or retry allocation fails, but leaves the pointer unchanged. Later, otx2_sq_aura_pool_init() unwinds the partial setup through otx2_aura_pool_free(), which frees pool->stack again. The CN20K-specific cn20k_pool_aq_init() implementation has the same bug in its corresponding error path. Set pool->stack to NULL immediately after the local free so the shared cleanup path does not free the same stack again while cleaning up partially initialized pool state. The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still present in v7.1-rc3. Runtime validation was not performed because reproducing this path requires OcteonTX2/CN20K hardware. Fixes: caa2da34fd25 ("octeontx2-pf: Initialize and config queues") Fixes: d322fbd17203 ("octeontx2-pf: Initialize cn20k specific aura and pool contexts") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan Signed-off-by: Dawei Feng Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260515151826.1005397-1-dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

octeontx2-af: CGX: add bounds check to cgx_speed_mbps index

2026-06-19T11:37:26+00:00

[ Upstream commit c0bf0a4f3f1f5f57aa83e1400ba4f56f0abfd542 ] cgx_speed_mbps has 13 elements but RESP_LINKSTAT_SPEED can yield values 0-15. If it returns a value >= 13, this causes an out-of-bounds array access. Add a bounds check and default to speed 0 if the index is out of range. Fixes: 61071a871ea6 ("octeontx2-af: Forward CGX link notifications to PFs") Cc: Sunil Goutham Cc: Linu Cherian Cc: Geetha sowjanya Cc: hariprasad Cc: Subbaraya Sundeep Cc: Andrew Lunn Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Sam Daly Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Link: https://patch.msgid.link/2026051352-refined-demise-e88d@gregkh Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

octeontx2-af: replace deprecated strncpy with strscpy

2026-06-19T11:37:26+00:00

[ Upstream commit 473f8f2d1bfe1103f20140fdc80cad406b4d68c0 ] `strncpy` is deprecated for use on NUL-terminated destination strings [1] and as such we should prefer more robust and less ambiguous string interfaces. We can see that linfo->lmac_type is expected to be NUL-terminated based on the `... - 1`'s present in the current code. Presumably making room for a NUL-byte at the end of the buffer. Considering the above, a suitable replacement is `strscpy` [2] due to the fact that it guarantees NUL-termination on the destination buffer without unnecessarily NUL-padding. Let's also prefer the more idiomatic strscpy usage of (dest, src, sizeof(dest)) rather than (dest, src, SOME_LEN). Link: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#strncpy-on-nul-terminated-strings [1] Link: https://manpages.debian.org/testing/linux-manual-4.8/strscpy.9.en.html [2] Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/90 Signed-off-by: Justin Stitt Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231010-strncpy-drivers-net-ethernet-marvell-octeontx2-af-cgx-c-v1-1-a443e18f9de8@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Stable-dep-of: c0bf0a4f3f1f ("octeontx2-af: CGX: add bounds check to cgx_speed_mbps index") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ice: fix VF queue configuration with low MTU values

2026-06-19T11:37:26+00:00

[ Upstream commit 3ba4dd024d26372733d1c02e13e076c6016e3320 ] The ice driver's VF queue configuration validation rejects databuffer_size values below 1024 bytes, which prevents VFs from using MTU values below 871 bytes. The iavf driver calculates databuffer_size based on the MTU using: databuffer_size = ALIGN(MTU + LIBETH_RX_LL_LEN, 128) where LIBETH_RX_LL_LEN = 26 (ETH_HLEN + 2*VLAN_HLEN + ETH_FCS_LEN). For MTU values below 871: MTU 870: 870 + 26 = 896, aligned to 128 = 896 (< 1024, rejected) MTU 871: 871 + 26 = 897, aligned to 128 = 1024 (>= 1024, accepted) The 1024-byte minimum seems unnecessarily restrictive, because the hardware supports databuffer_size as low as 128 bytes (the alignment boundary), which should allow MTU values down to the standard minimum of 68 bytes. I haven't found the reason why the limit was configured in the commit 9c7dd7566d18 ("ice: add validation in OP_CONFIG_VSI_QUEUES VF message"), so with no more information and since it is working, change the minimum databuffer_size validation from 1024 to 128 bytes to allow standard low MTU values while still preventing invalid configurations. Fixes: 9c7dd7566d18 ("ice: add validation in OP_CONFIG_VSI_QUEUES VF message") cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller Reviewed-by: Michal Swiatkowski Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260515182419.1597859-3-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski [ applied the change to ice_virtchnl.c ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: wwan: t7xx: validate port_count against message length in t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler

2026-06-19T11:37:23+00:00

[ Upstream commit 0e7c074cfcd9bd93765505f9eb8b42f03ed2a744 ] t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler() uses the modem-supplied port_count field as a loop bound over port_msg->data[] without checking that the message buffer contains sufficient data. A modem sending port_count=65535 in a 12-byte buffer triggers a slab-out-of-bounds read of up to 262140 bytes. Add a sizeof(*port_msg) check before accessing the port message header fields to guard against undersized messages. Add a struct_size() check after extracting port_count and before the loop. In t7xx_parse_host_rt_data(), guard the rt_feature header read with a remaining-buffer check before accessing data_len, validate feat_data_len against the actual remaining buffer to prevent OOB reads and signed integer overflow on offset. Pass msg_len from both call sites: skb->len at the DPMAIF path after skb_pull(), and the validated feat_data_len at the handshake path. Fixes: da45d2566a1d ("net: wwan: t7xx: Add control port") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260501110713.145563-1-jhapavitra98@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

wifi: brcmfmac: Fix potential use-after-free issue when stopping watchdog task

2026-06-19T11:37:21+00:00

[ Upstream commit c623b63580880cc742255eaed3d79804c1b91143 ] Watchdog task might end between send_sig() and kthread_stop() calls, what results in the use-after-free issue. Fix this by increasing watchdog task reference count before calling send_sig() and dropping it by switching to kthread_stop_put(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 373c83a801f1 ("brcmfmac: stop watchdog before detach and free everything") Fixes: a9ffda88be74 ("brcm80211: fmac: abstract bus_stop interface function pointer") Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski Acked-by: Arend van Spriel Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260416093339.2066829-1-m.szyprowski@samsung.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg [ replaced kthread_stop_put() with open-coded kthread_stop() + put_task_struct() ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: stmmac: Prevent NULL deref when RX memory exhausted

2026-06-19T11:37:21+00:00

[ Upstream commit 0bb05e6adfa99a2ea1fee1125cc0953409f83ed8 ] The CPU receives frames from the MAC through conventional DMA: the CPU allocates buffers for the MAC, then the MAC fills them and returns ownership to the CPU. For each hardware RX queue, the CPU and MAC coordinate through a shared ring array of DMA descriptors: one descriptor per DMA buffer. Each descriptor includes the buffer's physical address and a status flag ("OWN") indicating which side owns the buffer: OWN=0 for CPU, OWN=1 for MAC. The CPU is only allowed to set the flag and the MAC is only allowed to clear it, and both must move through the ring in sequence: thus the ring is used for both "submissions" and "completions." In the stmmac driver, stmmac_rx() bookmarks its position in the ring with the `cur_rx` index. The main receive loop in that function checks for rx_descs[cur_rx].own=0, gives the corresponding buffer to the network stack (NULLing the pointer), and increments `cur_rx` modulo the ring size. After the loop exits, stmmac_rx_refill(), which bookmarks its position with `dirty_rx`, allocates fresh buffers and rearms the descriptors (setting OWN=1). If it fails any allocation, it simply stops early (leaving OWN=0) and will retry where it left off when next called. This means descriptors have a three-stage lifecycle (terms my own): - `empty` (OWN=1, buffer valid) - `full` (OWN=0, buffer valid and populated) - `dirty` (OWN=0, buffer NULL) But because stmmac_rx() only checks OWN, it confuses `full`/`dirty`. In the past (see 'Fixes:'), there was a bug where the loop could cycle `cur_rx` all the way back to the first descriptor it dirtied, resulting in a NULL dereference when mistaken for `full`. The aforementioned commit resolved that *specific* failure by capping the loop's iteration limit at `dma_rx_size - 1`, but this is only a partial fix: if the previous stmmac_rx_refill() didn't complete, then there are leftover `dirty` descriptors that the loop might encounter without needing to cycle fully around. The current code therefore panics (see 'Closes:') when stmmac_rx_refill() is memory-starved long enough for `cur_rx` to catch up to `dirty_rx`. Fix this by explicitly checking, before advancing `cur_rx`, if the next entry is dirty; exit the loop if so. This prevents processing of the final, used descriptor until stmmac_rx_refill() succeeds, but fully prevents the `cur_rx == dirty_rx` ambiguity as the previous bugfix intended: so remove the clamp as well. Since stmmac_rx_zc() is a copy-paste-and-tweak of stmmac_rx() and the code structure is identical, any fix to stmmac_rx() will also need a corresponding fix for stmmac_rx_zc(). Therefore, apply the same check there. In stmmac_rx() (not stmmac_rx_zc()), a related bug remains: after the MAC sets OWN=0 on the final descriptor, it will be unable to send any further DMA-complete IRQs until it's given more `empty` descriptors. Currently, the driver simply *hopes* that the next stmmac_rx_refill() succeeds, risking an indefinite stall of the receive process if not. But this is not a regression, so it can be addressed in a future change. Fixes: b6cb4541853c7 ("net: stmmac: avoid rx queue overrun") Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=221010 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Russell King Signed-off-by: Sam Edwards Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260422044503.5349-1-CFSworks@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: stmmac: rename STMMAC_GET_ENTRY() -> STMMAC_NEXT_ENTRY()

2026-06-19T11:37:21+00:00

[ Upstream commit 6b4286e0550814cdc4b897f881ec1fa8b0313227 ] STMMAC_GET_ENTRY() doesn't describe what this macro is doing - it is incrementing the provided index for the circular array of descriptors. Replace "GET" with "NEXT" as this better describes the action here. Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) Link: https://patch.msgid.link/E1w2vba-0000000DbWo-1oL5@rmk-PC.armlinux.org.uk Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Stable-dep-of: 0bb05e6adfa9 ("net: stmmac: Prevent NULL deref when RX memory exhausted") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman