<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/drivers/iommu/amd, branch v6.19.12</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.19.12</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.19.12'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2026-03-25T10:13:31+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>iommu/amd: Block identity domain when SNP enabled</title>
<updated>2026-03-25T10:13:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joe Damato</name>
<email>joe@dama.to</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-09T23:52:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3fd27dfd8a6fe96303b0e31c52ba82a4db20af18'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3fd27dfd8a6fe96303b0e31c52ba82a4db20af18</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ba17de98545d07285d15ce4fe2afe98283338fb0 ]

Previously, commit 8388f7df936b ("iommu/amd: Do not support
IOMMU_DOMAIN_IDENTITY after SNP is enabled") prevented users from
changing the IOMMU domain to identity if SNP was enabled.

This resulted in an error when writing to sysfs:

  # echo "identity" &gt; /sys/kernel/iommu_groups/50/type
  -bash: echo: write error: Cannot allocate memory

However, commit 4402f2627d30 ("iommu/amd: Implement global identity
domain") changed the flow of the code, skipping the SNP guard and
allowing users to change the IOMMU domain to identity after a machine
has booted.

Once the user does that, they will probably try to bind and the
device/driver will start to do DMA which will trigger errors:

  iommu ivhd3: AMD-Vi: Event logged [ILLEGAL_DEV_TABLE_ENTRY device=0000:43:00.0 pasid=0x00000 address=0x3737b01000 flags=0x0020]
  iommu ivhd3: AMD-Vi: Control Reg : 0xc22000142148d
  AMD-Vi: DTE[0]: 6000000000000003
  AMD-Vi: DTE[1]: 0000000000000001
  AMD-Vi: DTE[2]: 2000003088b3e013
  AMD-Vi: DTE[3]: 0000000000000000
  bnxt_en 0000:43:00.0 (unnamed net_device) (uninitialized): Error (timeout: 500015) msg {0x0 0x0} len:0
  iommu ivhd3: AMD-Vi: Event logged [ILLEGAL_DEV_TABLE_ENTRY device=0000:43:00.0 pasid=0x00000 address=0x3737b01000 flags=0x0020]
  iommu ivhd3: AMD-Vi: Control Reg : 0xc22000142148d
  AMD-Vi: DTE[0]: 6000000000000003
  AMD-Vi: DTE[1]: 0000000000000001
  AMD-Vi: DTE[2]: 2000003088b3e013
  AMD-Vi: DTE[3]: 0000000000000000
  bnxt_en 0000:43:00.0: probe with driver bnxt_en failed with error -16

To prevent this from happening, create an attach wrapper for
identity_domain_ops which returns EINVAL if amd_iommu_snp_en is true.

With this commit applied:

  # echo "identity" &gt; /sys/kernel/iommu_groups/62/type
  -bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument

Fixes: 4402f2627d30 ("iommu/amd: Implement global identity domain")
Signed-off-by: Joe Damato &lt;joe@dama.to&gt;
Reviewed-by: Vasant Hegde &lt;vasant.hegde@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;joerg.roedel@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>iommu/amd: serialize sequence allocation under concurrent TLB invalidations</title>
<updated>2026-03-04T12:20:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ankit Soni</name>
<email>Ankit.Soni@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-22T15:30:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=48caa7542a795c9679ec1bd1bc2592e05a7369a4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:48caa7542a795c9679ec1bd1bc2592e05a7369a4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9e249c48412828e807afddc21527eb734dc9bd3d ]

With concurrent TLB invalidations, completion wait randomly gets timed out
because cmd_sem_val was incremented outside the IOMMU spinlock, allowing
CMD_COMPL_WAIT commands to be queued out of sequence and breaking the
ordering assumption in wait_on_sem().
Move the cmd_sem_val increment under iommu-&gt;lock so completion sequence
allocation is serialized with command queuing.
And remove the unnecessary return.

Fixes: d2a0cac10597 ("iommu/amd: move wait_on_sem() out of spinlock")

Tested-by: Srikanth Aithal &lt;sraithal@amd.com&gt;
Reported-by: Srikanth Aithal &lt;sraithal@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ankit Soni &lt;Ankit.Soni@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Vasant Hegde &lt;vasant.hegde@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;joerg.roedel@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>iommu/amd: move wait_on_sem() out of spinlock</title>
<updated>2026-03-04T12:20:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ankit Soni</name>
<email>Ankit.Soni@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-12-01T14:39:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=496269d12072ecb219826485bdbec70c92a8eef5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:496269d12072ecb219826485bdbec70c92a8eef5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d2a0cac10597068567d336e85fa3cbdbe8ca62bf ]

With iommu.strict=1, the existing completion wait path can cause soft
lockups under stressed environment, as wait_on_sem() busy-waits under the
spinlock with interrupts disabled.

Move the completion wait in iommu_completion_wait() out of the spinlock.
wait_on_sem() only polls the hardware-updated cmd_sem and does not require
iommu-&gt;lock, so holding the lock during the busy wait unnecessarily
increases contention and extends the time with interrupts disabled.

Signed-off-by: Ankit Soni &lt;Ankit.Soni@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Vasant Hegde &lt;vasant.hegde@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;joerg.roedel@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>iommu/amd: Use core's primary handler and set IRQF_ONESHOT</title>
<updated>2026-02-26T23:00:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sebastian Andrzej Siewior</name>
<email>bigeasy@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-28T09:55:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=7c52ac0980ffa6b48becde25a5ea3143c601c833'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7c52ac0980ffa6b48becde25a5ea3143c601c833</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5bfcdccb4d18d3909b7f87942be67fd6bdc00c1d ]

request_threaded_irq() is invoked with a primary and a secondary handler
and no flags are passed. The primary handler is the same as
irq_default_primary_handler() so there is no need to have an identical
copy.

The lack of the IRQF_ONESHOT can be dangerous because the interrupt
source is not masked while the threaded handler is active. This means,
especially on LEVEL typed interrupt lines, the interrupt can fire again
before the threaded handler had a chance to run.

Use the default primary interrupt handler by specifying NULL and set
IRQF_ONESHOT so the interrupt source is masked until the secondary
handler is done.

Fixes: 72fe00f01f9a3 ("x86/amd-iommu: Use threaded interupt handler")
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260128095540.863589-4-bigeasy@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>iommu/amd: Fix error path in amd_iommu_probe_device()</title>
<updated>2026-01-18T10:03:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasant Hegde</name>
<email>vasant.hegde@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-16T05:53:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3222b6de5145272c43a90cb8667377d676635ea0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3222b6de5145272c43a90cb8667377d676635ea0</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently, the error path of amd_iommu_probe_device() unconditionally
references dev_data, which may not be initialized if an early failure
occurs (like iommu_init_device() fails).

Move the out_err label to ensure the function exits immediately on
failure without accessing potentially uninitialized dev_data.

Fixes: 19e5cc156cb ("iommu/amd: Enable support for up to 2K interrupts per function")
Cc: Rakuram Eswaran &lt;rakuram.e96@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jörg Rödel &lt;joro@8bytes.org&gt;
Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@linaro.org&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202512191724.meqJENXe-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Vasant Hegde &lt;vasant.hegde@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;joerg.roedel@amd.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>amd/iommu: Make protection domain ID functions non-static</title>
<updated>2025-12-19T10:23:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sairaj Kodilkar</name>
<email>sarunkod@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-11-21T09:11:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=c7fe9384c85d31e35bb61574d7a742ba59fb27c3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c7fe9384c85d31e35bb61574d7a742ba59fb27c3</id>
<content type='text'>
So that both iommu.c and init.c can utilize them. Also define a new
function 'pdom_id_destroy()' to destroy 'pdom_ids' instead of directly
calling ida functions.

Signed-off-by: Sairaj Kodilkar &lt;sarunkod@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Vasant Hegde &lt;vasant.hegde@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;joerg.roedel@amd.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>amd/iommu: Preserve domain ids inside the kdump kernel</title>
<updated>2025-12-19T10:23:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sairaj Kodilkar</name>
<email>sarunkod@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-11-21T09:11:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=c2e8dc1222c2136e714d5d972dce7e64924e4ed8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c2e8dc1222c2136e714d5d972dce7e64924e4ed8</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently AMD IOMMU driver does not reserve domain ids programmed in the
DTE while reusing the device table inside kdump kernel. This can cause
reallocation of these domain ids for newer domains that are created by
the kdump kernel, which can lead to potential IO_PAGE_FAULTs

Hence reserve these ids inside pdom_ids.

Fixes: 38e5f33ee359 ("iommu/amd: Reuse device table for kdump")
Signed-off-by: Sairaj Kodilkar &lt;sarunkod@amd.com&gt;
Reported-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@nvidia.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Vasant Hegde &lt;vasant.hegde@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;joerg.roedel@amd.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'tsm-for-6.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/devsec/tsm</title>
<updated>2025-12-06T18:15:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-12-06T18:15:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=249872f53d64441690927853e9d3af36394802d5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:249872f53d64441690927853e9d3af36394802d5</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull PCIe Link Encryption and Device Authentication from Dan Williams:
 "New PCI infrastructure and one architecture implementation for PCIe
  link encryption establishment via platform firmware services.

  This work is the result of multiple vendors coming to consensus on
  some core infrastructure (thanks Alexey, Yilun, and Aneesh!), and
  three vendor implementations, although only one is included in this
  pull. The PCI core changes have an ack from Bjorn, the crypto/ccp/
  changes have an ack from Tom, and the iommu/amd/ changes have an ack
  from Joerg.

  PCIe link encryption is made possible by the soup of acronyms
  mentioned in the shortlog below. Link Integrity and Data Encryption
  (IDE) is a protocol for installing keys in the transmitter and
  receiver at each end of a link. That protocol is transported over Data
  Object Exchange (DOE) mailboxes using PCI configuration requests.

  The aspect that makes this a "platform firmware service" is that the
  key provisioning and protocol is coordinated through a Trusted
  Execution Envrionment (TEE) Security Manager (TSM). That is either
  firmware running in a coprocessor (AMD SEV-TIO), or quasi-hypervisor
  software (Intel TDX Connect / ARM CCA) running in a protected CPU
  mode.

  Now, the only reason to ask a TSM to run this protocol and install the
  keys rather than have a Linux driver do the same is so that later, a
  confidential VM can ask the TSM directly "can you certify this
  device?".

  That precludes host Linux from provisioning its own keys, because host
  Linux is outside the trust domain for the VM. It also turns out that
  all architectures, save for one, do not publish a mechanism for an OS
  to establish keys in the root port. So "TSM-established link
  encryption" is the only cross-architecture path for this capability
  for the foreseeable future.

  This unblocks the other arch implementations to follow in v6.20/v7.0,
  once they clear some other dependencies, and it unblocks the next
  phase of work to implement the end-to-end flow of confidential device
  assignment. The PCIe specification calls this end-to-end flow Trusted
  Execution Environment (TEE) Device Interface Security Protocol
  (TDISP).

  In the meantime, Linux gets a link encryption facility which has
  practical benefits along the same lines as memory encryption. It
  authenticates devices via certificates and may protect against
  interposer attacks trying to capture clear-text PCIe traffic.

  Summary:

   - Introduce the PCI/TSM core for the coordination of device
     authentication, link encryption and establishment (IDE), and later
     management of the device security operational states (TDISP).
     Notify the new TSM core layer of PCI device arrival and departure

   - Add a low level TSM driver for the link encryption establishment
     capabilities of the AMD SEV-TIO architecture

   - Add a library of helpers TSM drivers to use for IDE establishment
     and the DOE transport

   - Add skeleton support for 'bind' and 'guest_request' operations in
     support of TDISP"

* tag 'tsm-for-6.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/devsec/tsm: (23 commits)
  crypto/ccp: Fix CONFIG_PCI=n build
  virt: Fix Kconfig warning when selecting TSM without VIRT_DRIVERS
  crypto/ccp: Implement SEV-TIO PCIe IDE (phase1)
  iommu/amd: Report SEV-TIO support
  psp-sev: Assign numbers to all status codes and add new
  ccp: Make snp_reclaim_pages and __sev_do_cmd_locked public
  PCI/TSM: Add 'dsm' and 'bound' attributes for dependent functions
  PCI/TSM: Add pci_tsm_guest_req() for managing TDIs
  PCI/TSM: Add pci_tsm_bind() helper for instantiating TDIs
  PCI/IDE: Initialize an ID for all IDE streams
  PCI/IDE: Add Address Association Register setup for downstream MMIO
  resource: Introduce resource_assigned() for discerning active resources
  PCI/TSM: Drop stub for pci_tsm_doe_transfer()
  drivers/virt: Drop VIRT_DRIVERS build dependency
  PCI/TSM: Report active IDE streams
  PCI/IDE: Report available IDE streams
  PCI/IDE: Add IDE establishment helpers
  PCI: Establish document for PCI host bridge sysfs attributes
  PCI: Add PCIe Device 3 Extended Capability enumeration
  PCI/TSM: Establish Secure Sessions and Link Encryption
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'soc-drivers-6.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/soc/soc</title>
<updated>2025-12-06T01:29:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-12-06T01:29:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=208eed95fc710827b100266c9450ae84d46727bd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:208eed95fc710827b100266c9450ae84d46727bd</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull SoC driver updates from Arnd Bergmann:
 "This is the first half of the driver changes:

   - A treewide interface change to the "syscore" operations for power
     management, as a preparation for future Tegra specific changes

   - Reset controller updates with added drivers for LAN969x, eic770 and
     RZ/G3S SoCs

   - Protection of system controller registers on Renesas and Google
     SoCs, to prevent trivially triggering a system crash from e.g.
     debugfs access

   - soc_device identification updates on Nvidia, Exynos and Mediatek

   - debugfs support in the ST STM32 firewall driver

   - Minor updates for SoC drivers on AMD/Xilinx, Renesas, Allwinner, TI

   - Cleanups for memory controller support on Nvidia and Renesas"

* tag 'soc-drivers-6.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/soc/soc: (114 commits)
  memory: tegra186-emc: Fix missing put_bpmp
  Documentation: reset: Remove reset_controller_add_lookup()
  reset: fix BIT macro reference
  reset: rzg2l-usbphy-ctrl: Fix a NULL vs IS_ERR() bug in probe
  reset: th1520: Support reset controllers in more subsystems
  reset: th1520: Prepare for supporting multiple controllers
  dt-bindings: reset: thead,th1520-reset: Add controllers for more subsys
  dt-bindings: reset: thead,th1520-reset: Remove non-VO-subsystem resets
  reset: remove legacy reset lookup code
  clk: davinci: psc: drop unused reset lookup
  reset: rzg2l-usbphy-ctrl: Add support for RZ/G3S SoC
  reset: rzg2l-usbphy-ctrl: Add support for USB PWRRDY
  dt-bindings: reset: renesas,rzg2l-usbphy-ctrl: Document RZ/G3S support
  reset: eswin: Add eic7700 reset driver
  dt-bindings: reset: eswin: Documentation for eic7700 SoC
  reset: sparx5: add LAN969x support
  dt-bindings: reset: microchip: Add LAN969x support
  soc: rockchip: grf: Add select correct PWM implementation on RK3368
  soc/tegra: pmc: Add USB wake events for Tegra234
  amba: tegra-ahb: Fix device leak on SMMU enable
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>iommu/amd: Report SEV-TIO support</title>
<updated>2025-12-02T20:06:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Kardashevskiy</name>
<email>aik@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-12-02T02:44:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=eeb934137debfbe98be61a27756a605edf492ed3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:eeb934137debfbe98be61a27756a605edf492ed3</id>
<content type='text'>
The SEV-TIO switch in the AMD BIOS is reported to the OS via
the IOMMU Extended Feature 2 register (EFR2), bit 1.

Add helper to parse the bit and report the feature presence.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy &lt;aik@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251202024449.542361-4-aik@amd.com
Acked-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;joerg.roedel@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Vasant Hegde &lt;vasant.hegde@amd.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
