<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/drivers/infiniband/sw, branch v6.6.148</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.6.148</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.6.148'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2026-08-03T09:15:13+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/siw: publish QP after initialization</title>
<updated>2026-08-03T09:15:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ruoyu Wang</name>
<email>ruoyuw560@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-30T06:00:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=36e91a58397ca8c978e38a0bf389f0c6113fa8ca'/>
<id>urn:sha1:36e91a58397ca8c978e38a0bf389f0c6113fa8ca</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit bb27fcc67c429d97f785c92c35a6c5adebb05d7f ]

siw_create_qp() currently calls siw_qp_add() before the queues, CQ
pointers, state, completion, and device list entry are ready. A QPN
lookup can therefore reach a QP that is still being constructed.

Move siw_qp_add() to the end of siw_create_qp(), after QP
initialization and before adding the QP to the siw device list.

Fixes: f29dd55b0236 ("rdma/siw: queue pair methods")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260630060040.966461-1-ruoyuw560@gmail.com
Suggested-by: Bernard Metzler &lt;bernard.metzler@linux.dev&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ruoyu Wang &lt;ruoyuw560@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Bernard Metzler &lt;bernard.metzler@linux.dev&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/siw: Only check attrs-&gt;cap.max_send_wr in siw_create_qp</title>
<updated>2026-08-03T09:15:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Guoqing Jiang</name>
<email>guoqing.jiang@linux.dev</email>
</author>
<published>2023-11-13T11:57:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=8bf715284f08ac24e1ce1032838e277d0d443500'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8bf715284f08ac24e1ce1032838e277d0d443500</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 788bbf4c2fc6e0c35bae9ed5068f484272539d3e ]

We can just check max_send_wr here given both max_send_wr and
max_recv_wr are defined as u32 type, and we also need to ensure
num_sqe (derived from max_send_wr) shouldn't be zero.

Acked-by: Bernard Metzler &lt;bmt@zurich.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Guoqing Jiang &lt;guoqing.jiang@linux.dev&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231113115726.12762-16-guoqing.jiang@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leon@kernel.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: bb27fcc67c42 ("RDMA/siw: publish QP after initialization")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/rxe: Copy WQE to local buffer in non-SRQ receive path</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:03:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tristan Madani</name>
<email>tristmd@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-18T21:50:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=fc72fd61cc8b2e2e3e92ae4c0e9cc30c9a7ecb78'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fc72fd61cc8b2e2e3e92ae4c0e9cc30c9a7ecb78</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d6ab440240a04b8737ee4c7bb21af9182e451733 ]

For non-SRQ QPs, the responder reads WQE fields directly from the
shared queue buffer mapped into userspace. This allows a malicious
user to modify fields like num_sge or sge entries while the kernel
is processing the WQE, leading to out-of-bounds reads in
rxe_resp_check_length() and copy_data().

Introduce get_recv_wqe() that validates num_sge and copies the WQE
to a kernel-local buffer before processing, matching the approach
already used for SRQ WQEs in get_srq_wqe(). The srq_wqe buffer is
reused since SRQ and non-SRQ paths are mutually exclusive per QP.

Fixes: 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260518215040.1598586-3-tristan@talencesecurity.com
Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani &lt;tristan@talencesecurity.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun &lt;yanjun.zhu@linux.dev&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/rxe: Fix TOCTOU heap overflow in get_srq_wqe</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:03:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tristan Madani</name>
<email>tristmd@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-18T21:50:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=cd19a6345e3727adafafa5954b58b13c92e13b80'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cd19a6345e3727adafafa5954b58b13c92e13b80</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 22b8fbded65b8c441b634a185f8da67657df6c50 ]

get_srq_wqe() reads wqe-&gt;dma.num_sge from the shared receive queue
buffer, which is mapped into userspace. It validates num_sge against
max_sge, but then re-reads the same field to calculate the memcpy
size. A concurrent userspace thread can modify num_sge between
validation and use, causing a heap buffer overflow when copying the
WQE into qp-&gt;resp.srq_wqe.

Read num_sge into a local variable and use it for both the bounds
check and the size calculation.

Fixes: 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260518215040.1598586-2-tristan@talencesecurity.com
Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani &lt;tristan@talencesecurity.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun &lt;yanjun.zhu@linux.dev&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/rxe: Fix a use-after-free problem in rxe_mmap</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:03:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zhu Yanjun</name>
<email>yanjun.zhu@linux.dev</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-15T00:25:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=665fb7d22a700c66a78db0cf88c6e6a649aba9d0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:665fb7d22a700c66a78db0cf88c6e6a649aba9d0</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 35744ab3d03c5fca8c1752f53fc8fc674e14c561 ]

rxe_mmap() removes a rxe_mmap_info struct from the pending_mmaps list
and releases pending_lock while the struct's kref is still at 1:

   list_del_init(&amp;ip-&gt;pending_mmaps);
   spin_unlock_bh(&amp;rxe-&gt;pending_lock);   /* ref == 1, no lock held */
   ret = remap_vmalloc_range(vma, ip-&gt;obj, 0);  /* walks PTEs */
   [...]
   rxe_vma_open(vma);                    /* kref_get, ref → 2 */
   remap_vmalloc_range_partial() walks PTEs without any lock.

A concurrent DESTROY_CQ ioctl on another CPU calls:

    kref_put(&amp;q-&gt;ip-&gt;ref, rxe_mmap_release)   /* ref 1→0 */
    vfree(ip-&gt;obj)   /* clears vmalloc PTEs mid-walk */
    kfree(ip)        /* frees rxe_mmap_info */

This yields:

   1. Kernel crash, vmalloc_to_page() returns NULL when vfree wins the
   per-PTE race -&gt; vm_insert_page(NULL) → GPF in validate_page_before_insert

   2. Page UAF, vmalloc_to_page() reads a stale PTE before vfree clears
   it. User VMA holds a PTE to a free'd page which might eventually get
   reallocated later by vmalloc which allows the attacker to get a clean
   page-level UAF.

   It is worth noting that even though a page-level UAF is possible given
   the strong primitive, it is statistically very difficult to achieve
   given the very short time window (after the last insert_page and before
   the kref_get).

The call trace are as below:

  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
  KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
  CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 413 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.0.0-rc5-dirty #28 PREEMPT(lazy)
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:validate_page_before_insert+0x32/0x300
  Code: e5 41 57 41 56 49 89 fe 41 55 41 54 53 48 89 f3 e8 93 b5 a3 ff 48 8d 7b 08 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 &lt;80&gt; 3c 02 00 0f 85 7b 02 00 00 4c 8b 63 08 31 ff 4d 89 e5 41 83 e5
  RSP: 0018:ffff88811b15f2f0 EFLAGS: 00000202
  RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000008
  RBP: ffff88811b15f318 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8881181eee00
  R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8881181eee00 R15: ffff8881181eee20
  FS:  00007b1e000f76c0(0000) GS:ffff8884268e0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007b1e00a24ac0 CR3: 0000000116eb3000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   insert_page+0x8f/0x190
   ? __pfx_insert_page+0x10/0x10
   ? kasan_save_alloc_info+0x38/0x60
   vm_insert_page+0x2e7/0x400
   remap_vmalloc_range_partial+0x212/0x3e0
   remap_vmalloc_range+0x6e/0xb0
   ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
   rxe_mmap+0x2e9/0x5d0
   ib_uverbs_mmap+0x1ad/0x2c0
   __mmap_region+0x12c2/0x2ad0
   ? __pfx___mmap_region+0x10/0x10
   ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x58/0xb0
   ? mas_prev_slot+0x360/0x39c0
   ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x58/0xb0
   ? mas_next_slot+0x1e5b/0x2f40
   ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp8+0x18/0x30
   ? unmapped_area_topdown+0x4dd/0x610
   ? kfree+0x1b1/0x440
   ? free_cpumask_var+0x16/0x30
   ? __kasan_slab_free+0x7d/0xa0
   ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp8+0x18/0x30
   mmap_region+0x2e6/0x3c0
   do_mmap+0xa3e/0x12a0
   ? __pfx_do_mmap+0x10/0x10
   ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
   ? down_write_killable+0xba/0x160
   ? __pfx_down_write_killable+0x10/0x10
   ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp4+0x16/0x30
   vm_mmap_pgoff+0x2d4/0x4a0
   ? __pfx_vm_mmap_pgoff+0x10/0x10
   ? fget+0x1bf/0x270
   ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x40c/0x690
   ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4+0x16/0x30
   ? __pfx_ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x10/0x10
   ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
   ? _raw_spin_trylock+0xbb/0x130
   ? __pfx__raw_spin_trylock+0x10/0x10
   __x64_sys_mmap+0x135/0x1e0
   x64_sys_call+0x1c14/0x2790
   do_syscall_64+0xd2/0x1050
   ? rcu_core+0x352/0x7d0
   ? rcu_core_si+0xe/0x20
   ? handle_softirqs+0x1aa/0x650
   ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp4+0x16/0x30
   ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0xe1/0x160
   ? irqentry_exit+0xb1/0x670
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260515002537.6209-1-yanjun.zhu@linux.dev
Reported-and-tested-by: nasm &lt;n4sm@protonmail.com&gt;
Suggested-by: nasm &lt;n4sm@protonmail.com&gt;
Fixes: 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver")
Signed-off-by: Zhu Yanjun &lt;yanjun.zhu@linux.dev&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/siw: bound Read Response placement to the RREAD length</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:02:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Bommarito</name>
<email>michael.bommarito@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-02T19:47:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b2e26c955f8dd7e8d3f16c858db05245ea4fa817'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b2e26c955f8dd7e8d3f16c858db05245ea4fa817</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7d29f7e9dbd844cae4d3e559cf78324b9642fd6b upstream.

In drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_qp_rx.c, siw_proc_rresp() places each
inbound Read Response DDP segment at sge-&gt;laddr + wqe-&gt;processed and then
accumulates wqe-&gt;processed, but it never checks the running total against
the sink buffer length on continuation segments. siw_check_sge() resolves
and validates the sink memory only on the first fragment (the if (!*mem)
branch), and siw_rresp_check_ntoh() compares the cumulative length against
wqe-&gt;bytes only on the final segment (the !frx-&gt;more_ddp_segs guard).

A connected siw peer that answers an outstanding RREAD with Read Response
segments that keep the DDP Last flag clear, carrying more total payload
than the RREAD requested, drives wqe-&gt;processed past the validated sink
buffer; the next siw_rx_data() call writes out of bounds at
sge-&gt;laddr + wqe-&gt;processed. siw runs iWARP over ordinary routable TCP,
so the peer is the remote end of an established RDMA connection and needs
no local privilege.

Bound every segment before placement, exactly as siw_proc_send() and
siw_proc_write() already do for their tagged and untagged paths, and
terminate the connection with a base-or-bounds DDP error when the
Read Response would overrun the sink buffer.

This is the second receive-path length fix for this file. A separate
change rejects an MPA FPDU length that underflows the per-fragment
remainder in the header decode; that guard does not cover this case,
because here each individual segment length is self-consistent and only
the accumulated placement offset overruns the buffer.

Fixes: 8b6a361b8c48 ("rdma/siw: receive path")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260602194700.2273758-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito &lt;michael.bommarito@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA: During rereg_mr ensure that REREG_ACCESS is compatible</title>
<updated>2026-06-19T11:39:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason Gunthorpe</name>
<email>jgg@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-15T22:52:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=09dc18894148381d3bfc550083b1236043870dce'/>
<id>urn:sha1:09dc18894148381d3bfc550083b1236043870dce</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit badad6fad60def1b9805559dd81dbab3d97b82aa ]

If IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS changes from RO to RW then the umem has to be
re-evaluated to ensure it is properly pinned as RW. Since the umem is
hidden inside each driver's mr struct add a ib_umem_check_rereg() function
that each driver has to call before processing IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS.

mlx4 has to retain its duplicate ib_access_writable check because it
implements IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS | IB_MR_REREG_TRANS by changing both items
in place sequentially while the MR is live, so it will continue to not
support this combination.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b40656aa7d55 ("RDMA/umem: remove FOLL_FORCE usage")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/0-v1-06fb1a2d6cf5+107-rereg_access_jgg@nvidia.com
Reported-by: Philip Tsukerman &lt;philiptsukerman@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/rxe: Fix "trying to register non-static key in rxe_qp_do_cleanup" bug</title>
<updated>2026-06-19T11:39:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zhu Yanjun</name>
<email>yanjun.zhu@linux.dev</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-05T16:55:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=d859e53596d1b58afd31b98c4b6ab2dd465b58c7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d859e53596d1b58afd31b98c4b6ab2dd465b58c7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1c7eec4d5f3b39cdea2153abaebf1b7229a47072 upstream.

Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 assign_lock_key kernel/locking/lockdep.c:986 [inline]
 register_lock_class+0x4a3/0x4c0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1300
 __lock_acquire+0x99/0x1ba0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5110
 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5866 [inline]
 lock_acquire+0x179/0x350 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5823
 __timer_delete_sync+0x152/0x1b0 kernel/time/timer.c:1644
 rxe_qp_do_cleanup+0x5c3/0x7e0 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:815
 execute_in_process_context+0x3a/0x160 kernel/workqueue.c:4596
 __rxe_cleanup+0x267/0x3c0 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_pool.c:232
 rxe_create_qp+0x3f7/0x5f0 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c:604
 create_qp+0x62d/0xa80 drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c:1250
 ib_create_qp_kernel+0x9f/0x310 drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c:1361
 ib_create_qp include/rdma/ib_verbs.h:3803 [inline]
 rdma_create_qp+0x10c/0x340 drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:1144
 rds_ib_setup_qp+0xc86/0x19a0 net/rds/ib_cm.c:600
 rds_ib_cm_initiate_connect+0x1e8/0x3d0 net/rds/ib_cm.c:944
 rds_rdma_cm_event_handler_cmn+0x61f/0x8c0 net/rds/rdma_transport.c:109
 cma_cm_event_handler+0x94/0x300 drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:2184
 cma_work_handler+0x15b/0x230 drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:3042
 process_one_work+0x9cc/0x1b70 kernel/workqueue.c:3238
 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3319 [inline]
 worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf10 kernel/workqueue.c:3400
 kthread+0x3c2/0x780 kernel/kthread.c:464
 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:153
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

The root cause is as below:

In the function rxe_create_qp, the function rxe_qp_from_init is called
to create qp, if this function rxe_qp_from_init fails, rxe_cleanup will
be called to handle all the allocated resources, including the timers:
retrans_timer and rnr_nak_timer.

The function rxe_qp_from_init calls the function rxe_qp_init_req to
initialize the timers: retrans_timer and rnr_nak_timer.

But these timers are initialized in the end of rxe_qp_init_req.
If some errors occur before the initialization of these timers, this
problem will occur.

The solution is to check whether these timers are initialized or not.
If these timers are not initialized, ignore these timers.

Fixes: 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver")
Reported-by: syzbot+4edb496c3cad6e953a31@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4edb496c3cad6e953a31
Signed-off-by: Zhu Yanjun &lt;yanjun.zhu@linux.dev&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250419080741.1515231-1-yanjun.zhu@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leon@kernel.org&gt;
[ Vladislav: keep del_timer_sync() because linux-6.6.y has not renamed it
  to timer_delete_sync() yet. The actual fix is unchanged: check the timer
  .function fields before deleting the timers. ]
Signed-off-by: Vladislav Nikolaev &lt;vlad102nikolaev@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/siw: Reject MPA FPDU length underflow before signed receive math</title>
<updated>2026-06-01T15:43:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Bommarito</name>
<email>michael.bommarito@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-13T17:53:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=14553be882d9ce91749c9d64041de66e34ad8e70'/>
<id>urn:sha1:14553be882d9ce91749c9d64041de66e34ad8e70</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0ce1bc9e46ecabe84772bb561e373c0d9876d6f2 upstream.

A malicious connected siw peer can send an iWARP FPDU whose MPA length
field (c_hdr-&gt;mpa_len, 16 bit big-endian, peer-controlled) is smaller
than the fixed DDP/RDMAP header for the announced opcode. Soft-iWARP
parses the full header in siw_get_hdr() based on iwarp_pktinfo[opcode]
.hdr_len, but never compares mpa_len against that header length.

siw_tcp_rx_data() then derives

    srx-&gt;fpdu_part_rem = be16_to_cpu(mpa_len) - fpdu_part_rcvd
                         + MPA_HDR_SIZE;

where fpdu_part_rcvd equals iwarp_pktinfo[opcode].hdr_len at this
point. For a tagged WRITE (hdr_len 16, MPA_HDR_SIZE 2) the smallest
on-wire mpa_len of 0 yields fpdu_part_rem = -14, and any mpa_len below
hdr_len - MPA_HDR_SIZE underflows to a negative int.

The signed value then flows into siw_proc_write()/siw_proc_rresp() as

    bytes = min(srx-&gt;fpdu_part_rem, srx-&gt;skb_new);

is handed to siw_check_mem() as an int len (whose interval check
addr + len &gt; mem-&gt;va + mem-&gt;len is satisfied for a valid base when
len is negative), and reaches siw_rx_data() -&gt; siw_rx_kva() /
siw_rx_umem() -&gt; skb_copy_bits() as a signed copy length. The header
copy branch in skb_copy_bits() promotes that to size_t, producing a
multi-gigabyte read.

KASAN under a KUnit harness that drives the real kernel TCP receive
path -- a loopback AF_INET socketpair, the malformed FPDU written via
kernel_sendmsg, sk_data_ready firing in softirq, tcp_read_sock
dispatching to siw_tcp_rx_data -- reports:

    BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skb_copy_bits+0x284/0x480
    Read of size 4294967295 at addr ffff888...
    Call Trace:
     skb_copy_bits
     siw_rx_kva
     siw_rx_data
     siw_check_mem
     siw_proc_write
     siw_tcp_rx_data
     __tcp_read_sock
     siw_qp_llp_data_ready
     tcp_data_ready
     tcp_data_queue

Add the missing invariant at the earliest point where the peer header
is fully assembled. iwarp_pktinfo[*].hdr_len - MPA_HDR_SIZE is exactly
the value the siw transmitter uses as the minimum mpa_len for each
opcode (drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_qp.c:33), so this matches the
protocol contract. Out-of-range FPDUs terminate the connection with
TERM_ERROR_LAYER_LLP / LLP_ETYPE_MPA / LLP_ECODE_FPDU_START -- which
is RFC 5044 Section 8 error code 3 ("Marker and ULPDU Length fields
do not agree on the start of an FPDU"), the correct framing-error
class for this inconsistency.

Fixes: 8b6a361b8c48 ("rdma/siw: receive path")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260513175325.2042630-2-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito &lt;michael.bommarito@gmail.com&gt;
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
Acked-by: Bernard Metzler &lt;bernard.metzler@linux.dev&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/rxe: Reject unknown opcodes before ICRC processing</title>
<updated>2026-05-17T15:13:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Bommarito</name>
<email>michael.bommarito@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-14T11:15:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=e3dc3a2fb05f4ed49c7f20594c4c52350d032189'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e3dc3a2fb05f4ed49c7f20594c4c52350d032189</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4c6f86d85d03cdb33addce86aa69aa795ca6c47a upstream.

Even after applying commit 7244491dab34 ("RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC
before payload_size() in rxe_rcv"), a single unauthenticated UDP packet
can still trigger panic.  That patch handled payload_size() underflow only
for valid opcodes with short packets, not for packets carrying an unknown
opcode.  The unknown-opcode OOB read described below predates that commit
and reaches back to the initial Soft RoCE driver.

The check added there reads

    pkt-&gt;paylen &lt; header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE

where header_size(pkt) expands to rxe_opcode[pkt-&gt;opcode].length.  The
rxe_opcode[] array has 256 entries but is only populated for defined IB
opcodes; any other entry (for example opcode 0xff) is zero-initialized, so
length == 0 and the check degenerates to

    pkt-&gt;paylen &lt; 0 + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE

which does not constrain pkt-&gt;paylen enough.  rxe_icrc_hdr() then computes

    rxe_opcode[pkt-&gt;opcode].length - RXE_BTH_BYTES

which underflows when length == 0 and passes a huge value to rxe_crc32(),
causing an out-of-bounds read of the skb payload.

Reproduced on v7.0-rc7 with that fix applied, QEMU/KVM with
CONFIG_RDMA_RXE=y and CONFIG_KASAN=y, after

    rdma link add rxe0 type rxe netdev eth0

A single 48-byte UDP packet to port 4791 with BTH opcode=0xff and
QPN=IB_MULTICAST_QPN triggers:

    BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in crc32_le+0x115/0x170
    Read of size 1 at addr ...
    The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
     allocated 704-byte region
    Call Trace:
     crc32_le+0x115/0x170
     rxe_icrc_hdr.isra.0+0x226/0x300
     rxe_icrc_check+0x13f/0x3a0
     rxe_rcv+0x6e1/0x16e0
     rxe_udp_encap_recv+0x20a/0x320
     udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x7ed/0x12c0

Subsequent packets with the same shape fault on unmapped memory and panic
the kernel.  The trigger requires only module load and "rdma link add"; no
QP, no connection, and no authentication.

Fix this by rejecting packets whose opcode has no rxe_opcode[] entry,
detected via the zero mask or zero length, before any length arithmetic
runs.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260414111555.3386793-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito &lt;michael.bommarito@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun &lt;yanjun.zhu@linux.dev&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
