kernel/linux.git/drivers/infiniband/core, branch v4.19.16

IB/core: Fix oops in netdev_next_upper_dev_rcu()

2019-01-13T08:50:57+00:00

[ Upstream commit 37fbd834b4e492dc41743830cbe435f35120abd8 ] When support for bonding of RoCE devices was added, there was necessarily a link between the RoCE device and the paired netdevice that was part of the bond. If you remove the mlx4_en module, that paired association is broken (the RoCE device is still present but the paired netdevice has been released). We need to account for this in is_upper_ndev_bond_master_filter() and filter out those links with a broken pairing or else we later oops in netdev_next_upper_dev_rcu(). Fixes: 408f1242d940 ("IB/core: Delete lower netdevice default GID entries in bonding scenario") Signed-off-by: Mark Zhang Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

RDMA/core: Add GIDs while changing MAC addr only for registered ndev

2018-12-17T08:24:34+00:00

[ Upstream commit d52ef88a9f4be523425730da3239cf87bee936da ] Currently when MAC address is changed, regardless of the netdev reg_state, GID entries are removed and added to reflect the new MAC address and new default GID entries. When a bonding device is used and the underlying PCI device is removed several netdevice events are generated. Two events of the interest are CHANGEADDR and UNREGISTER event on lower(slave) netdevice of the bond netdevice. Sometimes CHANGEADDR event is generated when netdev state is UNREGISTERING (after UNREGISTER event is generated). In this scenario, GID entries for default GIDs are added and never deleted because GID entries are deleted only when netdev state is < UNREGISTERED. This leads to non zero reference count on the netdevice. Due to this, PCI device unbind operation is getting stuck. To avoid it, when changing mac address, add GID entries only if netdev is in REGISTERED state. Fixes: 03db3a2d81e6 ("IB/core: Add RoCE GID table management") Signed-off-by: Parav Pandit Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

RDMA/cm: Respect returned status of cm_init_av_by_path

2018-11-13T19:08:32+00:00

[ Upstream commit e54b6a3bcd1ec972b25a164bdf495d9e7120b107 ] Add missing check for failure of cm_init_av_by_path Fixes: e1444b5a163e ("IB/cm: Fix automatic path migration support") Reported-by: Slava Shwartsman Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

RDMA/core: Do not expose unsupported counters

2018-11-13T19:08:32+00:00

[ Upstream commit 0f6ef65d1c6ec8deb5d0f11f86631ec4cfe8f22e ] If the provider driver (such as rdma_rxe) doesn't support pma counters, avoid exposing its directory similar to optional hw_counters directory. If core fails to read the PMA counter, return an error so that user can retry later if needed. Fixes: 35c4cbb17811 ("IB/core: Create get_perf_mad function in sysfs.c") Reported-by: Holger Hoffstätte Tested-by: Holger Hoffstätte Signed-off-by: Parav Pandit Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

RDMA/ucma: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability

2018-10-16T16:47:40+00:00

hdr.cmd can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1686 ucma_write() warn: potential spectre issue 'ucma_cmd_table' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing hdr.cmd before using it to index ucm_cmd_table. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford

IB/ucm: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability

2018-10-16T15:32:40+00:00

hdr.cmd can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: drivers/infiniband/core/ucm.c:1127 ib_ucm_write() warn: potential spectre issue 'ucm_cmd_table' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing hdr.cmd before using it to index ucm_cmd_table. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford

RDMA/core: Set right entry state before releasing reference

2018-09-25T21:01:09+00:00

Currently add_modify_gid() for IB link layer has followong issue in cache update path. When GID update event occurs, core releases reference to the GID table without updating its state and/or entry pointer. CPU-0 CPU-1 ------ ----- ib_cache_update() IPoIB ULP add_modify_gid() [..] put_gid_entry() refcnt = 0, but state = valid, entry is valid. (work item is not yet executed). ipoib_create_ah() rdma_create_ah() rdma_get_gid_attr() <-- Tries to acquire gid_attr which has refcnt = 0. This is incorrect. GID entry state and entry pointer is provides the accurate GID enty state. Such fields must be updated with rwlock to protect against readers and, such fields must be in sane state before refcount can drop to zero. Otherwise above race condition can happen leading to use-after-free situation. Following backtrace has been observed when cache update for an IB port is triggered while IPoIB ULP is creating an AH. Therefore, when updating GID entry, first mark a valid entry as invalid through state and set the barrier so that no callers can acquired the GID entry, followed by release reference to it. refcount_t: increment on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 29106 at lib/refcount.c:153 refcount_inc_checked+0x30/0x50 Workqueue: ib-comp-unb-wq ib_cq_poll_work [ib_core] RIP: 0010:refcount_inc_checked+0x30/0x50 RSP: 0018:ffff8802ad36f600 EFLAGS: 00010082 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff86710100 RBP: ffff8802d6e60a30 R08: ffffed005d67bf8b R09: ffffed005d67bf8b R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed005d67bf8a R12: ffff88027620cee8 R13: ffff8802d6e60988 R14: ffff8802d6e60a78 R15: 0000000000000202 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8802eb200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f3ab35e5c88 CR3: 00000002ce84a000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 IPv6: ADDRCONF(NETDEV_CHANGE): ib1: link becomes ready Call Trace: rdma_get_gid_attr+0x220/0x310 [ib_core] ? lock_acquire+0x145/0x3a0 rdma_fill_sgid_attr+0x32c/0x470 [ib_core] rdma_create_ah+0x89/0x160 [ib_core] ? rdma_fill_sgid_attr+0x470/0x470 [ib_core] ? ipoib_create_ah+0x52/0x260 [ib_ipoib] ipoib_create_ah+0xf5/0x260 [ib_ipoib] ipoib_mcast_join_complete+0xbbe/0x2540 [ib_ipoib] Fixes: b150c3862d21 ("IB/core: Introduce GID entry reference counts") Signed-off-by: Parav Pandit Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe

IB/uverbs: Free uapi on destroy

2018-09-25T20:47:33+00:00

Make sure we free struct uverbs_api once we clean the radix tree. It was allocated by uverbs_alloc_api(). Fixes: 9ed3e5f44772 ("IB/uverbs: Build the specs into a radix tree at runtime") Reported-by: Bart Van Assche Signed-off-by: Mark Bloch Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe

RDMA/uverbs: Fix validity check for modify QP

2018-09-20T22:47:30+00:00

Uverbs shouldn't enforce QP state in the command unless the user set the QP state bit in the attribute mask. In addition, only copy qp attr fields which have the corresponding bit set in the attribute mask over to the internal attr structure. Fixes: 88de869bbe4f ("RDMA/uverbs: Ensure validity of current QP state value") Fixes: bc38a6abdd5a ("[PATCH] IB uverbs: core implementation") Signed-off-by: Majd Dibbiny Signed-off-by: Jack Morgenstein Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe

ucma: fix a use-after-free in ucma_resolve_ip()

2018-09-13T17:04:13+00:00

There is a race condition between ucma_close() and ucma_resolve_ip(): CPU0 CPU1 ucma_resolve_ip(): ucma_close(): ctx = ucma_get_ctx(file, cmd.id); list_for_each_entry_safe(ctx, tmp, &file->ctx_list, list) { mutex_lock(&mut); idr_remove(&ctx_idr, ctx->id); mutex_unlock(&mut); ... mutex_lock(&mut); if (!ctx->closing) { mutex_unlock(&mut); rdma_destroy_id(ctx->cm_id); ... ucma_free_ctx(ctx); ret = rdma_resolve_addr(); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); Before idr_remove(), ucma_get_ctx() could still find the ctx and after rdma_destroy_id(), rdma_resolve_addr() may still access id_priv pointer. Also, ucma_put_ctx() may use ctx after ucma_free_ctx() too. ucma_close() should call ucma_put_ctx() too which tests the refcnt and waits for the last one releasing it. The similar pattern is already used by ucma_destroy_id(). Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+da2591e115d57a9cbb8b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+cfe3c1e8ef634ba8964b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Jason Gunthorpe Cc: Doug Ledford Cc: Leon Romanovsky Signed-off-by: Cong Wang Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford