<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c, branch linux-4.16.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=linux-4.16.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=linux-4.16.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2018-02-21T18:52:19+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/uverbs: Fix kernel panic while using XRC_TGT QP type</title>
<updated>2018-02-21T18:52:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Leon Romanovsky</name>
<email>leonro@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-21T08:25:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f45765872e7aae7b81feb3044aaf9886b21885ef'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f45765872e7aae7b81feb3044aaf9886b21885ef</id>
<content type='text'>
Attempt to modify XRC_TGT QP type from the user space (ibv_xsrq_pingpong
invocation) will trigger the following kernel panic. It is caused by the
fact that such QPs missed uobject initialization.

[   17.408845] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000048
[   17.412645] IP: rdma_lookup_put_uobject+0x9/0x50
[   17.416567] PGD 0 P4D 0
[   17.419262] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[   17.422915] CPU: 0 PID: 455 Comm: ibv_xsrq_pingpo Not tainted 4.16.0-rc1+ #86
[   17.424765] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.7.5-0-ge51488c-20140602_164612-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014
[   17.427399] RIP: 0010:rdma_lookup_put_uobject+0x9/0x50
[   17.428445] RSP: 0018:ffffb8c7401e7c90 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   17.429543] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffb8c7401e7cf8 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   17.432426] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[   17.437448] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00000000000218f0 R09: ffffffff8ebc4cac
[   17.440223] R10: fffff6038052cd80 R11: ffff967694b36400 R12: ffff96769391f800
[   17.442184] R13: ffffb8c7401e7cd8 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff967699f60000
[   17.443971] FS:  00007fc29207d700(0000) GS:ffff96769fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   17.446623] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   17.448059] CR2: 0000000000000048 CR3: 000000001397a000 CR4: 00000000000006b0
[   17.449677] Call Trace:
[   17.450247]  modify_qp.isra.20+0x219/0x2f0
[   17.451151]  ib_uverbs_modify_qp+0x90/0xe0
[   17.452126]  ib_uverbs_write+0x1d2/0x3c0
[   17.453897]  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x93c/0xe40
[   17.454938]  __vfs_write+0x36/0x180
[   17.455875]  vfs_write+0xad/0x1e0
[   17.456766]  SyS_write+0x52/0xc0
[   17.457632]  do_syscall_64+0x75/0x180
[   17.458631]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x21/0x86
[   17.460004] RIP: 0033:0x7fc29198f5a0
[   17.460982] RSP: 002b:00007ffccc71f018 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[   17.463043] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000078 RCX: 00007fc29198f5a0
[   17.464581] RDX: 0000000000000078 RSI: 00007ffccc71f050 RDI: 0000000000000003
[   17.466148] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000078 R09: 00007ffccc71f050
[   17.467750] R10: 000055b6cf87c248 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffccc71f300
[   17.469541] R13: 000055b6cf8733a0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[   17.471151] Code: 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 47 48 48 8b 00 48 8b 40 10 e9 0b 8b 68 00 90 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 53 89 f5 &lt;48&gt; 8b 47 48 48 89 fb 40 0f b6 f6 48 8b 00 48 8b 40 20 e8 e0 8a
[   17.475185] RIP: rdma_lookup_put_uobject+0x9/0x50 RSP: ffffb8c7401e7c90
[   17.476841] CR2: 0000000000000048
[   17.477764] ---[ end trace 1dbcc5354071a712 ]---
[   17.478880] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[   17.480277] Kernel Offset: 0xd000000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)

Fixes: 2f08ee363fe0 ("RDMA/restrack: don't use uaccess_kernel()")
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/restrack: don't use uaccess_kernel()</title>
<updated>2018-02-16T17:18:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steve Wise</name>
<email>swise@opengridcomputing.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-15T02:43:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=2f08ee363fe097bc6dc01aac53e1798b16c00986'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2f08ee363fe097bc6dc01aac53e1798b16c00986</id>
<content type='text'>
uaccess_kernel() isn't sufficient to determine if an rdma resource is
user-mode or not.  For example, resources allocated in the add_one()
function of an ib_client get falsely labeled as user mode, when they
are kernel mode allocations.  EG: mad qps.

The result is that these qps are skipped over during a nldev query
because of an erroneous namespace mismatch.

So now we determine if the resource is user-mode by looking at the object
struct's uobject or similar pointer to know if it was allocated for user
mode applications.

Fixes: 02d8883f520e ("RDMA/restrack: Add general infrastructure to track RDMA resources")
Signed-off-by: Steve Wise &lt;swise@opengridcomputing.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/verbs: Check existence of function prior to accessing it</title>
<updated>2018-02-16T16:18:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Leon Romanovsky</name>
<email>leonro@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-14T12:38:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=2188558621ed475cef55fa94ce535499452f0091'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2188558621ed475cef55fa94ce535499452f0091</id>
<content type='text'>
Update all the flows to ensure that function pointer exists prior
to accessing it.

This is much safer than checking the uverbs_ex_mask variable, especially
since we know that test isn't working properly and will be removed
in -next.

This prevents a user triggereable oops.

Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/uverbs: Sanitize user entered port numbers prior to access it</title>
<updated>2018-02-15T22:31:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Leon Romanovsky</name>
<email>leonro@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-14T10:35:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=5d4c05c3ee36f67ddc107ab5ea0898af01a62cc1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5d4c05c3ee36f67ddc107ab5ea0898af01a62cc1</id>
<content type='text'>
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in copy_ah_attr_from_uverbs+0x6f2/0x8c0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88006476a198 by task syzkaller697701/265

CPU: 0 PID: 265 Comm: syzkaller697701 Not tainted 4.15.0+ #90
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.7.5-0-ge51488c-20140602_164612-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0xde/0x164
 ? dma_virt_map_sg+0x22c/0x22c
 ? show_regs_print_info+0x17/0x17
 ? lock_contended+0x11a0/0x11a0
 print_address_description+0x83/0x3e0
 kasan_report+0x18c/0x4b0
 ? copy_ah_attr_from_uverbs+0x6f2/0x8c0
 ? copy_ah_attr_from_uverbs+0x6f2/0x8c0
 ? lookup_get_idr_uobject+0x120/0x200
 ? copy_ah_attr_from_uverbs+0x6f2/0x8c0
 copy_ah_attr_from_uverbs+0x6f2/0x8c0
 ? modify_qp+0xd0e/0x1350
 modify_qp+0xd0e/0x1350
 ib_uverbs_modify_qp+0xf9/0x170
 ? ib_uverbs_query_qp+0xa70/0xa70
 ib_uverbs_write+0x7f9/0xef0
 ? attach_entity_load_avg+0x8b0/0x8b0
 ? ib_uverbs_query_qp+0xa70/0xa70
 ? uverbs_devnode+0x110/0x110
 ? cyc2ns_read_end+0x10/0x10
 ? print_irqtrace_events+0x280/0x280
 ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x200
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
 ? time_hardirqs_on+0x27/0x670
 __vfs_write+0x10d/0x700
 ? uverbs_devnode+0x110/0x110
 ? kernel_read+0x170/0x170
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
 ? finish_task_switch+0x1bd/0x7a0
 ? finish_task_switch+0x194/0x7a0
 ? prandom_u32_state+0xe/0x180
 ? rcu_read_unlock+0x80/0x80
 ? security_file_permission+0x93/0x260
 vfs_write+0x1b0/0x550
 SyS_write+0xc7/0x1a0
 ? SyS_read+0x1a0/0x1a0
 ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b
RIP: 0033:0x433c29
RSP: 002b:00007ffcf2be82a8 EFLAGS: 00000217

Allocated by task 62:
 kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0
 kmem_cache_alloc+0x141/0x480
 dup_fd+0x101/0xcc0
 copy_process.part.62+0x166f/0x4390
 _do_fork+0x1cb/0xe90
 kernel_thread+0x34/0x40
 call_usermodehelper_exec_work+0x112/0x260
 process_one_work+0x929/0x1aa0
 worker_thread+0x5c6/0x12a0
 kthread+0x346/0x510
 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

Freed by task 259:
 kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xc0
 kmem_cache_free+0xf3/0x4c0
 put_files_struct+0x225/0x2c0
 exit_files+0x88/0xc0
 do_exit+0x67c/0x1520
 do_group_exit+0xe8/0x380
 SyS_exit_group+0x1e/0x20
 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88006476a000
 which belongs to the cache files_cache of size 832
The buggy address is located 408 bytes inside of
 832-byte region [ffff88006476a000, ffff88006476a340)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea000191da80 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x4000000000008100(slab|head)
raw: 4000000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000100080008
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000100000001 ffff88006bcf7a80 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff88006476a080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff88006476a100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
&gt;ffff88006476a180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                            ^
 ffff88006476a200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff88006476a280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================

Cc: syzkaller &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 4.11
Fixes: 44c58487d51a ("IB/core: Define 'ib' and 'roce' rdma_ah_attr types")
Reported-by: Noa Osherovich &lt;noaos@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/uverbs: Fix circular locking dependency</title>
<updated>2018-02-15T22:31:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Leon Romanovsky</name>
<email>leonro@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-14T10:35:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=1ff5325c3ca1843228a86549318bbd3b414b9207'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1ff5325c3ca1843228a86549318bbd3b414b9207</id>
<content type='text'>
Avoid circular locking dependency by calling
to uobj_alloc_commit() outside of xrcd_tree_mutex lock.

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
4.15.0+ #87 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syzkaller401056/269 is trying to acquire lock:
 (&amp;uverbs_dev-&gt;xrcd_tree_mutex){+.+.}, at: [&lt;000000006c12d2cd&gt;] uverbs_free_xrcd+0xd2/0x360

but task is already holding lock:
 (&amp;ucontext-&gt;uobjects_lock){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000da010f09&gt;] uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0x168/0x730

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-&gt; #1 (&amp;ucontext-&gt;uobjects_lock){+.+.}:
       __mutex_lock+0x111/0x1720
       rdma_alloc_commit_uobject+0x22c/0x600
       ib_uverbs_open_xrcd+0x61a/0xdd0
       ib_uverbs_write+0x7f9/0xef0
       __vfs_write+0x10d/0x700
       vfs_write+0x1b0/0x550
       SyS_write+0xc7/0x1a0
       entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b

-&gt; #0 (&amp;uverbs_dev-&gt;xrcd_tree_mutex){+.+.}:
       lock_acquire+0x19d/0x440
       __mutex_lock+0x111/0x1720
       uverbs_free_xrcd+0xd2/0x360
       remove_commit_idr_uobject+0x6d/0x110
       uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0x2f0/0x730
       ib_uverbs_cleanup_ucontext.constprop.3+0x52/0x120
       ib_uverbs_close+0xf2/0x570
       __fput+0x2cd/0x8d0
       task_work_run+0xec/0x1d0
       do_exit+0x6a1/0x1520
       do_group_exit+0xe8/0x380
       SyS_exit_group+0x1e/0x20
       entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&amp;ucontext-&gt;uobjects_lock);
                               lock(&amp;uverbs_dev-&gt;xrcd_tree_mutex);
                               lock(&amp;ucontext-&gt;uobjects_lock);
  lock(&amp;uverbs_dev-&gt;xrcd_tree_mutex);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

3 locks held by syzkaller401056/269:
 #0:  (&amp;file-&gt;cleanup_mutex){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000c9f0c252&gt;] ib_uverbs_close+0xac/0x570
 #1:  (&amp;ucontext-&gt;cleanup_rwsem){++++}, at: [&lt;00000000b6994d49&gt;] uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0xf6/0x730
 #2:  (&amp;ucontext-&gt;uobjects_lock){+.+.}, at: [&lt;00000000da010f09&gt;] uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0x168/0x730

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 269 Comm: syzkaller401056 Not tainted 4.15.0+ #87
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.7.5-0-ge51488c-20140602_164612-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0xde/0x164
 ? dma_virt_map_sg+0x22c/0x22c
 ? uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0x168/0x730
 ? console_unlock+0x502/0xbd0
 print_circular_bug.isra.24+0x35e/0x396
 ? print_circular_bug_header+0x12e/0x12e
 ? find_usage_backwards+0x30/0x30
 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b
 validate_chain.isra.28+0x25d1/0x40c0
 ? check_usage+0xb70/0xb70
 ? graph_lock+0x160/0x160
 ? find_usage_backwards+0x30/0x30
 ? cyc2ns_read_end+0x10/0x10
 ? print_irqtrace_events+0x280/0x280
 ? __lock_acquire+0x93d/0x1630
 __lock_acquire+0x93d/0x1630
 lock_acquire+0x19d/0x440
 ? uverbs_free_xrcd+0xd2/0x360
 __mutex_lock+0x111/0x1720
 ? uverbs_free_xrcd+0xd2/0x360
 ? uverbs_free_xrcd+0xd2/0x360
 ? __mutex_lock+0x828/0x1720
 ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1550/0x1550
 ? uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0x168/0x730
 ? __lock_acquire+0x9a9/0x1630
 ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1550/0x1550
 ? uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0xf6/0x730
 ? lock_contended+0x11a0/0x11a0
 ? uverbs_free_xrcd+0xd2/0x360
 uverbs_free_xrcd+0xd2/0x360
 remove_commit_idr_uobject+0x6d/0x110
 uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0x2f0/0x730
 ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x200
 ? uverbs_close_fd+0x1c0/0x1c0
 ib_uverbs_cleanup_ucontext.constprop.3+0x52/0x120
 ib_uverbs_close+0xf2/0x570
 ? ib_uverbs_remove_one+0xb50/0xb50
 ? ib_uverbs_remove_one+0xb50/0xb50
 __fput+0x2cd/0x8d0
 task_work_run+0xec/0x1d0
 do_exit+0x6a1/0x1520
 ? fsnotify_first_mark+0x220/0x220
 ? exit_notify+0x9f0/0x9f0
 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0x8b
 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0x8b
 ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
 ? time_hardirqs_on+0x27/0x670
 ? time_hardirqs_off+0x27/0x490
 ? syscall_return_slowpath+0x6c/0x460
 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0x8b
 do_group_exit+0xe8/0x380
 SyS_exit_group+0x1e/0x20
 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b
RIP: 0033:0x431ce9

Cc: syzkaller &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 4.11
Fixes: fd3c7904db6e ("IB/core: Change idr objects to use the new schema")
Reported-by: Noa Osherovich &lt;noaos@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/uverbs: Fix bad unlock balance in ib_uverbs_close_xrcd</title>
<updated>2018-02-15T22:31:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Leon Romanovsky</name>
<email>leonro@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-14T10:35:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=5c2e1c4f926856717f3fd31932e926dc3fe77ebd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5c2e1c4f926856717f3fd31932e926dc3fe77ebd</id>
<content type='text'>
There is no matching lock for this mutex. Git history suggests this is
just a missed remnant from an earlier version of the function before
this locking was moved into uverbs_free_xrcd.

Originally this lock was protecting the xrcd_table_delete()

=====================================
WARNING: bad unlock balance detected!
4.15.0+ #87 Not tainted
-------------------------------------
syzkaller223405/269 is trying to release lock (&amp;uverbs_dev-&gt;xrcd_tree_mutex) at:
[&lt;00000000b8703372&gt;] ib_uverbs_close_xrcd+0x195/0x1f0
but there are no more locks to release!

other info that might help us debug this:
1 lock held by syzkaller223405/269:
 #0:  (&amp;uverbs_dev-&gt;disassociate_srcu){....}, at: [&lt;000000005af3b960&gt;] ib_uverbs_write+0x265/0xef0

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 269 Comm: syzkaller223405 Not tainted 4.15.0+ #87
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.7.5-0-ge51488c-20140602_164612-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0xde/0x164
 ? dma_virt_map_sg+0x22c/0x22c
 ? ib_uverbs_write+0x265/0xef0
 ? console_unlock+0x502/0xbd0
 ? ib_uverbs_close_xrcd+0x195/0x1f0
 print_unlock_imbalance_bug+0x131/0x160
 lock_release+0x59d/0x1100
 ? ib_uverbs_close_xrcd+0x195/0x1f0
 ? lock_acquire+0x440/0x440
 ? lock_acquire+0x440/0x440
 __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x88/0x670
 ? wait_for_completion+0x4c0/0x4c0
 ? rdma_lookup_get_uobject+0x145/0x2f0
 ib_uverbs_close_xrcd+0x195/0x1f0
 ? ib_uverbs_open_xrcd+0xdd0/0xdd0
 ib_uverbs_write+0x7f9/0xef0
 ? cyc2ns_read_end+0x10/0x10
 ? ib_uverbs_open_xrcd+0xdd0/0xdd0
 ? uverbs_devnode+0x110/0x110
 ? cyc2ns_read_end+0x10/0x10
 ? cyc2ns_read_end+0x10/0x10
 ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x200
 __vfs_write+0x10d/0x700
 ? uverbs_devnode+0x110/0x110
 ? kernel_read+0x170/0x170
 ? __fget+0x358/0x5d0
 ? security_file_permission+0x93/0x260
 vfs_write+0x1b0/0x550
 SyS_write+0xc7/0x1a0
 ? SyS_read+0x1a0/0x1a0
 ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b
RIP: 0033:0x4335c9

Cc: syzkaller &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 4.11
Fixes: fd3c7904db6e ("IB/core: Change idr objects to use the new schema")
Reported-by: Noa Osherovich &lt;noaos@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/restrack: Increment CQ restrack object before committing</title>
<updated>2018-02-15T22:31:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Leon Romanovsky</name>
<email>leonro@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-14T10:35:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=0cba0efcc7238d47a045a8d7a4079f6a22993546'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0cba0efcc7238d47a045a8d7a4079f6a22993546</id>
<content type='text'>
Once the uobj is committed it is immediately possible another thread
could destroy it, which worst case, can result in a use-after-free
of the restrack objects.

Cc: syzkaller &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Fixes: 08f294a1524b ("RDMA/core: Add resource tracking for create and destroy CQs")
Reported-by: Noa Osherovich &lt;noaos@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/core: Add resource tracking for create and destroy PDs</title>
<updated>2018-01-30T03:21:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Leon Romanovsky</name>
<email>leonro@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-28T09:17:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=9d5f8c209b3f29259e6aa9595ea2dc2dfa27549a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9d5f8c209b3f29259e6aa9595ea2dc2dfa27549a</id>
<content type='text'>
Track create and destroy operations of PD objects.

Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch &lt;markb@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Steve Wise &lt;swise@opengridcomputing.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/core: Add resource tracking for create and destroy CQs</title>
<updated>2018-01-30T03:21:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Leon Romanovsky</name>
<email>leonro@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-28T09:17:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=08f294a1524bc3211a28091daa6c7513828c7d33'/>
<id>urn:sha1:08f294a1524bc3211a28091daa6c7513828c7d33</id>
<content type='text'>
Track create and destroy operations of CQ objects.

Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch &lt;markb@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Steve Wise &lt;swise@opengridcomputing.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/core: Add resource tracking for create and destroy QPs</title>
<updated>2018-01-30T03:21:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Leon Romanovsky</name>
<email>leonro@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-28T09:17:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=78a0cd648a802450602c95e164a820fe1a165247'/>
<id>urn:sha1:78a0cd648a802450602c95e164a820fe1a165247</id>
<content type='text'>
Track create and destroy operations of QP objects.

Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch &lt;markb@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Steve Wise &lt;swise@opengridcomputing.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
