kernel/linux.git/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx, branch v6.6.25

drm/vmwgfx: Create debugfs ttm_resource_manager entry only if needed

2024-04-03T13:28:57+00:00

commit 4be9075fec0a639384ed19975634b662bfab938f upstream. The driver creates /sys/kernel/debug/dri/0/mob_ttm even when the corresponding ttm_resource_manager is not allocated. This leads to a crash when trying to read from this file. Add a check to create mob_ttm, system_mob_ttm, and gmr_ttm debug file only when the corresponding ttm_resource_manager is allocated. crash> bt PID: 3133409 TASK: ffff8fe4834a5000 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "grep" #0 [ffffb954506b3b20] machine_kexec at ffffffffb2a6bec3 #1 [ffffb954506b3b78] __crash_kexec at ffffffffb2bb598a #2 [ffffb954506b3c38] crash_kexec at ffffffffb2bb68c1 #3 [ffffb954506b3c50] oops_end at ffffffffb2a2a9b1 #4 [ffffb954506b3c70] no_context at ffffffffb2a7e913 #5 [ffffb954506b3cc8] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffffb2a7ec8c #6 [ffffb954506b3d10] do_page_fault at ffffffffb2a7f887 #7 [ffffb954506b3d40] page_fault at ffffffffb360116e [exception RIP: ttm_resource_manager_debug+0x11] RIP: ffffffffc04afd11 RSP: ffffb954506b3df0 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffff8fe41a6d1200 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000940 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffc04b4338 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffb954506b3e08 R8: ffff8fee3ffad000 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff8fe41a76a000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8fe5bb6f3900 R15: ffff8fe41a6d1200 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #8 [ffffb954506b3e00] ttm_resource_manager_show at ffffffffc04afde7 [ttm] #9 [ffffb954506b3e30] seq_read at ffffffffb2d8f9f3 RIP: 00007f4c4eda8985 RSP: 00007ffdbba9e9f8 RFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000037e000 RCX: 00007f4c4eda8985 RDX: 000000000037e000 RSI: 00007f4c41573000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000000000037e000 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 000000000037fe30 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f4c41573000 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00007f4c41572010 R15: 0000000000000003 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 CS: 0033 SS: 002b Signed-off-by: Jocelyn Falempe Fixes: af4a25bbe5e7 ("drm/vmwgfx: Add debugfs entries for various ttm resource managers") Cc: Reviewed-by: Zack Rusin Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240312093551.196609-1-jfalempe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

drm/vmwgfx: Fix the lifetime of the bo cursor memory

2024-04-03T13:28:16+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9a9e8a7159ca09af9b1a300a6c8e8b6ff7501c76 ] The cleanup can be dispatched while the atomic update is still active, which means that the memory acquired in the atomic update needs to not be invalidated by the cleanup. The buffer objects in vmw_plane_state instead of using the builtin map_and_cache were trying to handle the lifetime of the mapped memory themselves, leading to crashes. Use the map_and_cache instead of trying to manage the lifetime of the buffer objects held by the vmw_plane_state. Fixes kernel oops'es in IGT's kms_cursor_legacy forked-bo. Signed-off-by: Zack Rusin Fixes: bb6780aa5a1d ("drm/vmwgfx: Diff cursors when using cmds") Cc: # v6.2+ Reviewed-by: Martin Krastev Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240126200804.732454-6-zack.rusin@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

drm/vmwgfx: Fix possible null pointer derefence with invalid contexts

2024-04-03T13:28:16+00:00

[ Upstream commit 517621b7060096e48e42f545fa6646fc00252eac ] vmw_context_cotable can return either an error or a null pointer and its usage sometimes went unchecked. Subsequent code would then try to access either a null pointer or an error value. The invalid dereferences were only possible with malformed userspace apps which never properly initialized the rendering contexts. Check the results of vmw_context_cotable to fix the invalid derefs. Thanks: ziming zhang(@ezrak1e) from Ant Group Light-Year Security Lab who was the first person to discover it. Niels De Graef who reported it and helped to track down the poc. Fixes: 9c079b8ce8bf ("drm/vmwgfx: Adapt execbuf to the new validation api") Cc: # v4.20+ Reported-by: Niels De Graef Signed-off-by: Zack Rusin Cc: Martin Krastev Cc: Maaz Mombasawala Cc: Ian Forbes Cc: Broadcom internal kernel review list Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org Reviewed-by: Maaz Mombasawala Reviewed-by: Martin Krastev Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240110200305.94086-1-zack.rusin@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

drm/vmwgfx: Unmap the surface before resetting it on a plane state

2024-04-03T13:28:15+00:00

[ Upstream commit 27571c64f1855881753e6f33c3186573afbab7ba ] Switch to a new plane state requires unreferencing of all held surfaces. In the work required for mob cursors the mapped surfaces started being cached but the variable indicating whether the surface is currently mapped was not being reset. This leads to crashes as the duplicated state, incorrectly, indicates the that surface is mapped even when no surface is present. That's because after unreferencing the surface it's perfectly possible for the plane to be backed by a bo instead of a surface. Reset the surface mapped flag when unreferencing the plane state surface to fix null derefs in cleanup. Fixes crashes in KDE KWin 6.0 on Wayland: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 4 PID: 2533 Comm: kwin_wayland Not tainted 6.7.0-rc3-vmwgfx #2 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020 RIP: 0010:vmw_du_cursor_plane_cleanup_fb+0x124/0x140 [vmwgfx] Code: 00 00 00 75 3a 48 83 c4 10 5b 5d c3 cc cc cc cc 48 8b b3 a8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 99 90 43 c0 e8 93 c5 db ca 48 8b 83 a8 00 00 00 <48> 8b 78 28 e8 e3 f> RSP: 0018:ffffb6b98216fa80 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff969d84cdcb00 RCX: 0000000000000027 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff969e75f21600 RBP: ffff969d4143dc50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffb6b98216f920 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffff969e7feb3b10 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000000027b R15: ffff969d49c9fc00 FS: 00007f1e8f1b4180(0000) GS:ffff969e75f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 0000000104006004 CR4: 00000000003706f0 Call Trace: ? __die+0x23/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4e0 ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x180 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? vmw_du_cursor_plane_cleanup_fb+0x124/0x140 [vmwgfx] drm_atomic_helper_cleanup_planes+0x9b/0xc0 commit_tail+0xd1/0x130 drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x11a/0x140 drm_atomic_commit+0x97/0xd0 ? __pfx___drm_printfn_info+0x10/0x10 drm_atomic_helper_update_plane+0xf5/0x160 drm_mode_cursor_universal+0x10e/0x270 drm_mode_cursor_common+0x102/0x230 ? __pfx_drm_mode_cursor2_ioctl+0x10/0x10 drm_ioctl_kernel+0xb2/0x110 drm_ioctl+0x26d/0x4b0 ? __pfx_drm_mode_cursor2_ioctl+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_drm_ioctl+0x10/0x10 vmw_generic_ioctl+0xa4/0x110 [vmwgfx] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x94/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x61/0xe0 ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0xaf/0xd0 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x2b/0x40 ? do_syscall_64+0x70/0xe0 ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0xaf/0xd0 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x2b/0x40 ? do_syscall_64+0x70/0xe0 ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 RIP: 0033:0x7f1e93f279ed Code: 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 c8 31 c0 48 8d 45 10 c7 45 b0 10 00 00 00 48 89 45 b8 48 8d 45 d0 48 89 45 c0 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <89> c2 3d 00 f0 ff f> RSP: 002b:00007ffca0faf600 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055db876ed2c0 RCX: 00007f1e93f279ed RDX: 00007ffca0faf6c0 RSI: 00000000c02464bb RDI: 0000000000000015 RBP: 00007ffca0faf650 R08: 000055db87184010 R09: 0000000000000007 R10: 000055db886471a0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffca0faf6c0 R13: 00000000c02464bb R14: 0000000000000015 R15: 00007ffca0faf790 Modules linked in: snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_ine> CR2: 0000000000000028 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:vmw_du_cursor_plane_cleanup_fb+0x124/0x140 [vmwgfx] Code: 00 00 00 75 3a 48 83 c4 10 5b 5d c3 cc cc cc cc 48 8b b3 a8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 99 90 43 c0 e8 93 c5 db ca 48 8b 83 a8 00 00 00 <48> 8b 78 28 e8 e3 f> RSP: 0018:ffffb6b98216fa80 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff969d84cdcb00 RCX: 0000000000000027 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff969e75f21600 RBP: ffff969d4143dc50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffb6b98216f920 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffff969e7feb3b10 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000000027b R15: ffff969d49c9fc00 FS: 00007f1e8f1b4180(0000) GS:ffff969e75f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 0000000104006004 CR4: 00000000003706f0 Signed-off-by: Zack Rusin Fixes: 485d98d472d5 ("drm/vmwgfx: Add support for CursorMob and CursorBypass 4") Reported-by: Stefan Hoffmeister Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/misc/-/issues/34 Cc: Martin Krastev Cc: Maaz Mombasawala Cc: Ian Forbes Cc: Broadcom internal kernel review list Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: # v5.19+ Acked-by: Javier Martinez Canillas Reviewed-by: Maaz Mombasawala Reviewed-by: Martin Krastev Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231224052540.605040-1-zack.rusin@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

drm/vmwgfx: Fix vmw_du_get_cursor_mob fencing of newly-created MOBs

2024-03-26T22:19:44+00:00

[ Upstream commit ed96cf7ad590989b009d6da5cd26387d995dac13 ] The fencing of MOB creation used in vmw_du_get_cursor_mob was incompatible with register-based device communication employed by this routine. As a result cursor MOB creation was racy, leading to potentially broken/missing mouse cursor on desktops using CursorMob device feature. Fixes: 53bc3f6fb6b3 ("drm/vmwgfx: Clean up cursor mobs") Signed-off-by: Martin Krastev Reviewed-by: Maaz Mombasawala Reviewed-by: Zack Rusin Signed-off-by: Zack Rusin Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240126200804.732454-5-zack.rusin@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

drm/vmwgfx: fix a memleak in vmw_gmrid_man_get_node

2024-03-26T22:19:42+00:00

[ Upstream commit 89709105a6091948ffb6ec2427954cbfe45358ce ] When ida_alloc_max fails, resources allocated before should be freed, including *res allocated by kmalloc and ttm_resource_init. Fixes: d3bcb4b02fe9 ("drm/vmwgfx: switch the TTM backends to self alloc") Signed-off-by: Zhipeng Lu Signed-off-by: Zack Rusin Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231204091416.3308430-1-alexious@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

drm: Disable the cursor plane on atomic contexts with virtualized drivers

2024-02-01T00:19:08+00:00

commit 4e3b70da64a53784683cfcbac2deda5d6e540407 upstream. Cursor planes on virtualized drivers have special meaning and require that the clients handle them in specific ways, e.g. the cursor plane should react to the mouse movement the way a mouse cursor would be expected to and the client is required to set hotspot properties on it in order for the mouse events to be routed correctly. This breaks the contract as specified by the "universal planes". Fix it by disabling the cursor planes on virtualized drivers while adding a foundation on top of which it's possible to special case mouse cursor planes for clients that want it. Disabling the cursor planes makes some kms compositors which were broken, e.g. Weston, fallback to software cursor which works fine or at least better than currently while having no effect on others, e.g. gnome-shell or kwin, which put virtualized drivers on a deny-list when running in atomic context to make them fallback to legacy kms and avoid this issue. Signed-off-by: Zack Rusin Fixes: 681e7ec73044 ("drm: Allow userspace to ask for universal plane list (v2)") Cc: # v5.4+ Cc: Maarten Lankhorst Cc: Maxime Ripard Cc: Thomas Zimmermann Cc: David Airlie Cc: Daniel Vetter Cc: Dave Airlie Cc: Gerd Hoffmann Cc: Hans de Goede Cc: Gurchetan Singh Cc: Chia-I Wu Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: spice-devel@lists.freedesktop.org Acked-by: Pekka Paalanen Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas Acked-by: Simon Ser Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231023074613.41327-2-aesteve@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

drm: Update file owner during use

2024-01-01T12:42:25+00:00

[ Upstream commit 1c7a387ffef894b1ab3942f0482dac7a6e0a909c ] With the typical model where the display server opens the file descriptor and then hands it over to the client(*), we were showing stale data in debugfs. Fix it by updating the drm_file->pid on ioctl access from a different process. The field is also made RCU protected to allow for lockless readers. Update side is protected with dev->filelist_mutex. Before: $ cat /sys/kernel/debug/dri/0/clients command pid dev master a uid magic Xorg 2344 0 y y 0 0 Xorg 2344 0 n y 0 2 Xorg 2344 0 n y 0 3 Xorg 2344 0 n y 0 4 After: $ cat /sys/kernel/debug/dri/0/clients command tgid dev master a uid magic Xorg 830 0 y y 0 0 xfce4-session 880 0 n y 0 1 xfwm4 943 0 n y 0 2 neverball 1095 0 n y 0 3 *) More detailed and historically accurate description of various handover implementation kindly provided by Emil Velikov: """ The traditional model, the server was the orchestrator managing the primary device node. From the fd, to the master status and authentication. But looking at the fd alone, this has varied across the years. IIRC in the DRI1 days, Xorg (libdrm really) would have a list of open fd(s) and reuse those whenever needed, DRI2 the client was responsible for open() themselves and with DRI3 the fd was passed to the client. Around the inception of DRI3 and systemd-logind, the latter became another possible orchestrator. Whereby Xorg and Wayland compositors could ask it for the fd. For various reasons (hysterical and genuine ones) Xorg has a fallback path going the open(), whereas Wayland compositors are moving to solely relying on logind... some never had fallback even. Over the past few years, more projects have emerged which provide functionality similar (be that on API level, Dbus, or otherwise) to systemd-logind. """ v2: * Fixed typo in commit text and added a fine historical explanation from Emil. Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin Cc: "Christian König" Cc: Daniel Vetter Acked-by: Christian König Reviewed-by: Emil Velikov Reviewed-by: Rob Clark Tested-by: Rob Clark Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230621094824.2348732-1-tvrtko.ursulin@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Christian König Stable-dep-of: 5a6c9a05e55c ("drm: Fix FD ownership check in drm_master_check_perm()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

drm: vmwgfx_surface.c: copy user-array safely

2023-11-28T17:19:40+00:00

[ Upstream commit 06ab64a0d836ac430c5f94669710a78aa43942cb ] Currently, there is no overflow-check with memdup_user(). Use the new function memdup_array_user() instead of memdup_user() for duplicating the user-space array safely. Suggested-by: David Airlie Signed-off-by: Philipp Stanner Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Zack Rusin Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230920123612.16914-7-pstanner@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

drm/vmwgfx: Keep a gem reference to user bos in surfaces

2023-10-09T19:53:30+00:00

Surfaces can be backed (i.e. stored in) memory objects (mob's) which are created and managed by the userspace as GEM buffers. Surfaces grab only a ttm reference which means that the gem object can be deleted underneath us, especially in cases where prime buffer export is used. Make sure that all userspace surfaces which are backed by gem objects hold a gem reference to make sure they're not deleted before vmw surfaces are done with them, which fixes: ------------[ cut here ]------------ refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 2632 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x150 Modules linked in: overlay vsock_loopback vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vsock snd_ens1371 snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus snd_pcm gameport> CPU: 2 PID: 2632 Comm: vmw_ref_count Not tainted 6.5.0-rc2-vmwgfx #1 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x150 Code: eb 9e 0f b6 1d 8b 5b a6 01 80 fb 01 0f 87 ba e4 80 00 83 e3 01 75 89 48 c7 c7 c0 3c f9 a3 c6 05 6f 5b a6 01 01 e8 15 81 98 ff <0f> 0b e9 6f ff ff ff 0f b> RSP: 0018:ffffbdc34344bba0 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000027 RDX: ffff960475ea1548 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff960475ea1540 RBP: ffffbdc34344bba8 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 65646e75203a745f R10: ffffffffa5b32b20 R11: 72657466612d6573 R12: ffff96037d6a6400 R13: ffff9603484805b0 R14: 000000000000000b R15: ffff9603bed06060 FS: 00007f5fd8520c40(0000) GS:ffff960475e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f5fda755000 CR3: 000000010d012005 CR4: 00000000003706e0 Call Trace: ? show_regs+0x6e/0x80 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x150 ? __warn+0x91/0x150 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x150 ? report_bug+0x19d/0x1b0 ? handle_bug+0x46/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x1d/0x80 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x150 drm_gem_object_handle_put_unlocked+0xba/0x110 [drm] drm_gem_object_release_handle+0x6e/0x80 [drm] drm_gem_handle_delete+0x6a/0xc0 [drm] ? __pfx_vmw_bo_unref_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [vmwgfx] vmw_bo_unref_ioctl+0x33/0x40 [vmwgfx] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xbc/0x160 [drm] drm_ioctl+0x2d2/0x580 [drm] ? __pfx_vmw_bo_unref_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [vmwgfx] ? do_vmi_munmap+0xee/0x180 vmw_generic_ioctl+0xbd/0x180 [vmwgfx] vmw_unlocked_ioctl+0x19/0x20 [vmwgfx] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x99/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x90 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x2a/0x50 ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x90 ? handle_mm_fault+0x16e/0x2f0 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x34/0x170 ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0xd/0x20 ? irqentry_exit+0x3f/0x50 ? exc_page_fault+0x8e/0x190 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 RIP: 0033:0x7f5fda51aaff Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <41> 89 c0 3d 00 f0 ff ff 7> RSP: 002b:00007ffd536a4d30 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd536a4de0 RCX: 00007f5fda51aaff RDX: 00007ffd536a4de0 RSI: 0000000040086442 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000040086442 R08: 000055fa603ada50 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd536a51b8 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 000055fa5ebb4c80 R15: 00007f5fda90f040 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- A lot of the analyis on the bug was done by Murray McAllister and Ian Forbes. Reported-by: Murray McAllister Cc: Ian Forbes Signed-off-by: Zack Rusin Fixes: a950b989ea29 ("drm/vmwgfx: Do not drop the reference to the handle too soon") Cc: # v6.2+ Reviewed-by: Martin Krastev Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230928041355.737635-1-zack@kde.org