<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/drivers/crypto/ccp, branch v6.6.142</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.6.142</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.6.142'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2026-05-23T11:03:23+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp - copy IV using skcipher ivsize</title>
<updated>2026-05-23T11:03:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moses</name>
<email>p@1g4.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-01T08:07:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=eecee15e263ccb8cd77170a56ab6c969cb54dd6a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:eecee15e263ccb8cd77170a56ab6c969cb54dd6a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a7a1f3cdd64d8a165d9b8c9e9ad7fb46ac19dfc4 ]

AF_ALG rfc3686-ctr-aes-ccp requests pass an 8-byte IV to the driver.

ccp_aes_complete() restores AES_BLOCK_SIZE bytes into the caller's IV
buffer while RFC3686 skciphers expose an 8-byte IV, so the restore
overruns the provided buffer.

Use crypto_skcipher_ivsize() to copy only the algorithm's IV length.

Fixes: 2b789435d7f3 ("crypto: ccp - CCP AES crypto API support")
Signed-off-by: Paul Moses &lt;p@1g4.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp: Don't attempt to copy ID to userspace if PSP command failed</title>
<updated>2026-04-27T13:23:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sean Christopherson</name>
<email>seanjc@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-13T17:57:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=09427bcb1715fb20a80b6acd5156dbf15ab5c363'/>
<id>urn:sha1:09427bcb1715fb20a80b6acd5156dbf15ab5c363</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4f685dbfa87c546e51d9dc6cab379d20f275e114 upstream.

When retrieving the ID for the CPU, don't attempt to copy the ID blob to
userspace if the firmware command failed.  If the failure was due to an
invalid length, i.e. the userspace buffer+length was too small, copying
the number of bytes _firmware_ requires will overflow the kernel-allocated
buffer and leak data to userspace.

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
  Read of size 64 at addr ffff8881867f5960 by task syz.0.906/24388

  CPU: 130 UID: 0 PID: 24388 Comm: syz.0.906 Tainted: G     U     O        7.0.0-smp-DEV #28 PREEMPTLAZY
  Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
  Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.62.0-0 11/19/2025
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x110 ../lib/dump_stack.c:120
   print_address_description ../mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
   print_report+0xbc/0x260 ../mm/kasan/report.c:482
   kasan_report+0xa2/0xe0 ../mm/kasan/report.c:595
   check_region_inline ../mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
   kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 ../mm/kasan/generic.c:200
   instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
   _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
   _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
   copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline]
   sev_ioctl_do_get_id2+0x361/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2222
   sev_ioctl+0x25f/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2575
   vfs_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
   __do_sys_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
   __se_sys_ioctl+0x11d/0x1b0 ../fs/ioctl.c:583
   do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
   do_syscall_64+0xe0/0x800 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
   &lt;/TASK&gt;

WARN if the driver says the command succeeded, but the firmware error code
says otherwise, as __sev_do_cmd_locked() is expected to return -EIO on any
firwmware error.

Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Sebastian Alba Vives &lt;sebasjosue84@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: d6112ea0cb34 ("crypto: ccp - introduce SEV_GET_ID2 command")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp: Don't attempt to copy PDH cert to userspace if PSP command failed</title>
<updated>2026-04-27T13:23:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sean Christopherson</name>
<email>seanjc@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-13T17:48:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b5c14bd4da1f376f385722fe1da993f1edab6472'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b5c14bd4da1f376f385722fe1da993f1edab6472</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e76239fed3cffd6d304d8ca3ce23984fd24f57d3 upstream.

When retrieving the PDH cert, don't attempt to copy the blobs to userspace
if the firmware command failed.  If the failure was due to an invalid
length, i.e. the userspace buffer+length was too small, copying the number
of bytes _firmware_ requires will overflow the kernel-allocated buffer and
leak data to userspace.

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
  Read of size 2084 at addr ffff8885c4ab8aa0 by task syz.0.186/21033

  CPU: 51 UID: 0 PID: 21033 Comm: syz.0.186 Tainted: G     U     O        7.0.0-smp-DEV #28 PREEMPTLAZY
  Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
  Hardware name: Google, Inc.                                                       Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.84.12-0 11/17/2025
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x110 ../lib/dump_stack.c:120
   print_address_description ../mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
   print_report+0xbc/0x260 ../mm/kasan/report.c:482
   kasan_report+0xa2/0xe0 ../mm/kasan/report.c:595
   check_region_inline ../mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
   kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 ../mm/kasan/generic.c:200
   instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
   _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
   _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
   copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline]
   sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export+0x3d3/0x7c0 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2347
   sev_ioctl+0x2a2/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2568
   vfs_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
   __do_sys_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
   __se_sys_ioctl+0x11d/0x1b0 ../fs/ioctl.c:583
   do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
   do_syscall_64+0xe0/0x800 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
   &lt;/TASK&gt;

WARN if the driver says the command succeeded, but the firmware error code
says otherwise, as __sev_do_cmd_locked() is expected to return -EIO on any
firwmware error.

Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Sebastian Alba Vives &lt;sebasjosue84@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: 76a2b524a4b1 ("crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT ioctl command")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp: Don't attempt to copy CSR to userspace if PSP command failed</title>
<updated>2026-04-27T13:23:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sean Christopherson</name>
<email>seanjc@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-13T17:43:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=607ba280f2adb5092cf5386c3935afac2ca0031a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:607ba280f2adb5092cf5386c3935afac2ca0031a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit abe4a6d6f606113251868c2c4a06ba904bb41eed upstream.

When retrieving the PEK CSR, don't attempt to copy the blob to userspace
if the firmware command failed.  If the failure was due to an invalid
length, i.e. the userspace buffer+length was too small, copying the number
of bytes _firmware_ requires will overflow the kernel-allocated buffer and
leak data to userspace.

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
  Read of size 2084 at addr ffff898144612e20 by task syz.9.219/21405

  CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 21405 Comm: syz.9.219 Tainted: G     U     O        7.0.0-smp-DEV #28 PREEMPTLAZY
  Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
  Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.62.0-0 11/19/2025
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x110 ../lib/dump_stack.c:120
   print_address_description ../mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
   print_report+0xbc/0x260 ../mm/kasan/report.c:482
   kasan_report+0xa2/0xe0 ../mm/kasan/report.c:595
   check_region_inline ../mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
   kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 ../mm/kasan/generic.c:200
   instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
   _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
   _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
   copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline]
   sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr+0x31f/0x590 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:1872
   sev_ioctl+0x3a4/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2562
   vfs_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
   __do_sys_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
   __se_sys_ioctl+0x11d/0x1b0 ../fs/ioctl.c:583
   do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
   do_syscall_64+0xe0/0x800 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
   &lt;/TASK&gt;

WARN if the driver says the command succeeded, but the firmware error code
says otherwise, as __sev_do_cmd_locked() is expected to return -EIO on any
firwmware error.

Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Sebastian Alba Vives &lt;sebasjosue84@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: e799035609e1 ("crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_CSR ioctl command")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp - Send PSP_CMD_TEE_RING_DESTROY when PSP_CMD_TEE_RING_INIT fails</title>
<updated>2026-03-04T12:20:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mario Limonciello (AMD)</name>
<email>superm1@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-16T04:11:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=1733d168099e28f95771c52e743dc21bf8c2caa8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1733d168099e28f95771c52e743dc21bf8c2caa8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 7b85137caf110a09a4a18f00f730de4709f9afc8 ]

The hibernate resume sequence involves loading a resume kernel that is just
used for loading the hibernate image before shifting back to the existing
kernel.

During that hibernate resume sequence the resume kernel may have loaded
the ccp driver.  If this happens the resume kernel will also have called
PSP_CMD_TEE_RING_INIT but it will never have called
PSP_CMD_TEE_RING_DESTROY.

This is problematic because the existing kernel needs to re-initialize the
ring.  One could argue that the existing kernel should call destroy
as part of restore() but there is no guarantee that the resume kernel did
or didn't load the ccp driver.  There is also no callback opportunity for
the resume kernel to destroy before handing back control to the existing
kernel.

Similar problems could potentially exist with the use of kdump and
crash handling. I actually reproduced this issue like this:

1) rmmod ccp
2) hibernate the system
3) resume the system
4) modprobe ccp

The resume kernel will have loaded ccp but never destroyed and then when
I try to modprobe it fails.

Because of these possible cases add a flow that checks the error code from
the PSP_CMD_TEE_RING_INIT call and tries to call PSP_CMD_TEE_RING_DESTROY
if it failed.  If this succeeds then call PSP_CMD_TEE_RING_INIT again.

Fixes: f892a21f51162 ("crypto: ccp - use generic power management")
Reported-by: Lars Francke &lt;lars.francke@gmail.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/platform-driver-x86/CAD-Ua_gfJnQSo8ucS_7ZwzuhoBRJ14zXP7s8b-zX3ZcxcyWePw@mail.gmail.com/
Tested-by: Yijun Shen &lt;Yijun.Shen@Dell.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello (AMD) &lt;superm1@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Shyam Sundar S K &lt;Shyam-sundar.S-k@amd.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260116041132.153674-6-superm1@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen &lt;ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp - Factor out ring destroy handling to a helper</title>
<updated>2026-03-04T12:20:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mario Limonciello (AMD)</name>
<email>superm1@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-16T04:11:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=2abf05a122cf5033fb8785623f1f8ea05bd080fe'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2abf05a122cf5033fb8785623f1f8ea05bd080fe</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d95f87a65bce5f2f2a02ca6094ca4841d4073df3 ]

The ring destroy command needs to be used in multiple places. Split
out the code to a helper.

Tested-by: Yijun Shen &lt;Yijun.Shen@Dell.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello (AMD) &lt;superm1@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Shyam Sundar S K &lt;Shyam-sundar.S-k@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260116041132.153674-5-superm1@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen &lt;ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 7b85137caf11 ("crypto: ccp - Send PSP_CMD_TEE_RING_DESTROY when PSP_CMD_TEE_RING_INIT fails")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp - Move direct access to some PSP registers out of TEE</title>
<updated>2026-03-04T12:20:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Lendacky</name>
<email>thomas.lendacky@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-07T18:48:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b2e7e269aba9e5013f12fc4fda6d7ee602d4aeb3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b2e7e269aba9e5013f12fc4fda6d7ee602d4aeb3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 949a0c8dd3c257730ef7205be759e4bc6cf49cea ]

With the PSP mailbox registers supporting more than just TEE, access to
them must be maintained and serialized by the PSP device support. Remove
TEE support direct access and create an interface in the PSP support
where the register access can be controlled/serialized.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello &lt;mario.limonciello@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Rijo Thomas &lt;Rijo-john.Thomas@amd.com&gt;
Tested-by: Rijo Thomas &lt;Rijo-john.Thomas@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 7b85137caf11 ("crypto: ccp - Send PSP_CMD_TEE_RING_DESTROY when PSP_CMD_TEE_RING_INIT fails")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp - Add an S4 restore flow</title>
<updated>2026-03-04T12:20:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mario Limonciello (AMD)</name>
<email>superm1@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-16T04:11:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=54541017ac6a67ec8959c74d8d6d4510d80eff42'/>
<id>urn:sha1:54541017ac6a67ec8959c74d8d6d4510d80eff42</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0ba2035026d0ab6c7c7e65ad8b418dc73d5700d9 ]

The system will have lost power during S4.  The ring used for TEE
communications needs to be initialized before use.

Fixes: f892a21f51162 ("crypto: ccp - use generic power management")
Reported-by: Lars Francke &lt;lars.francke@gmail.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/platform-driver-x86/CAD-Ua_gfJnQSo8ucS_7ZwzuhoBRJ14zXP7s8b-zX3ZcxcyWePw@mail.gmail.com/
Tested-by: Yijun Shen &lt;Yijun.Shen@Dell.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello (AMD) &lt;superm1@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Shyam Sundar S K &lt;Shyam-sundar.S-k@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260116041132.153674-4-superm1@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen &lt;ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp - Fix crash when rebind ccp device for ccp.ko</title>
<updated>2025-08-15T10:08:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mengbiao Xiong</name>
<email>xisme1998@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-06-24T06:54:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=db111468531777cac8b4beb6515a88a54b0c4a74'/>
<id>urn:sha1:db111468531777cac8b4beb6515a88a54b0c4a74</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 181698af38d3f93381229ad89c09b5bd0496661a ]

When CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DEBUGFS is enabled, rebinding
the ccp device causes the following crash:

$ echo '0000:0a:00.2' &gt; /sys/bus/pci/drivers/ccp/unbind
$ echo '0000:0a:00.2' &gt; /sys/bus/pci/drivers/ccp/bind

[  204.976930] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000098
[  204.978026] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[  204.979126] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[  204.980226] PGD 0 P4D 0
[  204.981317] Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
...
[  204.997852] Call Trace:
[  204.999074]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[  205.000297]  start_creating+0x9f/0x1c0
[  205.001533]  debugfs_create_dir+0x1f/0x170
[  205.002769]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  205.004000]  ccp5_debugfs_setup+0x87/0x170 [ccp]
[  205.005241]  ccp5_init+0x8b2/0x960 [ccp]
[  205.006469]  ccp_dev_init+0xd4/0x150 [ccp]
[  205.007709]  sp_init+0x5f/0x80 [ccp]
[  205.008942]  sp_pci_probe+0x283/0x2e0 [ccp]
[  205.010165]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  205.011376]  local_pci_probe+0x4f/0xb0
[  205.012584]  pci_device_probe+0xdb/0x230
[  205.013810]  really_probe+0xed/0x380
[  205.015024]  __driver_probe_device+0x7e/0x160
[  205.016240]  device_driver_attach+0x2f/0x60
[  205.017457]  bind_store+0x7c/0xb0
[  205.018663]  drv_attr_store+0x28/0x40
[  205.019868]  sysfs_kf_write+0x5f/0x70
[  205.021065]  kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x145/0x1d0
[  205.022267]  vfs_write+0x308/0x440
[  205.023453]  ksys_write+0x6d/0xe0
[  205.024616]  __x64_sys_write+0x1e/0x30
[  205.025778]  x64_sys_call+0x16ba/0x2150
[  205.026942]  do_syscall_64+0x56/0x1e0
[  205.028108]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  205.029276] RIP: 0033:0x7fbc36f10104
[  205.030420] Code: 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 8d 05 e1 08 2e 00 8b 00 85 c0 75 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 f3 c3 66 90 41 54 55 49 89 d4 53 48 89 f5

This patch sets ccp_debugfs_dir to NULL after destroying it in
ccp5_debugfs_destroy, allowing the directory dentry to be
recreated when rebinding the ccp device.

Tested on AMD Ryzen 7 1700X.

Fixes: 3cdbe346ed3f ("crypto: ccp - Add debugfs entries for CCP information")
Signed-off-by: Mengbiao Xiong &lt;xisme1998@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp - Add support for PCI device 0x1134</title>
<updated>2025-05-02T05:50:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Devaraj Rangasamy</name>
<email>Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-02-06T22:11:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=d999b11302c4b44e9d04233fc4fd8f1749863ee0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d999b11302c4b44e9d04233fc4fd8f1749863ee0</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6cb345939b8cc4be79909875276aa9dc87d16757 ]

PCI device 0x1134 shares same register features as PCI device 0x17E0.
Hence reuse same data for the new PCI device ID 0x1134.

Signed-off-by: Devaraj Rangasamy &lt;Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello &lt;mario.limonciello@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
