<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h, branch linux-7.0.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=linux-7.0.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=linux-7.0.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2025-12-02T20:50:33+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>crypto/ccp: Implement SEV-TIO PCIe IDE (phase1)</title>
<updated>2025-12-02T20:50:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Kardashevskiy</name>
<email>aik@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-12-02T02:44:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=4be423572da1f4c11f45168e3fafda870ddac9f8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4be423572da1f4c11f45168e3fafda870ddac9f8</id>
<content type='text'>
Implement the SEV-TIO (Trusted I/O) firmware interface for PCIe TDISP
(Trust Domain In-Socket Protocol). This enables secure communication
between trusted domains and PCIe devices through the PSP (Platform
Security Processor).

The implementation includes:
- Device Security Manager (DSM) operations for establishing secure links
- SPDM (Security Protocol and Data Model) over DOE (Data Object Exchange)
- IDE (Integrity Data Encryption) stream management for secure PCIe

This module bridges the SEV firmware stack with the generic PCIe TSM
framework.

This is phase1 as described in Documentation/driver-api/pci/tsm.rst.

On AMD SEV, the AMD PSP firmware acts as TSM (manages the security/trust).
The CCP driver provides the interface to it and registers in the TSM
subsystem.

Detect the PSP support (reported via FEATURE_INFO + SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS)
and enable SEV-TIO in the SNP_INIT_EX call if the hardware supports TIO.

Implement SEV TIO PSP command wrappers in sev-dev-tio.c and store
the data in the SEV-TIO-specific structs.

Implement TSM hooks and IDE setup in sev-dev-tsm.c.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy &lt;aik@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/692f506bb80c9_261c11004@dwillia2-mobl4.notmuch
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ccp: Make snp_reclaim_pages and __sev_do_cmd_locked public</title>
<updated>2025-12-02T20:05:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Kardashevskiy</name>
<email>aik@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-12-02T02:44:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=8a5dd102e48752f8c4144f051eccc602774f1a93'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8a5dd102e48752f8c4144f051eccc602774f1a93</id>
<content type='text'>
The snp_reclaim_pages() helper reclaims pages in the FW state. SEV-TIO
and the TMPM driver (a hardware engine which smashes IOMMU PDEs among
other things) will use to reclaim memory when cleaning up.

Share and export snp_reclaim_pages().

Most of the SEV-TIO code uses sev_do_cmd() which locks the sev_cmd_mutex
and already exported. But the SNP init code (which also sets up SEV-TIO)
executes under the sev_cmd_mutex lock so the SEV-TIO code has to use
the __sev_do_cmd_locked() helper. This one though does not need to be
exported/shared globally as SEV-TIO is a part of the CCP driver still.

Share __sev_do_cmd_locked() via the CCP internal header.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy &lt;aik@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251202024449.542361-2-aik@amd.com
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'v6.18-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6</title>
<updated>2025-10-04T21:59:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-10-04T21:59:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=908057d185a41560a55890afa69c9676fc63e55c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:908057d185a41560a55890afa69c9676fc63e55c</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
 "Drivers:
   - Add ciphertext hiding support to ccp
   - Add hashjoin, gather and UDMA data move features to hisilicon
   - Add lz4 and lz77_only to hisilicon
   - Add xilinx hwrng driver
   - Add ti driver with ecb/cbc aes support
   - Add ring buffer idle and command queue telemetry for GEN6 in qat

  Others:
   - Use rcu_dereference_all to stop false alarms in rhashtable
   - Fix CPU number wraparound in padata"

* tag 'v6.18-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (78 commits)
  dt-bindings: rng: hisi-rng: convert to DT schema
  crypto: doc - Add explicit title heading to API docs
  hwrng: ks-sa - fix division by zero in ks_sa_rng_init
  KEYS: X.509: Fix Basic Constraints CA flag parsing
  crypto: anubis - simplify return statement in anubis_mod_init
  crypto: hisilicon/qm - set NULL to qm-&gt;debug.qm_diff_regs
  crypto: hisilicon/qm - clear all VF configurations in the hardware
  crypto: hisilicon - enable error reporting again
  crypto: hisilicon/qm - mask axi error before memory init
  crypto: hisilicon/qm - invalidate queues in use
  crypto: qat - Return pointer directly in adf_ctl_alloc_resources
  crypto: aspeed - Fix dma_unmap_sg() direction
  rhashtable: Use rcu_dereference_all and rcu_dereference_all_check
  crypto: comp - Use same definition of context alloc and free ops
  crypto: omap - convert from tasklet to BH workqueue
  crypto: qat - Replace kzalloc() + copy_from_user() with memdup_user()
  crypto: caam - double the entropy delay interval for retry
  padata: WQ_PERCPU added to alloc_workqueue users
  padata: replace use of system_unbound_wq with system_dfl_wq
  crypto: cryptd - WQ_PERCPU added to alloc_workqueue users
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp - Add new HV-Fixed page allocation/free API</title>
<updated>2025-09-17T10:11:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ashish Kalra</name>
<email>ashish.kalra@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-09-16T21:29:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=e09701dcdd9ca06be249091eeb786d57e67b613e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e09701dcdd9ca06be249091eeb786d57e67b613e</id>
<content type='text'>
When SEV-SNP is active, the TEE extended command header page and all output
buffers for TEE extended commands (such as used by Seamless Firmware servicing
support) must be in hypervisor-fixed state, assigned to the hypervisor and
marked immutable in the RMP entrie(s).

Add a new generic SEV API interface to allocate/free hypervisor fixed pages
which abstracts hypervisor fixed page allocation/free for PSP sub devices. The
API internally uses SNP_INIT_EX to transition pages to HV-Fixed page state.

If SNP is not enabled then the allocator is simply a wrapper over
alloc_pages() and __free_pages().

When the sub device free the pages, they are put on a free list and future
allocation requests will try to re-use the freed pages from this list. But
this list is not preserved across PSP driver load/unload hence this free/reuse
support is only supported while PSP driver is loaded. As HV_FIXED page state
is only changed at reboot, these pages are leaked as they cannot be returned
back to the page allocator and then potentially allocated to guests, which
will cause SEV-SNP guests to fail to start or terminate when accessing the
HV_FIXED page.

Suggested-by: Thomas Lendacky &lt;Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra &lt;ashish.kalra@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/cover.1758057691.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp - Add support for SNP_FEATURE_INFO command</title>
<updated>2025-08-16T09:20:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ashish Kalra</name>
<email>ashish.kalra@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-21T14:13:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=33cfb80d1910b41d1a25cef89b159c945aff0f24'/>
<id>urn:sha1:33cfb80d1910b41d1a25cef89b159c945aff0f24</id>
<content type='text'>
The FEATURE_INFO command provides hypervisors with a programmatic means
to learn about the supported features of the currently loaded firmware.
This command mimics the CPUID instruction relative to sub-leaf input and
the four unsigned integer output values. To obtain information
regarding the features present in the currently loaded SEV firmware,
use the SNP_FEATURE_INFO command.

Cache the SNP platform status and feature information from CPUID
0x8000_0024 in the sev_device structure. If SNP is enabled, utilize
this cached SNP platform status for the API major, minor and build
version.

Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra &lt;ashish.kalra@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kim Phillips &lt;kim.phillips@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp - Cache SEV platform status and platform state</title>
<updated>2025-08-16T09:20:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ashish Kalra</name>
<email>ashish.kalra@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-21T14:12:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=459daec42ea0cf5e276dfb82e90ed91e2db45d9e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:459daec42ea0cf5e276dfb82e90ed91e2db45d9e</id>
<content type='text'>
Cache the SEV platform status into sev_device structure and use this
cached SEV platform status for api_major/minor/build.

The platform state is unique between SEV and SNP and hence needs to be
tracked independently.

Remove the state field from sev_device structure and instead track SEV
state from the cached SEV platform status.

Suggested-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra &lt;ashish.kalra@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kim Phillips &lt;kim.phillips@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp: Handle legacy SEV commands when SNP is enabled</title>
<updated>2024-01-29T19:34:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Brijesh Singh</name>
<email>brijesh.singh@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-26T04:11:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=a867ad6b340f47b7333b80a54b8507fc2cd80aa4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a867ad6b340f47b7333b80a54b8507fc2cd80aa4</id>
<content type='text'>
The behavior of legacy SEV commands is altered when the firmware is
initialized for SNP support. In that case, all command buffer memory
that may get written to by legacy SEV commands must be marked as
firmware-owned in the RMP table prior to issuing the command.

Additionally, when a command buffer contains a system physical address
that points to additional buffers that firmware may write to, special
handling is needed depending on whether:

  1) the system physical address points to guest memory
  2) the system physical address points to host memory

To handle case #1, the pages of these buffers are changed to
firmware-owned in the RMP table before issuing the command, and restored
to hypervisor-owned after the command completes.

For case #2, a bounce buffer is used instead of the original address.

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh &lt;brijesh.singh@amd.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Michael Roth &lt;michael.roth@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth &lt;michael.roth@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra &lt;ashish.kalra@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-19-michael.roth@amd.com
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP</title>
<updated>2024-01-29T19:34:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Brijesh Singh</name>
<email>brijesh.singh@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-26T04:11:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=1ca5614b84eed5904f65f143e0e7aaab0ac4c6b2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1ca5614b84eed5904f65f143e0e7aaab0ac4c6b2</id>
<content type='text'>
Before SNP VMs can be launched, the platform must be appropriately
configured and initialized via the SNP_INIT command.

During the execution of SNP_INIT command, the firmware configures
and enables SNP security policy enforcement in many system components.
Some system components write to regions of memory reserved by early
x86 firmware (e.g. UEFI). Other system components write to regions
provided by the operation system, hypervisor, or x86 firmware.
Such system components can only write to HV-fixed pages or Default
pages. They will error when attempting to write to pages in other page
states after SNP_INIT enables their SNP enforcement.

Starting in SNP firmware v1.52, the SNP_INIT_EX command takes a list of
system physical address ranges to convert into the HV-fixed page states
during the RMP initialization. If INIT_RMP is 1, hypervisors should
provide all system physical address ranges that the hypervisor will
never assign to a guest until the next RMP re-initialization.

For instance, the memory that UEFI reserves should be included in the
range list. This allows system components that occasionally write to
memory (e.g. logging to UEFI reserved regions) to not fail due to
RMP initialization and SNP enablement.

Note that SNP_INIT(_EX) must not be executed while non-SEV guests are
executing, otherwise it is possible that the system could reset or hang.
The psp_init_on_probe module parameter was added for SEV/SEV-ES support
and the init_ex_path module parameter to allow for time for the
necessary file system to be mounted/available.

SNP_INIT(_EX) does not use the file associated with init_ex_path. So, to
avoid running into issues where SNP_INIT(_EX) is called while there are
other running guests, issue it during module probe regardless of the
psp_init_on_probe setting, but maintain the previous deferrable handling
for SEV/SEV-ES initialization.

  [ mdr: Squash in psp_init_on_probe changes from Tom, reduce
    proliferation of 'probe' function parameter where possible.
    bp: Fix 32-bit allmodconfig build. ]

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh &lt;brijesh.singh@amd.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Ashish Kalra &lt;ashish.kalra@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra &lt;ashish.kalra@amd.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@profian.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@profian.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth &lt;michael.roth@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-14-michael.roth@amd.com
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp - Move some PSP mailbox bit definitions into common header</title>
<updated>2023-03-17T03:16:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mario Limonciello</name>
<email>mario.limonciello@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-03-10T21:19:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=1c5c1daf04d13916867ef68c6ba7ae4f5e73801f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1c5c1daf04d13916867ef68c6ba7ae4f5e73801f</id>
<content type='text'>
Some of the bits and fields used for mailboxes communicating with the
PSP are common across all mailbox implementations (SEV, TEE, etc).

Move these bits into the common `linux/psp.h` so they don't need to
be re-defined for each implementation.

Acked-by: Rijo Thomas &lt;Rijo-john.Thomas@amd.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello &lt;mario.limonciello@amd.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jarkko Nikula &lt;jarkko.nikula@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp: Use the stack and common buffer for INIT command</title>
<updated>2021-04-21T16:20:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sean Christopherson</name>
<email>seanjc@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-04-06T22:49:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=a402e35177797d736dd3dc2d8537c1c9ac90d54a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a402e35177797d736dd3dc2d8537c1c9ac90d54a</id>
<content type='text'>
Drop the dedicated init_cmd_buf and instead use a local variable.  Now
that the low level helper uses an internal buffer for all commands,
using the stack for the upper layers is safe even when running with
CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20210406224952.4177376-8-seanjc@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh &lt;brijesh.singh@amd.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
