<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c, branch v6.19.11</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.19.11</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.19.11'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2026-03-25T10:13:26+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp - Fix leaking the same page twice</title>
<updated>2026-03-25T10:13:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Guenter Roeck</name>
<email>linux@roeck-us.net</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-04T20:39:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b4d3be542debb4855206f2e0ffa169706d38ef42'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b4d3be542debb4855206f2e0ffa169706d38ef42</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5c52607c43c397b79a9852ce33fc61de58c3645c ]

Commit 551120148b67 ("crypto: ccp - Fix a case where SNP_SHUTDOWN is
missed") fixed a case where SNP is left in INIT state if page reclaim
fails. It removes the transition to the INIT state for this command and
adjusts the page state management.

While doing this, it added a call to snp_leak_pages() after a call to
snp_reclaim_pages() failed. Since snp_reclaim_pages() already calls
snp_leak_pages() internally on the pages it fails to reclaim, calling
it again leaks the exact same page twice.

Fix by removing the extra call to snp_leak_pages().

The problem was found by an experimental code review agent based on
gemini-3.1-pro while reviewing backports into v6.18.y.

Assisted-by: Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro
Fixes: 551120148b67 ("crypto: ccp - Fix a case where SNP_SHUTDOWN is missed")
Cc: Tycho Andersen (AMD) &lt;tycho@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) &lt;tycho@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp - allow callers to use HV-Fixed page API when SEV is disabled</title>
<updated>2026-03-19T15:15:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ashish Kalra</name>
<email>ashish.kalra@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-06T21:26:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=830c2241f6808b75a007d0d8a10e0b06941442db'/>
<id>urn:sha1:830c2241f6808b75a007d0d8a10e0b06941442db</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8168a7b72bdee3790b126f63bd30306759206b15 upstream.

When SEV is disabled, the HV-Fixed page allocation call fails, which in
turn causes SFS initialization to fail.

Fix the HV-Fixed API so callers (for example, SFS) can use it even when
SEV is disabled by performing normal page allocation and freeing.

Fixes: e09701dcdd9c ("crypto: ccp - Add new HV-Fixed page allocation/free API")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra &lt;ashish.kalra@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp - narrow scope of snp_range_list</title>
<updated>2026-02-26T23:00:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tycho Andersen (AMD)</name>
<email>tycho@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-05T17:22:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=bc2003659e061edaaaab9aaeb1de32efe460d793'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bc2003659e061edaaaab9aaeb1de32efe460d793</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit dc8ccab15081efc4f2c5a9fc7b209cd641d29177 ]

snp_range_list is only used in __sev_snp_init_locked() in the SNP_INIT_EX
case, move the declaration there and add a __free() cleanup helper for it
instead of waiting until shutdown.

Fixes: 1ca5614b84ee ("crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP")
Reviewed-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy &lt;aik@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) &lt;tycho@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp - Fix a case where SNP_SHUTDOWN is missed</title>
<updated>2026-02-26T23:00:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Lendacky</name>
<email>thomas.lendacky@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-05T17:22:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=0ef8838e897a50a5e0a36a4e4c25412d079194a3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0ef8838e897a50a5e0a36a4e4c25412d079194a3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 551120148b67e04527b405c5ec33a31593846ba4 ]

If page reclaim fails in sev_ioctl_do_snp_platform_status() and SNP was
moved from UNINIT to INIT for the function, SNP is not moved back to
UNINIT state. Additionally, SNP is not required to be initialized in order
to execute the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command, so don't attempt to move to
INIT state and let SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS report the status as is.

Fixes: ceac7fb89e8d ("crypto: ccp - Ensure implicit SEV/SNP init and shutdown in ioctls")
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) &lt;tycho@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy &lt;aik@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) &lt;tycho@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'tsm-for-6.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/devsec/tsm</title>
<updated>2025-12-06T18:15:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-12-06T18:15:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=249872f53d64441690927853e9d3af36394802d5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:249872f53d64441690927853e9d3af36394802d5</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull PCIe Link Encryption and Device Authentication from Dan Williams:
 "New PCI infrastructure and one architecture implementation for PCIe
  link encryption establishment via platform firmware services.

  This work is the result of multiple vendors coming to consensus on
  some core infrastructure (thanks Alexey, Yilun, and Aneesh!), and
  three vendor implementations, although only one is included in this
  pull. The PCI core changes have an ack from Bjorn, the crypto/ccp/
  changes have an ack from Tom, and the iommu/amd/ changes have an ack
  from Joerg.

  PCIe link encryption is made possible by the soup of acronyms
  mentioned in the shortlog below. Link Integrity and Data Encryption
  (IDE) is a protocol for installing keys in the transmitter and
  receiver at each end of a link. That protocol is transported over Data
  Object Exchange (DOE) mailboxes using PCI configuration requests.

  The aspect that makes this a "platform firmware service" is that the
  key provisioning and protocol is coordinated through a Trusted
  Execution Envrionment (TEE) Security Manager (TSM). That is either
  firmware running in a coprocessor (AMD SEV-TIO), or quasi-hypervisor
  software (Intel TDX Connect / ARM CCA) running in a protected CPU
  mode.

  Now, the only reason to ask a TSM to run this protocol and install the
  keys rather than have a Linux driver do the same is so that later, a
  confidential VM can ask the TSM directly "can you certify this
  device?".

  That precludes host Linux from provisioning its own keys, because host
  Linux is outside the trust domain for the VM. It also turns out that
  all architectures, save for one, do not publish a mechanism for an OS
  to establish keys in the root port. So "TSM-established link
  encryption" is the only cross-architecture path for this capability
  for the foreseeable future.

  This unblocks the other arch implementations to follow in v6.20/v7.0,
  once they clear some other dependencies, and it unblocks the next
  phase of work to implement the end-to-end flow of confidential device
  assignment. The PCIe specification calls this end-to-end flow Trusted
  Execution Environment (TEE) Device Interface Security Protocol
  (TDISP).

  In the meantime, Linux gets a link encryption facility which has
  practical benefits along the same lines as memory encryption. It
  authenticates devices via certificates and may protect against
  interposer attacks trying to capture clear-text PCIe traffic.

  Summary:

   - Introduce the PCI/TSM core for the coordination of device
     authentication, link encryption and establishment (IDE), and later
     management of the device security operational states (TDISP).
     Notify the new TSM core layer of PCI device arrival and departure

   - Add a low level TSM driver for the link encryption establishment
     capabilities of the AMD SEV-TIO architecture

   - Add a library of helpers TSM drivers to use for IDE establishment
     and the DOE transport

   - Add skeleton support for 'bind' and 'guest_request' operations in
     support of TDISP"

* tag 'tsm-for-6.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/devsec/tsm: (23 commits)
  crypto/ccp: Fix CONFIG_PCI=n build
  virt: Fix Kconfig warning when selecting TSM without VIRT_DRIVERS
  crypto/ccp: Implement SEV-TIO PCIe IDE (phase1)
  iommu/amd: Report SEV-TIO support
  psp-sev: Assign numbers to all status codes and add new
  ccp: Make snp_reclaim_pages and __sev_do_cmd_locked public
  PCI/TSM: Add 'dsm' and 'bound' attributes for dependent functions
  PCI/TSM: Add pci_tsm_guest_req() for managing TDIs
  PCI/TSM: Add pci_tsm_bind() helper for instantiating TDIs
  PCI/IDE: Initialize an ID for all IDE streams
  PCI/IDE: Add Address Association Register setup for downstream MMIO
  resource: Introduce resource_assigned() for discerning active resources
  PCI/TSM: Drop stub for pci_tsm_doe_transfer()
  drivers/virt: Drop VIRT_DRIVERS build dependency
  PCI/TSM: Report active IDE streams
  PCI/IDE: Report available IDE streams
  PCI/IDE: Add IDE establishment helpers
  PCI: Establish document for PCI host bridge sysfs attributes
  PCI: Add PCIe Device 3 Extended Capability enumeration
  PCI/TSM: Establish Secure Sessions and Link Encryption
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm</title>
<updated>2025-12-06T01:01:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-12-06T01:01:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=51d90a15fedf8366cb96ef68d0ea2d0bf15417d2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:51d90a15fedf8366cb96ef68d0ea2d0bf15417d2</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini:
 "ARM:

   - Support for userspace handling of synchronous external aborts
     (SEAs), allowing the VMM to potentially handle the abort in a
     non-fatal manner

   - Large rework of the VGIC's list register handling with the goal of
     supporting more active/pending IRQs than available list registers
     in hardware. In addition, the VGIC now supports EOImode==1 style
     deactivations for IRQs which may occur on a separate vCPU than the
     one that acked the IRQ

   - Support for FEAT_XNX (user / privileged execute permissions) and
     FEAT_HAF (hardware update to the Access Flag) in the software page
     table walkers and shadow MMU

   - Allow page table destruction to reschedule, fixing long
     need_resched latencies observed when destroying a large VM

   - Minor fixes to KVM and selftests

  Loongarch:

   - Get VM PMU capability from HW GCFG register

   - Add AVEC basic support

   - Use 64-bit register definition for EIOINTC

   - Add KVM timer test cases for tools/selftests

  RISC/V:

   - SBI message passing (MPXY) support for KVM guest

   - Give a new, more specific error subcode for the case when in-kernel
     AIA virtualization fails to allocate IMSIC VS-file

   - Support KVM_DIRTY_LOG_INITIALLY_SET, enabling dirty log gradually
     in small chunks

   - Fix guest page fault within HLV* instructions

   - Flush VS-stage TLB after VCPU migration for Andes cores

  s390:

   - Always allocate ESCA (Extended System Control Area), instead of
     starting with the basic SCA and converting to ESCA with the
     addition of the 65th vCPU. The price is increased number of exits
     (and worse performance) on z10 and earlier processor; ESCA was
     introduced by z114/z196 in 2010

   - VIRT_XFER_TO_GUEST_WORK support

   - Operation exception forwarding support

   - Cleanups

  x86:

   - Skip the costly "zap all SPTEs" on an MMIO generation wrap if MMIO
     SPTE caching is disabled, as there can't be any relevant SPTEs to
     zap

   - Relocate a misplaced export

   - Fix an async #PF bug where KVM would clear the completion queue
     when the guest transitioned in and out of paging mode, e.g. when
     handling an SMI and then returning to paged mode via RSM

   - Leave KVM's user-return notifier registered even when disabling
     virtualization, as long as kvm.ko is loaded. On reboot/shutdown,
     keeping the notifier registered is ok; the kernel does not use the
     MSRs and the callback will run cleanly and restore host MSRs if the
     CPU manages to return to userspace before the system goes down

   - Use the checked version of {get,put}_user()

   - Fix a long-lurking bug where KVM's lack of catch-up logic for
     periodic APIC timers can result in a hard lockup in the host

   - Revert the periodic kvmclock sync logic now that KVM doesn't use a
     clocksource that's subject to NTP corrections

   - Clean up KVM's handling of MMIO Stale Data and L1TF, and bury the
     latter behind CONFIG_CPU_MITIGATIONS

   - Context switch XCR0, XSS, and PKRU outside of the entry/exit fast
     path; the only reason they were handled in the fast path was to
     paper of a bug in the core #MC code, and that has long since been
     fixed

   - Add emulator support for AVX MOV instructions, to play nice with
     emulated devices whose guest drivers like to access PCI BARs with
     large multi-byte instructions

  x86 (AMD):

   - Fix a few missing "VMCB dirty" bugs

   - Fix the worst of KVM's lack of EFER.LMSLE emulation

   - Add AVIC support for addressing 4k vCPUs in x2AVIC mode

   - Fix incorrect handling of selective CR0 writes when checking
     intercepts during emulation of L2 instructions

   - Fix a currently-benign bug where KVM would clobber SPEC_CTRL[63:32]
     on VMRUN and #VMEXIT

   - Fix a bug where KVM corrupt the guest code stream when re-injecting
     a soft interrupt if the guest patched the underlying code after the
     VM-Exit, e.g. when Linux patches code with a temporary INT3

   - Add KVM_X86_SNP_POLICY_BITS to advertise supported SNP policy bits
     to userspace, and extend KVM "support" to all policy bits that
     don't require any actual support from KVM

  x86 (Intel):

   - Use the root role from kvm_mmu_page to construct EPTPs instead of
     the current vCPU state, partly as worthwhile cleanup, but mostly to
     pave the way for tracking per-root TLB flushes, and elide EPT
     flushes on pCPU migration if the root is clean from a previous
     flush

   - Add a few missing nested consistency checks

   - Rip out support for doing "early" consistency checks via hardware
     as the functionality hasn't been used in years and is no longer
     useful in general; replace it with an off-by-default module param
     to WARN if hardware fails a check that KVM does not perform

   - Fix a currently-benign bug where KVM would drop the guest's
     SPEC_CTRL[63:32] on VM-Enter

   - Misc cleanups

   - Overhaul the TDX code to address systemic races where KVM (acting
     on behalf of userspace) could inadvertantly trigger lock contention
     in the TDX-Module; KVM was either working around these in weird,
     ugly ways, or was simply oblivious to them (though even Yan's
     devilish selftests could only break individual VMs, not the host
     kernel)

   - Fix a bug where KVM could corrupt a vCPU's cpu_list when freeing a
     TDX vCPU, if creating said vCPU failed partway through

   - Fix a few sparse warnings (bad annotation, 0 != NULL)

   - Use struct_size() to simplify copying TDX capabilities to userspace

   - Fix a bug where TDX would effectively corrupt user-return MSR
     values if the TDX Module rejects VP.ENTER and thus doesn't clobber
     host MSRs as expected

  Selftests:

   - Fix a math goof in mmu_stress_test when running on a single-CPU
     system/VM

   - Forcefully override ARCH from x86_64 to x86 to play nice with
     specifying ARCH=x86_64 on the command line

   - Extend a bunch of nested VMX to validate nested SVM as well

   - Add support for LA57 in the core VM_MODE_xxx macro, and add a test
     to verify KVM can save/restore nested VMX state when L1 is using
     5-level paging, but L2 is not

   - Clean up the guest paging code in anticipation of sharing the core
     logic for nested EPT and nested NPT

  guest_memfd:

   - Add NUMA mempolicy support for guest_memfd, and clean up a variety
     of rough edges in guest_memfd along the way

   - Define a CLASS to automatically handle get+put when grabbing a
     guest_memfd from a memslot to make it harder to leak references

   - Enhance KVM selftests to make it easer to develop and debug
     selftests like those added for guest_memfd NUMA support, e.g. where
     test and/or KVM bugs often result in hard-to-debug SIGBUS errors

   - Misc cleanups

  Generic:

   - Use the recently-added WQ_PERCPU when creating the per-CPU
     workqueue for irqfd cleanup

   - Fix a goof in the dirty ring documentation

   - Fix choice of target for directed yield across different calls to
     kvm_vcpu_on_spin(); the function was always starting from the first
     vCPU instead of continuing the round-robin search"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (260 commits)
  KVM: arm64: at: Update AF on software walk only if VM has FEAT_HAFDBS
  KVM: arm64: at: Use correct HA bit in TCR_EL2 when regime is EL2
  KVM: arm64: Document KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_{UX,PX}
  KVM: arm64: Fix spelling mistake "Unexpeced" -&gt; "Unexpected"
  KVM: arm64: Add break to default case in kvm_pgtable_stage2_pte_prot()
  KVM: arm64: Add endian casting to kvm_swap_s[12]_desc()
  KVM: arm64: Fix compilation when CONFIG_ARM64_USE_LSE_ATOMICS=n
  KVM: arm64: selftests: Add test for AT emulation
  KVM: arm64: nv: Expose hardware access flag management to NV guests
  KVM: arm64: nv: Implement HW access flag management in stage-2 SW PTW
  KVM: arm64: Implement HW access flag management in stage-1 SW PTW
  KVM: arm64: Propagate PTW errors up to AT emulation
  KVM: arm64: Add helper for swapping guest descriptor
  KVM: arm64: nv: Use pgtable definitions in stage-2 walk
  KVM: arm64: Handle endianness in read helper for emulated PTW
  KVM: arm64: nv: Stop passing vCPU through void ptr in S2 PTW
  KVM: arm64: Call helper for reading descriptors directly
  KVM: arm64: nv: Advertise support for FEAT_XNX
  KVM: arm64: Teach ptdump about FEAT_XNX permissions
  KVM: s390: Use generic VIRT_XFER_TO_GUEST_WORK functions
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto/ccp: Implement SEV-TIO PCIe IDE (phase1)</title>
<updated>2025-12-02T20:50:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Kardashevskiy</name>
<email>aik@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-12-02T02:44:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=4be423572da1f4c11f45168e3fafda870ddac9f8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4be423572da1f4c11f45168e3fafda870ddac9f8</id>
<content type='text'>
Implement the SEV-TIO (Trusted I/O) firmware interface for PCIe TDISP
(Trust Domain In-Socket Protocol). This enables secure communication
between trusted domains and PCIe devices through the PSP (Platform
Security Processor).

The implementation includes:
- Device Security Manager (DSM) operations for establishing secure links
- SPDM (Security Protocol and Data Model) over DOE (Data Object Exchange)
- IDE (Integrity Data Encryption) stream management for secure PCIe

This module bridges the SEV firmware stack with the generic PCIe TSM
framework.

This is phase1 as described in Documentation/driver-api/pci/tsm.rst.

On AMD SEV, the AMD PSP firmware acts as TSM (manages the security/trust).
The CCP driver provides the interface to it and registers in the TSM
subsystem.

Detect the PSP support (reported via FEATURE_INFO + SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS)
and enable SEV-TIO in the SNP_INIT_EX call if the hardware supports TIO.

Implement SEV TIO PSP command wrappers in sev-dev-tio.c and store
the data in the SEV-TIO-specific structs.

Implement TSM hooks and IDE setup in sev-dev-tsm.c.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy &lt;aik@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/692f506bb80c9_261c11004@dwillia2-mobl4.notmuch
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ccp: Make snp_reclaim_pages and __sev_do_cmd_locked public</title>
<updated>2025-12-02T20:05:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Kardashevskiy</name>
<email>aik@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-12-02T02:44:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=8a5dd102e48752f8c4144f051eccc602774f1a93'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8a5dd102e48752f8c4144f051eccc602774f1a93</id>
<content type='text'>
The snp_reclaim_pages() helper reclaims pages in the FW state. SEV-TIO
and the TMPM driver (a hardware engine which smashes IOMMU PDEs among
other things) will use to reclaim memory when cleaning up.

Share and export snp_reclaim_pages().

Most of the SEV-TIO code uses sev_do_cmd() which locks the sev_cmd_mutex
and already exported. But the SNP init code (which also sets up SEV-TIO)
executes under the sev_cmd_mutex lock so the SEV-TIO code has to use
the __sev_do_cmd_locked() helper. This one though does not need to be
exported/shared globally as SEV-TIO is a part of the CCP driver still.

Share __sev_do_cmd_locked() via the CCP internal header.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy &lt;aik@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251202024449.542361-2-aik@amd.com
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp - Add an API to return the supported SEV-SNP policy bits</title>
<updated>2025-11-14T18:30:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Lendacky</name>
<email>thomas.lendacky@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-10-27T19:33:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=c9434e64e8b4d17511f514f7495008f573595e3e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c9434e64e8b4d17511f514f7495008f573595e3e</id>
<content type='text'>
Supported policy bits are dependent on the level of SEV firmware that is
currently running. Create an API to return the supported policy bits for
the current level of firmware.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/e3f711366ddc22e3dd215c987fd2e28dc1c07f54.1761593632.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sev-dev: use override credential guards</title>
<updated>2025-11-05T22:11:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>brauner@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-11-03T14:57:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b7b4f7554bcc6b9ee0ec0404999bf080adad1f3c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b7b4f7554bcc6b9ee0ec0404999bf080adad1f3c</id>
<content type='text'>
Use override credential guards for scoped credential override with
automatic restoration on scope exit.

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251103-work-creds-guards-prepare_creds-v1-4-b447b82f2c9b@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
