kernel/linux.git/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c, branch v6.6.131

firmware_loader: Fix possible resource leak in fw_log_firmware_info()

2024-12-09T09:32:37+00:00

[ Upstream commit 369a9c046c2fdfe037f05b43b84c386bdbccc103 ] The alg instance should be released under the exception path, otherwise there may be resource leak here. To mitigate this, free the alg instance with crypto_free_shash when kmalloc fails. Fixes: 02fe26f25325 ("firmware_loader: Add debug message with checksum for FW file") Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui Reviewed-by: Amadeusz Sławiński Reviewed-by: Russ Weight Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241016110335.3677924-1-cuigaosheng1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

firmware_loader: Block path traversal

2024-10-04T14:29:51+00:00

commit f0e5311aa8022107d63c54e2f03684ec097d1394 upstream. Most firmware names are hardcoded strings, or are constructed from fairly constrained format strings where the dynamic parts are just some hex numbers or such. However, there are a couple codepaths in the kernel where firmware file names contain string components that are passed through from a device or semi-privileged userspace; the ones I could find (not counting interfaces that require root privileges) are: - lpfc_sli4_request_firmware_update() seems to construct the firmware filename from "ModelName", a string that was previously parsed out of some descriptor ("Vital Product Data") in lpfc_fill_vpd() - nfp_net_fw_find() seems to construct a firmware filename from a model name coming from nfp_hwinfo_lookup(pf->hwinfo, "nffw.partno"), which I think parses some descriptor that was read from the device. (But this case likely isn't exploitable because the format string looks like "netronome/nic_%s", and there shouldn't be any *folders* starting with "netronome/nic_". The previous case was different because there, the "%s" is *at the start* of the format string.) - module_flash_fw_schedule() is reachable from the ETHTOOL_MSG_MODULE_FW_FLASH_ACT netlink command, which is marked as GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM (meaning CAP_NET_ADMIN inside a user namespace is enough to pass the privilege check), and takes a userspace-provided firmware name. (But I think to reach this case, you need to have CAP_NET_ADMIN over a network namespace that a special kind of ethernet device is mapped into, so I think this is not a viable attack path in practice.) Fix it by rejecting any firmware names containing ".." path components. For what it's worth, I went looking and haven't found any USB device drivers that use the firmware loader dangerously. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Danilo Krummrich Fixes: abb139e75c2c ("firmware: teach the kernel to load firmware files directly from the filesystem") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Acked-by: Luis Chamberlain Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240828-firmware-traversal-v3-1-c76529c63b5f@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

firmware_loader: Fix a NULL vs IS_ERR() check

2023-05-31T19:31:00+00:00

The crypto_alloc_shash() function doesn't return NULL, it returns error pointers. Update the check accordingly. Fixes: 02fe26f25325 ("firmware_loader: Add debug message with checksum for FW file") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Reviewed-by: Cezary Rojewski Acked-by: Luis Chamberlain Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/36ef6042-ce74-4e8e-9e2c-5b5c28940610@kili.mountain Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

firmware_loader: Strip off \n from customized path

2023-04-20T09:42:27+00:00

Having helped an user recently figure out why the customized path being specified was not taken into account landed on a subtle difference between using: echo "/xyz/firmware" > /sys/module/firmware_class/parameters/path which inserts an additional newline which is passed as is down to fw_get_filesystem_firmware() and ultimately kernel_read_file_from_path() and fails. Strip off \n from the customized firmware path such that users do not run into these hard to debug situations. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230402135423.3235-1-f.fainelli@gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230413191757.1949088-1-f.fainelli@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

firmware_loader: Add debug message with checksum for FW file

2023-03-29T10:22:35+00:00

Enable dynamic-debug logging of firmware filenames and SHA256 checksums to clearly identify the firmware files that are loaded by the system. Example output: [ 34.944619] firmware_class:_request_firmware: i915 0000:00:02.0: Loaded FW: i915/kbl_dmc_ver1_04.bin, sha256: 2cde41c3e5ad181423bcc3e98ff9c49f743c88f18646af4d0b3c3a9664b831a1 [ 48.155884] firmware_class:_request_firmware: snd_soc_avs 0000:00:1f.3: Loaded FW: intel/avs/cnl/dsp_basefw.bin, sha256: 43f6ac1b066e9bd0423d914960fbbdccb391af27d2b1da1085eee3ea8df0f357 [ 49.579540] firmware_class:_request_firmware: snd_soc_avs 0000:00:1f.3: Loaded FW: intel/avs/rt274-tplg.bin, sha256: 4b3580da96dc3d2c443ba20c6728d8b665fceb3ed57223c3a57582bbad8e2413 [ 49.798196] firmware_class:_request_firmware: snd_soc_avs 0000:00:1f.3: Loaded FW: intel/avs/hda-8086280c-tplg.bin, sha256: 5653172579b2be1b51fd69f5cf46e2bac8d63f2a1327924311c13b2f1fe6e601 [ 49.859627] firmware_class:_request_firmware: snd_soc_avs 0000:00:1f.3: Loaded FW: intel/avs/dmic-tplg.bin, sha256: 00fb7fbdb74683333400d7e46925dae60db448b88638efcca0b30215db9df63f Reviewed-by: Cezary Rojewski Reviewed-by: Russ Weight Signed-off-by: Amadeusz Sławiński Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230317224729.1025879-1-amadeuszx.slawinski@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

cred: Do not default to init_cred in prepare_kernel_cred()

2022-11-01T17:04:52+00:00

A common exploit pattern for ROP attacks is to abuse prepare_kernel_cred() in order to construct escalated privileges[1]. Instead of providing a short-hand argument (NULL) to the "daemon" argument to indicate using init_cred as the base cred, require that "daemon" is always set to an actual task. Replace all existing callers that were passing NULL with &init_task. Future attacks will need to have sufficiently powerful read/write primitives to have found an appropriately privileged task and written it to the ROP stack as an argument to succeed, which is similarly difficult to the prior effort needed to escalate privileges before struct cred existed: locate the current cred and overwrite the uid member. This has the added benefit of meaning that prepare_kernel_cred() can no longer exceed the privileges of the init task, which may have changed from the original init_cred (e.g. dropping capabilities from the bounding set). [1] https://google.com/search?q=commit_creds(prepare_kernel_cred(0)) Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: David Howells Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" Cc: Steve French Cc: Ronnie Sahlberg Cc: Shyam Prasad N Cc: Tom Talpey Cc: Namjae Jeon Cc: Trond Myklebust Cc: Anna Schumaker Cc: Chuck Lever Cc: Jeff Layton Cc: "David S. Miller" Cc: Eric Dumazet Cc: Jakub Kicinski Cc: Paolo Abeni Cc: "Michal Koutný" Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org Cc: samba-technical@lists.samba.org Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Luis Chamberlain Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky Acked-by: Russ Weight Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Acked-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221026232943.never.775-kees@kernel.org

firmware_loader: Replace kmap() with kmap_local_page()

2022-07-28T14:32:56+00:00

The use of kmap() is being deprecated in favor of kmap_local_page(). Two main problems with kmap(): (1) It comes with an overhead as mapping space is restricted and protected by a global lock for synchronization and (2) kmap() also requires global TLB invalidation when the kmap’s pool wraps and it might block when the mapping space is fully utilized until a slot becomes available. kmap_local_page() is preferred over kmap() and kmap_atomic(). Where it cannot mechanically replace the latters, code refactor should be considered (special care must be taken if kernel virtual addresses are aliases in different contexts). With kmap_local_page() the mappings are per thread, CPU local, can take page faults, and can be called from any context (including interrupts). Call kmap_local_page() in firmware_loader wherever kmap() is currently used. In firmware_rw() use the helpers copy_{from,to}_page() instead of open coding the local mappings + memcpy(). Successfully tested with "firmware" selftests on a QEMU/KVM 32-bits VM with 4GB RAM, booting a kernel with HIGHMEM64GB enabled. Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Luis Chamberlain Suggested-by: Ira Weiny Reviewed-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Fabio M. De Francesco Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220714235030.12732-1-fmdefrancesco@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Merge tag 'driver-core-5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core

2022-06-03T18:48:47+00:00

Pull driver core updates from Greg KH: "Here is the set of driver core changes for 5.19-rc1. Lots of tiny driver core changes and cleanups happened this cycle, but the two major things are: - firmware_loader reorganization and additions including the ability to have XZ compressed firmware images and the ability for userspace to initiate the firmware load when it needs to, instead of being always initiated by the kernel. FPGA devices specifically want this ability to have their firmware changed over the lifetime of the system boot, and this allows them to work without having to come up with yet-another-custom-uapi interface for loading firmware for them. - physical location support added to sysfs so that devices that know this information, can tell userspace where they are located in a common way. Some ACPI devices already support this today, and more bus types should support this in the future. Smaller changes include: - driver_override api cleanups and fixes - error path cleanups and fixes - get_abi script fixes - deferred probe timeout changes. It's that last change that I'm the most worried about. It has been reported to cause boot problems for a number of systems, and I have a tested patch series that resolves this issue. But I didn't get it merged into my tree before 5.18-final came out, so it has not gotten any linux-next testing. I'll send the fixup patches (there are 2) as a follow-on series to this pull request. All have been tested in linux-next for weeks, with no reported issues other than the above-mentioned boot time-outs" * tag 'driver-core-5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core: (55 commits) driver core: fix deadlock in __device_attach kernfs: Separate kernfs_pr_cont_buf and rename_lock. topology: Remove unused cpu_cluster_mask() driver core: Extend deferred probe timeout on driver registration MAINTAINERS: add Russ Weight as a firmware loader maintainer driver: base: fix UAF when driver_attach failed test_firmware: fix end of loop test in upload_read_show() driver core: location: Add "back" as a possible output for panel driver core: location: Free struct acpi_pld_info *pld driver core: Add "*" wildcard support to driver_async_probe cmdline param driver core: location: Check for allocations failure arch_topology: Trace the update thermal pressure kernfs: Rename kernfs_put_open_node to kernfs_unlink_open_file. export: fix string handling of namespace in EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS rpmsg: use local 'dev' variable rpmsg: Fix calling device_lock() on non-initialized device firmware_loader: describe 'module' parameter of firmware_upload_register() firmware_loader: Move definitions from sysfs_upload.h to sysfs.h firmware_loader: Fix configs for sysfs split selftests: firmware: Add firmware upload selftests ...

firmware_loader: use kernel credentials when reading firmware

2022-05-06T08:00:03+00:00

Device drivers may decide to not load firmware when probed to avoid slowing down the boot process should the firmware filesystem not be available yet. In this case, the firmware loading request may be done when a device file associated with the driver is first accessed. The credentials of the userspace process accessing the device file may be used to validate access to the firmware files requested by the driver. Ensure that the kernel assumes the responsibility of reading the firmware. This was observed on Android for a graphic driver loading their firmware when the device file (e.g. /dev/mali0) was first opened by userspace (i.e. surfaceflinger). The security context of surfaceflinger was used to validate the access to the firmware file (e.g. /vendor/firmware/mali.bin). Previously, Android configurations were not setting up the firmware_class.path command line argument and were relying on the userspace fallback mechanism. In this case, the security context of the userspace daemon (i.e. ueventd) was consistently used to read firmware files. More Android devices are now found to set firmware_class.path which gives the kernel the opportunity to read the firmware directly (via kernel_read_file_from_path_initns). In this scenario, the current process credentials were used, even if unrelated to the loading of the firmware file. Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen Cc: # 5.10 Reviewed-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Luis Chamberlain Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220502004952.3970800-1-tweek@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Revert "firmware_loader: use kernel credentials when reading firmware"

2022-04-27T14:19:39+00:00

This reverts commit 3677563eb8731e1ad5970e3e57f74e5f9d63502a as it leaks memory :( Reported-by: Qian Cai Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427135823.GD71@qian Cc: Thiébaud Weksteen Cc: Luis Chamberlain Cc: John Stultz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman