<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/drivers/base/cpu.c, branch v4.19.112</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.19.112</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.19.112'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2019-11-12T18:21:36+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Add ITLB_MULTIHIT bug infrastructure</title>
<updated>2019-11-12T18:21:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vineela Tummalapalli</name>
<email>vineela.tummalapalli@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-04T11:22:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f9aa6b73a407b714c9aac44734eb4045c893c6f7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f9aa6b73a407b714c9aac44734eb4045c893c6f7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit db4d30fbb71b47e4ecb11c4efa5d8aad4b03dfae upstream.

Some processors may incur a machine check error possibly resulting in an
unrecoverable CPU lockup when an instruction fetch encounters a TLB
multi-hit in the instruction TLB. This can occur when the page size is
changed along with either the physical address or cache type. The relevant
erratum can be found here:

   https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205195

There are other processors affected for which the erratum does not fully
disclose the impact.

This issue affects both bare-metal x86 page tables and EPT.

It can be mitigated by either eliminating the use of large pages or by
using careful TLB invalidations when changing the page size in the page
tables.

Just like Spectre, Meltdown, L1TF and MDS, a new bit has been allocated in
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (PSCHANGE_MC_NO) and will be set on CPUs which
are mitigated against this issue.

Signed-off-by: Vineela Tummalapalli &lt;vineela.tummalapalli@intel.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation/taa: Add sysfs reporting for TSX Async Abort</title>
<updated>2019-11-12T18:21:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-23T10:19:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=15dfa5d706df85506a527c5572be5ff322031a01'/>
<id>urn:sha1:15dfa5d706df85506a527c5572be5ff322031a01</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6608b45ac5ecb56f9e171252229c39580cc85f0f upstream.

Add the sysfs reporting file for TSX Async Abort. It exposes the
vulnerability and the mitigation state similar to the existing files for
the other hardware vulnerabilities.

Sysfs file path is:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan &lt;neelima.krishnan@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Gross &lt;mgross@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting for MDS</title>
<updated>2019-05-14T17:17:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-18T21:51:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=8230c2028dce0aa3618524fd69e89bb6084789e6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8230c2028dce0aa3618524fd69e89bb6084789e6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8a4b06d391b0a42a373808979b5028f5c84d9c6a upstream

Add the sysfs reporting file for MDS. It exposes the vulnerability and
mitigation state similar to the existing files for the other speculative
hardware vulnerabilities.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters &lt;jcm@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jon Masters &lt;jcm@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tf</title>
<updated>2018-06-20T17:10:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andi Kleen</name>
<email>ak@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-13T22:48:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=17dbca119312b4e8173d4e25ff64262119fcef38'/>
<id>urn:sha1:17dbca119312b4e8173d4e25ff64262119fcef38</id>
<content type='text'>
L1TF core kernel workarounds are cheap and normally always enabled, However
they still should be reported in sysfs if the system is vulnerable or
mitigated. Add the necessary CPU feature/bug bits.

- Extend the existing checks for Meltdowns to determine if the system is
  vulnerable. All CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown are also not
  vulnerable to L1TF

- Check for 32bit non PAE and emit a warning as there is no practical way
  for mitigation due to the limited physical address bits

- If the system has more than MAX_PA/2 physical memory the invert page
  workarounds don't protect the system against the L1TF attack anymore,
  because an inverted physical address will also point to valid
  memory. Print a warning in this case and report that the system is
  vulnerable.

Add a function which returns the PFN limit for the L1TF mitigation, which
will be used in follow up patches for sanity and range checks.

[ tglx: Renamed the CPU feature bit to L1TF_PTEINV ]

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;


</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Expose /sys/../spec_store_bypass</title>
<updated>2018-05-03T11:55:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk</name>
<email>konrad.wilk@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-26T02:04:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=c456442cd3a59eeb1d60293c26cbe2ff2c4e42cf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c456442cd3a59eeb1d60293c26cbe2ff2c4e42cf</id>
<content type='text'>
Add the sysfs file for the new vulerability. It does not do much except
show the words 'Vulnerable' for recent x86 cores.

Intel cores prior to family 6 are known not to be vulnerable, and so are
some Atoms and some Xeon Phi.

It assumes that older Cyrix, Centaur, etc. cores are immune.

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>driver core: cpu: use put_device() if device_register fail</title>
<updated>2018-03-15T13:37:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arvind Yadav</name>
<email>arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-03-11T05:55:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3aaba245dfa33270a464d3098b8cce2a2af32784'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3aaba245dfa33270a464d3098b8cce2a2af32784</id>
<content type='text'>
if device_register() returned an error! Always use put_device()
to give up the reference initialized.

Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav &lt;arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'driver-core-4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core</title>
<updated>2018-02-01T18:00:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-01T18:00:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=47fcc0360cfb3fe82e4daddacad3c1cd80b0b75d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:47fcc0360cfb3fe82e4daddacad3c1cd80b0b75d</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull driver core updates from Greg KH:
 "Here is the set of "big" driver core patches for 4.16-rc1.

  The majority of the work here is in the firmware subsystem, with
  reworks to try to attempt to make the code easier to handle in the
  long run, but no functional change. There's also some tree-wide sysfs
  attribute fixups with lots of acks from the various subsystem
  maintainers, as well as a handful of other normal fixes and changes.

  And finally, some license cleanups for the driver core and sysfs code.

  All have been in linux-next for a while with no reported issues"

* tag 'driver-core-4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core: (48 commits)
  device property: Define type of PROPERTY_ENRTY_*() macros
  device property: Reuse property_entry_free_data()
  device property: Move property_entry_free_data() upper
  firmware: Fix up docs referring to FIRMWARE_IN_KERNEL
  firmware: Drop FIRMWARE_IN_KERNEL Kconfig option
  USB: serial: keyspan: Drop firmware Kconfig options
  sysfs: remove DEBUG defines
  sysfs: use SPDX identifiers
  drivers: base: add coredump driver ops
  sysfs: add attribute specification for /sysfs/devices/.../coredump
  test_firmware: fix missing unlock on error in config_num_requests_store()
  test_firmware: make local symbol test_fw_config static
  sysfs: turn WARN() into pr_warn()
  firmware: Fix a typo in fallback-mechanisms.rst
  treewide: Use DEVICE_ATTR_WO
  treewide: Use DEVICE_ATTR_RO
  treewide: Use DEVICE_ATTR_RW
  sysfs.h: Use octal permissions
  component: add debugfs support
  bus: simple-pm-bus: convert bool SIMPLE_PM_BUS to tristate
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2018-01-14T17:51:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-14T17:51:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=40548c6b6c134275c750eb372dc2cf8ee1bbc3d4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:40548c6b6c134275c750eb372dc2cf8ee1bbc3d4</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 pti updates from Thomas Gleixner:
 "This contains:

   - a PTI bugfix to avoid setting reserved CR3 bits when PCID is
     disabled. This seems to cause issues on a virtual machine at least
     and is incorrect according to the AMD manual.

   - a PTI bugfix which disables the perf BTS facility if PTI is
     enabled. The BTS AUX buffer is not globally visible and causes the
     CPU to fault when the mapping disappears on switching CR3 to user
     space. A full fix which restores BTS on PTI is non trivial and will
     be worked on.

   - PTI bugfixes for EFI and trusted boot which make sure that the user
     space visible page table entries have the NX bit cleared

   - removal of dead code in the PTI pagetable setup functions

   - add PTI documentation

   - add a selftest for vsyscall to verify that the kernel actually
     implements what it advertises.

   - a sysfs interface to expose vulnerability and mitigation
     information so there is a coherent way for users to retrieve the
     status.

   - the initial spectre_v2 mitigations, aka retpoline:

      + The necessary ASM thunk and compiler support

      + The ASM variants of retpoline and the conversion of affected ASM
        code

      + Make LFENCE serializing on AMD so it can be used as speculation
        trap

      + The RSB fill after vmexit

   - initial objtool support for retpoline

  As I said in the status mail this is the most of the set of patches
  which should go into 4.15 except two straight forward patches still on
  hold:

   - the retpoline add on of LFENCE which waits for ACKs

   - the RSB fill after context switch

  Both should be ready to go early next week and with that we'll have
  covered the major holes of spectre_v2 and go back to normality"

* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (28 commits)
  x86,perf: Disable intel_bts when PTI
  security/Kconfig: Correct the Documentation reference for PTI
  x86/pti: Fix !PCID and sanitize defines
  selftests/x86: Add test_vsyscall
  x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit
  x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps
  x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps
  x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps
  x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps
  x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace assembler indirect jumps
  x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps
  x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps
  x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation
  x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support
  objtool: Allow alternatives to be ignored
  objtool: Detect jumps to retpoline thunks
  x86/pti: Make unpoison of pgd for trusted boot work for real
  x86/alternatives: Fix optimize_nops() checking
  sysfs/cpu: Fix typos in vulnerability documentation
  x86/cpu/AMD: Use LFENCE_RDTSC in preference to MFENCE_RDTSC
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder</title>
<updated>2018-01-08T10:10:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-07T21:48:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=87590ce6e373d1a5401f6539f0c59ef92dd924a9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:87590ce6e373d1a5401f6539f0c59ef92dd924a9</id>
<content type='text'>
As the meltdown/spectre problem affects several CPU architectures, it makes
sense to have common way to express whether a system is affected by a
particular vulnerability or not. If affected the way to express the
mitigation should be common as well.

Create /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities folder and files for
meltdown, spectre_v1 and spectre_v2.

Allow architectures to override the show function.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180107214913.096657732@linutronix.de

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>driver core: add SPDX identifiers to all driver core files</title>
<updated>2017-12-07T17:36:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-07T16:30:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=989d42e85dc2f6823f39b8e9d080fd04bae0645d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:989d42e85dc2f6823f39b8e9d080fd04bae0645d</id>
<content type='text'>
It's good to have SPDX identifiers in all files to make it easier to
audit the kernel tree for correct licenses.

Update the driver core files files with the correct SPDX license
identifier based on the license text in the file itself.  The SPDX
identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of
the full boiler plate text.

This work is based on a script and data from Thomas Gleixner, Philippe
Ombredanne, and Kate Stewart.

Cc: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes@sipsolutions.net&gt;
Cc: "Luis R. Rodriguez" &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: William Breathitt Gray &lt;vilhelm.gray@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Kate Stewart &lt;kstewart@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Philippe Ombredanne &lt;pombredanne@nexb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
