<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/drivers/android/binder.c, branch v4.19.181</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.19.181</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.19.181'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2020-10-29T08:54:56+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>binder: fix UAF when releasing todo list</title>
<updated>2020-10-29T08:54:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Todd Kjos</name>
<email>tkjos@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-09T23:24:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=35cc2facc2a5ff52b9aa03f2dc81dcb000d97da3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:35cc2facc2a5ff52b9aa03f2dc81dcb000d97da3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f3277cbfba763cd2826396521b9296de67cf1bbc upstream.

When releasing a thread todo list when tearing down
a binder_proc, the following race was possible which
could result in a use-after-free:

1.  Thread 1: enter binder_release_work from binder_thread_release
2.  Thread 2: binder_update_ref_for_handle() -&gt; binder_dec_node_ilocked()
3.  Thread 2: dec nodeA --&gt; 0 (will free node)
4.  Thread 1: ACQ inner_proc_lock
5.  Thread 2: block on inner_proc_lock
6.  Thread 1: dequeue work (BINDER_WORK_NODE, part of nodeA)
7.  Thread 1: REL inner_proc_lock
8.  Thread 2: ACQ inner_proc_lock
9.  Thread 2: todo list cleanup, but work was already dequeued
10. Thread 2: free node
11. Thread 2: REL inner_proc_lock
12. Thread 1: deref w-&gt;type (UAF)

The problem was that for a BINDER_WORK_NODE, the binder_work element
must not be accessed after releasing the inner_proc_lock while
processing the todo list elements since another thread might be
handling a deref on the node containing the binder_work element
leading to the node being freed.

Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos &lt;tkjos@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201009232455.4054810-1-tkjos@google.com
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 4.14, 4.19, 5.4, 5.8
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>binder: Prevent context manager from incrementing ref 0</title>
<updated>2020-08-11T13:32:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-27T12:04:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=74e42c22f2125bb07ffd9b0cccef120815e68725'/>
<id>urn:sha1:74e42c22f2125bb07ffd9b0cccef120815e68725</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4b836a1426cb0f1ef2a6e211d7e553221594f8fc upstream.

Binder is designed such that a binder_proc never has references to
itself. If this rule is violated, memory corruption can occur when a
process sends a transaction to itself; see e.g.
&lt;https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=09e05aba06723a94d43d&gt;.

There is a remaining edgecase through which such a transaction-to-self
can still occur from the context of a task with BINDER_SET_CONTEXT_MGR
access:

 - task A opens /dev/binder twice, creating binder_proc instances P1
   and P2
 - P1 becomes context manager
 - P2 calls ACQUIRE on the magic handle 0, allocating index 0 in its
   handle table
 - P1 dies (by closing the /dev/binder fd and waiting a bit)
 - P2 becomes context manager
 - P2 calls ACQUIRE on the magic handle 0, allocating index 1 in its
   handle table
   [this triggers a warning: "binder: 1974:1974 tried to acquire
   reference to desc 0, got 1 instead"]
 - task B opens /dev/binder once, creating binder_proc instance P3
 - P3 calls P2 (via magic handle 0) with (void*)1 as argument (two-way
   transaction)
 - P2 receives the handle and uses it to call P3 (two-way transaction)
 - P3 calls P2 (via magic handle 0) (two-way transaction)
 - P2 calls P2 (via handle 1) (two-way transaction)

And then, if P2 does *NOT* accept the incoming transaction work, but
instead closes the binder fd, we get a crash.

Solve it by preventing the context manager from using ACQUIRE on ref 0.
There shouldn't be any legitimate reason for the context manager to do
that.

Additionally, print a warning if someone manages to find another way to
trigger a transaction-to-self bug in the future.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 457b9a6f09f0 ("Staging: android: add binder driver")
Acked-by: Todd Kjos &lt;tkjos@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Martijn Coenen &lt;maco@android.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200727120424.1627555-1-jannh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>android: binder: no outgoing transaction when thread todo has transaction</title>
<updated>2019-11-20T17:46:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sherry Yang</name>
<email>sherryy@android.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-14T00:28:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b0cb2d8164d0dfd19ef050505fbf936b2df1b10d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b0cb2d8164d0dfd19ef050505fbf936b2df1b10d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 44b73962cb25f1c8170ea695c4564b05a75e1fd4 ]

When a process dies, failed reply is sent to the sender of any transaction
queued on a dead thread's todo list. The sender asserts that the
received failed reply corresponds to the head of the transaction stack.
This assert can fail if the dead thread is allowed to send outgoing
transactions when there is already a transaction on its todo list,
because this new transaction can end up on the transaction stack of the
original sender. The following steps illustrate how this assertion can
fail.

1. Thread1 sends txn19 to Thread2
   (T1-&gt;transaction_stack=txn19, T2-&gt;todo+=txn19)
2. Without processing todo list, Thread2 sends txn20 to Thread1
   (T1-&gt;todo+=txn20, T2-&gt;transaction_stack=txn20)
3. T1 processes txn20 on its todo list
   (T1-&gt;transaction_stack=txn20-&gt;txn19, T1-&gt;todo=&lt;empty&gt;)
4. T2 dies, T2-&gt;todo cleanup attempts to send failed reply for txn19, but
   T1-&gt;transaction_stack points to txn20 -- assertion failes

Step 2. is the incorrect behavior. When there is a transaction on a
thread's todo list, this thread should not be able to send any outgoing
synchronous transactions. Only the head of the todo list needs to be
checked because only threads that are waiting for proc work can directly
receive work from another thread, and no work is allowed to be queued
on such a thread without waking up the thread. This patch also enforces
that a thread is not waiting for proc work when a work is directly
enqueued to its todo list.

Acked-by: Arve Hjønnevåg &lt;arve@android.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sherry Yang &lt;sherryy@android.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Martijn Coenen &lt;maco@android.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>binder: fix possible UAF when freeing buffer</title>
<updated>2019-08-04T07:30:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Todd Kjos</name>
<email>tkjos@android.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-12T20:29:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=22068d49d09d2b3890e19d7b2048a33340f992da'/>
<id>urn:sha1:22068d49d09d2b3890e19d7b2048a33340f992da</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a370003cc301d4361bae20c9ef615f89bf8d1e8a upstream.

There is a race between the binder driver cleaning
up a completed transaction via binder_free_transaction()
and a user calling binder_ioctl(BC_FREE_BUFFER) to
release a buffer. It doesn't matter which is first but
they need to be protected against running concurrently
which can result in a UAF.

Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos &lt;tkjos@google.com&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;



</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>binder: prevent transactions to context manager from its own process.</title>
<updated>2019-07-31T05:27:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hridya Valsaraju</name>
<email>hridya@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-15T19:18:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=e907b1314481c8586ff3793fd92c7dbd8aa841ae'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e907b1314481c8586ff3793fd92c7dbd8aa841ae</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 49ed96943a8e0c62cc5a9b0a6cfc88be87d1fcec upstream.

Currently, a transaction to context manager from its own process
is prevented by checking if its binder_proc struct is the same as
that of the sender. However, this would not catch cases where the
process opens the binder device again and uses the new fd to send
a transaction to the context manager.

Reported-by: syzbot+8b3c354d33c4ac78bfad@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Hridya Valsaraju &lt;hridya@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Todd Kjos &lt;tkjos@google.com&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190715191804.112933-1-hridya@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>binder: fix memory leak in error path</title>
<updated>2019-07-14T06:11:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Todd Kjos</name>
<email>tkjos@android.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-21T17:54:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=524ad00e80b7b1138e933a3dc62e67cb25baadc6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:524ad00e80b7b1138e933a3dc62e67cb25baadc6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1909a671dbc3606685b1daf8b22a16f65ea7edda upstream.

syzkallar found a 32-byte memory leak in a rarely executed error
case. The transaction complete work item was not freed if put_user()
failed when writing the BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE to the user command
buffer. Fixed by freeing it before put_user() is called.

Reported-by: syzbot+182ce46596c3f2e1eb24@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos &lt;tkjos@google.com&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>binder: fix race that allows malicious free of live buffer</title>
<updated>2018-12-05T18:32:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Todd Kjos</name>
<email>tkjos@android.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-06T23:55:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=553927d6aab993e1297d0c69274cd0c2df5440ca'/>
<id>urn:sha1:553927d6aab993e1297d0c69274cd0c2df5440ca</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7bada55ab50697861eee6bb7d60b41e68a961a9c upstream.

Malicious code can attempt to free buffers using the BC_FREE_BUFFER
ioctl to binder. There are protections against a user freeing a buffer
while in use by the kernel, however there was a window where
BC_FREE_BUFFER could be used to free a recently allocated buffer that
was not completely initialized. This resulted in a use-after-free
detected by KASAN with a malicious test program.

This window is closed by setting the buffer's allow_user_free attribute
to 0 when the buffer is allocated or when the user has previously freed
it instead of waiting for the caller to set it. The problem was that
when the struct buffer was recycled, allow_user_free was stale and set
to 1 allowing a free to go through.

Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos &lt;tkjos@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Arve Hjønnevåg &lt;arve@android.com&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 4.14
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>android: binder: Rate-limit debug and userspace triggered err msgs</title>
<updated>2018-08-08T09:05:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sherry Yang</name>
<email>sherryy@android.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-07T19:57:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=128f38041035001276e964cda1cf951f218d965d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:128f38041035001276e964cda1cf951f218d965d</id>
<content type='text'>
Use rate-limited debug messages where userspace can trigger
excessive log spams.

Acked-by: Arve Hjønnevåg &lt;arve@android.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sherry Yang &lt;sherryy@android.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>android: binder: Include asm/cacheflush.h after linux/ include files</title>
<updated>2018-07-24T12:23:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Guenter Roeck</name>
<email>linux@roeck-us.net</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-23T21:41:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f371a7c17aaa47dd7aedc89ef3cd1d5638c03f5e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f371a7c17aaa47dd7aedc89ef3cd1d5638c03f5e</id>
<content type='text'>
If asm/cacheflush.h is included first, the following build warnings are
seen with sparc32 builds.

In file included from arch/sparc/include/asm/cacheflush.h:11:0,
        from drivers/android/binder.c:54:
arch/sparc/include/asm/cacheflush_32.h:40:37: warning:
	'struct page' declared inside parameter list will not be visible
	outside of this definition or declaration

Moving the asm/ include after linux/ includes solves the problem.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>android: binder: Change return type to vm_fault_t</title>
<updated>2018-05-14T14:06:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Souptick Joarder</name>
<email>jrdr.linux@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-23T16:24:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=e19f70aa02f34abd4c5740f761f4694e9a7c8b3d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e19f70aa02f34abd4c5740f761f4694e9a7c8b3d</id>
<content type='text'>
Use new return type vm_fault_t for fault handler in
struct vm_operations_struct. For now, this is just
documenting that the function returns a VM_FAULT
value rather than an errno.  Once all instances are
converted, vm_fault_t will become a distinct type.

Reference id -&gt; 1c8f422059ae ("mm: change return type
to vm_fault_t")

Signed-off-by: Souptick Joarder &lt;jrdr.linux@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
