<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/crypto/authencesn.c, branch v7.0.10</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v7.0.10</id>
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<updated>2026-05-07T04:14:16+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>crypto: authencesn - reject short ahash digests during instance creation</title>
<updated>2026-05-07T04:14:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yucheng Lu</name>
<email>kanolyc@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-22T13:45:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=9aff81e8217e9de2929084b03b3c7f81988c112b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9aff81e8217e9de2929084b03b3c7f81988c112b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5db6ef9847717329f12c5ea8aba7e9f588a980c0 upstream.

authencesn requires either a zero authsize or an authsize of at least
4 bytes because the ESN encrypt/decrypt paths always move 4 bytes of
high-order sequence number data at the end of the authenticated data.

While crypto_authenc_esn_setauthsize() already rejects explicit
non-zero authsizes in the range 1..3, crypto_authenc_esn_create()
still copied auth-&gt;digestsize into inst-&gt;alg.maxauthsize without
validating it.  The AEAD core then initialized the tfm's default
authsize from that value.

As a result, selecting an ahash with digest size 1..3, such as
cbcmac(cipher_null), exposed authencesn instances whose default
authsize was invalid even though setauthsize() would have rejected the
same value.  AF_ALG could then trigger the ESN tail handling with a
too-short tag and hit an out-of-bounds access.

Reject authencesn instances whose ahash digest size is in the invalid
non-zero range 1..3 so that no tfm can inherit an unsupported default
authsize.

Fixes: f15f05b0a5de ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Yifan Wu &lt;yifanwucs@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Juefei Pu &lt;tomapufckgml@gmail.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan &lt;yuantan098@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan &lt;yuantan098@gmail.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Xin Liu &lt;bird@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Tested-by: Yuhang Zheng &lt;z1652074432@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yucheng Lu &lt;kanolyc@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei &lt;n05ec@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: authencesn - Fix src offset when decrypting in-place</title>
<updated>2026-04-27T13:30:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-14T23:39:06+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9f641baf918a61e716de0f747fec4281b40ce76b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1f48ad3b19a9dfc947868edda0bb8e48e5b5a8fa upstream.

The src SG list offset wasn't set properly when decrypting in-place,
fix it.

Reported-by: Wolfgang Walter &lt;linux@stwm.de&gt;
Fixes: e02494114ebf ("crypto: authencesn - Do not place hiseq at end of dst for out-of-place decryption")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: authencesn - Do not place hiseq at end of dst for out-of-place decryption</title>
<updated>2026-03-31T08:11:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-27T06:04:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=e02494114ebf7c8b42777c6cd6982f113bfdbec7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e02494114ebf7c8b42777c6cd6982f113bfdbec7</id>
<content type='text'>
When decrypting data that is not in-place (src != dst), there is
no need to save the high-order sequence bits in dst as it could
simply be re-copied from the source.

However, the data to be hashed need to be rearranged accordingly.

Reported-by: Taeyang Lee &lt;0wn@theori.io&gt;
Fixes: 104880a6b470 ("crypto: authencesn - Convert to new AEAD interface")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;

Thanks,

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: authencesn - reject too-short AAD (assoclen&lt;8) to match ESP/ESN spec</title>
<updated>2026-01-20T06:38:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Taeyang Lee</name>
<email>0wn@theori.io</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-16T07:03:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=2397e9264676be7794f8f7f1e9763d90bd3c7335'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2397e9264676be7794f8f7f1e9763d90bd3c7335</id>
<content type='text'>
authencesn assumes an ESP/ESN-formatted AAD. When assoclen is shorter than
the minimum expected length, crypto_authenc_esn_decrypt() can advance past
the end of the destination scatterlist and trigger a NULL pointer dereference
in scatterwalk_map_and_copy(), leading to a kernel panic (DoS).

Add a minimum AAD length check to fail fast on invalid inputs.

Fixes: 104880a6b470 ("crypto: authencesn - Convert to new AEAD interface")
Reported-By: Taeyang Lee &lt;0wn@theori.io&gt;
Signed-off-by: Taeyang Lee &lt;0wn@theori.io&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: authenc - use memcpy_sglist() instead of null skcipher</title>
<updated>2025-05-12T05:32:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-05T19:10:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=dbc4b1458e931e47198c3165ff5853bc1ad6bd7a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dbc4b1458e931e47198c3165ff5853bc1ad6bd7a</id>
<content type='text'>
For copying data between two scatterlists, just use memcpy_sglist()
instead of the so-called "null skcipher".  This is much simpler.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "crypto: run initcalls for generic implementations earlier"</title>
<updated>2025-05-05T10:20:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-30T08:17:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ef93f1562803cd7bb8159e3abedaf7f47dce4e35'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ef93f1562803cd7bb8159e3abedaf7f47dce4e35</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit c4741b23059794bd99beef0f700103b0d983b3fd.

Crypto API self-tests no longer run at registration time and now
occur either at late_initcall or upon the first use.

Therefore the premise of the above commit no longer exists.  Revert
it and subsequent additions of subsys_initcall and arch_initcall.

Note that lib/crypto calls will stay at subsys_initcall (or rather
downgraded from arch_initcall) because they may need to occur
before Crypto API registration.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: authencesn - stop using alignmask of ahash</title>
<updated>2023-10-27T10:04:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-22T08:10:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=03be4e45074e2a9cb5e06bf527141716262574e6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:03be4e45074e2a9cb5e06bf527141716262574e6</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that the alignmask for ahash and shash algorithms is always 0,
simplify the code in authenc accordingly.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: authencesn - Only access common skcipher fields on spawn</title>
<updated>2023-10-13T10:27:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-03T03:43:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=24a285cea82961824d9709025dea69dbc84e01a0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:24a285cea82961824d9709025dea69dbc84e01a0</id>
<content type='text'>
As skcipher spawns may be of the type lskcipher, only the common
fields may be accessed.  This was already the case but use the
correct helpers to make this more obvious.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: api - Use data directly in completion function</title>
<updated>2023-02-13T10:35:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-08T05:58:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=255e48eb17684157336bd6dd98d22c1b2d9e3f43'/>
<id>urn:sha1:255e48eb17684157336bd6dd98d22c1b2d9e3f43</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch does the final flag day conversion of all completion
functions which are now all contained in the Crypto API.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: algapi - use common mechanism for inheriting flags</title>
<updated>2020-07-16T11:49:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-10T06:20:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=7bcb2c99f8ed032cfb3f5596b4dccac6b1f501df'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7bcb2c99f8ed032cfb3f5596b4dccac6b1f501df</id>
<content type='text'>
The flag CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC is "inherited" in the sense that when a
template is instantiated, the template will have CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC set if
any of the algorithms it uses has CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC set.

We'd like to add a second flag (CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY) that gets
"inherited" in the same way.  This is difficult because the handling of
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC is hardcoded everywhere.  Address this by:

  - Add CRYPTO_ALG_INHERITED_FLAGS, which contains the set of flags that
    have these inheritance semantics.

  - Add crypto_algt_inherited_mask(), for use by template -&gt;create()
    methods.  It returns any of these flags that the user asked to be
    unset and thus must be passed in the 'mask' to crypto_grab_*().

  - Also modify crypto_check_attr_type() to handle computing the 'mask'
    so that most templates can just use this.

  - Make crypto_grab_*() propagate these flags to the template instance
    being created so that templates don't have to do this themselves.

Make crypto/simd.c propagate these flags too, since it "wraps" another
algorithm, similar to a template.

Based on a patch by Mikulas Patocka &lt;mpatocka@redhat.com&gt;
(https://lore.kernel.org/r/alpine.LRH.2.02.2006301414580.30526@file01.intranet.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com).

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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