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<title>kernel/linux.git/certs/blacklist.c, branch v6.1.174</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.1.174</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.1.174'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2022-06-21T15:05:06+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>certs: Move load_certificate_list() to be with the asymmetric keys code</title>
<updated>2022-06-21T15:05:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-18T22:48:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=60050ffe3d770dd1df5b641aa48f49d07a54bd84'/>
<id>urn:sha1:60050ffe3d770dd1df5b641aa48f49d07a54bd84</id>
<content type='text'>
Move load_certificate_list(), which loads a series of binary X.509
certificates from a blob and inserts them as keys into a keyring, to be
with the asymmetric keys code that it drives.

This makes it easier to add FIPS selftest code in which we need to load up
a private keyring for the tests to use.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce &lt;simo@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165515742145.1554877.13488098107542537203.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>certs: Explain the rationale to call panic()</title>
<updated>2022-05-23T15:47:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mickaël Salaün</name>
<email>mic@linux.microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-22T11:13:23+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:4d99750106adbaecee587232f2589f65170d5ce4</id>
<content type='text'>
The blacklist_init() function calls panic() for memory allocation
errors.  This change documents the reason why we don't return -ENODEV.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220322111323.542184-2-mic@digikod.net
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YjeW2r6Wv55Du0bJ@iki.fi
Suggested-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring</title>
<updated>2022-05-23T15:47:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mickaël Salaün</name>
<email>mic@linux.microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-07-12T17:03:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=6364d106e0417e00eb5f223d8a90287d1c421ce0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6364d106e0417e00eb5f223d8a90287d1c421ce0</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a kernel option SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE to enable the root user
to dynamically add new keys to the blacklist keyring.  This enables to
invalidate new certificates, either from being loaded in a keyring, or
from being trusted in a PKCS#7 certificate chain.  This also enables to
add new file hashes to be denied by the integrity infrastructure.

Being able to untrust a certificate which could have normaly been
trusted is a sensitive operation.  This is why adding new hashes to the
blacklist keyring is only allowed when these hashes are signed and
vouched by the builtin trusted keyring.  A blacklist hash is stored as a
key description.  The PKCS#7 signature of this description must be
provided as the key payload.

Marking a certificate as untrusted should be enforced while the system
is running.  It is then forbiden to remove such blacklist keys.

Update blacklist keyring, blacklist key and revoked certificate access
rights:
* allows the root user to search for a specific blacklisted hash, which
  make sense because the descriptions are already viewable;
* forbids key update (blacklist and asymmetric ones);
* restricts kernel rights on the blacklist keyring to align with the
  root user rights.

See help in tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh .

Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw2@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Eric Snowberg &lt;eric.snowberg@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-6-mic@digikod.net
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict</title>
<updated>2022-05-23T15:47:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mickaël Salaün</name>
<email>mic@linux.microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-07-12T17:03:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=bf21dc591bb5f17ba4b29b84d4866e0adc39f57f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bf21dc591bb5f17ba4b29b84d4866e0adc39f57f</id>
<content type='text'>
Before exposing this new key type to user space, make sure that only
meaningful blacklisted hashes are accepted.  This is also checked for
builtin blacklisted hashes, but a following commit make sure that the
user will notice (at built time) and will fix the configuration if it
already included errors.

Check that a blacklist key description starts with a valid prefix and
then a valid hexadecimal string.

Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw2@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Eric Snowberg &lt;eric.snowberg@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-4-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation</title>
<updated>2022-05-23T15:47:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mickaël Salaün</name>
<email>mic@linux.microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-07-12T17:03:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=141e523914f72575915dd334fce3cef4fb0f1e91'/>
<id>urn:sha1:141e523914f72575915dd334fce3cef4fb0f1e91</id>
<content type='text'>
Factor out the blacklist hash creation with the get_raw_hash() helper.
This also centralize the "tbs" and "bin" prefixes and make them private,
which help to manage them consistently.

Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw2@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Eric Snowberg &lt;eric.snowberg@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-5-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>certs: Add ability to preload revocation certs</title>
<updated>2021-03-11T16:33:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Snowberg</name>
<email>eric.snowberg@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-22T18:10:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=d1f044103dad70c1cec0a8f3abdf00834fec8b98'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d1f044103dad70c1cec0a8f3abdf00834fec8b98</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a new Kconfig option called SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS. If set,
this option should be the filename of a PEM-formated file containing
X.509 certificates to be included in the default blacklist keyring.

DH Changes:
 - Make the new Kconfig option depend on SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST.
 - Fix SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS=n, but CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST=y[1][2].
 - Use CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST for extract-cert[3].
 - Use CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST for revocation_certificates.o[3].

Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg &lt;eric.snowberg@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e1c15c74-82ce-3a69-44de-a33af9b320ea@infradead.org/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210303034418.106762-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210304175030.184131-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ [3]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200930201508.35113-3-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-4-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v5
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161428673564.677100.4112098280028451629.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161433312452.902181.4146169951896577982.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161529606657.163428.3340689182456495390.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>certs: Add EFI_CERT_X509_GUID support for dbx entries</title>
<updated>2021-03-11T16:31:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Snowberg</name>
<email>eric.snowberg@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-22T18:10:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=56c5812623f95313f6a46fbf0beee7fa17c68bbf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:56c5812623f95313f6a46fbf0beee7fa17c68bbf</id>
<content type='text'>
This fixes CVE-2020-26541.

The Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database, dbx, contains a list of now
revoked signatures and keys previously approved to boot with UEFI Secure
Boot enabled.  The dbx is capable of containing any number of
EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, and EFI_CERT_X509_GUID
entries.

Currently when EFI_CERT_X509_GUID are contained in the dbx, the entries are
skipped.

Add support for EFI_CERT_X509_GUID dbx entries. When a EFI_CERT_X509_GUID
is found, it is added as an asymmetrical key to the .blacklist keyring.
Anytime the .platform keyring is used, the keys in the .blacklist keyring
are referenced, if a matching key is found, the key will be rejected.

[DH: Made the following changes:
 - Added to have a config option to enable the facility.  This allows a
   Kconfig solution to make sure that pkcs7_validate_trust() is
   enabled.[1][2]
 - Moved the functions out from the middle of the blacklist functions.
 - Added kerneldoc comments.]

Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg &lt;eric.snowberg@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
cc: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
cc: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@kernel.org&gt;
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200901165143.10295-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # rfc
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200909172736.73003-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200911182230.62266-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v3
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200916004927.64276-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v4
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-2-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v5
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161428672051.677100.11064981943343605138.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161433310942.902181.4901864302675874242.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161529605075.163428.14625520893961300757.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/bc2c24e3-ed68-2521-0bf4-a1f6be4a895d@infradead.org/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210225125638.1841436-1-arnd@kernel.org/ [2]
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>certs: Replace K{U,G}IDT_INIT() with GLOBAL_ROOT_{U,G}ID</title>
<updated>2021-01-21T16:16:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mickaël Salaün</name>
<email>mic@linux.microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-20T18:04:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=a6cb0ab7daf78ce87d70212dfdb01a622d833500'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a6cb0ab7daf78ce87d70212dfdb01a622d833500</id>
<content type='text'>
Align with the new macros and add appropriate include files.

Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw2@infradead.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion</title>
<updated>2021-01-21T16:16:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-20T18:04:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=4993e1f9479a4161fd7d93e2b8b30b438f00cb0f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4993e1f9479a4161fd7d93e2b8b30b438f00cb0f</id>
<content type='text'>
KEY_FLAG_KEEP is not meant to be passed to keyring_alloc() or key_alloc(),
as these only take KEY_ALLOC_* flags.  KEY_FLAG_KEEP has the same value as
KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION, but fortunately only key_create_or_update()
uses it.  LSMs using the key_alloc hook don't check that flag.

KEY_FLAG_KEEP is then ignored but fortunately (again) the root user cannot
write to the blacklist keyring, so it is not possible to remove a key/hash
from it.

Fix this by adding a KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP flag that tells key_alloc() to set
KEY_FLAG_KEEP on the new key.  blacklist_init() can then, correctly, pass
this to keyring_alloc().

We can also use this in ima_mok_init() rather than setting the flag
manually.

Note that this doesn't fix an observable bug with the current
implementation but it is required to allow addition of new hashes to the
blacklist in the future without making it possible for them to be removed.

Fixes: 734114f8782f ("KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring")
Reported-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
cc: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw2@infradead.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>certs: Fix blacklisted hexadecimal hash string check</title>
<updated>2021-01-21T16:16:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mickaël Salaün</name>
<email>mic@linux.microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-20T18:04:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=84ffbefd657b25dbca0dbd7772226fb83b8213b8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:84ffbefd657b25dbca0dbd7772226fb83b8213b8</id>
<content type='text'>
When looking for a blacklisted hash, bin2hex() is used to transform a
binary hash to an ascii (lowercase) hexadecimal string.  This string is
then search for in the description of the keys from the blacklist
keyring.  When adding a key to the blacklist keyring,
blacklist_vet_description() checks the hash prefix and the hexadecimal
string, but not that this string is lowercase.  It is then valid to set
hashes with uppercase hexadecimal, which will be silently ignored by the
kernel.

Add an additional check to blacklist_vet_description() to check that
hexadecimal strings are in lowercase.

Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel &lt;mathstuf@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw2@infradead.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
