kernel/linux.git/arch, branch v6.6.156

KVM: s390: vsie: zero stale crypto bits

2026-09-02T12:29:20+00:00

commit 34d5b5b646c91cfb9338d7a12c955a70ffb8c66b upstream. When shadowing crypto access bits from a format0 apcb (crycb 0 or 1), the bits 64..255 are unchanged from whatever is in the vsie page in the crycb and thus in the apcb. This gives a nested guest potential access to a device no longer available. Zero out the remaining bits. Fixes: 6b79de4b056e ("KVM: s390: vsie: allow guest FORMAT-1 CRYCB on host FORMAT-2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda Message-ID: <20260811153738.206885-3-borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/CPU/AMD: Carve out a Zen5 models range

2026-09-02T12:29:20+00:00

commit 52075128273ace53e6254e37899a47d40d4baf45 upstream. Family 0x1a, model 0xd0..0xd7 belongs to the Zen5 generation. Carve it out from the larger, Zen6 range where former doesn't belong. [ bp: Rewrite commit message, add tags. ] Fixes: b5f53e6d3d32 ("x86/CPU/AMD: Add more Zen6 models") Signed-off-by: Pratik Vishwakarma [ bp: Backport only the Zen5 bits. ] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Cc: Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260729055459.15904-1-Pratik.Vishwakarma@amd.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/CPU/AMD: Add models 0x60-0x6f to the Zen5 range

2026-09-02T12:29:20+00:00

commit bf5641eccf71bcd13a849930e190563c3a19815d upstream. Add some new Zen5 models for the 0x1A family. [ bp: Merge the 0x60 and 0x70 ranges. ] Signed-off-by: Perry Yuan Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240729064626.24297-1-bp@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/CPU/AMD: Add models 0x10-0x1f to the Zen5 range

2026-09-02T12:29:20+00:00

commit 2718a7fdf292b2dcb49c856fa8a6a955ebbbc45f upstream. Add some more Zen5 models. Fixes: 3e4147f33f8b ("x86/CPU/AMD: Add X86_FEATURE_ZEN5") Signed-off-by: Wenkuan Wang Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423144111.1362-1-bp@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/CPU/AMD: Add more models to X86_FEATURE_ZEN5

2026-09-02T12:29:20+00:00

commit b9328fd636bd50da89e792e135b234ba8e6fe59f upstream. Add model ranges starting at 0x20, 0x40 and 0x70 to the synthetic feature flag X86_FEATURE_ZEN5. Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124220749.2983-1-mario.limonciello@amd.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/CPU/AMD: Add X86_FEATURE_ZEN5

2026-09-02T12:29:20+00:00

commit 3e4147f33f8b647775357bae0248b9a2aeebfcd2 upstream. Add a synthetic feature flag for Zen5. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240104201138.5072-1-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

powerpc/hv-gpci: fix preempt count leak in sysfs show paths

2026-09-02T12:29:17+00:00

[ Upstream commit dbc30a57bd8e026995e9fa8e8c31cffd18542c01 ] Four sysfs show() callbacks in hv-gpci take get_cpu_var(hv_gpci_reqb) (which calls preempt_disable()) but only call the matching put_cpu_var() on the error path under the 'out:' label. Every successful read leaks one preempt_disable(): processor_bus_topology_show() processor_config_show() affinity_domain_via_virtual_processor_show() affinity_domain_via_domain_show() (affinity_domain_via_partition_show() was already correct.) On a CONFIG_PREEMPT=y kernel, repeated reads raise preempt_count and eventually return to userspace with preemption still disabled. The next user-mode page fault then hits faulthandler_disabled() == 1, gets forced to SIGSEGV, and the resulting coredump trips 'BUG: scheduling while atomic' in call_usermodehelper_exec -> wait_for_completion_state -> schedule: BUG: scheduling while atomic: //0x00000004 ... __schedule_bug+0x6c/0x90 __schedule+0x58c/0x13a0 schedule+0x48/0x1a0 schedule_timeout+0x104/0x170 wait_for_completion_state+0x16c/0x330 call_usermodehelper_exec+0x254/0x2d0 vfs_coredump+0x1050/0x2590 get_signal+0xb9c/0xc80 do_notify_resume+0xf8/0x470 Add an out_success label that calls put_cpu_var() before returning the byte count, mirroring affinity_domain_via_partition_show(). Fixes: 71f1c39647d8 ("powerpc/hv_gpci: Add sysfs file inside hv_gpci device to show processor bus topology information") Fixes: 1a160c2a13c6 ("powerpc/hv_gpci: Add sysfs file inside hv_gpci device to show processor config information") Fixes: 71a7ccb478fc ("powerpc/hv_gpci: Add sysfs file inside hv_gpci device to show affinity domain via virtual processor information") Fixes: a69a57cac1ec ("powerpc/hv_gpci: Add sysfs file inside hv_gpci device to show affinity domain via domain information") Signed-off-by: Aboorva Devarajan Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260508041256.3447113-1-aboorvad@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

riscv: Fix register corruption from uninitialized cregs on error

2026-09-02T12:29:17+00:00

[ Upstream commit 6ebcbb53fc9bc30843054ed99fd60b8e542628f4 ] compat_riscv_gpr_set() calls cregs_to_regs() unconditionally, even when user_regset_copyin() fails. Since cregs is an uninitialized stack variable, a copyin failure causes uninitialized stack data to be written into the target task's pt_regs, corrupting its register state and potentially leaking kernel stack contents. compat_restore_sigcontext() has the same issue: it calls cregs_to_regs() even when __copy_from_user() fails, leading to the same corruption of the signal-returning task's register state on error. Only call cregs_to_regs() when the user copy succeeds. Fixes: 4608c159594f ("riscv: compat: ptrace: Add compat_arch_ptrace implement") Fixes: 7383ee05314b ("riscv: compat: signal: Add rt_frame implementation") Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling Assisted-by: Cursor:claude-4.6-opus-high-thinking Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260501062320.2339562-1-mikey@neuling.org Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

KVM: arm64: Prevent access to vCPU events before init

2026-09-02T12:29:17+00:00

[ Upstream commit 0aa1b76fe1429629215a7c79820e4b96233ac4a3 ] Another day, another syzkaller bug. KVM erroneously allows userspace to pend vCPU events for a vCPU that hasn't been initialized yet, leading to KVM interpreting a bunch of uninitialized garbage for routing / injecting the exception. In one case the injection code and the hyp disagree on whether the vCPU has a 32bit EL1 and put the vCPU into an illegal mode for AArch64, tripping the BUG() in exception_target_el() during the next injection: kernel BUG at arch/arm64/kvm/inject_fault.c:40! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 318 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.17.0-rc4-00104-g10fd0285305d #6 PREEMPT Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 21402009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : exception_target_el+0x88/0x8c lr : pend_serror_exception+0x18/0x13c sp : ffff800082f03a10 x29: ffff800082f03a10 x28: ffff0000cb132280 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff0000c2a99c20 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: 0000000000008000 x22: 0000000000000002 x21: 0000000000000004 x20: 0000000000008000 x19: ffff0000c2a99c20 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 00000000200000c0 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : ffff800082f03af8 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : ffff800080f621f0 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 000000000040009b x1 : 0000000000000003 x0 : ffff0000c2a99c20 Call trace: exception_target_el+0x88/0x8c (P) kvm_inject_serror_esr+0x40/0x3b4 __kvm_arm_vcpu_set_events+0xf0/0x100 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x180/0x9d4 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x60c/0x9f4 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0x104 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 el0_svc+0x34/0xf0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe4 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c Code: f946bc01 b4fffe61 9101e020 17fffff2 (d4210000) Reject the ioctls outright as no sane VMM would call these before KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT anyway. Even if it did the exception would've been thrown away by the eventual reset of the vCPU's state. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.17 Fixes: b7b27facc7b5 ("arm/arm64: KVM: Add KVM_GET/SET_VCPU_EVENTS") Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

KVM: x86/mmu: Check write tracking in all address spaces

2026-09-02T12:29:16+00:00

commit 0f38453cdb2e17566ccb7c0f3dabd5bd21caca26 upstream. kvm_gfn_is_write_tracked() checks only the supplied memslot, but page tracking is per-address-space and shadow pages are shared across all address spaces. With SMM, a GFN can therefore be write-tracked in one address space and appear untracked through the other. Check the supplied slot first, then the slot for the other address space. This ensures all callers honor write tracking regardless of the active address space. In particular, it prevents mmu_try_to_unsync_pages() from marking an upper-level shadow page unsync and eventually triggering the BUG in pte_list_remove(). Fixes: 699023e23965 ("KVM: x86: add SMM to the MMU role, support SMRAM address space") Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5 Signed-off-by: Jinu Kim Message-ID: <20260721103512.2136240-2-kimjw04271234@gmail.com> [invert direction of the conditional. - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini [ artem: adapt to 6.6, which has neither KVM_MAX_NR_ADDRESS_SPACES nor kvm_arch_nr_memslot_as_ids(); use KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM instead. That macro is CONFIG_KVM_SMM-conditional in 6.6, so the guard on KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM > 1 around the peer-slot lookup is retained ] Signed-off-by: Artem Dinaburg Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin