<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/arch/x86/virt, branch master</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=master</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=master'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2026-04-17T14:18:03+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm</title>
<updated>2026-04-17T14:18:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-17T14:18:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=01f492e1817e858d1712f2489d0afbaa552f417b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:01f492e1817e858d1712f2489d0afbaa552f417b</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
 "Arm:

   - Add support for tracing in the standalone EL2 hypervisor code,
     which should help both debugging and performance analysis. This
     uses the new infrastructure for 'remote' trace buffers that can be
     exposed by non-kernel entities such as firmware, and which came
     through the tracing tree

   - Add support for GICv5 Per Processor Interrupts (PPIs), as the
     starting point for supporting the new GIC architecture in KVM

   - Finally add support for pKVM protected guests, where pages are
     unmapped from the host as they are faulted into the guest and can
     be shared back from the guest using pKVM hypercalls. Protected
     guests are created using a new machine type identifier. As the
     elusive guestmem has not yet delivered on its promises, anonymous
     memory is also supported

     This is only a first step towards full isolation from the host; for
     example, the CPU register state and DMA accesses are not yet
     isolated. Because this does not really yet bring fully what it
     promises, it is hidden behind CONFIG_ARM_PKVM_GUEST +
     'kvm-arm.mode=protected', and also triggers TAINT_USER when a VM is
     created. Caveat emptor

   - Rework the dreaded user_mem_abort() function to make it more
     maintainable, reducing the amount of state being exposed to the
     various helpers and rendering a substantial amount of state
     immutable

   - Expand the Stage-2 page table dumper to support NV shadow page
     tables on a per-VM basis

   - Tidy up the pKVM PSCI proxy code to be slightly less hard to
     follow

   - Fix both SPE and TRBE in non-VHE configurations so that they do not
     generate spurious, out of context table walks that ultimately lead
     to very bad HW lockups

   - A small set of patches fixing the Stage-2 MMU freeing in error
     cases

   - Tighten-up accepted SMC immediate value to be only #0 for host
     SMCCC calls

   - The usual cleanups and other selftest churn

  LoongArch:

   - Use CSR_CRMD_PLV for kvm_arch_vcpu_in_kernel()

   - Add DMSINTC irqchip in kernel support

  RISC-V:

   - Fix steal time shared memory alignment checks

   - Fix vector context allocation leak

   - Fix array out-of-bounds in pmu_ctr_read() and pmu_fw_ctr_read_hi()

   - Fix double-free of sdata in kvm_pmu_clear_snapshot_area()

   - Fix integer overflow in kvm_pmu_validate_counter_mask()

   - Fix shift-out-of-bounds in make_xfence_request()

   - Fix lost write protection on huge pages during dirty logging

   - Split huge pages during fault handling for dirty logging

   - Skip CSR restore if VCPU is reloaded on the same core

   - Implement kvm_arch_has_default_irqchip() for KVM selftests

   - Factored-out ISA checks into separate sources

   - Added hideleg to struct kvm_vcpu_config

   - Factored-out VCPU config into separate sources

   - Support configuration of per-VM HGATP mode from KVM user space

  s390:

   - Support for ESA (31-bit) guests inside nested hypervisors

   - Remove restriction on memslot alignment, which is not needed
     anymore with the new gmap code

   - Fix LPSW/E to update the bear (which of course is the breaking
     event address register)

  x86:

   - Shut up various UBSAN warnings on reading module parameter before
     they were initialized

   - Don't zero-allocate page tables that are used for splitting
     hugepages in the TDP MMU, as KVM is guaranteed to set all SPTEs in
     the page table and thus write all bytes

   - As an optimization, bail early when trying to unsync 4KiB mappings
     if the target gfn can just be mapped with a 2MiB hugepage

  x86 generic:

   - Copy single-chunk MMIO write values into struct kvm_vcpu (more
     precisely struct kvm_mmio_fragment) to fix use-after-free stack
     bugs where KVM would dereference stack pointer after an exit to
     userspace

   - Clean up and comment the emulated MMIO code to try to make it
     easier to maintain (not necessarily "easy", but "easier")

   - Move VMXON+VMXOFF and EFER.SVME toggling out of KVM (not *all* of
     VMX and SVM enabling) as it is needed for trusted I/O

   - Advertise support for AVX512 Bit Matrix Multiply (BMM) instructions

   - Immediately fail the build if a required #define is missing in one
     of KVM's headers that is included multiple times

   - Reject SET_GUEST_DEBUG with -EBUSY if there's an already injected
     exception, mostly to prevent syzkaller from abusing the uAPI to
     trigger WARNs, but also because it can help prevent userspace from
     unintentionally crashing the VM

   - Exempt SMM from CPUID faulting on Intel, as per the spec

   - Misc hardening and cleanup changes

  x86 (AMD):

   - Fix and optimize IRQ window inhibit handling for AVIC; make it
     per-vCPU so that KVM doesn't prematurely re-enable AVIC if multiple
     vCPUs have to-be-injected IRQs

   - Clean up and optimize the OSVW handling, avoiding a bug in which
     KVM would overwrite state when enabling virtualization on multiple
     CPUs in parallel. This should not be a problem because OSVW should
     usually be the same for all CPUs

   - Drop a WARN in KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION where KVM complains
     about a "too large" size based purely on user input

   - Clean up and harden the pinning code for KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION

   - Disallow synchronizing a VMSA of an already-launched/encrypted
     vCPU, as doing so for an SNP guest will crash the host due to an
     RMP violation page fault

   - Overhaul KVM's APIs for detecting SEV+ guests so that VM-scoped
     queries are required to hold kvm-&gt;lock, and enforce it by lockdep.
     Fix various bugs where sev_guest() was not ensured to be stable for
     the whole duration of a function or ioctl

   - Convert a pile of kvm-&gt;lock SEV code to guard()

   - Play nicer with userspace that does not enable
     KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_PAYLOAD, for which KVM needs to set CR2 and DR6
     as a response to ioctls such as KVM_GET_VCPU_EVENTS (even if the
     payload would end up in EXITINFO2 rather than CR2, for example).
     Only set CR2 and DR6 when consumption of the payload is imminent,
     but on the other hand force delivery of the payload in all paths
     where userspace retrieves CR2 or DR6

   - Use vcpu-&gt;arch.cr2 when updating vmcb12's CR2 on nested #VMEXIT
     instead of vmcb02-&gt;save.cr2. The value is out of sync after a
     save/restore or after a #PF is injected into L2

   - Fix a class of nSVM bugs where some fields written by the CPU are
     not synchronized from vmcb02 to cached vmcb12 after VMRUN, and so
     are not up-to-date when saved by KVM_GET_NESTED_STATE

   - Fix a class of bugs where the ordering between KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE
     and KVM_SET_{S}REGS could cause vmcb02 to be incorrectly
     initialized after save+restore

   - Add a variety of missing nSVM consistency checks

   - Fix several bugs where KVM failed to correctly update VMCB fields
     on nested #VMEXIT

   - Fix several bugs where KVM failed to correctly synthesize #UD or
     #GP for SVM-related instructions

   - Add support for save+restore of virtualized LBRs (on SVM)

   - Refactor various helpers and macros to improve clarity and
     (hopefully) make the code easier to maintain

   - Aggressively sanitize fields when copying from vmcb12, to guard
     against unintentionally allowing L1 to utilize yet-to-be-defined
     features

   - Fix several bugs where KVM botched rAX legality checks when
     emulating SVM instructions. There are remaining issues in that KVM
     doesn't handle size prefix overrides for 64-bit guests

   - Fail emulation of VMRUN/VMLOAD/VMSAVE if mapping vmcb12 fails
     instead of somewhat arbitrarily synthesizing #GP (i.e. don't double
     down on AMD's architectural but sketchy behavior of generating #GP
     for "unsupported" addresses)

   - Cache all used vmcb12 fields to further harden against TOCTOU bugs

  x86 (Intel):

   - Drop obsolete branch hint prefixes from the VMX instruction macros

   - Use ASM_INPUT_RM() in __vmcs_writel() to coerce clang into using a
     register input when appropriate

   - Code cleanups

  guest_memfd:

   - Don't mark guest_memfd folios as accessed, as guest_memfd doesn't
     support reclaim, the memory is unevictable, and there is no storage
     to write back to

  LoongArch selftests:

   - Add KVM PMU test cases

  s390 selftests:

   - Enable more memory selftests

  x86 selftests:

   - Add support for Hygon CPUs in KVM selftests

   - Fix a bug in the MSR test where it would get false failures on
     AMD/Hygon CPUs with exactly one of RDPID or RDTSCP

   - Add an MADV_COLLAPSE testcase for guest_memfd as a regression test
     for a bug where the kernel would attempt to collapse guest_memfd
     folios against KVM's will"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (373 commits)
  KVM: x86: use inlines instead of macros for is_sev_*guest
  x86/virt: Treat SVM as unsupported when running as an SEV+ guest
  KVM: SEV: Goto an existing error label if charging misc_cg for an ASID fails
  KVM: SVM: Move lock-protected allocation of SEV ASID into a separate helper
  KVM: SEV: use mutex guard in snp_handle_guest_req()
  KVM: SEV: use mutex guard in sev_mem_enc_unregister_region()
  KVM: SEV: use mutex guard in sev_mem_enc_ioctl()
  KVM: SEV: use mutex guard in snp_launch_update()
  KVM: SEV: Assert that kvm-&gt;lock is held when querying SEV+ support
  KVM: SEV: Document that checking for SEV+ guests when reclaiming memory is "safe"
  KVM: SEV: Hide "struct kvm_sev_info" behind CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y
  KVM: SEV: WARN on unhandled VM type when initializing VM
  KVM: LoongArch: selftests: Add PMU overflow interrupt test
  KVM: LoongArch: selftests: Add basic PMU event counting test
  KVM: LoongArch: selftests: Add cpucfg read/write helpers
  LoongArch: KVM: Add DMSINTC inject msi to vCPU
  LoongArch: KVM: Add DMSINTC device support
  LoongArch: KVM: Make vcpu_is_preempted() as a macro rather than function
  LoongArch: KVM: Move host CSR_GSTAT save and restore in context switch
  LoongArch: KVM: Move host CSR_EENTRY save and restore in context switch
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86_sev_for_v7.1_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2026-04-14T22:20:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-14T22:20:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=60b8d4d492815eed6d52646998167bc60dd94e5a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:60b8d4d492815eed6d52646998167bc60dd94e5a</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 SEV updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Change the SEV host code handling of when SNP gets enabled in order
   to allow the machine to claim SNP-related resources only when SNP
   guests are really going to be launched. The user requests this by
   loading the ccp module and thus it controls when SNP initialization
   is done

   So export an API which module code can call and do the necessary SNP
   setup only when really needed

 - Drop an unnecessary write-back and invalidate operation that was
   being performed too early, since the ccp driver already issues its
   own at the correct point in the initialization sequence

 - Drop the hotplug callbacks for enabling SNP on newly onlined CPUs,
   which were both architecturally unsound (the firmware rejects
   initialization if any CPU lacks the required configuration) and buggy
   (the MFDM SYSCFG MSR bit was not being set)

 - Code refactoring and cleanups to accomplish the above

* tag 'x86_sev_for_v7.1_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  crypto/ccp: Update HV_FIXED page states to allow freeing of memory
  crypto/ccp: Implement SNP x86 shutdown
  x86/sev, crypto/ccp: Move HSAVE_PA setup to arch/x86/
  x86/sev, crypto/ccp: Move SNP init to ccp driver
  x86/sev: Create snp_shutdown()
  x86/sev: Create snp_prepare()
  x86/sev: Create a function to clear/zero the RMP
  x86/sev: Rename SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT to SNP_FEATURES_IMPL
  x86/virt/sev: Keep the RMP table bookkeeping area mapped
  x86/virt/sev: Drop WBINVD before setting MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN
  x86/virt/sev: Drop support for SNP hotplug
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/virt: Treat SVM as unsupported when running as an SEV+ guest</title>
<updated>2026-04-09T19:21:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sean Christopherson</name>
<email>seanjc@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-09T19:13:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=e30aa03d032df0f3ee5efb1995a7a2fe662177be'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e30aa03d032df0f3ee5efb1995a7a2fe662177be</id>
<content type='text'>
When running as an SEV+ guest, treat SVM as unsupported even if CPUID (and
other reporting, e.g. MSRs) enumerate support for SVM, as KVM  doesn't
support nested virtualization within an SEV VM (KVM would need to
explicitly share all VMCBs and other assets with the untrusted host), let
alone running nested VMs within SEV-ES+ guests (e.g. emulating VMLOAD,
VMSAVE, and VMRUN all require access to guest register state).  And outside
of KVM, there is no in-tree user of SVM enabling.

Arguably, the hypervisor/VMM (e.g. QEMU) should clear SVM from guest CPUID
for SEV VMs, especially for SEV-ES+, but super duper technically, it's
feasible to run nested VMs in SEV+ guests (with many caveats).  More
importantly, Linux-as-a-guest has played nice with SVM being advertised to
SEV+ guests for a long time.

Treating SVM as unsupported fixes a regression where a clean shutdown of
an SEV-ES+ guest degrades into an abrupt termination.  Due to a gnarly
virtualization hole in SEV-ES (the architecture), where EFER must NOT be
intercepted by the hypervisor (because the untrusted hypervisor can't set
e.g. EFER.LME on behalf o the guest), the _host's_ EFER.SVME is visible to
the guest.  Because EFER.SVME must be always '1' while in guest mode,
Linux-the-guest sees EFER.SVME=1 even when _its_ EFER.SVME is '0', thinks
it has enabled virtualization, and ultimately can cause
x86_svm_emergency_disable_virtualization_cpu() to execute STGI to ensure
GIF is enabled.  Executing STGI _should_ be fine, except Linux is a also
wee bit paranoid when running as an SEV-ES guest.

Because L0 sees EFER.SVME=0 for the guest, a well-behaved L0 hypervisor
will intercept STGI (to inject #UD), and thus generate a #VC on the STGI.
Which, again, should be fine.  Unfortunately, vc_check_opcode_bytes() fails
to account for STGI and other SVM instructions, throws a fatal error, and
triggers a termination request.  In a perfect world, the #VC handler would
be more forgiving of unknown intercepts, especially when the #VC happened
on an instruction with exception fixup.  For now, just fix the immediate
regression.

Fixes: 428afac5a8ea ("KVM: x86: Move bulk of emergency virtualizaton logic to virt subsystem")
Reported-by: Srikanth Aithal &lt;sraithal@amd.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/c820e242-9f3a-4210-b414-19d11b022404@amd.com
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260409191341.1932853-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/sev, crypto/ccp: Move HSAVE_PA setup to arch/x86/</title>
<updated>2026-03-29T17:59:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tycho Andersen (AMD)</name>
<email>tycho@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-24T16:12:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=7b2bc5f0ab983a7aad7fa5180cede4b3e91fc164'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7b2bc5f0ab983a7aad7fa5180cede4b3e91fc164</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that there is snp_prepare() that indicates when the CCP driver wants to
prepare the architecture for SNP_INIT(_EX), move this architecture-specific
bit of code to a more sensible place.

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) &lt;tycho@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260324161301.1353976-6-tycho@kernel.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/sev, crypto/ccp: Move SNP init to ccp driver</title>
<updated>2026-03-29T10:32:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tycho Andersen (AMD)</name>
<email>tycho@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-24T16:12:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=299933b118d1bcf8b93d58076aed34582718b0dd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:299933b118d1bcf8b93d58076aed34582718b0dd</id>
<content type='text'>
Use the new snp_prepare() to initialize SNP from the ccp driver instead of at
boot time. This means that SNP is not enabled unless it is really going to be
used (i.e. kvm_amd loads the ccp driver automatically).

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) &lt;tycho@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260324161301.1353976-5-tycho@kernel.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/sev: Create snp_shutdown()</title>
<updated>2026-03-29T10:15:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tycho Andersen (AMD)</name>
<email>tycho@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-24T16:12:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b65546b14d273dde2a56c0313da36a6aeb5c3f32'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b65546b14d273dde2a56c0313da36a6aeb5c3f32</id>
<content type='text'>
After SNP_SHUTDOWN, two things should be done:

1. clear the RMP table
2. disable MFDM to prevent the FW_WARN in k8_check_syscfg_dram_mod_en() in
   the event of a kexec

Create and export to the CCP driver a function that does them.

Also change the MFDM helper to allow for disabling the bit, since the SNP x86
shutdown path needs to disable MFDM.

The comment for k8_check_syscfg_dram_mod_en() notes, the "BIOS" is supposed
clear it, or the kernel in the case of module unload and shutdown followed by
kexec.

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) &lt;tycho@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260324161301.1353976-4-tycho@kernel.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/sev: Create snp_prepare()</title>
<updated>2026-03-28T21:16:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tycho Andersen (AMD)</name>
<email>tycho@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-26T16:11:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ca2ca373ec854d203c74e6ac1c4e08a70e8d2509'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ca2ca373ec854d203c74e6ac1c4e08a70e8d2509</id>
<content type='text'>
In preparation for delayed SNP initialization, create a function snp_prepare()
that does the necessary architecture setup.  Export this function for the ccp
module to allow it to do the setup as necessary.

Introduce a cpu_read_lock/unlock() wrapper around the MFDM and SNP enable.
While CPU hotplug is not supported, this makes sure that the bit setting
happens on the same set of CPUs in both cases.

This improvement was suggested by Sashiko:

  https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260324161301.1353976-1-tycho%40kernel.org

Also move {mfd,snp}_enable() out of the __init section, since these will be
called later.

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) &lt;tycho@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260326161110.1764303-3-tycho@kernel.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/sev: Create a function to clear/zero the RMP</title>
<updated>2026-03-28T21:10:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Lendacky</name>
<email>thomas.lendacky@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-24T16:12:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=9c016c3f4928f436b9ad20f30a5a9d538490fbb4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9c016c3f4928f436b9ad20f30a5a9d538490fbb4</id>
<content type='text'>
In preparation for delayed SNP initialization and disablement on shutdown,
create a function, clear_rmp(), that clears the RMP bookkeeping area and the
RMP entries.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) &lt;tycho@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260324161301.1353976-2-tycho@kernel.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/virt/sev: Keep the RMP table bookkeeping area mapped</title>
<updated>2026-03-09T20:49:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Lendacky</name>
<email>thomas.lendacky@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-09T18:00:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=cca149429956745293ea94865ff8be6f77cc003d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cca149429956745293ea94865ff8be6f77cc003d</id>
<content type='text'>
In preparation for delayed SNP initialization and disablement on shutdown, the
RMP will need to be cleared each time SNP is disabled. Maintain the mapping to
the RMP bookkeeping area to avoid mapping and unmapping it each time and any
possible errors that may arise from that.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) &lt;tycho@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260309180053.2389118-4-tycho@kernel.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/virt/sev: Drop WBINVD before setting MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN</title>
<updated>2026-03-09T20:48:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tycho Andersen (AMD)</name>
<email>tycho@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-09T18:00:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=99cf1fb58e68291d408b4c4484181cf88f081857'/>
<id>urn:sha1:99cf1fb58e68291d408b4c4484181cf88f081857</id>
<content type='text'>
WBINVD is required before SNP_INIT(_EX), but not before setting
MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN, since the ccp driver already does its own WBINVD
before SNP_INIT (and this one would be too early for that anyway...).

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) &lt;tycho@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260309180053.2389118-3-tycho@kernel.org
</content>
</entry>
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