<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/arch/x86/include, branch v7.0-rc7</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v7.0-rc7</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v7.0-rc7'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2026-03-15T19:22:10+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm</title>
<updated>2026-03-15T19:22:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-15T19:22:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=11e8c7e9471cf8e6ae6ec7324a3174191cd965e3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:11e8c7e9471cf8e6ae6ec7324a3174191cd965e3</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
 "Quite a large pull request, partly due to skipping last week and
  therefore having material from ~all submaintainers in this one. About
  a fourth of it is a new selftest, and a couple more changes are large
  in number of files touched (fixing a -Wflex-array-member-not-at-end
  compiler warning) or lines changed (reformatting of a table in the API
  documentation, thanks rST).

  But who am I kidding---it's a lot of commits and there are a lot of
  bugs being fixed here, some of them on the nastier side like the
  RISC-V ones.

  ARM:

   - Correctly handle deactivation of interrupts that were activated
     from LRs. Since EOIcount only denotes deactivation of interrupts
     that are not present in an LR, start EOIcount deactivation walk
     *after* the last irq that made it into an LR

   - Avoid calling into the stubs to probe for ICH_VTR_EL2.TDS when pKVM
     is already enabled -- not only thhis isn't possible (pKVM will
     reject the call), but it is also useless: this can only happen for
     a CPU that has already booted once, and the capability will not
     change

   - Fix a couple of low-severity bugs in our S2 fault handling path,
     affecting the recently introduced LS64 handling and the even more
     esoteric handling of hwpoison in a nested context

   - Address yet another syzkaller finding in the vgic initialisation,
     where we would end-up destroying an uninitialised vgic with nasty
     consequences

   - Address an annoying case of pKVM failing to boot when some of the
     memblock regions that the host is faulting in are not page-aligned

   - Inject some sanity in the NV stage-2 walker by checking the limits
     against the advertised PA size, and correctly report the resulting
     faults

  PPC:

   - Fix a PPC e500 build error due to a long-standing wart that was
     exposed by the recent conversion to kmalloc_obj(); rip out all the
     ugliness that led to the wart

  RISC-V:

   - Prevent speculative out-of-bounds access using array_index_nospec()
     in APLIC interrupt handling, ONE_REG regiser access, AIA CSR
     access, float register access, and PMU counter access

   - Fix potential use-after-free issues in kvm_riscv_gstage_get_leaf(),
     kvm_riscv_aia_aplic_has_attr(), and kvm_riscv_aia_imsic_has_attr()

   - Fix potential null pointer dereference in
     kvm_riscv_vcpu_aia_rmw_topei()

   - Fix off-by-one array access in SBI PMU

   - Skip THP support check during dirty logging

   - Fix error code returned for Smstateen and Ssaia ONE_REG interface

   - Check host Ssaia extension when creating AIA irqchip

  x86:

   - Fix cases where CPUID mitigation features were incorrectly marked
     as available whenever the kernel used scattered feature words for
     them

   - Validate _all_ GVAs, rather than just the first GVA, when
     processing a range of GVAs for Hyper-V's TLB flush hypercalls

   - Fix a brown paper bug in add_atomic_switch_msr()

   - Use hlist_for_each_entry_srcu() when traversing mask_notifier_list,
     to fix a lockdep warning; KVM doesn't hold RCU, just irq_srcu

   - Ensure AVIC VMCB fields are initialized if the VM has an in-kernel
     local APIC (and AVIC is enabled at the module level)

   - Update CR8 write interception when AVIC is (de)activated, to fix a
     bug where the guest can run in perpetuity with the CR8 intercept
     enabled

   - Add a quirk to skip the consistency check on FREEZE_IN_SMM, i.e. to
     allow L1 hypervisors to set FREEZE_IN_SMM. This reverts (by
     default) an unintentional tightening of userspace ABI in 6.17, and
     provides some amount of backwards compatibility with hypervisors
     who want to freeze PMCs on VM-Entry

   - Validate the VMCS/VMCB on return to a nested guest from SMM,
     because either userspace or the guest could stash invalid values in
     memory and trigger the processor's consistency checks

  Generic:

   - Remove a subtle pseudo-overlay of kvm_stats_desc, which, aside from
     being unnecessary and confusing, triggered compiler warnings due to
     -Wflex-array-member-not-at-end

   - Document that vcpu-&gt;mutex is take outside of kvm-&gt;slots_lock and
     kvm-&gt;slots_arch_lock, which is intentional and desirable despite
     being rather unintuitive

  Selftests:

   - Increase the maximum number of NUMA nodes in the guest_memfd
     selftest to 64 (from 8)"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (43 commits)
  KVM: selftests: Verify SEV+ guests can read and write EFER, CR0, CR4, and CR8
  Documentation: kvm: fix formatting of the quirks table
  KVM: x86: clarify leave_smm() return value
  selftests: kvm: add a test that VMX validates controls on RSM
  selftests: kvm: extract common functionality out of smm_test.c
  KVM: SVM: check validity of VMCB controls when returning from SMM
  KVM: VMX: check validity of VMCS controls when returning from SMM
  KVM: SVM: Set/clear CR8 write interception when AVIC is (de)activated
  KVM: SVM: Initialize AVIC VMCB fields if AVIC is enabled with in-kernel APIC
  KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_X86_QUIRK_VMCS12_ALLOW_FREEZE_IN_SMM
  KVM: x86: Fix SRCU list traversal in kvm_fire_mask_notifiers()
  KVM: VMX: Fix a wrong MSR update in add_atomic_switch_msr()
  KVM: x86: hyper-v: Validate all GVAs during PV TLB flush
  KVM: x86: synthesize CPUID bits only if CPU capability is set
  KVM: PPC: e500: Rip out "struct tlbe_ref"
  KVM: PPC: e500: Fix build error due to using kmalloc_obj() with wrong type
  KVM: selftests: Increase 'maxnode' for guest_memfd tests
  KVM: arm64: pkvm: Don't reprobe for ICH_VTR_EL2.TDS on CPU hotplug
  KVM: arm64: vgic: Pick EOIcount deactivations from AP-list tail
  KVM: arm64: Remove the redundant ISB in __kvm_at_s1e2()
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_X86_QUIRK_VMCS12_ALLOW_FREEZE_IN_SMM</title>
<updated>2026-03-11T17:41:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jim Mattson</name>
<email>jmattson@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-05T23:15:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=e2ffe85b6d2bb7780174b87aa4468a39be17eb81'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e2ffe85b6d2bb7780174b87aa4468a39be17eb81</id>
<content type='text'>
Add KVM_X86_QUIRK_VMCS12_ALLOW_FREEZE_IN_SMM to allow L1 to set
FREEZE_IN_SMM in vmcs12's GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL field, as permitted
prior to commit 6b1dd26544d0 ("KVM: VMX: Preserve host's
DEBUGCTLMSR_FREEZE_IN_SMM while running the guest").  Enable the quirk
by default for backwards compatibility (like all quirks); userspace
can disable it via KVM_CAP_DISABLE_QUIRKS2 for consistency with the
constraints on WRMSR(IA32_DEBUGCTL).

Note that the quirk only bypasses the consistency check.  The vmcs02 bit is
still owned by the host, and PMCs are not frozen during virtualized SMM.
In particular, if a host administrator decides that PMCs should not be
frozen during physical SMM, then L1 has no say in the matter.

Fixes: 095686e6fcb4 ("KVM: nVMX: Check vmcs12-&gt;guest_ia32_debugctl on nested VM-Enter")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson &lt;jmattson@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260205231537.1278753-1-jmattson@google.com
[sean: tag for stable@, clean-up and fix goofs in the comment and docs]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
[Rename quirk. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'efi-fixes-for-v7.0-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi</title>
<updated>2026-03-08T19:13:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-08T19:13:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=fc9f248d8c591454e257edd54ac4085d84f11e6a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fc9f248d8c591454e257edd54ac4085d84f11e6a</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull EFI fix from Ard Biesheuvel:
 "Fix for the x86 EFI workaround keeping boot services code and data
  regions reserved until after SetVirtualAddressMap() completes:
  deferred struct page initialization may result in some of this memory
  being lost permanently"

* tag 'efi-fixes-for-v7.0-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi:
  x86/efi: defer freeing of boot services memory
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86-urgent-2026-03-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2026-03-08T01:12:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-08T01:12:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=c23719abc3308df7ed3ad35650ad211fb2d2003d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c23719abc3308df7ed3ad35650ad211fb2d2003d</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:

 - Fix SEV guest boot failures in certain circumstances, due to
   very early code relying on a BSS-zeroed variable that isn't
   actually zeroed yet an may contain non-zero bootup values

   Move the variable into the .data section go gain even earlier
   zeroing

 - Expose &amp; allow the IBPB-on-Entry feature on SNP guests, which
   was not properly exposed to guests due to initial implementational
   caution

 - Fix O= build failure when CONFIG_EFI_SBAT_FILE is using relative
   file paths

 - Fix the various SNC (Sub-NUMA Clustering) topology enumeration
   bugs/artifacts (sched-domain build errors mostly).

   SNC enumeration data got more complicated with Granite Rapids X
   (GNR) and Clearwater Forest X (CWF), which exposed these bugs
   and made their effects more serious

 - Also use the now sane(r) SNC code to fix resctrl SNC detection bugs

 - Work around a historic libgcc unwinder bug in the vdso32 sigreturn
   code (again), which regressed during an overly aggressive recent
   cleanup of DWARF annotations

* tag 'x86-urgent-2026-03-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/entry/vdso32: Work around libgcc unwinder bug
  x86/resctrl: Fix SNC detection
  x86/topo: Fix SNC topology mess
  x86/topo: Replace x86_has_numa_in_package
  x86/topo: Add topology_num_nodes_per_package()
  x86/numa: Store extra copy of numa_nodes_parsed
  x86/boot: Handle relative CONFIG_EFI_SBAT_FILE file paths
  x86/sev: Allow IBPB-on-Entry feature for SNP guests
  x86/boot/sev: Move SEV decompressor variables into the .data section
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-linus-7.0-rc3-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip</title>
<updated>2026-03-07T15:44:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-07T15:44:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=0f912c8917e810a4aa81d122a8e7d0a918505ab9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0f912c8917e810a4aa81d122a8e7d0a918505ab9</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull xen fixes from Juergen Gross:

 - a cleanup of arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S removing the pre-built page
   tables for Xen guests

 - a small comment update

 - another cleanup for Xen PVH guests mode

 - fix an issue with Xen PV-devices backed by driver domains

* tag 'for-linus-7.0-rc3-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
  xen/xenbus: better handle backend crash
  xenbus: add xenbus_device parameter to xenbus_read_driver_state()
  x86/PVH: Use boot params to pass RSDP address in start_info page
  x86/xen: update outdated comment
  xen/acpi-processor: fix _CST detection using undersized evaluation buffer
  x86/xen: Build identity mapping page tables dynamically for XENPV
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/topo: Add topology_num_nodes_per_package()</title>
<updated>2026-03-04T15:35:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-03T10:55:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ae6730ff42b3a13d94b405edeb5e40108b6d21b6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ae6730ff42b3a13d94b405edeb5e40108b6d21b6</id>
<content type='text'>
Use the MADT and SRAT table data to compute __num_nodes_per_package.

Specifically, SRAT has already been parsed in x86_numa_init(), which is called
before acpi_boot_init() which parses MADT. So both are available in
topology_init_possible_cpus().

This number is useful to divinate the various Intel CoD/SNC and AMD NPS modes,
since the platforms are failing to provide this otherwise.

Doing it this way is independent of the number of online CPUs and
other such shenanigans.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: K Prateek Nayak &lt;kprateek.nayak@amd.com&gt;
Tested-by: Zhang Rui &lt;rui.zhang@intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Chen Yu &lt;yu.c.chen@intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Kyle Meyer &lt;kyle.meyer@hpe.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260303110100.004091624@infradead.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/numa: Store extra copy of numa_nodes_parsed</title>
<updated>2026-03-04T15:35:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-03T10:55:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=48084cc153a5b0fbf0aa98d47670d3be0b9f64d5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:48084cc153a5b0fbf0aa98d47670d3be0b9f64d5</id>
<content type='text'>
The topology setup code needs to know the total number of physical
nodes enumerated in SRAT; however NUMA_EMU can cause the existing
numa_nodes_parsed bitmap to be fictitious. Therefore, keep a copy of
the bitmap specifically to retain the physical node count.

Suggested-by: K Prateek Nayak &lt;kprateek.nayak@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: K Prateek Nayak &lt;kprateek.nayak@amd.com&gt;
Tested-by: Zhang Rui &lt;rui.zhang@intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Chen Yu &lt;yu.c.chen@intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Kyle Meyer &lt;kyle.meyer@hpe.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260303110059.889884023@infradead.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/xen: Build identity mapping page tables dynamically for XENPV</title>
<updated>2026-03-03T13:21:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hou Wenlong</name>
<email>houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-22T10:06:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=63dc2c34a91642d9ae615a9609841fa317a36c92'/>
<id>urn:sha1:63dc2c34a91642d9ae615a9609841fa317a36c92</id>
<content type='text'>
After commit 47ffe0578aee ("x86/pvh: Add 64bit relocation page tables"),
the PVH entry uses a new set of page tables instead of the
preconstructed page tables in head64.S. Since those preconstructed page
tables are only used in XENPV now and XENPV does not actually need the
preconstructed identity page tables directly, they can be filled in
xen_setup_kernel_pagetable(). Therefore, build the identity mapping page
table dynamically to remove the preconstructed page tables and make the
code cleaner.

Signed-off-by: Hou Wenlong &lt;houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Message-ID: &lt;453981eae7e8158307f971d1632d5023adbe03c3.1769074722.git.houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/sev: Allow IBPB-on-Entry feature for SNP guests</title>
<updated>2026-03-02T10:08:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kim Phillips</name>
<email>kim.phillips@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-03T22:24:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=9073428bb204d921ae15326bb7d4558d9d269aab'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9073428bb204d921ae15326bb7d4558d9d269aab</id>
<content type='text'>
The SEV-SNP IBPB-on-Entry feature does not require a guest-side
implementation. It was added in Zen5 h/w, after the first SNP Zen
implementation, and thus was not accounted for when the initial set of SNP
features were added to the kernel.

In its abundant precaution, commit

  8c29f0165405 ("x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP guest feature negotiation support")

included SEV_STATUS' IBPB-on-Entry bit as a reserved bit, thereby masking
guests from using the feature.

Allow guests to make use of IBPB-on-Entry when supported by the hypervisor, as
the bit is now architecturally defined and safe to expose.

Fixes: 8c29f0165405 ("x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP guest feature negotiation support")
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips &lt;kim.phillips@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nikunj A Dadhania &lt;nikunj@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260203222405.4065706-2-kim.phillips@amd.com
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/efi: defer freeing of boot services memory</title>
<updated>2026-02-25T11:02:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mike Rapoport (Microsoft)</name>
<email>rppt@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-25T06:55:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=a4b0bf6a40f3c107c67a24fbc614510ef5719980'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a4b0bf6a40f3c107c67a24fbc614510ef5719980</id>
<content type='text'>
efi_free_boot_services() frees memory occupied by EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE
and EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA using memblock_free_late().

There are two issue with that: memblock_free_late() should be used for
memory allocated with memblock_alloc() while the memory reserved with
memblock_reserve() should be freed with free_reserved_area().

More acutely, with CONFIG_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT=y
efi_free_boot_services() is called before deferred initialization of the
memory map is complete.

Benjamin Herrenschmidt reports that this causes a leak of ~140MB of
RAM on EC2 t3a.nano instances which only have 512MB or RAM.

If the freed memory resides in the areas that memory map for them is
still uninitialized, they won't be actually freed because
memblock_free_late() calls memblock_free_pages() and the latter skips
uninitialized pages.

Using free_reserved_area() at this point is also problematic because
__free_page() accesses the buddy of the freed page and that again might
end up in uninitialized part of the memory map.

Delaying the entire efi_free_boot_services() could be problematic
because in addition to freeing boot services memory it updates
efi.memmap without any synchronization and that's undesirable late in
boot when there is concurrency.

More robust approach is to only defer freeing of the EFI boot services
memory.

Split efi_free_boot_services() in two. First efi_unmap_boot_services()
collects ranges that should be freed into an array then
efi_free_boot_services() later frees them after deferred init is complete.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ec2aaef14783869b3be6e3c253b2dcbf67dbc12a.camel@kernel.crashing.org
Fixes: 916f676f8dc0 ("x86, efi: Retain boot service code until after switching to virtual mode")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) &lt;rppt@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
