kernel/linux.git/arch/x86/include, branch v6.2.2

x86/alternatives: Introduce int3_emulate_jcc()

2023-02-25T10:13:28+00:00

commit db7adcfd1cec4e95155e37bc066fddab302c6340 upstream. Move the kprobe Jcc emulation into int3_emulate_jcc() so it can be used by more code -- specifically static_call() will need this. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230123210607.057678245@infradead.org Cc: Nathan Chancellor Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm

2023-02-14T17:17:01+00:00

Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini: "Certain AMD processors are vulnerable to a cross-thread return address predictions bug. When running in SMT mode and one of the sibling threads transitions out of C0 state, the other thread gets access to twice as many entries in the RSB, but unfortunately the predictions of the now-halted logical processor are not purged. Therefore, the executing processor could speculatively execute from locations that the now-halted processor had trained the RSB on. The Spectre v2 mitigations cover the Linux kernel, as it fills the RSB when context switching to the idle thread. However, KVM allows a VMM to prevent exiting guest mode when transitioning out of C0 using the KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS capability can be used by a VMM to change this behavior. To mitigate the cross-thread return address predictions bug, a VMM must not be allowed to override the default behavior to intercept C0 transitions. These patches introduce a KVM module parameter that, if set, will prevent the user from disabling the HLT, MWAIT and CSTATE exits" * tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: Documentation/hw-vuln: Add documentation for Cross-Thread Return Predictions KVM: x86: Mitigate the cross-thread return address predictions bug x86/speculation: Identify processors vulnerable to SMT RSB predictions

x86/speculation: Identify processors vulnerable to SMT RSB predictions

2023-02-10T11:43:03+00:00

Certain AMD processors are vulnerable to a cross-thread return address predictions bug. When running in SMT mode and one of the sibling threads transitions out of C0 state, the other sibling thread could use return target predictions from the sibling thread that transitioned out of C0. The Spectre v2 mitigations cover the Linux kernel, as it fills the RSB when context switching to the idle thread. However, KVM allows a VMM to prevent exiting guest mode when transitioning out of C0. A guest could act maliciously in this situation, so create a new x86 BUG that can be used to detect if the processor is vulnerable. Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky Message-Id: <91cec885656ca1fcd4f0185ce403a53dd9edecb7.1675956146.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini

x86/cpu: Add Lunar Lake M

2023-02-08T20:04:35+00:00

Intel confirmed the existence of this CPU in Q4'2022 earnings presentation. Add the CPU model number. [ dhansen: Merging these as soon as possible makes it easier on all the folks developing model-specific features. ] Signed-off-by: Kan Liang Signed-off-by: Tony Luck Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230208172340.158548-1-tony.luck%40intel.com

x86/debug: Fix stack recursion caused by wrongly ordered DR7 accesses

2023-01-31T11:51:19+00:00

In kernels compiled with CONFIG_PARAVIRT=n, the compiler re-orders the DR7 read in exc_nmi() to happen before the call to sev_es_ist_enter(). This is problematic when running as an SEV-ES guest because in this environment the DR7 read might cause a #VC exception, and taking #VC exceptions is not safe in exc_nmi() before sev_es_ist_enter() has run. The result is stack recursion if the NMI was caused on the #VC IST stack, because a subsequent #VC exception in the NMI handler will overwrite the stack frame of the interrupted #VC handler. As there are no compiler barriers affecting the ordering of DR7 reads/writes, make the accesses to this register volatile, forbidding the compiler to re-order them. [ bp: Massage text, make them volatile too, to make sure some aggressive compiler optimization pass doesn't discard them. ] Fixes: 315562c9af3d ("x86/sev-es: Adjust #VC IST Stack on entering NMI handler") Reported-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230127035616.508966-1-aik@amd.com

acpi: Fix suspend with Xen PV

2023-01-19T21:52:05+00:00

Commit f1e525009493 ("x86/boot: Skip realmode init code when running as Xen PV guest") missed one code path accessing real_mode_header, leading to dereferencing NULL when suspending the system under Xen: [ 348.284004] PM: suspend entry (deep) [ 348.289532] Filesystems sync: 0.005 seconds [ 348.291545] Freezing user space processes ... (elapsed 0.000 seconds) done. [ 348.292457] OOM killer disabled. [ 348.292462] Freezing remaining freezable tasks ... (elapsed 0.104 seconds) done. [ 348.396612] printk: Suspending console(s) (use no_console_suspend to debug) [ 348.749228] PM: suspend devices took 0.352 seconds [ 348.769713] ACPI: EC: interrupt blocked [ 348.816077] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000001c [ 348.816080] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 348.816081] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 348.816083] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 348.816086] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 348.816089] CPU: 0 PID: 6764 Comm: systemd-sleep Not tainted 6.1.3-1.fc32.qubes.x86_64 #1 [ 348.816092] Hardware name: Star Labs StarBook/StarBook, BIOS 8.01 07/03/2022 [ 348.816093] RIP: e030:acpi_get_wakeup_address+0xc/0x20 Fix that by adding an optional acpi callback allowing to skip setting the wakeup address, as in the Xen PV case this will be handled by the hypervisor anyway. Fixes: f1e525009493 ("x86/boot: Skip realmode init code when running as Xen PV guest") Reported-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230117155724.22940-1-jgross%40suse.com

x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP guest feature negotiation support

2023-01-19T16:29:58+00:00

The hypervisor can enable various new features (SEV_FEATURES[1:63]) and start a SNP guest. Some of these features need guest side implementation. If any of these features are enabled without it, the behavior of the SNP guest will be undefined. It may fail booting in a non-obvious way making it difficult to debug. Instead of allowing the guest to continue and have it fail randomly later, detect this early and fail gracefully. The SEV_STATUS MSR indicates features which the hypervisor has enabled. While booting, SNP guests should ascertain that all the enabled features have guest side implementation. In case a feature is not implemented in the guest, the guest terminates booting with GHCB protocol Non-Automatic Exit(NAE) termination request event, see "SEV-ES Guest-Hypervisor Communication Block Standardization" document (currently at https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf), section "Termination Request". Populate SW_EXITINFO2 with mask of unsupported features that the hypervisor can easily report to the user. More details in the AMD64 APM Vol 2, Section "SEV_STATUS MSR". [ bp: - Massage. - Move snp_check_features() call to C code. Note: the CC:stable@ aspect here is to be able to protect older, stable kernels when running on newer hypervisors. Or not "running" but fail reliably and in a well-defined manner instead of randomly. ] Fixes: cbd3d4f7c4e5 ("x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support") Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230118061943.534309-1-nikunj@amd.com

KVM: x86/xen: Avoid deadlock by adding kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock leaf node lock

2023-01-11T22:45:58+00:00

In commit 14243b387137a ("KVM: x86/xen: Add KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_XEN_EVTCHN and event channel delivery") the clever version of me left some helpful notes for those who would come after him: /* * For the irqfd workqueue, using the main kvm->lock mutex is * fine since this function is invoked from kvm_set_irq() with * no other lock held, no srcu. In future if it will be called * directly from a vCPU thread (e.g. on hypercall for an IPI) * then it may need to switch to using a leaf-node mutex for * serializing the shared_info mapping. */ mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); In commit 2fd6df2f2b47 ("KVM: x86/xen: intercept EVTCHNOP_send from guests") the other version of me ran straight past that comment without reading it, and introduced a potential deadlock by taking vcpu->mutex and kvm->lock in the wrong order. Solve this as originally suggested, by adding a leaf-node lock in the Xen state rather than using kvm->lock for it. Fixes: 2fd6df2f2b47 ("KVM: x86/xen: intercept EVTCHNOP_send from guests") Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse Message-Id: <20230111180651.14394-4-dwmw2@infradead.org> [Rebase, add docs. - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini

x86/insn: Avoid namespace clash by separating instruction decoder MMIO type from MMIO trace type

2023-01-03T17:46:06+00:00

Both and define various MMIO_ enum constants, whose namespace overlaps. Rename the ones to have a INSN_ prefix, so that the headers can be used from the same source file. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230101162910.710293-2-Jason@zx2c4.com

Merge tag 'x86_mm_for_6.2_v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2022-12-17T20:06:53+00:00

Pull x86 mm updates from Dave Hansen: "New Feature: - Randomize the per-cpu entry areas Cleanups: - Have CR3_ADDR_MASK use PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK instead of open coding it - Move to "native" set_memory_rox() helper - Clean up pmd_get_atomic() and i386-PAE - Remove some unused page table size macros" * tag 'x86_mm_for_6.2_v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (35 commits) x86/mm: Ensure forced page table splitting x86/kasan: Populate shadow for shared chunk of the CPU entry area x86/kasan: Add helpers to align shadow addresses up and down x86/kasan: Rename local CPU_ENTRY_AREA variables to shorten names x86/mm: Populate KASAN shadow for entire per-CPU range of CPU entry area x86/mm: Recompute physical address for every page of per-CPU CEA mapping x86/mm: Rename __change_page_attr_set_clr(.checkalias) x86/mm: Inhibit _PAGE_NX changes from cpa_process_alias() x86/mm: Untangle __change_page_attr_set_clr(.checkalias) x86/mm: Add a few comments x86/mm: Fix CR3_ADDR_MASK x86/mm: Remove P*D_PAGE_MASK and P*D_PAGE_SIZE macros mm: Convert __HAVE_ARCH_P..P_GET to the new style mm: Remove pointless barrier() after pmdp_get_lockless() x86/mm/pae: Get rid of set_64bit() x86_64: Remove pointless set_64bit() usage x86/mm/pae: Be consistent with pXXp_get_and_clear() x86/mm/pae: Use WRITE_ONCE() x86/mm/pae: Don't (ab)use atomic64 mm/gup: Fix the lockless PMD access ...