kernel/linux.git/arch/x86/boot, branch v6.1.179

x86/boot: Reject too long acpi_rsdp= values

2026-07-24T13:55:00+00:00

commit d130041a7b96f79cd4c7079a6c2431a6db4c9619 upstream. cmdline_find_option() returns the full length of the parsed acpi_rsdp= value. get_cmdline_acpi_rsdp() then silently truncates values which do not fit in the val[] buffer. Prevent boot_kstrtoul() from parsing a truncated value and then the kernel from silently using the wrong RSDP address, see discussion in Link:. Issue a warning so that the user is aware that s/he supplied a malformed value and can get feedback instead of silent crashes. [ bp: Make commit message more precise. ] Fixes: 3c98e71b42a7 ("x86/boot: Add "acpi_rsdp=" early parsing") Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260617130417.36651-4-thorsten.blum@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/boot: Validate console=uart8250 baud rate to fix early boot hang

2026-07-24T13:55:00+00:00

commit ffa0aa5b625fe0bed7463ac613f8b06676ff4542 upstream. When the baud rate is empty, 0, invalid, or overflows to 0 when stored as an int, the system will hang during early boot because of a division by zero in early_serial_init(). Fall back to DEFAULT_BAUD when the resulting baud rate is 0 to prevent an early system hang. Fixes: ce0aa5dd20e4 ("x86, setup: Make the setup code also accept console=uart8250") Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260713194924.126472-3-thorsten.blum@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/sev: Allow IBPB-on-Entry feature for SNP guests

2026-03-25T10:03:14+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9073428bb204d921ae15326bb7d4558d9d269aab ] The SEV-SNP IBPB-on-Entry feature does not require a guest-side implementation. It was added in Zen5 h/w, after the first SNP Zen implementation, and thus was not accounted for when the initial set of SNP features were added to the kernel. In its abundant precaution, commit 8c29f0165405 ("x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP guest feature negotiation support") included SEV_STATUS' IBPB-on-Entry bit as a reserved bit, thereby masking guests from using the feature. Allow guests to make use of IBPB-on-Entry when supported by the hypervisor, as the bit is now architecturally defined and safe to expose. Fixes: 8c29f0165405 ("x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP guest feature negotiation support") Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Reviewed-by: Nikunj A Dadhania Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky Cc: stable@kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260203222405.4065706-2-kim.phillips@amd.com [ No SECURE_AVIC ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/boot: Fix page table access in 5-level to 4-level paging transition

2026-01-11T14:18:22+00:00

[ Upstream commit eb2266312507d7b757859e2227aa5c4ba6280ebe ] When transitioning from 5-level to 4-level paging, the existing code incorrectly accesses page table entries by directly dereferencing CR3 and applying PAGE_MASK. This approach has several issues: - __native_read_cr3() returns the raw CR3 register value, which on x86_64 includes not just the physical address but also flags. Bits above the physical address width of the system i.e. above __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT) are also not masked. - The PGD entry is masked by PAGE_SIZE which doesn't take into account the higher bits such as _PAGE_BIT_NOPTISHADOW. Replace this with proper accessor functions: - native_read_cr3_pa(): Uses CR3_ADDR_MASK to additionally mask metadata out of CR3 (like SME or LAM bits). All remaining bits are real address bits or reserved and must be 0. - mask pgd value with PTE_PFN_MASK instead of PAGE_MASK, accounting for flags above bit 51 (_PAGE_BIT_NOPTISHADOW in particular). Bits below 51, but above the max physical address are reserved and must be 0. Fixes: e9d0e6330eb8 ("x86/boot/compressed/64: Prepare new top-level page table for trampoline") Reported-by: Michael van der Westhuizen Reported-by: Tobias Fleig Co-developed-by: Kiryl Shutsemau Signed-off-by: Kiryl Shutsemau Signed-off-by: Usama Arif Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Acked-by: Dave Hansen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a482fd68-ce54-472d-8df1-33d6ac9f6bb5@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

x86/sev: Evict cache lines during SNP memory validation

2025-08-15T10:05:12+00:00

Commit 7b306dfa326f70114312b320d083b21fa9481e1e upstream. An SNP cache coherency vulnerability requires a cache line eviction mitigation when validating memory after a page state change to private. The specific mitigation is to touch the first and last byte of each 4K page that is being validated. There is no need to perform the mitigation when performing a page state change to shared and rescinding validation. CPUID bit Fn8000001F_EBX[31] defines the COHERENCY_SFW_NO CPUID bit that, when set, indicates that the software mitigation for this vulnerability is not needed. Implement the mitigation and invoke it when validating memory (making it private) and the COHERENCY_SFW_NO bit is not set, indicating the SNP guest is vulnerable. Co-developed-by: Michael Roth Signed-off-by: Michael Roth Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/build: Fix broken copy command in genimage.sh when making isoimage

2025-06-04T12:40:11+00:00

[ Upstream commit e451630226bd09dc730eedb4e32cab1cc7155ae8 ] Problem: Currently when running the "make isoimage" command there is an error related to wrong parameters passed to the cp command: "cp: missing destination file operand after 'arch/x86/boot/isoimage/'" This is caused because FDINITRDS is an empty array. Solution: Check if FDINITRDS is empty before executing the "cp" command, similar to how it is done in the case of hdimage. Signed-off-by: Nir Lichtman Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Masahiro Yamada Cc: Michal Marek Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250110120500.GA923218@lichtman.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

x86/boot: Use '-std=gnu11' to fix build with GCC 15

2025-02-21T12:49:46+00:00

commit ee2ab467bddfb2d7f68d996dbab94d7b88f8eaf7 upstream. GCC 15 changed the default C standard version to C23, which should not have impacted the kernel because it requests the gnu11 standard via '-std=' in the main Makefile. However, the x86 compressed boot Makefile uses its own set of KBUILD_CFLAGS without a '-std=' value (i.e., using the default), resulting in errors from the kernel's definitions of bool, true, and false in stddef.h, which are reserved keywords under C23. ./include/linux/stddef.h:11:9: error: expected identifier before ‘false’ 11 | false = 0, ./include/linux/types.h:35:33: error: two or more data types in declaration specifiers 35 | typedef _Bool bool; Set '-std=gnu11' in the x86 compressed boot Makefile to resolve the error and consistently use the same C standard version for the entire kernel. Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/4OAhbllK7x4QJGpZjkYjtBYNLd_2whHx9oFiuZcGwtVR4hIzvduultkgfAIRZI3vQpZylu7Gl929HaYFRGeMEalWCpeMzCIIhLxxRhq4U-Y=@protonmail.com/ Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/Z4467umXR2PZ0M1H@tucnak/ Reported-by: Kostadin Shishmanov Reported-by: Jakub Jelinek Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250121-x86-use-std-consistently-gcc-15-v1-1-8ab0acf645cb%40kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/boot: Don't add the EFI stub to targets, again

2024-06-21T12:35:53+00:00

commit b2747f108b8034271fd5289bd8f3a7003e0775a3 upstream. This is a re-commit of da05b143a308 ("x86/boot: Don't add the EFI stub to targets") after the tagged patch incorrectly reverted it. vmlinux-objs-y is added to targets, with an assumption that they are all relative to $(obj); adding a $(objtree)/drivers/... path causes the build to incorrectly create a useless arch/x86/boot/compressed/drivers/... directory tree. Fix this just by using a different make variable for the EFI stub. Fixes: cb8bda8ad443 ("x86/boot/compressed: Rename efi_thunk_64.S to efi-mixed.S") Signed-off-by: Ben Segall Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.1+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/xm267ceukksz.fsf@bsegall.svl.corp.google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/boot/64: Clear most of CR4 in startup_64(), except PAE, MCE and LA57

2024-06-12T09:03:11+00:00

[ Upstream commit a0025f587c685e5ff842fb0194036f2ca0b6eaf4 ] The early 64-bit boot code must be entered with a 1:1 mapping of the bootable image, but it cannot operate without a 1:1 mapping of all the assets in memory that it accesses, and therefore, it creates such mappings for all known assets upfront, and additional ones on demand when a page fault happens on a memory address. These mappings are created with the global bit G set, as the flags used to create page table descriptors are based on __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC defined by the core kernel, even though the context where these mappings are used is very different. This means that the TLB maintenance carried out by the decompressor is not sufficient if it is entered with CR4.PGE enabled, which has been observed to happen with the stage0 bootloader of project Oak. While this is a dubious practice if no global mappings are being used to begin with, the decompressor is clearly at fault here for creating global mappings and not performing the appropriate TLB maintenance. Since commit: f97b67a773cd84b ("x86/decompressor: Only call the trampoline when changing paging levels") CR4 is no longer modified by the decompressor if no change in the number of paging levels is needed. Before that, CR4 would always be set to a consistent value with PGE cleared. So let's reinstate a simplified version of the original logic to put CR4 into a known state, and preserve the PAE, MCE and LA57 bits, none of which can be modified freely at this point (PAE and LA57 cannot be changed while running in long mode, and MCE cannot be cleared when running under some hypervisors). This effectively clears PGE and works around the project Oak bug. Fixes: f97b67a773cd84b ("x86/decompressor: Only call the trampoline when ...") Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240410151354.506098-2-ardb+git@google.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

x86/efistub: Remap kernel text read-only before dropping NX attribute

2024-04-27T15:07:07+00:00

[ Commit 9c55461040a9264b7e44444c53d26480b438eda6 upstream ] Currently, the EFI stub invokes the EFI memory attributes protocol to strip any NX restrictions from the entire loaded kernel, resulting in all code and data being mapped read-write-execute. The point of the EFI memory attributes protocol is to remove the need for all memory allocations to be mapped with both write and execute permissions by default, and make it the OS loader's responsibility to transition data mappings to code mappings where appropriate. Even though the UEFI specification does not appear to leave room for denying memory attribute changes based on security policy, let's be cautious and avoid relying on the ability to create read-write-execute mappings. This is trivially achievable, given that the amount of kernel code executing via the firmware's 1:1 mapping is rather small and limited to the .head.text region. So let's drop the NX restrictions only on that subregion, but not before remapping it as read-only first. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman