<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/arch/powerpc/platforms, branch linux-5.9.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=linux-5.9.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=linux-5.9.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2020-12-11T12:22:10+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/pseries: Pass MSI affinity to irq_create_mapping()</title>
<updated>2020-12-11T12:22:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Laurent Vivier</name>
<email>lvivier@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-26T08:28:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=732630a290d2c0f20c9c117d1b60fd2fade3b7b7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:732630a290d2c0f20c9c117d1b60fd2fade3b7b7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9ea69a55b3b9a71cded9726af591949c1138f235 upstream.

With virtio multiqueue, normally each queue IRQ is mapped to a CPU.

Commit 0d9f0a52c8b9f ("virtio_scsi: use virtio IRQ affinity") exposed
an existing shortcoming of the arch code by moving virtio_scsi to
the automatic IRQ affinity assignment.

The affinity is correctly computed in msi_desc but this is not applied
to the system IRQs.

It appears the affinity is correctly passed to rtas_setup_msi_irqs() but
lost at this point and never passed to irq_domain_alloc_descs()
(see commit 06ee6d571f0e ("genirq: Add affinity hint to irq allocation"))
because irq_create_mapping() doesn't take an affinity parameter.

Use the new irq_create_mapping_affinity() function, which allows to forward
the affinity setting from rtas_setup_msi_irqs() to irq_domain_alloc_descs().

With this change, the virtqueues are correctly dispatched between the CPUs
on pseries.

Fixes: e75eafb9b039 ("genirq/msi: Switch to new irq spreading infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier &lt;lvivier@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz &lt;groug@kaod.org&gt;
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201126082852.1178497-3-lvivier@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/64s/powernv: Fix memory corruption when saving SLB entries on MCE</title>
<updated>2020-12-11T12:22:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicholas Piggin</name>
<email>npiggin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-28T07:07:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=64316364fdaa5a447340ffe6f39b861826f8412e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:64316364fdaa5a447340ffe6f39b861826f8412e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a1ee28117077c3bf24e5ab6324c835eaab629c45 upstream.

This can be hit by an HPT guest running on an HPT host and bring down
the host, so it's quite important to fix.

Fixes: 7290f3b3d3e6 ("powerpc/64s/powernv: machine check dump SLB contents")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.4+
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mahesh Salgaonkar &lt;mahesh@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201128070728.825934-2-npiggin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/64s: flush L1D after user accesses</title>
<updated>2020-11-22T09:15:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicholas Piggin</name>
<email>npiggin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-19T23:22:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ab13e7fce101aabea634b4087bfc0f4a131e8bff'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ab13e7fce101aabea634b4087bfc0f4a131e8bff</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9a32a7e78bd0cd9a9b6332cbdc345ee5ffd0c5de upstream.

IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache
before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It
is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible
memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of
hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where
protected data could be leaked.

However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that
the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass
"kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony
Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself,
but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with
side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an
attack.

This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege
boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache after user accesses.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens &lt;dja@axtens.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/64s: flush L1D on kernel entry</title>
<updated>2020-11-22T09:15:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicholas Piggin</name>
<email>npiggin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-19T23:22:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=e590b36718d6e740b7b19514f710402a6499164c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e590b36718d6e740b7b19514f710402a6499164c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f79643787e0a0762d2409b7b8334e83f22d85695 upstream.

IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache
before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It
is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible
memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of
hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where
protected data could be leaked.

However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that
the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass
"kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony
Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself,
but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with
side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an
attack.

This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege
boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache on kernel entry.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens &lt;dja@axtens.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/powermac: Fix low_sleep_handler with KUAP and KUEP</title>
<updated>2020-11-05T10:51:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christophe Leroy</name>
<email>christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-11T10:29:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b77220b670fbb562bf32b4676a4ffa5e0a947d79'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b77220b670fbb562bf32b4676a4ffa5e0a947d79</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2c637d2df4ee4830e9d3eb2bd5412250522ce96e upstream.

low_sleep_handler() has an hardcoded restore of segment registers
that doesn't take KUAP and KUEP into account.

Use head_32's load_segment_registers() routine instead.

Fixes: a68c31fc01ef ("powerpc/32s: Implement Kernel Userspace Access Protection")
Fixes: 31ed2b13c48d ("powerpc/32s: Implement Kernel Userspace Execution Prevention.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/21b05f7298c1b18f73e6e5b4cd5005aafa24b6da.1599820109.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/powernv/elog: Fix race while processing OPAL error log event.</title>
<updated>2020-11-05T10:51:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mahesh Salgaonkar</name>
<email>mahesh@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-06T07:32:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=0797686ac440241f360387ae80f649233ae8ad0d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0797686ac440241f360387ae80f649233ae8ad0d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit aea948bb80b478ddc2448f7359d574387521a52d upstream.

Every error log reported by OPAL is exported to userspace through a
sysfs interface and notified using kobject_uevent(). The userspace
daemon (opal_errd) then reads the error log and acknowledges the error
log is saved safely to disk. Once acknowledged the kernel removes the
respective sysfs file entry causing respective resources to be
released including kobject.

However it's possible the userspace daemon may already be scanning
elog entries when a new sysfs elog entry is created by the kernel.
User daemon may read this new entry and ack it even before kernel can
notify userspace about it through kobject_uevent() call. If that
happens then we have a potential race between
elog_ack_store-&gt;kobject_put() and kobject_uevent which can lead to
use-after-free of a kernfs object resulting in a kernel crash. eg:

  BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on read at 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6bfb
  Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000008ff2a0
  Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
  LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV
  CPU: 27 PID: 805 Comm: irq/29-opal-elo Not tainted 5.9.0-rc2-gcc-8.2.0-00214-g6f56a67bcbb5-dirty #363
  ...
  NIP kobject_uevent_env+0xa0/0x910
  LR  elog_event+0x1f4/0x2d0
  Call Trace:
    0x5deadbeef0000122 (unreliable)
    elog_event+0x1f4/0x2d0
    irq_thread_fn+0x4c/0xc0
    irq_thread+0x1c0/0x2b0
    kthread+0x1c4/0x1d0
    ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x6c

This patch fixes this race by protecting the sysfs file
creation/notification by holding a reference count on kobject until we
safely send kobject_uevent().

The function create_elog_obj() returns the elog object which if used
by caller function will end up in use-after-free problem again.
However, the return value of create_elog_obj() function isn't being
used today and there is no need as well. Hence change it to return
void to make this fix complete.

Fixes: 774fea1a38c6 ("powerpc/powernv: Read OPAL error log and export it through sysfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.15+
Reported-by: Oliver O'Halloran &lt;oohall@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mahesh Salgaonkar &lt;mahesh@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V &lt;aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Oliver O'Halloran &lt;oohall@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Vasant Hegde &lt;hegdevasant@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
[mpe: Rework the logic to use a single return, reword comments, add oops]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201006122051.190176-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/memhotplug: Make lmb size 64bit</title>
<updated>2020-11-05T10:51:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Aneesh Kumar K.V</name>
<email>aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-07T11:48:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=2e6181523dbbb5574ade5ca00b82566b60289406'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2e6181523dbbb5574ade5ca00b82566b60289406</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 301d2ea6572386245c5d2d2dc85c3b5a737b85ac upstream.

Similar to commit 89c140bbaeee ("pseries: Fix 64 bit logical memory block panic")
make sure different variables tracking lmb_size are updated to be 64 bit.

This was found by code audit.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V &lt;aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201007114836.282468-3-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/powernv/smp: Fix spurious DBG() warning</title>
<updated>2020-11-05T10:51:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oliver O'Halloran</name>
<email>oohall@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-04T00:54:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=d4ddc5ade2994a4df7e725c5214e36e4ea540f53'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d4ddc5ade2994a4df7e725c5214e36e4ea540f53</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f6bac19cf65c5be21d14a0c9684c8f560f2096dd ]

When building with W=1 we get the following warning:

 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/smp.c: In function ‘pnv_smp_cpu_kill_self’:
 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/smp.c:276:16: error: suggest braces around
 	empty body in an ‘if’ statement [-Werror=empty-body]
   276 |      cpu, srr1);
       |                ^
 cc1: all warnings being treated as errors

The full context is this block:

 if (srr1 &amp;&amp; !generic_check_cpu_restart(cpu))
 	DBG("CPU%d Unexpected exit while offline srr1=%lx!\n",
 			cpu, srr1);

When building with DEBUG undefined DBG() expands to nothing and GCC emits
the warning due to the lack of braces around an empty statement.

Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran &lt;oohall@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Joel Stanley &lt;joel@jms.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200804005410.146094-2-oohall@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/pseries: Avoid using addr_to_pfn in real mode</title>
<updated>2020-10-29T09:12:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ganesh Goudar</name>
<email>ganeshgr@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-24T06:39:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ae04a238f748906270ede9228304528d7d730895'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ae04a238f748906270ede9228304528d7d730895</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4ff753feab021242144818b9a3ba011238218145 ]

When an UE or memory error exception is encountered the MCE handler
tries to find the pfn using addr_to_pfn() which takes effective
address as an argument, later pfn is used to poison the page where
memory error occurred, recent rework in this area made addr_to_pfn
to run in real mode, which can be fatal as it may try to access
memory outside RMO region.

Have two helper functions to separate things to be done in real mode
and virtual mode without changing any functionality. This also fixes
the following error as the use of addr_to_pfn is now moved to virtual
mode.

Without this change following kernel crash is seen on hitting UE.

[  485.128036] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
[  485.128040] LE SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
[  485.128047] Modules linked in:
[  485.128067] CPU: 15 PID: 6536 Comm: insmod Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 5.7.0 #22
[  485.128074] NIP:  c00000000009b24c LR: c0000000000398d8 CTR: c000000000cd57c0
[  485.128078] REGS: c000000003f1f970 TRAP: 0300   Tainted: G OE (5.7.0)
[  485.128082] MSR:  8000000000001003 &lt;SF,ME,RI,LE&gt;  CR: 28008284  XER: 00000001
[  485.128088] CFAR: c00000000009b190 DAR: c0000001fab00000 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 1
[  485.128088] GPR00: 0000000000000001 c000000003f1fbf0 c000000001634300 0000b0fa01000000
[  485.128088] GPR04: d000000002220000 0000000000000000 00000000fab00000 0000000000000022
[  485.128088] GPR08: c0000001fab00000 0000000000000000 c0000001fab00000 c000000003f1fc14
[  485.128088] GPR12: 0000000000000008 c000000003ff5880 d000000002100008 0000000000000000
[  485.128088] GPR16: 000000000000ff20 000000000000fff1 000000000000fff2 d0000000021a1100
[  485.128088] GPR20: d000000002200000 c00000015c893c50 c000000000d49b28 c00000015c893c50
[  485.128088] GPR24: d0000000021a0d08 c0000000014e5da8 d0000000021a0818 000000000000000a
[  485.128088] GPR28: 0000000000000008 000000000000000a c0000000017e2970 000000000000000a
[  485.128125] NIP [c00000000009b24c] __find_linux_pte+0x11c/0x310
[  485.128130] LR [c0000000000398d8] addr_to_pfn+0x138/0x170
[  485.128133] Call Trace:
[  485.128135] Instruction dump:
[  485.128138] 3929ffff 7d4a3378 7c883c36 7d2907b4 794a1564 7d294038 794af082 3900ffff
[  485.128144] 79291f24 790af00e 78e70020 7d095214 &lt;7c69502a&gt; 2fa30000 419e011c 70690040
[  485.128152] ---[ end trace d34b27e29ae0e340 ]---

Fixes: 9ca766f9891d ("powerpc/64s/pseries: machine check convert to use common event code")
Signed-off-by: Ganesh Goudar &lt;ganeshgr@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200724063946.21378-1-ganeshgr@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/powernv/dump: Fix race while processing OPAL dump</title>
<updated>2020-10-29T09:12:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasant Hegde</name>
<email>hegdevasant@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-17T16:42:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b6a49c2768a9ad57cc91d6c985cef887d25b855b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b6a49c2768a9ad57cc91d6c985cef887d25b855b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0a43ae3e2beb77e3481d812834d33abe270768ab ]

Every dump reported by OPAL is exported to userspace through a sysfs
interface and notified using kobject_uevent(). The userspace daemon
(opal_errd) then reads the dump and acknowledges that the dump is
saved safely to disk. Once acknowledged the kernel removes the
respective sysfs file entry causing respective resources to be
released including kobject.

However it's possible the userspace daemon may already be scanning
dump entries when a new sysfs dump entry is created by the kernel.
User daemon may read this new entry and ack it even before kernel can
notify userspace about it through kobject_uevent() call. If that
happens then we have a potential race between
dump_ack_store-&gt;kobject_put() and kobject_uevent which can lead to
use-after-free of a kernfs object resulting in a kernel crash.

This patch fixes this race by protecting the sysfs file
creation/notification by holding a reference count on kobject until we
safely send kobject_uevent().

The function create_dump_obj() returns the dump object which if used
by caller function will end up in use-after-free problem again.
However, the return value of create_dump_obj() function isn't being
used today and there is no need as well. Hence change it to return
void to make this fix complete.

Fixes: c7e64b9ce04a ("powerpc/powernv Platform dump interface")
Signed-off-by: Vasant Hegde &lt;hegdevasant@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201017164210.264619-1-hegdevasant@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
