<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c, branch linux-4.16.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=linux-4.16.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=linux-4.16.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2018-05-25T14:46:06+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/64s: Add support for a store forwarding barrier at kernel entry/exit</title>
<updated>2018-05-25T14:46:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicholas Piggin</name>
<email>npiggin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-22T14:41:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=18cdd9bc7889ca87b9746dd5eebbce230744769b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:18cdd9bc7889ca87b9746dd5eebbce230744769b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a048a07d7f4535baa4cbad6bc024f175317ab938 upstream.

On some CPUs we can prevent a vulnerability related to store-to-load
forwarding by preventing store forwarding between privilege domains,
by inserting a barrier in kernel entry and exit paths.

This is known to be the case on at least Power7, Power8 and Power9
powerpc CPUs.

Barriers must be inserted generally before the first load after moving
to a higher privilege, and after the last store before moving to a
lower privilege, HV and PR privilege transitions must be protected.

Barriers are added as patch sections, with all kernel/hypervisor entry
points patched, and the exit points to lower privilge levels patched
similarly to the RFI flush patching.

Firmware advertisement is not implemented yet, so CPU flush types
are hard coded.

Thanks to Michal Suchánek for bug fixes and review.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira &lt;mauricfo@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling &lt;mikey@neuling.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michal Suchánek &lt;msuchanek@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/lib: Fix off-by-one in alternate feature patching</title>
<updated>2018-04-24T07:43:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Ellerman</name>
<email>mpe@ellerman.id.au</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-16T13:25:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=999e92eb36349868a99324719016783309b8e505'/>
<id>urn:sha1:999e92eb36349868a99324719016783309b8e505</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b8858581febb050688e276b956796bc4a78299ed upstream.

When we patch an alternate feature section, we have to adjust any
relative branches that branch out of the alternate section.

But currently we have a bug if we have a branch that points to past
the last instruction of the alternate section, eg:

  FTR_SECTION_ELSE
  1:     b       2f
         or      6,6,6
  2:
  ALT_FTR_SECTION_END(...)
         nop

This will result in a relative branch at 1 with a target that equals
the end of the alternate section.

That branch does not need adjusting when it's moved to the non-else
location. Currently we do adjust it, resulting in a branch that goes
off into the link-time location of the else section, which is junk.

The fix is to not patch branches that have a target == end of the
alternate section.

Fixes: d20fe50a7b3c ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Branch inside feature section")
Fixes: 9b1a735de64c ("powerpc: Add logic to patch alternative feature sections")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.27+
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'fixes' into next</title>
<updated>2018-01-21T12:21:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Ellerman</name>
<email>mpe@ellerman.id.au</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-21T12:21:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ebf0b6a8b1e445d2be66087732aafcda12ab9f59'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ebf0b6a8b1e445d2be66087732aafcda12ab9f59</id>
<content type='text'>
Merge our fixes branch from the 4.15 cycle.

Unusually the fixes branch saw some significant features merged,
notably the RFI flush patches, so we want the code in next to be
tested against that, to avoid any surprises when the two are merged.

There's also some other work on the panic handling that was reverted
in fixes and we now want to do properly in next, which would conflict.

And we also fix a few other minor merge conflicts.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/lib/feature-fixups: use raw_patch_instruction()</title>
<updated>2018-01-21T04:06:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christophe Leroy</name>
<email>christophe.leroy@c-s.fr</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-24T07:31:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=8183d99f4a22c2abbc543847a588df3666ef0c0c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8183d99f4a22c2abbc543847a588df3666ef0c0c</id>
<content type='text'>
feature fixups need to use patch_instruction() early in the boot,
even before the code is relocated to its final address, requiring
patch_instruction() to use PTRRELOC() in order to address data.

But feature fixups applies on code before it is set to read only,
even for modules. Therefore, feature fixups can use
raw_patch_instruction() instead.

Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@c-s.fr&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/64s: Add support for RFI flush of L1-D cache</title>
<updated>2018-01-10T10:27:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Ellerman</name>
<email>mpe@ellerman.id.au</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-09T16:07:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=aa8a5e0062ac940f7659394f4817c948dc8c0667'/>
<id>urn:sha1:aa8a5e0062ac940f7659394f4817c948dc8c0667</id>
<content type='text'>
On some CPUs we can prevent the Meltdown vulnerability by flushing the
L1-D cache on exit from kernel to user mode, and from hypervisor to
guest.

This is known to be the case on at least Power7, Power8 and Power9. At
this time we do not know the status of the vulnerability on other CPUs
such as the 970 (Apple G5), pasemi CPUs (AmigaOne X1000) or Freescale
CPUs. As more information comes to light we can enable this, or other
mechanisms on those CPUs.

The vulnerability occurs when the load of an architecturally
inaccessible memory region (eg. userspace load of kernel memory) is
speculatively executed to the point where its result can influence the
address of a subsequent speculatively executed load.

In order for that to happen, the first load must hit in the L1,
because before the load is sent to the L2 the permission check is
performed. Therefore if no kernel addresses hit in the L1 the
vulnerability can not occur. We can ensure that is the case by
flushing the L1 whenever we return to userspace. Similarly for
hypervisor vs guest.

In order to flush the L1-D cache on exit, we add a section of nops at
each (h)rfi location that returns to a lower privileged context, and
patch that with some sequence. Newer firmwares are able to advertise
to us that there is a special nop instruction that flushes the L1-D.
If we do not see that advertised, we fall back to doing a displacement
flush in software.

For guest kernels we support migration between some CPU versions, and
different CPUs may use different flush instructions. So that we are
prepared to migrate to a machine with a different flush instruction
activated, we may have to patch more than one flush instruction at
boot if the hypervisor tells us to.

In the end this patch is mostly the work of Nicholas Piggin and
Michael Ellerman. However a cast of thousands contributed to analysis
of the issue, earlier versions of the patch, back ports testing etc.
Many thanks to all of them.

Tested-by: Jon Masters &lt;jcm@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe</title>
<updated>2017-07-12T23:26:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Axtens</name>
<email>dja@axtens.net</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-12T21:36:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=c69a48cdb301a18697bc8c9935baf4f32861cf9e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c69a48cdb301a18697bc8c9935baf4f32861cf9e</id>
<content type='text'>
Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on
boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp.

This boils down to things like this:

  extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1;
  extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig;

  check(memcmp(&amp;ftr_fixup_test1, &amp;ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0);

We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size'
bytes at those addresses.

However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to
memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single
unsigned int.  So if size &gt; sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic
at runtime.

We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels
unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s.  Therefore the size isn't
incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe
memcmp and no panic.

[1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens &lt;dja@axtens.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan &lt;andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan &lt;andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Daniel Micay &lt;danielmicay@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/headers: Prepare to remove the &lt;linux/mm_types.h&gt; dependency from &lt;linux/sched.h&gt;</title>
<updated>2017-03-02T07:42:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-03T23:16:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=589ee62844e042b0b7d19ef57fb4cff77f3ca294'/>
<id>urn:sha1:589ee62844e042b0b7d19ef57fb4cff77f3ca294</id>
<content type='text'>
Update code that relied on sched.h including various MM types for them.

This will allow us to remove the &lt;linux/mm_types.h&gt; include from &lt;linux/sched.h&gt;.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/32: Fix crash during static key init</title>
<updated>2016-08-10T09:41:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Benjamin Herrenschmidt</name>
<email>benh@kernel.crashing.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-08-10T07:27:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=97f6e0cc35026a2a09147a6da636d901525e1969'/>
<id>urn:sha1:97f6e0cc35026a2a09147a6da636d901525e1969</id>
<content type='text'>
We cannot do those initializations from apply_feature_fixups() as
this function runs in a very restricted environment on 32-bit where
the kernel isn't running at its linked address and the PTRRELOC()
macro must be used for any global accesss.

Instead, split them into a separtate steup_feature_keys() function
which is called in a more suitable spot on ppc32.

Fixes: 309b315b6ec6 ("powerpc: Call jump_label_init() in apply_feature_fixups()")
Reported-and-tested-by: Christian Kujau &lt;lists@nerdbynature.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/32: Fix early access to cpu_spec relocation</title>
<updated>2016-08-03T05:43:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Benjamin Herrenschmidt</name>
<email>benh@kernel.crashing.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-08-02T05:53:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=2c0f99516f53911c3f2f81ab3815841e3408f11e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2c0f99516f53911c3f2f81ab3815841e3408f11e</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 9402c6846131 ("powerpc: Factor do_feature_fixup calls")
introduced a subtle bug on 32-bit. When reading the cpu spec from the
global, we not only need to do a pointer relocation on the global
address but also on the pointer we read from it.

This fixes crashes reported on MPC5200 based machines.

Fixes: 9402c6846131 ("powerpc: Factor do_feature_fixup calls")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc: Add option to use jump label for mmu_has_feature()</title>
<updated>2016-08-01T01:15:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kevin Hao</name>
<email>haokexin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-07-23T09:12:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=c12e6f24d4137822d5019c1f78ac65bd27a3447d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c12e6f24d4137822d5019c1f78ac65bd27a3447d</id>
<content type='text'>
As we just did for CPU features.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Hao &lt;haokexin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V &lt;aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
