kernel/linux.git/arch/arm, branch v6.1.179

ARM: imx31: Fix IIM mapping leak in revision check

2026-07-24T13:54:38+00:00

[ Upstream commit ccb4b54b8ecf1ebafef96d538cd6c5c8455bb390 ] mx31_read_cpu_rev() maps the IIM registers with of_iomap() to read the silicon revision, but returns without unmapping the MMIO mapping. Keep the normalized revision value in a local variable and route the return path through iounmap() after the revision register has been read. Fixes: 3172225d45bd ("ARM: imx31: Retrieve the IIM base address from devicetree") Signed-off-by: Yuho Choi Signed-off-by: Frank Li Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ARM: imx3: Fix CCM node reference leak

2026-07-24T13:54:37+00:00

[ Upstream commit 36d46348eb5fc4bc505cd2290ddd70c25fbe6bb3 ] of_find_compatible_node() returns a referenced device node. The i.MX31 and i.MX35 early init paths use the node to map the CCM registers with of_iomap(), but never drop the node reference. Release the node after the mapping is created. Fixes: 2cf98d12958c ("ARM: imx3: Retrieve the CCM base address from devicetree") Signed-off-by: Yuho Choi Signed-off-by: Frank Li Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ARM: dts: am335x-sl50: Fix audio bitclock and frame master endpoint

2026-07-24T13:54:33+00:00

[ Upstream commit 2bc564f46b00dc4f4331fc337277ff3f5fac8a4e ] The cpu_endpoint in mcasp0 specifies the TLV320AIC3106 codec as the bitclock and frame master, but the phandles point to the codec's port node (codec_port) rather than its endpoint node (codec_endpoint). audio-graph-card calls simple_util_parse_daifmt() with ep_codec set to the endpoint node (codec_endpoint). The function resolves the bitclock-master phandle and checks whether it equals ep_codec. Since codec_port is the parent of codec_endpoint, not the endpoint itself, the comparison always evaluates to false. This causes the mcasp0 CPU side to be silently configured as bitclock and frame master instead of the codec, which is the opposite of the intended configuration. Fix by pointing bitclock-master and frame-master to codec_endpoint. Fixes: e5f89dbdebc5 ("ARM: dts: am335x-sl50: use audio-graph-card for sound") Signed-off-by: Jihed Chaibi Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260325223411.123666-1-jihed.chaibi.dev@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Kevin Hilman (TI) Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

crypto: sun4i-ss - Remove insecure and unused rng_alg

2026-07-24T13:54:31+00:00

commit b2c41fa9dd8fc740c489e060b199165771f268d1 upstream. Remove sun4i_ss_rng, as it is insecure and unused: - It has multiple vulnerabilities. sun4i_ss_prng_seed() is missing locking and has a buffer overflow. sun4i_ss_prng_generate() fails to fill the entire buffer with cryptographic random bytes, because it rounds the destination length down and also doesn't actually wait for the hardware to be ready before pulling bytes from it. - No user of this code is known. It's usable only theoretically via the "rng" algorithm type of AF_ALG. But userspace actually just uses the actual Linux RNG (/dev/random etc) instead. And rng_algs don't contribute entropy to the actual Linux RNG either. (This may have been confused with hwrng, which does contribute entropy.) The sun4i_ss_prng_seed() buffer overflow was reported by Tianchu Chen and discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine There's no point in fixing all these vulnerabilities individually when this is unused code, so let's just remove it. Fixes: b8ae5c7387ad ("crypto: sun4i-ss - support the Security System PRNG") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Tianchu Chen Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/af749a8447bd7f0e9dd26ca6c87e9c6afecb09d9@linux.dev/ Acked-by: Corentin LABBE Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ARM: fix branch predictor hardening

2026-07-04T11:41:28+00:00

commit fd2dee1c6e2256f726ba33fd3083a7be0efc80d3 upstream. __do_user_fault() may be called with indeterminent interrupt enable state, which means we may be preemptive at this point. This causes problems when calling harden_branch_predictor(). For example, when called from a data abort, do_alignment_fault()->do_bad_area(). Move harden_branch_predictor() out of __do_user_fault() and into the calling contexts. Moving it into do_kernel_address_page_fault(), we can be sure that interrupts will be disabled here. Converting do_translation_fault() to use do_kernel_address_page_fault() rather than do_bad_area() means that we keep branch predictor handling for translation faults. Interrupts will also be disabled at this call site. do_sect_fault() needs special handling, so detect user mode accesses to kernel-addresses, and add an explicit call to branch predictor hardening. Finally, add branch predictor hardening to do_alignment() for the faulting case (user mode accessing kernel addresses) before interrupts are enabled. This should cover all cases where harden_branch_predictor() is called, ensuring that it is always has interrupts disabled, also ensuring that it is called early in each call path. Reviewed-by: Xie Yuanbin Tested-by: Xie Yuanbin Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ARM: fix hash_name() fault

2026-07-04T11:41:28+00:00

commit 7733bc7d299d682f2723dc38fc7f370b9bf973e9 upstream. Zizhi Wo reports: "During the execution of hash_name()->load_unaligned_zeropad(), a potential memory access beyond the PAGE boundary may occur. For example, when the filename length is near the PAGE_SIZE boundary. This triggers a page fault, which leads to a call to do_page_fault()->mmap_read_trylock(). If we can't acquire the lock, we have to fall back to the mmap_read_lock() path, which calls might_sleep(). This breaks RCU semantics because path lookup occurs under an RCU read-side critical section." This is seen with CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP=y and CONFIG_KFENCE=y. Kernel addresses (with the exception of the vectors/kuser helper page) do not have VMAs associated with them. If the vectors/kuser helper page faults, then there are two possibilities: 1. if the fault happened while in kernel mode, then we're basically dead, because the CPU won't be able to vector through this page to handle the fault. 2. if the fault happened while in user mode, that means the page was protected from user access, and we want to fault anyway. Thus, we can handle kernel addresses from any context entirely separately without going anywhere near the mmap lock. This gives us an entirely non-sleeping path for all kernel mode kernel address faults. As we handle the kernel address faults before interrupts are enabled, this change has the side effect of improving the branch predictor hardening, but does not completely solve the issue. Reported-by: Zizhi Wo Reported-by: Xie Yuanbin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251126090505.3057219-1-wozizhi@huaweicloud.com Reviewed-by: Xie Yuanbin Tested-by: Xie Yuanbin Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ARM: allow __do_kernel_fault() to report execution of memory faults

2026-07-04T11:41:28+00:00

commit 40b466db1dffb41f0529035c59c5739636d0e5b8 upstream Allow __do_kernel_fault() to detect the execution of memory, so we can provide the same fault message as do_page_fault() would do. This is required when we split the kernel address fault handling from the main do_page_fault() code path. Reviewed-by: Xie Yuanbin Tested-by: Xie Yuanbin Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ARM: group is_permission_fault() with is_translation_fault()

2026-07-04T11:41:28+00:00

commit dea20281ac88226615761c570c8ff7adc18e6ac2 upstream. Group is_permission_fault() with is_translation_fault(), which is needed to use is_permission_fault() in __do_kernel_fault(). As this is static inline, there is no need for this to be under CONFIG_MMU. Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ARM: 9475/1: entry: use byte load for KASAN VMAP stack shadow

2026-06-19T11:37:14+00:00

commit 77a1f6883dc6e837bb2cb30b9b02e2f94338e2c6 upstream. Commit 44e9a3bb76e5 ("ARM: 9430/1: entry: Do a dummy read from VMAP shadow") added a dummy read from the KASAN VMAP stack shadow in __switch_to(). The read uses ldr, but the KASAN shadow address is byte-granular and is not guaranteed to be word aligned. ARMv5 faults unaligned word loads. With CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC and CONFIG_VMAP_STACK enabled, ARM926/VersatilePB crashes in __switch_to() with an alignment exception before reaching init. Use ldrb for the dummy shadow access. The code only needs to fault in the shadow mapping if the stack shadow is missing, so a byte load is sufficient and matches the granularity of KASAN shadow memory. Fixes: 44e9a3bb76e5 ("ARM: 9430/1: entry: Do a dummy read from VMAP shadow") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.13+ Signed-off-by: Karl Mehltretter Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij Signed-off-by: Russell King Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ARM: 9474/1: io: avoid KASAN instrumentation of raw halfword I/O

2026-06-19T11:37:14+00:00

commit d59ed803715a71fb9582e139d648ece8d66dc743 upstream. For CPUs before ARMv6, __raw_readw() and __raw_writew() are implemented as C volatile halfword accesses so the compiler can generate an access sequence that is safe for those machines. With KASAN enabled, those C accesses are instrumented as normal memory accesses. That is not valid for MMIO. On ARM926/VersatilePB with KASAN enabled, PL011 probing traps in __asan_store2() while registering the UART, because the instrumented writew() tries to check KASAN shadow for an MMIO address. Keep the existing volatile halfword access, but move the ARMv5 definitions into __no_kasan_or_inline functions so raw MMIO halfword accesses are not instrumented by KASAN. The ARMv6-and-newer inline assembly path is unchanged. Fixes: 421015713b30 ("ARM: 9017/2: Enable KASan for ARM") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.11+ Signed-off-by: Karl Mehltretter Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij Signed-off-by: Russell King Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman