<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h, branch linux-5.9.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=linux-5.9.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=linux-5.9.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2020-08-05T19:39:48+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>random: random.h should include archrandom.h, not the other way around</title>
<updated>2020-08-05T19:39:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-05T19:39:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=585524081ecdcde1c719e63916c514866d898217'/>
<id>urn:sha1:585524081ecdcde1c719e63916c514866d898217</id>
<content type='text'>
This is hopefully the final piece of the crazy puzzle with random.h
dependencies.

And by "hopefully" I obviously mean "Linus is a hopeless optimist".

Reported-and-tested-by: Daniel Díaz &lt;daniel.diaz@linaro.org&gt;
Acked-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: add credited/trusted RNG support</title>
<updated>2020-02-28T04:21:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-02-10T13:00:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ead5084cdf5af51445d219800c2ac8b01eb85f2f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ead5084cdf5af51445d219800c2ac8b01eb85f2f</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently arm64 doesn't initialize the primary CRNG in a (potentially)
trusted manner as we only detect the presence of the RNG once secondary
CPUs are up.

Now that the core RNG code distinguishes the early initialization of the
primary CRNG, we can implement arch_get_random_seed_long_early() to
support this.

This patch does so.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210130015.17664-4-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: Use v8.5-RNG entropy for KASLR seed</title>
<updated>2020-01-22T09:54:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Brown</name>
<email>broonie@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-01-21T12:58:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=2e8e1ea88cbcb19a77b7acb67f6ffe39cc15740c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2e8e1ea88cbcb19a77b7acb67f6ffe39cc15740c</id>
<content type='text'>
When seeding KALSR on a system where we have architecture level random
number generation make use of that entropy, mixing it in with the seed
passed by the bootloader. Since this is run very early in init before
feature detection is complete we open code rather than use archrandom.h.

Signed-off-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: Implement archrandom.h for ARMv8.5-RNG</title>
<updated>2020-01-22T09:54:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Henderson</name>
<email>richard.henderson@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-01-21T12:58:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=1a50ec0b3b2e9a83f1b1245ea37a853aac2f741c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1a50ec0b3b2e9a83f1b1245ea37a853aac2f741c</id>
<content type='text'>
Expose the ID_AA64ISAR0.RNDR field to userspace, as the RNG system
registers are always available at EL0.

Implement arch_get_random_seed_long using RNDR.  Given that the
TRNG is likely to be a shared resource between cores, and VMs,
do not explicitly force re-seeding with RNDRRS.  In order to avoid
code complexity and potential issues with hetrogenous systems only
provide values after cpufeature has finalized the system capabilities.

Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson &lt;richard.henderson@linaro.org&gt;
[Modified to only function after cpufeature has finalized the system
capabilities and move all the code into the header -- broonie]
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
[will: Advertise HWCAP via /proc/cpuinfo]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
