kernel/linux.git/Documentation/security/keys, branch v6.6.132

Documentation: Fix typos

2023-08-18T17:29:03+00:00

Fix typos in Documentation. Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814212822.193684-4-helgaas@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet

KEYS: encrypted: fix key instantiation with user-provided data

2022-10-19T17:01:23+00:00

Commit cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data") added key instantiation with user provided decrypted data. The user data is hex-ascii-encoded but was just memcpy'ed to the binary buffer. Fix this to use hex2bin instead. Old keys created from user provided decrypted data saved with "keyctl pipe" are still valid, however if the key is recreated from decrypted data the old key must be converted to the correct format. This can be done with a small shell script, e.g.: BROKENKEY=abcdefABCDEF1234567890aaaaaaaaaa NEWKEY=$(echo -ne $BROKENKEY | xxd -p -c32) keyctl add user masterkey "$(cat masterkey.bin)" @u keyctl add encrypted testkey "new user:masterkey 32 $NEWKEY" @u However, NEWKEY is still broken: If for BROKENKEY 32 bytes were specified, a brute force attacker knowing the key properties would only need to try at most 2^(16*8) keys, as if the key was only 16 bytes long. The security issue is a result of the combination of limiting the input range to hex-ascii and using memcpy() instead of hex2bin(). It could have been fixed either by allowing binary input or using hex2bin() (and doubling the ascii input key length). This patch implements the latter. The corresponding test for the Linux Test Project ltp has also been fixed (see link below). Fixes: cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data") Cc: stable@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ltp/20221006081709.92303897@mail.steuer-voss.de/ Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Nikolaus Voss Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

Documentation: update watch_queue.rst references

2022-07-07T19:09:59+00:00

Changeset f5461124d59b ("Documentation: move watch_queue to core-api") renamed: Documentation/watch_queue.rst to: Documentation/core-api/watch_queue.rst. Update the cross-references accordingly. Fixes: f5461124d59b ("Documentation: move watch_queue to core-api") Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1c220de9c58f35e815a3df9458ac2bea323c8bfb.1656234456.git.mchehab@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet

doc: trusted-encrypted: describe new CAAM trust source

2022-05-23T15:47:50+00:00

Update documentation for trusted key use with the Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM), an IP on NXP SoCs. Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

KEYS: trusted: allow use of kernel RNG for key material

2022-05-23T15:47:50+00:00

The two existing trusted key sources don't make use of the kernel RNG, but instead let the hardware doing the sealing/unsealing also generate the random key material. However, both users and future backends may want to place less trust into the quality of the trust source's random number generator and instead reuse the kernel entropy pool, which can be seeded from multiple entropy sources. Make this possible by adding a new trusted.rng parameter, that will force use of the kernel RNG. In its absence, it's up to the trust source to decide, which random numbers to use, maintaining the existing behavior. Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Acked-by: Sumit Garg Acked-by: Pankaj Gupta Reviewed-by: David Gstir Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta Tested-by: Michael Walle # on ls1028a (non-E and E) Tested-by: John Ernberg # iMX8QXP Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data

2022-02-22T00:47:45+00:00

For availability and performance reasons master keys often need to be released outside of a Key Management Service (KMS) to clients. It would be beneficial to provide a mechanism where the wrapping/unwrapping of data encryption keys (DEKs) is not dependent on a remote call at runtime yet security is not (or only minimally) compromised. Master keys could be securely stored in the Kernel and be used to wrap/unwrap keys from Userspace. The encrypted.c class supports instantiation of encrypted keys with either an already-encrypted key material, or by generating new key material based on random numbers. This patch defines a new datablob format: [] that allows to inject and encrypt user-provided decrypted data. The decrypted data must be hex-ascii encoded. Signed-off-by: Yael Tzur Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

doc: trusted-encrypted: updates with TEE as a new trust source

2021-04-14T13:30:30+00:00

Update documentation for Trusted and Encrypted Keys with TEE as a new trust source. Following is brief description of updates: - Add a section to demonstrate a list of supported devices along with their security properties/guarantees. - Add a key generation section. - Updates for usage section including differences specific to a trust source. Co-developed-by: Elaine Palmer Signed-off-by: Elaine Palmer Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs

2021-04-14T13:30:30+00:00

Modify the TPM2 key format blob output to export and import in the ASN.1 form for TPM2 sealed object keys. For compatibility with prior trusted keys, the importer will also accept two TPM2B quantities representing the public and private parts of the key. However, the export via keyctl pipe will only output the ASN.1 format. The benefit of the ASN.1 format is that it's a standard and thus the exported key can be used by userspace tools (openssl_tpm2_engine, openconnect and tpm2-tss-engine). The format includes policy specifications, thus it gets us out of having to construct policy handles in userspace and the format includes the parent meaning you don't have to keep passing it in each time. This patch only implements basic handling for the ASN.1 format, so keys with passwords but no policy. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

watch_queue: Drop references to /dev/watch_queue

2021-01-21T16:16:08+00:00

The merged API doesn't use a watch_queue device, but instead relies on pipes, so let the documentation reflect that. Fixes: f7e47677e39a ("watch_queue: Add a key/keyring notification facility") Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi Signed-off-by: David Howells Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel

docs: trusted-encrypted.rst: update parameters for command examples

2020-09-09T17:30:14+00:00

The parameters in command examples for tpm2_createprimary and tpm2_evictcontrol are outdated, people (like me) are not able to create trusted key by these command examples. This patch updates the parameters of command example tpm2_createprimary and tpm2_evictcontrol in trusted-encrypted.rst. With Linux kernel v5.8 and tpm2-tools-4.1, people can create a trusted key by following the examples in this document. Signed-off-by: Coly Li Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Cc: Dan Williams Cc: James Bottomley Cc: Jason Gunthorpe Cc: Mimi Zohar Cc: Peter Huewe Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200821135356.15737-1-colyli@suse.de Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet