<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git, branch v6.19.10</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.19.10</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.19.10'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2026-03-25T10:13:32+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>Linux 6.19.10</title>
<updated>2026-03-25T10:13:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-25T10:13:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=271f8eab9590b57a2ff0c8c9eee357723c4a85cb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:271f8eab9590b57a2ff0c8c9eee357723c4a85cb</id>
<content type='text'>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260323134504.575022936@linuxfoundation.org
Tested-by: Brett A C Sheffield &lt;bacs@librecast.net&gt;
Tested-by: Ronald Warsow &lt;rwarsow@gmx.de&gt;
Tested-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) &lt;pavel@nabladev.com&gt;
Tested-by: Peter Schneider &lt;pschneider1968@googlemail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Florian Fainelli &lt;florian.fainelli@broadcom.com&gt;
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso &lt;carnil@debian.org&gt;
Tested-by: Shuah Khan &lt;skhan@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Tested-by: Ron Economos &lt;re@w6rz.net&gt;
Tested-by: Jon Hunter &lt;jonathanh@nvidia.com&gt;
Tested-by: Takeshi Ogasawara &lt;takeshi.ogasawara@futuring-girl.com&gt;
Tested-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Justin M. Forbes &lt;jforbes@fedoraproject.org&gt;
Tested-by: Dileep Malepu &lt;dileep.debian@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Florian Fainelli &lt;florian.fainelli@broadcom.com&gt;
Tested-by: Miguel Ojeda &lt;ojeda@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Barry K. Nathan &lt;barryn@pobox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/privcmd: add boot control for restricted usage in domU</title>
<updated>2026-03-25T10:13:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-10-14T11:28:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=916c52aed0cb5c5e3f2ba8a5e3ae52775b22e1a0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:916c52aed0cb5c5e3f2ba8a5e3ae52775b22e1a0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1613462be621ad5103ec338a7b0ca0746ec4e5f1 upstream.

When running in an unprivileged domU under Xen, the privcmd driver
is restricted to allow only hypercalls against a target domain, for
which the current domU is acting as a device model.

Add a boot parameter "unrestricted" to allow all hypercalls (the
hypervisor will still refuse destructive hypercalls affecting other
guests).

Make this new parameter effective only in case the domU wasn't started
using secure boot, as otherwise hypercalls targeting the domU itself
might result in violating the secure boot functionality.

This is achieved by adding another lockdown reason, which can be
tested to not being set when applying the "unrestricted" option.

This is part of XSA-482

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/privcmd: restrict usage in unprivileged domU</title>
<updated>2026-03-25T10:13:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-10-09T14:54:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=cbede2e833da1893afbea9b3ff29b5dda23a4a91'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cbede2e833da1893afbea9b3ff29b5dda23a4a91</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 453b8fb68f3641fea970db88b7d9a153ed2a37e8 upstream.

The Xen privcmd driver allows to issue arbitrary hypercalls from
user space processes. This is normally no problem, as access is
usually limited to root and the hypervisor will deny any hypercalls
affecting other domains.

In case the guest is booted using secure boot, however, the privcmd
driver would be enabling a root user process to modify e.g. kernel
memory contents, thus breaking the secure boot feature.

The only known case where an unprivileged domU is really needing to
use the privcmd driver is the case when it is acting as the device
model for another guest. In this case all hypercalls issued via the
privcmd driver will target that other guest.

Fortunately the privcmd driver can already be locked down to allow
only hypercalls targeting a specific domain, but this mode can be
activated from user land only today.

The target domain can be obtained from Xenstore, so when not running
in dom0 restrict the privcmd driver to that target domain from the
beginning, resolving the potential problem of breaking secure boot.

This is XSA-482

Reported-by: Teddy Astie &lt;teddy.astie@vates.tech&gt;
Fixes: 1c5de1939c20 ("xen: add privcmd driver")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>hwmon: (max6639) Fix pulses-per-revolution implementation</title>
<updated>2026-03-25T10:13:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Guenter Roeck</name>
<email>linux@roeck-us.net</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-20T04:31:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=6f11461f882cfde67614bc471bfdfc39474b8de5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6f11461f882cfde67614bc471bfdfc39474b8de5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e7bae9a7a5e1251ab414291f4e9304d702bb9221 ]

The valid range for the pulses-per-revolution devicetree property is
1..4. The current code checks for a range of 1..5. Fix it.

Declare the variable used to retrieve pulses per revolution from
devicetree as u32 (unsigned) to match the of_property_read_u32() API.

The current code uses a postfix decrement when writing the pulses per
resolution into the chip. This has no effect since the value is evaluated
before it is decremented. Fix it by decrementing before evaluating the
value.

Fixes: 7506ebcd662b ("hwmon: (max6639) : Configure based on DT property")
Cc: Naresh Solanki &lt;naresh.solanki@9elements.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>drm/xe/guc: Fail immediately on GuC load error</title>
<updated>2026-03-25T10:13:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniele Ceraolo Spurio</name>
<email>daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-03T00:17:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=50802d40964f327a6950562b62d1ebf7238a39fb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:50802d40964f327a6950562b62d1ebf7238a39fb</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9b72283ec9b8685acdb3467de8fbc3352fdb70bb ]

By using the same variable for both the return of poll_timeout_us and
the return of the polled function guc_wait_ucode, the return value of
the latter is overwritten and lost after exiting the polling loop. Since
guc_wait_ucode returns -1 on GuC load failure, we lose that information
and always continue as if the GuC had been loaded correctly.

This is fixed by simply using 2 separate variables.

Fixes: a4916b4da448 ("drm/xe/guc: Refactor GuC load to use poll_timeout_us()")
Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio &lt;daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Matthew Brost &lt;matthew.brost@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vinay Belgaumkar &lt;vinay.belgaumkar@intel.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260303001732.2540493-2-daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com
(cherry picked from commit c85ec5c5753a46b5c2aea1292536487be9470ffe)
Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström &lt;thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: realm: Fix PTE_NS_SHARED for 52bit PA support</title>
<updated>2026-03-25T10:13:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Suzuki K Poulose</name>
<email>suzuki.poulose@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-16T16:19:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=c92738fdbe74de582b20c2143847e55eecf4996a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c92738fdbe74de582b20c2143847e55eecf4996a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8c6e9b60f5c7985a9fe41320556a92d7a33451df ]

With LPA/LPA2, the top bits of the PFN (Bits[51:48]) end up in the lower bits
of the PTE. So, simply creating a mask of the "top IPA bit" doesn't work well
for these configurations to set the "top" bit at the output of Stage1
translation.

Fix this by using the __phys_to_pte_val() to do the right thing for all
configurations.

Tested using, kvmtool, placing the memory at a higher address (-m &lt;size&gt;@&lt;Addr&gt;).

 e.g:
 # lkvm run --realm -c 4 -m 512M@@128T -k Image --console serial

 sh-5.0# dmesg | grep "LPA2\|RSI"
[    0.000000] RME: Using RSI version 1.0
[    0.000000] CPU features: detected: 52-bit Virtual Addressing (LPA2)
[    0.777354] CPU features: detected: 52-bit Virtual Addressing for KVM (LPA2)

Fixes: 399306954996 ("arm64: realm: Query IPA size from the RMM")
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Steven Price &lt;steven.price@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Steven Price &lt;steven.price@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tools/bootconfig: fix fd leak in load_xbc_file() on fstat failure</title>
<updated>2026-03-25T10:13:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Law</name>
<email>objecting@objecting.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-18T23:43:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=16515a053b7221f825d9ac023794c99a1d41c4ce'/>
<id>urn:sha1:16515a053b7221f825d9ac023794c99a1d41c4ce</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3b2c2ab4ceb82af484310c3087541eab00ea288b ]

If fstat() fails after open() succeeds, the function returns without
closing the file descriptor. Also preserve errno across close(), since
close() may overwrite it before the error is returned.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260318155847.78065-3-objecting@objecting.org/

Fixes: 950313ebf79c ("tools: bootconfig: Add bootconfig command")
Signed-off-by: Josh Law &lt;objecting@objecting.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/bootconfig: check xbc_init_node() return in override path</title>
<updated>2026-03-25T10:13:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Law</name>
<email>objecting@objecting.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-18T23:43:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=68c0ae8399bf26e85978d5216f182d18381f0198'/>
<id>urn:sha1:68c0ae8399bf26e85978d5216f182d18381f0198</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit bb288d7d869e86d382f35a0e26242c5ccb05ca82 ]

The ':=' override path in xbc_parse_kv() calls xbc_init_node() to
re-initialize an existing value node but does not check the return
value. If xbc_init_node() fails (data offset out of range), parsing
silently continues with stale node data.

Add the missing error check to match the xbc_add_node() call path
which already checks for failure.

In practice, a bootconfig using ':=' to override a value near the
32KB data limit could silently retain the old value, meaning a
security-relevant boot parameter override (e.g., a trace filter or
debug setting) would not take effect as intended.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260318155847.78065-2-objecting@objecting.org/

Fixes: e5efaeb8a8f5 ("bootconfig: Support mixing a value and subkeys under a key")
Signed-off-by: Josh Law &lt;objecting@objecting.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs/tests: exec: Remove bad test vector</title>
<updated>2026-03-25T10:13:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>kees@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-18T18:36:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=bbf791cffb635a6ea89c4297876b0c5fc31f865e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bbf791cffb635a6ea89c4297876b0c5fc31f865e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c4192754e836e0ffed95833509b6ada975b74418 ]

Drop an unusable test in the bprm stack limits.

Reported-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/a3e9b1c2-40c1-45df-9fa2-14ee6a7b3fe2@roeck-us.net
Fixes: 60371f43e56b ("exec: Add KUnit test for bprm_stack_limits()")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>drm/i915/gt: Check set_default_submission() before deferencing</title>
<updated>2026-03-25T10:13:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rahul Bukte</name>
<email>rahul.bukte@sony.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-03T04:48:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=1a16150729db8d997e39519f9d58e6b435c4c087'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1a16150729db8d997e39519f9d58e6b435c4c087</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0162ab3220bac870e43e229e6e3024d1a21c3f26 ]

When the i915 driver firmware binaries are not present, the
set_default_submission pointer is not set. This pointer is
dereferenced during suspend anyways.

Add a check to make sure it is set before dereferencing.

[   23.289926] PM: suspend entry (deep)
[   23.293558] Filesystems sync: 0.000 seconds
[   23.298010] Freezing user space processes
[   23.302771] Freezing user space processes completed (elapsed 0.000 seconds)
[   23.309766] OOM killer disabled.
[   23.313027] Freezing remaining freezable tasks
[   23.318540] Freezing remaining freezable tasks completed (elapsed 0.001 seconds)
[   23.342038] serial 00:05: disabled
[   23.345719] serial 00:02: disabled
[   23.349342] serial 00:01: disabled
[   23.353782] sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Synchronizing SCSI cache
[   23.358993] sd 1:0:0:0: [sdb] Synchronizing SCSI cache
[   23.361635] ata1.00: Entering standby power mode
[   23.368863] ata2.00: Entering standby power mode
[   23.445187] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[   23.452194] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
[   23.457896] #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
[   23.463065] PGD 0 P4D 0
[   23.465640] Oops: Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[   23.469869] CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 211 Comm: kworker/u48:18 Tainted: G S      W           6.19.0-rc4-00020-gf0b9d8eb98df #10 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[   23.482512] Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [W]=WARN
[   23.496511] Workqueue: async async_run_entry_fn
[   23.501087] RIP: 0010:0x0
[   23.503755] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6.
[   23.510324] RSP: 0018:ffffb4a60065fca8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   23.515592] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9f428290e000 RCX: 000000000000000f
[   23.522765] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000282 RDI: ffff9f428290e000
[   23.529937] RBP: ffff9f4282907070 R08: ffff9f4281130428 R09: 00000000ffffffff
[   23.537111] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff9f42829070f8
[   23.544284] R13: ffff9f4282906028 R14: ffff9f4282900000 R15: ffff9f4282906b68
[   23.551457] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9f466b2cf000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   23.559588] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   23.565365] CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000031c230001 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0
[   23.572539] PKRU: 55555554
[   23.575281] Call Trace:
[   23.577770]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[   23.579905]  intel_engines_reset_default_submission+0x42/0x60
[   23.585695]  __intel_gt_unset_wedged+0x191/0x200
[   23.590360]  intel_gt_unset_wedged+0x20/0x40
[   23.594675]  gt_sanitize+0x15e/0x170
[   23.598290]  i915_gem_suspend_late+0x6b/0x180
[   23.602692]  i915_drm_suspend_late+0x35/0xf0
[   23.607008]  ? __pfx_pci_pm_suspend_late+0x10/0x10
[   23.611843]  dpm_run_callback+0x78/0x1c0
[   23.615817]  device_suspend_late+0xde/0x2e0
[   23.620037]  async_suspend_late+0x18/0x30
[   23.624082]  async_run_entry_fn+0x25/0xa0
[   23.628129]  process_one_work+0x15b/0x380
[   23.632182]  worker_thread+0x2a5/0x3c0
[   23.635973]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[   23.640279]  kthread+0xf6/0x1f0
[   23.643464]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[   23.647263]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[   23.651045]  ret_from_fork+0x131/0x190
[   23.654837]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[   23.658634]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[   23.662597]  &lt;/TASK&gt;
[   23.664826] Modules linked in:
[   23.667914] CR2: 0000000000000000
[   23.671271] ------------[ cut here ]------------

Signed-off-by: Rahul Bukte &lt;rahul.bukte@sony.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Suraj Kandpal &lt;suraj.kandpal@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Suraj Kandpal &lt;suraj.kandpal@intel.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260203044839.1555147-1-suraj.kandpal@intel.com
(cherry picked from commit daa199abc3d3d1740c9e3a2c3e9216ae5b447cad)
Fixes: ff44ad51ebf8 ("drm/i915: Move engine-&gt;submit_request selection to a vfunc")
Signed-off-by: Joonas Lahtinen &lt;joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
