kernel/linux.git, branch v6.12.82

Linux 6.12.82

2026-04-18T08:41:59+00:00

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260413155728.181580293@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Brett A C Sheffield Tested-by: Florian Fainelli Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso Tested-by: Barry K. Nathan Tested-by: Jon Hunter Tested-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) Tested-by: Ron Economos Tested-by: Francesco Dolcini Tested-by: Peter Schneider Tested-by: Shuah Khan Tested-by: Miguel Ojeda Tested-by: Harshit Mogalapalli Tested-by: Shung-Hsi Yu Tested-by: Mark Brown Tested-by: Dileep Malepu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/CPU: Fix FPDSS on Zen1

2026-04-18T08:41:59+00:00

commit e55d98e7756135f32150b9b8f75d580d0d4b2dd3 upstream. Zen1's hardware divider can leave, under certain circumstances, partial results from previous operations. Those results can be leaked by another, attacker thread. Fix that with a chicken bit. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ALSA: hda/hdmi: Add quirk for TUXEDO IBS14G6

2026-04-18T08:41:59+00:00

commit d649c58bcad8fb9b749e3837136a201632fa109d upstream. Depending on the timing during boot, the BIOS might report wrong pin capabilities, which can lead to HDMI audio being disabled. Therefore, force HDMI audio connection on TUXEDO InfinityBook S 14 Gen6. Signed-off-by: Aaron Erhardt Signed-off-by: Werner Sembach Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260218213234.429686-1-wse@tuxedocomputers.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: skb: fix cross-cache free of KFENCE-allocated skb head

2026-04-18T08:41:59+00:00

commit 0f42e3f4fe2a58394e37241d02d9ca6ab7b7d516 upstream. SKB_SMALL_HEAD_CACHE_SIZE is intentionally set to a non-power-of-2 value (e.g. 704 on x86_64) to avoid collisions with generic kmalloc bucket sizes. This ensures that skb_kfree_head() can reliably use skb_end_offset to distinguish skb heads allocated from skb_small_head_cache vs. generic kmalloc caches. However, when KFENCE is enabled, kfence_ksize() returns the exact requested allocation size instead of the slab bucket size. If a caller (e.g. bpf_test_init) allocates skb head data via kzalloc() and the requested size happens to equal SKB_SMALL_HEAD_CACHE_SIZE, then slab_build_skb() -> ksize() returns that exact value. After subtracting skb_shared_info overhead, skb_end_offset ends up matching SKB_SMALL_HEAD_HEADROOM, causing skb_kfree_head() to incorrectly free the object to skb_small_head_cache instead of back to the original kmalloc cache, resulting in a slab cross-cache free: kmem_cache_free(skbuff_small_head): Wrong slab cache. Expected skbuff_small_head but got kmalloc-1k Fix this by always calling kfree(head) in skb_kfree_head(). This keeps the free path generic and avoids allocator-specific misclassification for KFENCE objects. Fixes: bf9f1baa279f ("net: add dedicated kmem_cache for typical/small skb->head") Reported-by: Antonius Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAK8a0jxC5L5N7hq-DT2_NhUyjBxrPocoiDazzsBk4TGgT1r4-A@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260403014517.142550-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

rxrpc: Fix missing error checks for rxkad encryption/decryption failure

2026-04-18T08:41:59+00:00

commit f93af41b9f5f798823d0d0fb8765c2a936d76270 upstream. Add error checking for failure of crypto_skcipher_en/decrypt() to various rxkad function as the crypto functions can fail with ENOMEM at least. Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both") Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260401105614.1696001-10-dhowells@redhat.com Signed-off-by: David Howells cc: Marc Dionne cc: Jeffrey Altman cc: Simon Horman cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org cc: stable@kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-17-dhowells@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

rxrpc: Fix key/keyring checks in setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY/KEYRING)

2026-04-18T08:41:59+00:00

commit 2afd86ccbb2082a3c4258aea8c07e5bb6267bc2f upstream. An AF_RXRPC socket can be both client and server at the same time. When sending new calls (ie. it's acting as a client), it uses rx->key to set the security, and when accepting incoming calls (ie. it's acting as a server), it uses rx->securities. setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY) sets rx->key to point to an rxrpc-type key and setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEYRING) sets rx->securities to point to a keyring of rxrpc_s-type keys. Now, it should be possible to use both rx->key and rx->securities on the same socket - but for userspace AF_RXRPC sockets rxrpc_setsockopt() prevents that. Fix this by: (1) Remove the incorrect check rxrpc_setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEYRING) makes on rx->key. (2) Move the check that rxrpc_setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY) makes on rx->key down into rxrpc_request_key(). (3) Remove rxrpc_request_key()'s check on rx->securities. This (in combination with a previous patch) pushes the checks down into the functions that set those pointers and removes the cross-checks that prevent both key and keyring being set. Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both") Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260401105614.1696001-10-dhowells@redhat.com Signed-off-by: David Howells cc: Marc Dionne cc: Anderson Nascimento cc: Luxiao Xu cc: Yuan Tan cc: Simon Horman cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org cc: stable@kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-16-dhowells@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

rxrpc: fix reference count leak in rxrpc_server_keyring()

2026-04-18T08:41:59+00:00

commit f125846ee79fcae537a964ce66494e96fa54a6de upstream. This patch fixes a reference count leak in rxrpc_server_keyring() by checking if rx->securities is already set. Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both") Reported-by: Yifan Wu Reported-by: Juefei Pu Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan Suggested-by: Xin Liu Tested-by: Ren Wei Signed-off-by: Luxiao Xu Signed-off-by: Ren Wei Signed-off-by: David Howells cc: Marc Dionne cc: Simon Horman cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org cc: stable@kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-15-dhowells@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

rxrpc: reject undecryptable rxkad response tickets

2026-04-18T08:41:59+00:00

commit fe4447cd95623b1cfacc15f280aab73a6d7340b2 upstream. rxkad_decrypt_ticket() decrypts the RXKAD response ticket and then parses the buffer as plaintext without checking whether crypto_skcipher_decrypt() succeeded. A malformed RESPONSE can therefore use a non-block-aligned ticket length, make the decrypt operation fail, and still drive the ticket parser with attacker-controlled bytes. Check the decrypt result and abort the connection with RXKADBADTICKET when ticket decryption fails. Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both") Reported-by: Yifan Wu Reported-by: Juefei Pu Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan Suggested-by: Xin Liu Tested-by: Ren Wei Signed-off-by: Yuqi Xu Signed-off-by: Ren Wei Signed-off-by: David Howells cc: Marc Dionne cc: Simon Horman cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org cc: stable@kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-12-dhowells@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

rxrpc: Only put the call ref if one was acquired

2026-04-18T08:41:59+00:00

commit 6331f1b24a3e85465f6454e003a3e6c22005a5c5 upstream. rxrpc_input_packet_on_conn() can process a to-client packet after the current client call on the channel has already been torn down. In that case chan->call is NULL, rxrpc_try_get_call() returns NULL and there is no reference to drop. The client-side implicit-end error path does not account for that and unconditionally calls rxrpc_put_call(). This turns a protocol error path into a kernel crash instead of rejecting the packet. Only drop the call reference if one was actually acquired. Keep the existing protocol error handling unchanged. Fixes: 5e6ef4f1017c ("rxrpc: Make the I/O thread take over the call and local processor work") Reported-by: Yifan Wu Reported-by: Juefei Pu Signed-off-by: Douya Le Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan Suggested-by: Xin Liu Signed-off-by: Ao Zhou Signed-off-by: David Howells cc: Marc Dionne cc: Simon Horman cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org cc: stable@kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-11-dhowells@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

rxrpc: Fix key reference count leak from call->key

2026-04-18T08:41:58+00:00

commit d666540d217e8d420544ebdfbadeedd623562733 upstream. When creating a client call in rxrpc_alloc_client_call(), the code obtains a reference to the key. This is never cleaned up and gets leaked when the call is destroyed. Fix this by freeing call->key in rxrpc_destroy_call(). Before the patch, it shows the key reference counter elevated: $ cat /proc/keys | grep afs@54321 1bffe9cd I--Q--i 8053480 4169w 3b010000 1000 1000 rxrpc afs@54321: ka $ After the patch, the invalidated key is removed when the code exits: $ cat /proc/keys | grep afs@54321 $ Fixes: f3441d4125fc ("rxrpc: Copy client call parameters into rxrpc_call earlier") Signed-off-by: Anderson Nascimento Co-developed-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: David Howells Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Altman cc: Marc Dionne cc: Simon Horman cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org cc: stable@kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-9-dhowells@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman