kernel/linux.git, branch v5.4.102

Linux 5.4.102

2021-03-04T09:26:54+00:00

Tested-by: Hulk Robot Tested-by: Jon Hunter Tested-by: Florian Fainelli Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing Tested-by: Guenter Roeck Tested-by: Jason Self Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210301161048.294656001@linuxfoundation.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210301194420.658523615@linuxfoundation.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210302122324.851128359@linuxfoundation.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210302123219.029306163@linuxfoundation.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210302192606.592235492@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ARM: dts: aspeed: Add LCLK to lpc-snoop

2021-03-04T09:26:54+00:00

commit d050d049f8b8077025292c1ecf456c4ee7f96861 upstream. Signed-off-by: John Wang Reviewed-by: Joel Stanley Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202051634.490-2-wangzhiqiang.bj@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: qrtr: Fix memory leak in qrtr_tun_open

2021-03-04T09:26:53+00:00

commit fc0494ead6398609c49afa37bc949b61c5c16b91 upstream. If qrtr_endpoint_register() failed, tun is leaked. Fix this, by freeing tun in error path. syzbot report: BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff88811848d680 (size 64): comm "syz-executor684", pid 10171, jiffies 4294951561 (age 26.070s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 80 dd 0a 84 ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 90 d6 48 18 81 88 ff ff 90 d6 48 18 81 88 ff ff ..H.......H..... backtrace: [<0000000018992a50>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:552 [inline] [<0000000018992a50>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:682 [inline] [<0000000018992a50>] qrtr_tun_open+0x22/0x90 net/qrtr/tun.c:35 [<0000000003a453ef>] misc_open+0x19c/0x1e0 drivers/char/misc.c:141 [<00000000dec38ac8>] chrdev_open+0x10d/0x340 fs/char_dev.c:414 [<0000000079094996>] do_dentry_open+0x1e6/0x620 fs/open.c:817 [<000000004096d290>] do_open fs/namei.c:3252 [inline] [<000000004096d290>] path_openat+0x74a/0x1b00 fs/namei.c:3369 [<00000000b8e64241>] do_filp_open+0xa0/0x190 fs/namei.c:3396 [<00000000a3299422>] do_sys_openat2+0xed/0x230 fs/open.c:1172 [<000000002c1bdcef>] do_sys_open fs/open.c:1188 [inline] [<000000002c1bdcef>] __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1204 [inline] [<000000002c1bdcef>] __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1199 [inline] [<000000002c1bdcef>] __x64_sys_openat+0x7f/0xe0 fs/open.c:1199 [<00000000f3a5728f>] do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 [<000000004b38b7ec>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Fixes: 28fb4e59a47d ("net: qrtr: Expose tunneling endpoint to user space") Reported-by: syzbot+5d6e4af21385f5cfc56a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Takeshi Misawa Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210221234427.GA2140@DESKTOP Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

dm era: Update in-core bitset after committing the metadata

2021-03-04T09:26:53+00:00

commit 2099b145d77c1d53f5711f029c37cc537897cee6 upstream. In case of a system crash, dm-era might fail to mark blocks as written in its metadata, although the corresponding writes to these blocks were passed down to the origin device and completed successfully. Consider the following sequence of events: 1. We write to a block that has not been yet written in the current era 2. era_map() checks the in-core bitmap for the current era and sees that the block is not marked as written. 3. The write is deferred for submission after the metadata have been updated and committed. 4. The worker thread processes the deferred write (process_deferred_bios()) and marks the block as written in the in-core bitmap, **before** committing the metadata. 5. The worker thread starts committing the metadata. 6. We do more writes that map to the same block as the write of step (1) 7. era_map() checks the in-core bitmap and sees that the block is marked as written, **although the metadata have not been committed yet**. 8. These writes are passed down to the origin device immediately and the device reports them as completed. 9. The system crashes, e.g., power failure, before the commit from step (5) finishes. When the system recovers and we query the dm-era target for the list of written blocks it doesn't report the aforementioned block as written, although the writes of step (6) completed successfully. The issue is that era_map() decides whether to defer or not a write based on non committed information. The root cause of the bug is that we update the in-core bitmap, **before** committing the metadata. Fix this by updating the in-core bitmap **after** successfully committing the metadata. Fixes: eec40579d84873 ("dm: add era target") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.15+ Signed-off-by: Nikos Tsironis Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: sched: fix police ext initialization

2021-03-04T09:26:53+00:00

commit 396d7f23adf9e8c436dd81a69488b5b6a865acf8 upstream. When police action is created by cls API tcf_exts_validate() first conditional that calls tcf_action_init_1() directly, the action idr is not updated according to latest changes in action API that require caller to commit newly created action to idr with tcf_idr_insert_many(). This results such action not being accessible through act API and causes crash reported by syzbot: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:71 [inline] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in atomic_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:27 [inline] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in __tcf_idr_release net/sched/act_api.c:178 [inline] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in tcf_idrinfo_destroy+0x129/0x1d0 net/sched/act_api.c:598 Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000010 by task kworker/u4:5/204 CPU: 0 PID: 204 Comm: kworker/u4:5 Not tainted 5.11.0-rc7-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline] dump_stack+0x107/0x163 lib/dump_stack.c:120 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:400 [inline] kasan_report.cold+0x5f/0xd5 mm/kasan/report.c:413 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:179 [inline] check_memory_region+0x13d/0x180 mm/kasan/generic.c:185 instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:71 [inline] atomic_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:27 [inline] __tcf_idr_release net/sched/act_api.c:178 [inline] tcf_idrinfo_destroy+0x129/0x1d0 net/sched/act_api.c:598 tc_action_net_exit include/net/act_api.h:151 [inline] police_exit_net+0x168/0x360 net/sched/act_police.c:390 ops_exit_list+0x10d/0x160 net/core/net_namespace.c:190 cleanup_net+0x4ea/0xb10 net/core/net_namespace.c:604 process_one_work+0x98d/0x15f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2275 worker_thread+0x64c/0x1120 kernel/workqueue.c:2421 kthread+0x3b1/0x4a0 kernel/kthread.c:292 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:296 ================================================================== Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 0 PID: 204 Comm: kworker/u4:5 Tainted: G B 5.11.0-rc7-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline] dump_stack+0x107/0x163 lib/dump_stack.c:120 panic+0x306/0x73d kernel/panic.c:231 end_report+0x58/0x5e mm/kasan/report.c:100 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:403 [inline] kasan_report.cold+0x67/0xd5 mm/kasan/report.c:413 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:179 [inline] check_memory_region+0x13d/0x180 mm/kasan/generic.c:185 instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:71 [inline] atomic_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:27 [inline] __tcf_idr_release net/sched/act_api.c:178 [inline] tcf_idrinfo_destroy+0x129/0x1d0 net/sched/act_api.c:598 tc_action_net_exit include/net/act_api.h:151 [inline] police_exit_net+0x168/0x360 net/sched/act_police.c:390 ops_exit_list+0x10d/0x160 net/core/net_namespace.c:190 cleanup_net+0x4ea/0xb10 net/core/net_namespace.c:604 process_one_work+0x98d/0x15f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2275 worker_thread+0x64c/0x1120 kernel/workqueue.c:2421 kthread+0x3b1/0x4a0 kernel/kthread.c:292 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:296 Kernel Offset: disabled Fix the issue by calling tcf_idr_insert_many() after successful action initialization. Fixes: 0fedc63fadf0 ("net_sched: commit action insertions together") Reported-by: syzbot+151e3e714d34ae4ce7e8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov Reviewed-by: Cong Wang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: icmp: pass zeroed opts from icmp{,v6}_ndo_send before sending

2021-03-04T09:26:53+00:00

commit ee576c47db60432c37e54b1e2b43a8ca6d3a8dca upstream. The icmp{,v6}_send functions make all sorts of use of skb->cb, casting it with IPCB or IP6CB, assuming the skb to have come directly from the inet layer. But when the packet comes from the ndo layer, especially when forwarded, there's no telling what might be in skb->cb at that point. As a result, the icmp sending code risks reading bogus memory contents, which can result in nasty stack overflows such as this one reported by a user: panic+0x108/0x2ea __stack_chk_fail+0x14/0x20 __icmp_send+0x5bd/0x5c0 icmp_ndo_send+0x148/0x160 In icmp_send, skb->cb is cast with IPCB and an ip_options struct is read from it. The optlen parameter there is of particular note, as it can induce writes beyond bounds. There are quite a few ways that can happen in __ip_options_echo. For example: // sptr/skb are attacker-controlled skb bytes sptr = skb_network_header(skb); // dptr/dopt points to stack memory allocated by __icmp_send dptr = dopt->__data; // sopt is the corrupt skb->cb in question if (sopt->rr) { optlen = sptr[sopt->rr+1]; // corrupt skb->cb + skb->data soffset = sptr[sopt->rr+2]; // corrupt skb->cb + skb->data // this now writes potentially attacker-controlled data, over // flowing the stack: memcpy(dptr, sptr+sopt->rr, optlen); } In the icmpv6_send case, the story is similar, but not as dire, as only IP6CB(skb)->iif and IP6CB(skb)->dsthao are used. The dsthao case is worse than the iif case, but it is passed to ipv6_find_tlv, which does a bit of bounds checking on the value. This is easy to simulate by doing a `memset(skb->cb, 0x41, sizeof(skb->cb));` before calling icmp{,v6}_ndo_send, and it's only by good fortune and the rarity of icmp sending from that context that we've avoided reports like this until now. For example, in KASAN: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0 Write of size 38 at addr ffff888006f1f80e by task ping/89 CPU: 2 PID: 89 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.10.0-rc7-debug+ #5 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x9a/0xcc print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1a/0x160 __kasan_report.cold+0x20/0x38 kasan_report+0x32/0x40 check_memory_region+0x145/0x1a0 memcpy+0x39/0x60 __ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0 __icmp_send+0x744/0x1700 Actually, out of the 4 drivers that do this, only gtp zeroed the cb for the v4 case, while the rest did not. So this commit actually removes the gtp-specific zeroing, while putting the code where it belongs in the shared infrastructure of icmp{,v6}_ndo_send. This commit fixes the issue by passing an empty IPCB or IP6CB along to the functions that actually do the work. For the icmp_send, this was already trivial, thanks to __icmp_send providing the plumbing function. For icmpv6_send, this required a tiny bit of refactoring to make it behave like the v4 case, after which it was straight forward. Fixes: a2b78e9b2cac ("sunvnet: generate ICMP PTMUD messages for smaller port MTUs") Reported-by: SinYu Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAF=yD-LOF116aHub6RMe8vB8ZpnrrnoTdqhobEx+bvoA8AsP0w@mail.gmail.com/T/ Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210223131858.72082-1-Jason@zx2c4.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipv6: silence compilation warning for non-IPV6 builds

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commit 1faba27f11c8da244e793546a1b35a9b1da8208e upstream. The W=1 compilation of allmodconfig generates the following warning: net/ipv6/icmp.c:448:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'icmp6_send' [-Wmissing-prototypes] 448 | void icmp6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info, | ^~~~~~~~~~ Fix it by providing function declaration for builds with ipv6 as a module. Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipv6: icmp6: avoid indirect call for icmpv6_send()

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commit cc7a21b6fbd945f8d8f61422ccd27203c1fafeb7 upstream. If IPv6 is builtin, we do not need an expensive indirect call to reach icmp6_send(). v2: put inline keyword before the type to avoid sparse warnings. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

xfrm: interface: use icmp_ndo_send helper

2021-03-04T09:26:53+00:00

commit 45942ba890e6f35232727a5fa33d732681f4eb9f upstream. Because xfrmi is calling icmp from network device context, it should use the ndo helper so that the rate limiting applies correctly. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Cc: Nicolas Dichtel Cc: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sunvnet: use icmp_ndo_send helper

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commit 67c9a7e1e3ac491b5df018803639addc36f154ba upstream. Because sunvnet is calling icmp from network device context, it should use the ndo helper so that the rate limiting applies correctly. While we're at it, doing the additional route lookup before calling icmp_ndo_send is superfluous, since this is the job of the icmp code in the first place. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Cc: Shannon Nelson Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman