kernel/linux.git, branch v5.15.183

Linux 5.15.183

2025-05-18T06:20:38+00:00

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250512172015.643809034@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Jon Hunter Tested-by: Florian Fainelli Tested-by: Mark Brown Tested-by: Ron Economos Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing Tested-by: Shuah Khan Tested-by: Vijayendra Suman Tested-by: Hardik Garg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/bhi: Do not set BHI_DIS_S in 32-bit mode

2025-05-18T06:20:38+00:00

commit 073fdbe02c69c43fb7c0d547ec265c7747d4a646 upstream. With the possibility of intra-mode BHI via cBPF, complete mitigation for BHI is to use IBHF (history fence) instruction with BHI_DIS_S set. Since this new instruction is only available in 64-bit mode, setting BHI_DIS_S in 32-bit mode is only a partial mitigation. Do not set BHI_DIS_S in 32-bit mode so as to avoid reporting misleading mitigated status. With this change IBHF won't be used in 32-bit mode, also remove the CONFIG_X86_64 check from emit_spectre_bhb_barrier(). Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/bpf: Add IBHF call at end of classic BPF

2025-05-18T06:20:38+00:00

commit 9f725eec8fc0b39bdc07dcc8897283c367c1a163 upstream. Classic BPF programs can be run by unprivileged users, allowing unprivileged code to execute inside the kernel. Attackers can use this to craft branch history in kernel mode that can influence the target of indirect branches. BHI_DIS_S provides user-kernel isolation of branch history, but cBPF can be used to bypass this protection by crafting branch history in kernel mode. To stop intra-mode attacks via cBPF programs, Intel created a new instruction Indirect Branch History Fence (IBHF). IBHF prevents the predicted targets of subsequent indirect branches from being influenced by branch history prior to the IBHF. IBHF is only effective while BHI_DIS_S is enabled. Add the IBHF instruction to cBPF jitted code's exit path. Add the new fence when the hardware mitigation is enabled (i.e., X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_HW is set) or after the software sequence (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP) is being used in a virtual machine. Note that X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_HW and X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP are mutually exclusive, so the JIT compiler will only emit the new fence, not the SW sequence, when X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_HW is set. Hardware that enumerates BHI_NO basically has BHI_DIS_S protections always enabled, regardless of the value of BHI_DIS_S. Since BHI_DIS_S doesn't protect against intra-mode attacks, enumerate BHI bug on BHI_NO hardware as well. Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/bpf: Call branch history clearing sequence on exit

2025-05-18T06:20:38+00:00

commit d4e89d212d401672e9cdfe825d947ee3a9fbe3f5 upstream. Classic BPF programs have been identified as potential vectors for intra-mode Branch Target Injection (BTI) attacks. Classic BPF programs can be run by unprivileged users. They allow unprivileged code to execute inside the kernel. Attackers can use unprivileged cBPF to craft branch history in kernel mode that can influence the target of indirect branches. Introduce a branch history buffer (BHB) clearing sequence during the JIT compilation of classic BPF programs. The clearing sequence is the same as is used in previous mitigations to protect syscalls. Since eBPF programs already have their own mitigations in place, only insert the call on classic programs that aren't run by privileged users. Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Revert "net: phy: microchip: force IRQ polling mode for lan88xx"

2025-05-18T06:20:38+00:00

This reverts commit 853e14cf36f6b16a372444a1eff54a3d7c6c1268 which is commit 30a41ed32d3088cd0d682a13d7f30b23baed7e93 upstream. It is reported to cause NFS boot problems on a Raspberry Pi 3b so revert it from this branch for now. Cc: Fiona Klute Cc: Andrew Lunn Cc: Paolo Abeni Cc: Sasha Levin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/aB6uurX99AZWM9I1@finisterre.sirena.org.uk Reported-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

do_umount(): add missing barrier before refcount checks in sync case

2025-05-18T06:20:38+00:00

[ Upstream commit 65781e19dcfcb4aed1167d87a3ffcc2a0c071d47 ] do_umount() analogue of the race fixed in 119e1ef80ecf "fix __legitimize_mnt()/mntput() race". Here we want to make sure that if __legitimize_mnt() doesn't notice our lock_mount_hash(), we will notice their refcount increment. Harder to hit than mntput_no_expire() one, fortunately, and consequences are milder (sync umount acting like umount -l on a rare race with RCU pathwalk hitting at just the wrong time instead of use-after-free galore mntput_no_expire() counterpart used to be hit). Still a bug... Fixes: 48a066e72d97 ("RCU'd vfsmounts") Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

nvme: unblock ctrl state transition for firmware update

2025-05-18T06:20:38+00:00

[ Upstream commit 650415fca0a97472fdd79725e35152614d1aad76 ] The original nvme subsystem design didn't have a CONNECTING state; the state machine allowed transitions from RESETTING to LIVE directly. With the introduction of nvme fabrics the CONNECTING state was introduce. Over time the nvme-pci started to use the CONNECTING state as well. Eventually, a bug fix for the nvme-fc started to depend that the only valid transition to LIVE was from CONNECTING. Though this change didn't update the firmware update handler which was still depending on RESETTING to LIVE transition. The simplest way to address it for the time being is to switch into CONNECTING state before going to LIVE state. Fixes: d2fe192348f9 ("nvme: only allow entering LIVE from CONNECTING state") Reported-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Daniel Wagner Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0134ea15-8d5f-41f7-9e9a-d7e6d82accaa@roeck-us.net Reviewed-by: Keith Busch Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

drm/panel: simple: Update timings for AUO G101EVN010

2025-05-18T06:20:38+00:00

[ Upstream commit 7c6fa1797a725732981f2d77711c867166737719 ] Switch to panel timings based on datasheet for the AUO G101EVN01.0 LVDS panel. Default timings were tested on the panel. Previous mode-based timings resulted in horizontal display shift. Signed-off-by: Kevin Baker Fixes: 4fb86404a977 ("drm/panel: simple: Add AUO G101EVN010 panel support") Reviewed-by: Neil Armstrong Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250505170256.1385113-1-kevinb@ventureresearch.com Signed-off-by: Neil Armstrong Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250505170256.1385113-1-kevinb@ventureresearch.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

MIPS: Fix MAX_REG_OFFSET

2025-05-18T06:20:38+00:00

[ Upstream commit c44572e0cc13c9afff83fd333135a0aa9b27ba26 ] Fix MAX_REG_OFFSET to point to the last register in 'pt_regs' and not to the marker itself, which could allow regs_get_register() to return an invalid offset. Fixes: 40e084a506eb ("MIPS: Add uprobes support.") Suggested-by: Maciej W. Rozycki Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

iio: adc: dln2: Use aligned_s64 for timestamp

2025-05-18T06:20:38+00:00

[ Upstream commit 5097eaae98e53f9ab9d35801c70da819b92ca907 ] Here the lack of marking allows the overall structure to not be sufficiently aligned resulting in misplacement of the timestamp in iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp(). Use aligned_s64 to force the alignment on all architectures. Fixes: 7c0299e879dd ("iio: adc: Add support for DLN2 ADC") Reported-by: David Lechner Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Reviewed-by: Nuno Sá Reviewed-by: David Lechner Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250413103443.2420727-4-jic23@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin