kernel/linux.git, branch v5.15.156

Linux 5.15.156

2024-04-17T09:15:18+00:00

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240415141942.235939111@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Florian Fainelli Tested-by: Kelsey Steele Tested-by: Mark Brown Tested-by: Ron Economos Tested-by: Harshit Mogalapalli Tested-by: Jon Hunter Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

drm/i915/cdclk: Fix CDCLK programming order when pipes are active

2024-04-17T09:15:17+00:00

commit 7b1f6b5aaec0f849e19c3e99d4eea75876853cdd upstream. Currently we always reprogram CDCLK from the intel_set_cdclk_pre_plane_update() when using squash/crawl. The code only works correctly for the cd2x update or full modeset cases, and it was simply never updated to deal with squash/crawl. If the CDCLK frequency is increasing we must reprogram it before we do anything else that might depend on the new higher frequency, and conversely we must not decrease the frequency until everything that might still depend on the old higher frequency has been dealt with. Since cdclk_state->pipe is only relevant when doing a cd2x update we can't use it to determine the correct sequence during squash/crawl. To that end introduce cdclk_state->disable_pipes which simply indicates that we must perform the update while the pipes are disable (ie. during intel_set_cdclk_pre_plane_update()). Otherwise we use the same old vs. new CDCLK frequency comparsiong as for cd2x updates. The only remaining problem case is when the voltage_level needs to increase due to a DDI port, but the CDCLK frequency is decreasing (and not all pipes are being disabled). The current approach will not bump the voltage level up until after the port has already been enabled, which is too late. But we'll take care of that case separately. v2: Don't break the "must disable pipes case" v3: Keep the on stack 'pipe' for future use Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: d62686ba3b54 ("drm/i915/adl_p: CDCLK crawl support for ADL") Reviewed-by: Uma Shankar Reviewed-by: Gustavo Sousa Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240402155016.13733-2-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com (cherry picked from commit 3aecee90ac12a351905f12dda7643d5b0676d6ca) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/bugs: Replace CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_{ON,OFF} with CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI

2024-04-17T09:15:17+00:00

commit 4f511739c54b549061993b53fc0380f48dfca23b upstream. For consistency with the other CONFIG_MITIGATION_* options, replace the CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_{ON,OFF} options with a single CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI option. [ mingo: Fix ] Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Sean Christopherson Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Nikolay Borisov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3833812ea63e7fdbe36bf8b932e63f70d18e2a2a.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto

2024-04-17T09:15:17+00:00

commit 36d4fe147c870f6d3f6602befd7ef44393a1c87a upstream. Unlike most other mitigations' "auto" options, spectre_bhi=auto only mitigates newer systems, which is confusing and not particularly useful. Remove it. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov Cc: Sean Christopherson Cc: Linus Torvalds Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/412e9dc87971b622bbbaf64740ebc1f140bff343.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/bugs: Clarify that syscall hardening isn't a BHI mitigation

2024-04-17T09:15:17+00:00

commit 5f882f3b0a8bf0788d5a0ee44b1191de5319bb8a upstream. While syscall hardening helps prevent some BHI attacks, there's still other low-hanging fruit remaining. Don't classify it as a mitigation and make it clear that the system may still be vulnerable if it doesn't have a HW or SW mitigation enabled. Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob") Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Sean Christopherson Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b5951dae3fdee7f1520d5136a27be3bdfe95f88b.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/bugs: Fix BHI handling of RRSBA

2024-04-17T09:15:17+00:00

commit 1cea8a280dfd1016148a3820676f2f03e3f5b898 upstream. The ARCH_CAP_RRSBA check isn't correct: RRSBA may have already been disabled by the Spectre v2 mitigation (or can otherwise be disabled by the BHI mitigation itself if needed). In that case retpolines are fine. Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob") Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Sean Christopherson Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6f56f13da34a0834b69163467449be7f58f253dc.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/bugs: Rename various 'ia32_cap' variables to 'x86_arch_cap_msr'

2024-04-17T09:15:17+00:00

commit d0485730d2189ffe5d986d4e9e191f1e4d5ffd24 upstream. So we are using the 'ia32_cap' value in a number of places, which got its name from MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR register. But there's very little 'IA32' about it - this isn't 32-bit only code, nor does it originate from there, it's just a historic quirk that many Intel MSR names are prefixed with IA32_. This is already clear from the helper method around the MSR: x86_read_arch_cap_msr(), which doesn't have the IA32 prefix. So rename 'ia32_cap' to 'x86_arch_cap_msr' to be consistent with its role and with the naming of the helper function. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Nikolay Borisov Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Sean Christopherson Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9592a18a814368e75f8f4b9d74d3883aa4fd1eaf.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/bugs: Cache the value of MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES

2024-04-17T09:15:17+00:00

commit cb2db5bb04d7f778fbc1a1ea2507aab436f1bff3 upstream. There's no need to keep reading MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES over and over. It's even read in the BHI sysfs function which is a big no-no. Just read it once and cache it. Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob") Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Sean Christopherson Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9592a18a814368e75f8f4b9d74d3883aa4fd1eaf.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/bugs: Fix BHI documentation

2024-04-17T09:15:17+00:00

commit dfe648903f42296866d79f10d03f8c85c9dfba30 upstream. Fix up some inaccuracies in the BHI documentation. Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob") Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Sean Christopherson Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8c84f7451bfe0dd08543c6082a383f390d4aa7e2.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/bugs: Fix return type of spectre_bhi_state()

2024-04-17T09:15:17+00:00

commit 04f4230e2f86a4e961ea5466eda3db8c1762004d upstream. The definition of spectre_bhi_state() incorrectly returns a const char * const. This causes the a compiler warning when building with W=1: warning: type qualifiers ignored on function return type [-Wignored-qualifiers] 2812 | static const char * const spectre_bhi_state(void) Remove the const qualifier from the pointer. Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob") Reported-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Linus Torvalds Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240409230806.1545822-1-daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman