kernel/linux.git, branch v4.9.322

Linux 4.9.322

2022-07-07T15:30:12+00:00

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220705115605.742248854@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Jon Hunter Tested-by: Florian Fainelli Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing Tested-by: Guenter Roeck Tested-by: Shuah Khan Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: usb: qmi_wwan: add Telit 0x1070 composition

2022-07-07T15:30:12+00:00

commit 94f2a444f28a649926c410eb9a38afb13a83ebe0 upstream. Add the following Telit FN990 composition: 0x1070: tty, adb, rmnet, tty, tty, tty, tty Signed-off-by: Daniele Palmas Acked-by: Bjørn Mork Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211210095722.22269-1-dnlplm@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Cc: Fabio Porcedda Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: usb: qmi_wwan: add Telit 0x1060 composition

2022-07-07T15:30:12+00:00

commit 8d17a33b076d24aa4861f336a125c888fb918605 upstream. This patch adds support for Telit LN920 0x1060 composition 0x1060: tty, adb, rmnet, tty, tty, tty, tty Signed-off-by: Carlo Lobrano Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Cc: Fabio Porcedda Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: usb: qmi_wwan: add Telit LE910Cx 0x1230 composition

2022-07-07T15:30:12+00:00

commit 5fd8477ed8ca77e64b93d44a6dae4aa70c191396 upstream. Add support for Telit LE910Cx 0x1230 composition: 0x1230: tty, adb, rmnet, audio, tty, tty, tty, tty Signed-off-by: Daniele Palmas Acked-by: Bjørn Mork Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201102110108.17244-1-dnlplm@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Cc: Fabio Porcedda Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: usb: qmi_wwan: add Telit 0x1260 and 0x1261 compositions

2022-07-07T15:30:12+00:00

commit b4e467c82f8c12af78b6f6fa5730cb7dea7af1b4 upstream. Added support for Telit LE910Cx 0x1260 and 0x1261 compositions. Signed-off-by: Daniele Palmas Acked-by: Bjørn Mork Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Cc: Fabio Porcedda Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

qmi_wwan: Added support for Telit LN940 series

2022-07-07T15:30:11+00:00

commit 1986af16e8ed355822600c24b3d2f0be46b573df upstream. Added support for the Telit LN940 series cellular modules QMI interface. QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR quirk requied for Qualcomm MDM9x40 chipset. Signed-off-by: Jörgen Storvist Acked-by: Bjørn Mork Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

xen/arm: Fix race in RB-tree based P2M accounting

2022-07-07T15:30:11+00:00

commit b75cd218274e01d026dc5240e86fdeb44bbed0c8 upstream. During the PV driver life cycle the mappings are added to the RB-tree by set_foreign_p2m_mapping(), which is called from gnttab_map_refs() and are removed by clear_foreign_p2m_mapping() which is called from gnttab_unmap_refs(). As both functions end up calling __set_phys_to_machine_multi() which updates the RB-tree, this function can be called concurrently. There is already a "p2m_lock" to protect against concurrent accesses, but the problem is that the first read of "phys_to_mach.rb_node" in __set_phys_to_machine_multi() is not covered by it, so this might lead to the incorrect mappings update (removing in our case) in RB-tree. In my environment the related issue happens rarely and only when PV net backend is running, the xen_add_phys_to_mach_entry() claims that it cannot add new pfn <-> mfn mapping to the tree since it is already exists which results in a failure when mapping foreign pages. But there might be other bad consequences related to the non-protected root reads such use-after-free, etc. While at it, also fix the similar usage in __pfn_to_mfn(), so initialize "struct rb_node *n" with the "p2m_lock" held in both functions to avoid possible bad consequences. This is CVE-2022-33744 / XSA-406. Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

xen/blkfront: force data bouncing when backend is untrusted

2022-07-07T15:30:11+00:00

commit 2400617da7eebf9167d71a46122828bc479d64c9 upstream. Split the current bounce buffering logic used with persistent grants into it's own option, and allow enabling it independently of persistent grants. This allows to reuse the same code paths to perform the bounce buffering required to avoid leaking contiguous data in shared pages not part of the request fragments. Reporting whether the backend is to be trusted can be done using a module parameter, or from the xenstore frontend path as set by the toolstack when adding the device. This is CVE-2022-33742, part of XSA-403. Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

xen/netfront: force data bouncing when backend is untrusted

2022-07-07T15:30:11+00:00

commit 4491001c2e0fa69efbb748c96ec96b100a5cdb7e upstream. Bounce all data on the skbs to be transmitted into zeroed pages if the backend is untrusted. This avoids leaking data present in the pages shared with the backend but not part of the skb fragments. This requires introducing a new helper in order to allocate skbs with a size multiple of XEN_PAGE_SIZE so we don't leak contiguous data on the granted pages. Reporting whether the backend is to be trusted can be done using a module parameter, or from the xenstore frontend path as set by the toolstack when adding the device. This is CVE-2022-33741, part of XSA-403. Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

xen/netfront: fix leaking data in shared pages

2022-07-07T15:30:11+00:00

commit 307c8de2b02344805ebead3440d8feed28f2f010 upstream. When allocating pages to be used for shared communication with the backend always zero them, this avoids leaking unintended data present on the pages. This is CVE-2022-33740, part of XSA-403. Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman