<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git, branch v4.4.132</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.4.132</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.4.132'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2018-05-16T08:06:53+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>Linux 4.4.132</title>
<updated>2018-05-16T08:06:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-16T08:06:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=69847b97f21141c2d4f6e9c1b22d932b7add3182'/>
<id>urn:sha1:69847b97f21141c2d4f6e9c1b22d932b7add3182</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/x86: Fix possible Spectre-v1 indexing for x86_pmu::event_map()</title>
<updated>2018-05-16T08:06:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-20T12:08:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f2fa49f50b327ffe100bc4bbbf7ca9b8762fcfac'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f2fa49f50b327ffe100bc4bbbf7ca9b8762fcfac</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 46b1b577229a091b137831becaa0fae8690ee15a upstream.

&gt; arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c:307 cstate_pmu_event_init() warn: potential spectre issue 'pkg_msr' (local cap)
&gt; arch/x86/events/intel/core.c:337 intel_pmu_event_map() warn: potential spectre issue 'intel_perfmon_event_map'
&gt; arch/x86/events/intel/knc.c:122 knc_pmu_event_map() warn: potential spectre issue 'knc_perfmon_event_map'
&gt; arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c:722 p4_pmu_event_map() warn: potential spectre issue 'p4_general_events'
&gt; arch/x86/events/intel/p6.c:116 p6_pmu_event_map() warn: potential spectre issue 'p6_perfmon_event_map'
&gt; arch/x86/events/amd/core.c:132 amd_pmu_event_map() warn: potential spectre issue 'amd_perfmon_event_map'

Userspace controls @attr, sanitize @attr-&gt;config before passing it on
to x86_pmu::event_map().

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/core: Fix possible Spectre-v1 indexing for -&gt;aux_pages[]</title>
<updated>2018-05-16T08:06:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-20T12:03:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f21e5918a98369190d4e167b011a5e9a62e9f2ad'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f21e5918a98369190d4e167b011a5e9a62e9f2ad</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4411ec1d1993e8dbff2898390e3fed280d88e446 upstream.

&gt; kernel/events/ring_buffer.c:871 perf_mmap_to_page() warn: potential spectre issue 'rb-&gt;aux_pages'

Userspace controls @pgoff through the fault address. Sanitize the
array index before doing the array dereference.

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/x86/msr: Fix possible Spectre-v1 indexing in the MSR driver</title>
<updated>2018-05-16T08:06:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-20T12:23:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ae5751bee1e21dd17de021e7706abbab0b5e49da'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ae5751bee1e21dd17de021e7706abbab0b5e49da</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 06ce6e9b6d6c09d4129c6e24a1314a395d816c10 upstream.

&gt; arch/x86/events/msr.c:178 msr_event_init() warn: potential spectre issue 'msr' (local cap)

Userspace controls @attr, sanitize cfg (attr-&gt;config) before using it
to index an array.

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/x86/cstate: Fix possible Spectre-v1 indexing for pkg_msr</title>
<updated>2018-05-16T08:06:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-20T12:25:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=5ff02cfcbbf6d09be1ef45796d24677a73d4e8a8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5ff02cfcbbf6d09be1ef45796d24677a73d4e8a8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a5f81290ce475489fa2551c01a07470c1a4c932e upstream.

&gt; arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c:307 cstate_pmu_event_init() warn: potential spectre issue 'pkg_msr' (local cap)

Userspace controls @attr, sanitize cfg (attr-&gt;config) before using it
to index an array.

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/x86: Fix possible Spectre-v1 indexing for hw_perf_event cache_*</title>
<updated>2018-05-16T08:06:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-20T12:06:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=9f2e20750aa96301abd7ff4791f6a6a977f453ca'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9f2e20750aa96301abd7ff4791f6a6a977f453ca</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ef9ee4ad38445a30909c48998624861716f2a994 upstream.

&gt; arch/x86/events/core.c:319 set_ext_hw_attr() warn: potential spectre issue 'hw_cache_event_ids[cache_type]' (local cap)
&gt; arch/x86/events/core.c:319 set_ext_hw_attr() warn: potential spectre issue 'hw_cache_event_ids' (local cap)
&gt; arch/x86/events/core.c:328 set_ext_hw_attr() warn: potential spectre issue 'hw_cache_extra_regs[cache_type]' (local cap)
&gt; arch/x86/events/core.c:328 set_ext_hw_attr() warn: potential spectre issue 'hw_cache_extra_regs' (local cap)

Userspace controls @config which contains 3 (byte) fields used for a 3
dimensional array deref.

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing/uprobe_event: Fix strncpy corner case</title>
<updated>2018-05-16T08:06:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Masami Hiramatsu</name>
<email>mhiramat@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-10T12:20:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=cb2798296082952f1d0f739bd8b68ef6f9c7ef6b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cb2798296082952f1d0f739bd8b68ef6f9c7ef6b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 50268a3d266ecfdd6c5873d62b2758d9732fc598 upstream.

Fix string fetch function to terminate with NUL.
It is OK to drop the rest of string.

Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Song Liu &lt;songliubraving@fb.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: 范龙飞 &lt;long7573@126.com&gt;
Fixes: 5baaa59ef09e ("tracing/probes: Implement 'memory' fetch method for uprobes")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "Bluetooth: btusb: Fix quirk for Atheros 1525/QCA6174"</title>
<updated>2018-05-16T08:06:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hans de Goede</name>
<email>hdegoede@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-26T12:18:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=fc47961e81838f2bf46a6a0ba62ba150e0b1c71c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fc47961e81838f2bf46a6a0ba62ba150e0b1c71c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 544a591668813583021474fa5c7ff4942244d654 upstream.

Commit f44cb4b19ed4 ("Bluetooth: btusb: Fix quirk for Atheros
1525/QCA6174") is causing bluetooth to no longer work for several
people, see: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1568911

So lets revert it for now and try to find another solution for
devices which need the modified quirk.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede &lt;hdegoede@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>atm: zatm: Fix potential Spectre v1</title>
<updated>2018-05-16T08:06:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gustavo A. R. Silva</name>
<email>gustavo@embeddedor.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-03T18:17:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=46864b108b00bda066f5774785efbe82a4439a84'/>
<id>urn:sha1:46864b108b00bda066f5774785efbe82a4439a84</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2be147f7459db5bbf292e0a6f135037b55e20b39 upstream.

pool can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/atm/zatm.c:1462 zatm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue
'zatm_dev-&gt;pool_info' (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing pool before using it to index
zatm_dev-&gt;pool_info

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&amp;m=152449131114778&amp;w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavo@embeddedor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: atm: Fix potential Spectre v1</title>
<updated>2018-05-16T08:06:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gustavo A. R. Silva</name>
<email>gustavo@embeddedor.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-03T18:45:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=0df23e9b9b2f0293b873145bd22d218d2940dfaa'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0df23e9b9b2f0293b873145bd22d218d2940dfaa</id>
<content type='text'>
commit acf784bd0ce257fe43da7ca266f7a10b837479d2 upstream.

ioc_data.dev_num can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
net/atm/lec.c:702 lec_vcc_attach() warn: potential spectre issue
'dev_lec'

Fix this by sanitizing ioc_data.dev_num before using it to index
dev_lec. Also, notice that there is another instance in which array
dev_lec is being indexed using ioc_data.dev_num at line 705:
lec_vcc_added(netdev_priv(dev_lec[ioc_data.dev_num]),

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&amp;m=152449131114778&amp;w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavo@embeddedor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
</feed>
