kernel/linux.git, branch v4.19.94

Linux 4.19.94

2020-01-09T09:19:10+00:00

perf/x86/intel/bts: Fix the use of page_private()

2020-01-09T09:19:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit ff61541cc6c1962957758ba433c574b76f588d23 ] Commit 8062382c8dbe2 ("perf/x86/intel/bts: Add BTS PMU driver") brought in a warning with the BTS buffer initialization that is easily tripped with (assuming KPTI is disabled): instantly throwing: > ------------[ cut here ]------------ > WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 326 at arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c:86 bts_buffer_setup_aux+0x117/0x3d0 > Modules linked in: > CPU: 2 PID: 326 Comm: perf Not tainted 5.4.0-rc8-00291-gceb9e77324fa #904 > RIP: 0010:bts_buffer_setup_aux+0x117/0x3d0 > Call Trace: > rb_alloc_aux+0x339/0x550 > perf_mmap+0x607/0xc70 > mmap_region+0x76b/0xbd0 ... It appears to assume (for lost raisins) that PagePrivate() is set, while later it actually tests for PagePrivate() before using page_private(). Make it consistent and always check PagePrivate() before using page_private(). Fixes: 8062382c8dbe2 ("perf/x86/intel/bts: Add BTS PMU driver") Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Vince Weaver Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191205142853.28894-2-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

xen/blkback: Avoid unmapping unmapped grant pages

2020-01-09T09:19:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit f9bd84a8a845d82f9b5a081a7ae68c98a11d2e84 ] For each I/O request, blkback first maps the foreign pages for the request to its local pages. If an allocation of a local page for the mapping fails, it should unmap every mapping already made for the request. However, blkback's handling mechanism for the allocation failure does not mark the remaining foreign pages as unmapped. Therefore, the unmap function merely tries to unmap every valid grant page for the request, including the pages not mapped due to the allocation failure. On a system that fails the allocation frequently, this problem leads to following kernel crash. [ 372.012538] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001 [ 372.012546] IP: [] gnttab_unmap_refs.part.7+0x1c/0x40 [ 372.012557] PGD 16f3e9067 PUD 16426e067 PMD 0 [ 372.012562] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP [ 372.012566] Modules linked in: act_police sch_ingress cls_u32 ... [ 372.012746] Call Trace: [ 372.012752] [] gnttab_unmap_refs+0x34/0x40 [ 372.012759] [] xen_blkbk_unmap+0x83/0x150 [xen_blkback] ... [ 372.012802] [] dispatch_rw_block_io+0x970/0x980 [xen_blkback] ... Decompressing Linux... Parsing ELF... done. Booting the kernel. [ 0.000000] Initializing cgroup subsys cpuset This commit fixes this problem by marking the grant pages of the given request that didn't mapped due to the allocation failure as invalid. Fixes: c6cc142dac52 ("xen-blkback: use balloon pages for all mappings") Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse Reviewed-by: Maximilian Heyne Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

s390/smp: fix physical to logical CPU map for SMT

2020-01-09T09:19:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit 72a81ad9d6d62dcb79f7e8ad66ffd1c768b72026 ] If an SMT capable system is not IPL'ed from the first CPU the setup of the physical to logical CPU mapping is broken: the IPL core gets CPU number 0, but then the next core gets CPU number 1. Correct would be that all SMT threads of CPU 0 get the subsequent logical CPU numbers. This is important since a lot of code (like e.g. the CPU topology code) assumes that CPU maps are setup like this. If the mapping is broken the system will not IPL due to broken topology masks: [ 1.716341] BUG: arch topology broken [ 1.716342] the SMT domain not a subset of the MC domain [ 1.716343] BUG: arch topology broken [ 1.716344] the MC domain not a subset of the BOOK domain This scenario can usually not happen since LPARs are always IPL'ed from CPU 0 and also re-IPL is intiated from CPU 0. However older kernels did initiate re-IPL on an arbitrary CPU. If therefore a re-IPL from an old kernel into a new kernel is initiated this may lead to crash. Fix this by setting up the physical to logical CPU mapping correctly. Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ubifs: ubifs_tnc_start_commit: Fix OOB in layout_in_gaps

2020-01-09T09:19:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit 6abf57262166b4f4294667fb5206ae7ba1ba96f5 ] Running stress-test test_2 in mtd-utils on ubi device, sometimes we can get following oops message: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffff00000140 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 280a067 P4D 280a067 PUD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 0 PID: 60 Comm: kworker/u16:1 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.2.0 #13 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0 -0-ga698c8995f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-ubifs_0_0) RIP: 0010:rb_next_postorder+0x2e/0xb0 Code: 80 db 03 01 48 85 ff 0f 84 97 00 00 00 48 8b 17 48 83 05 bc 80 db 03 01 48 83 e2 fc 0f 84 82 00 00 00 48 83 05 b2 80 db 03 01 <48> 3b 7a 10 48 89 d0 74 02 f3 c3 48 8b 52 08 48 83 05 a3 80 db 03 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000887758 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: ffff888129ae4700 RBX: ffff888138b08400 RCX: 0000000080800001 RDX: ffffffff00000130 RSI: 0000000080800024 RDI: ffff888138b08400 RBP: ffff888138b08400 R08: ffffea0004a6b920 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffc90000887740 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888128d48000 R13: 0000000000000800 R14: 000000000000011e R15: 00000000000007c8 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88813ba00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffff00000140 CR3: 000000013789d000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: destroy_old_idx+0x5d/0xa0 [ubifs] ubifs_tnc_start_commit+0x4fe/0x1380 [ubifs] do_commit+0x3eb/0x830 [ubifs] ubifs_run_commit+0xdc/0x1c0 [ubifs] Above Oops are due to the slab-out-of-bounds happened in do-while of function layout_in_gaps indirectly called by ubifs_tnc_start_commit. In function layout_in_gaps, there is a do-while loop placing index nodes into the gaps created by obsolete index nodes in non-empty index LEBs until rest index nodes can totally be placed into pre-allocated empty LEBs. @c->gap_lebs points to a memory area(integer array) which records LEB numbers used by 'in-the-gaps' method. Whenever a fitable index LEB is found, corresponding lnum will be incrementally written into the memory area pointed by @c->gap_lebs. The size ((@c->lst.idx_lebs + 1) * sizeof(int)) of memory area is allocated before do-while loop and can not be changed in the loop. But @c->lst.idx_lebs could be increased by function ubifs_change_lp (called by layout_leb_in_gaps->ubifs_find_dirty_idx_leb->get_idx_gc_leb) during the loop. So, sometimes oob happens when number of cycles in do-while loop exceeds the original value of @c->lst.idx_lebs. See detail in https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=204229. This patch fixes oob in layout_in_gaps. Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

net: add annotations on hh->hh_len lockless accesses

2020-01-09T09:19:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit c305c6ae79e2ce20c22660ceda94f0d86d639a82 ] KCSAN reported a data-race [1] While we can use READ_ONCE() on the read sides, we need to make sure hh->hh_len is written last. [1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in eth_header_cache / neigh_resolve_output write to 0xffff8880b9dedcb8 of 4 bytes by task 29760 on cpu 0: eth_header_cache+0xa9/0xd0 net/ethernet/eth.c:247 neigh_hh_init net/core/neighbour.c:1463 [inline] neigh_resolve_output net/core/neighbour.c:1480 [inline] neigh_resolve_output+0x415/0x470 net/core/neighbour.c:1470 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:511 [inline] ip6_finish_output2+0x7a2/0xec0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:116 __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:142 [inline] __ip6_finish_output+0x2d7/0x330 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:127 ip6_finish_output+0x41/0x160 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:152 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:294 [inline] ip6_output+0xf2/0x280 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:175 dst_output include/net/dst.h:436 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:305 [inline] ndisc_send_skb+0x459/0x5f0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:505 ndisc_send_ns+0x207/0x430 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:647 rt6_probe_deferred+0x98/0xf0 net/ipv6/route.c:615 process_one_work+0x3d4/0x890 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0xa0/0x800 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x1d4/0x200 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1253 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 read to 0xffff8880b9dedcb8 of 4 bytes by task 29572 on cpu 1: neigh_resolve_output net/core/neighbour.c:1479 [inline] neigh_resolve_output+0x113/0x470 net/core/neighbour.c:1470 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:511 [inline] ip6_finish_output2+0x7a2/0xec0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:116 __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:142 [inline] __ip6_finish_output+0x2d7/0x330 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:127 ip6_finish_output+0x41/0x160 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:152 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:294 [inline] ip6_output+0xf2/0x280 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:175 dst_output include/net/dst.h:436 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:305 [inline] ndisc_send_skb+0x459/0x5f0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:505 ndisc_send_ns+0x207/0x430 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:647 rt6_probe_deferred+0x98/0xf0 net/ipv6/route.c:615 process_one_work+0x3d4/0x890 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0xa0/0x800 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x1d4/0x200 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1253 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 29572 Comm: kworker/1:4 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc6+ #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: events rt6_probe_deferred Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

xfs: periodically yield scrub threads to the scheduler

2020-01-09T09:19:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit 5d1116d4c6af3e580f1ed0382ca5a94bd65a34cf ] Christoph Hellwig complained about the following soft lockup warning when running scrub after generic/175 when preemption is disabled and slub debugging is enabled: watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#3 stuck for 22s! [xfs_scrub:161] Modules linked in: irq event stamp: 41692326 hardirqs last enabled at (41692325): [] _raw_0 hardirqs last disabled at (41692326): [] trace0 softirqs last enabled at (41684994): [] __do_e softirqs last disabled at (41684987): [] irq_e0 CPU: 3 PID: 16189 Comm: xfs_scrub Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #30 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.124 RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x39/0x40 Code: 89 f3 be 01 00 00 00 e8 d5 3a e5 fe 48 89 ef e8 ed 87 e5 f2 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000233f970 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffff3 RAX: ffff88813b398040 RBX: 0000000000000286 RCX: 0000000000000006 RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffff88813b3988c0 RDI: ffff88813b398040 RBP: ffff888137958640 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffea00042b0c00 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff88810ac32308 R15: ffff8881376fc040 FS: 00007f6113dea700(0000) GS:ffff88813bb80000(0000) knlGS:00000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f6113de8ff8 CR3: 000000012f290000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Call Trace: free_debug_processing+0x1dd/0x240 __slab_free+0x231/0x410 kmem_cache_free+0x30e/0x360 xchk_ag_btcur_free+0x76/0xb0 xchk_ag_free+0x10/0x80 xchk_bmap_iextent_xref.isra.14+0xd9/0x120 xchk_bmap_iextent+0x187/0x210 xchk_bmap+0x2e0/0x3b0 xfs_scrub_metadata+0x2e7/0x500 xfs_ioc_scrub_metadata+0x4a/0xa0 xfs_file_ioctl+0x58a/0xcd0 do_vfs_ioctl+0xa0/0x6f0 ksys_ioctl+0x5b/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x11/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe If preemption is disabled, all metadata buffers needed to perform the scrub are already in memory, and there are a lot of records to check, it's possible that the scrub thread will run for an extended period of time without sleeping for IO or any other reason. Then the watchdog timer or the RCU stall timeout can trigger, producing the backtrace above. To fix this problem, call cond_resched() from the scrub thread so that we back out to the scheduler whenever necessary. Reported-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ath9k_htc: Discard undersized packets

2020-01-09T09:19:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit cd486e627e67ee9ab66914d36d3127ef057cc010 ] Sometimes the hardware will push small packets that trigger a WARN_ON in mac80211. Discard them early to avoid this issue. This patch ports 2 patches from ath9k to ath9k_htc. commit 3c0efb745a172bfe96459e20cbd37b0c945d5f8d "ath9k: discard undersized packets". commit df5c4150501ee7e86383be88f6490d970adcf157 "ath9k: correctly handle short radar pulses". [ 112.835889] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 112.835971] WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 0 at net/mac80211/rx.c:804 ieee80211_rx_napi+0xaac/0xb40 [mac80211] [ 112.835973] Modules linked in: ath9k_htc ath9k_common ath9k_hw ath mac80211 cfg80211 libarc4 nouveau snd_hda_codec_hdmi intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic ledtrig_audio snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec video snd_hda_core ttm snd_hwdep drm_kms_helper snd_pcm crct10dif_pclmul snd_seq_midi drm snd_seq_midi_event crc32_pclmul snd_rawmidi ghash_clmulni_intel snd_seq aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd snd_seq_device glue_helper snd_timer sch_fq_codel i2c_algo_bit fb_sys_fops snd input_leds syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt intel_cstate mei_me intel_rapl_perf soundcore mxm_wmi lpc_ich mei kvm_intel kvm mac_hid irqbypass parport_pc ppdev lp parport ip_tables x_tables autofs4 hid_generic usbhid hid raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 multipath linear e1000e ahci libahci wmi [ 112.836022] CPU: 5 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/5 Not tainted 5.3.0-wt #1 [ 112.836023] Hardware name: MouseComputer Co.,Ltd. X99-S01/X99-S01, BIOS 1.0C-W7 04/01/2015 [ 112.836056] RIP: 0010:ieee80211_rx_napi+0xaac/0xb40 [mac80211] [ 112.836059] Code: 00 00 66 41 89 86 b0 00 00 00 e9 c8 fa ff ff 4c 89 b5 40 ff ff ff 49 89 c6 e9 c9 fa ff ff 48 c7 c7 e0 a2 a5 c0 e8 47 41 b0 e9 <0f> 0b 48 89 df e8 5a 94 2d ea e9 02 f9 ff ff 41 39 c1 44 89 85 60 [ 112.836060] RSP: 0018:ffffaa6180220da8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 112.836062] RAX: 0000000000000024 RBX: ffff909a20eeda00 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 112.836064] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff909a2f957448 RDI: ffff909a2f957448 [ 112.836065] RBP: ffffaa6180220e78 R08: 00000000000006e9 R09: 0000000000000004 [ 112.836066] R10: 000000000000000a R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 112.836068] R13: ffff909a261a47a0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000004 [ 112.836070] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff909a2f940000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 112.836071] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 112.836073] CR2: 00007f4e3ffffa08 CR3: 00000001afc0a006 CR4: 00000000001606e0 [ 112.836074] Call Trace: [ 112.836076] [ 112.836083] ? finish_td+0xb3/0xf0 [ 112.836092] ? ath9k_rx_prepare.isra.11+0x22f/0x2a0 [ath9k_htc] [ 112.836099] ath9k_rx_tasklet+0x10b/0x1d0 [ath9k_htc] [ 112.836105] tasklet_action_common.isra.22+0x63/0x110 [ 112.836108] tasklet_action+0x22/0x30 [ 112.836115] __do_softirq+0xe4/0x2da [ 112.836118] irq_exit+0xae/0xb0 [ 112.836121] do_IRQ+0x86/0xe0 [ 112.836125] common_interrupt+0xf/0xf [ 112.836126] [ 112.836130] RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0xa9/0x440 [ 112.836133] Code: 3d bc 20 38 55 e8 f7 1d 84 ff 49 89 c7 0f 1f 44 00 00 31 ff e8 28 29 84 ff 80 7d d3 00 0f 85 e6 01 00 00 fb 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 <45> 85 ed 0f 89 ff 01 00 00 41 c7 44 24 10 00 00 00 00 48 83 c4 18 [ 112.836134] RSP: 0018:ffffaa61800e3e48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffde [ 112.836136] RAX: ffff909a2f96b340 RBX: ffffffffabb58200 RCX: 000000000000001f [ 112.836137] RDX: 0000001a458adc5d RSI: 0000000026c9b581 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 112.836139] RBP: ffffaa61800e3e88 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 000000000002abc0 [ 112.836140] R10: ffffaa61800e3e18 R11: 000000000000002d R12: ffffca617fb40b00 [ 112.836141] R13: 0000000000000002 R14: ffffffffabb582d8 R15: 0000001a458adc5d [ 112.836145] ? cpuidle_enter_state+0x98/0x440 [ 112.836149] ? menu_select+0x370/0x600 [ 112.836151] cpuidle_enter+0x2e/0x40 [ 112.836154] call_cpuidle+0x23/0x40 [ 112.836156] do_idle+0x204/0x280 [ 112.836159] cpu_startup_entry+0x1d/0x20 [ 112.836164] start_secondary+0x167/0x1c0 [ 112.836169] secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 [ 112.836173] ---[ end trace 9f4cd18479cc5ae5 ]--- Signed-off-by: Masashi Honma Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ath9k_htc: Modify byte order for an error message

2020-01-09T09:19:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit e01fddc19d215f6ad397894ec2a851d99bf154e2 ] rs_datalen is be16 so we need to convert it before printing. Signed-off-by: Masashi Honma Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

net: core: limit nested device depth

2020-01-09T09:19:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit 5343da4c17429efaa5fb1594ea96aee1a283e694 ] Current code doesn't limit the number of nested devices. Nested devices would be handled recursively and this needs huge stack memory. So, unlimited nested devices could make stack overflow. This patch adds upper_level and lower_level, they are common variables and represent maximum lower/upper depth. When upper/lower device is attached or dettached, {lower/upper}_level are updated. and if maximum depth is bigger than 8, attach routine fails and returns -EMLINK. In addition, this patch converts recursive routine of netdev_walk_all_{lower/upper} to iterator routine. Test commands: ip link add dummy0 type dummy ip link add link dummy0 name vlan1 type vlan id 1 ip link set vlan1 up for i in {2..55} do let A=$i-1 ip link add vlan$i link vlan$A type vlan id $i done ip link del dummy0 Splat looks like: [ 155.513226][ T908] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __unwind_start+0x71/0x850 [ 155.514162][ T908] Write of size 88 at addr ffff8880608a6cc0 by task ip/908 [ 155.515048][ T908] [ 155.515333][ T908] CPU: 0 PID: 908 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #96 [ 155.516147][ T908] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 155.517233][ T908] Call Trace: [ 155.517627][ T908] [ 155.517918][ T908] Allocated by task 0: [ 155.518412][ T908] (stack is not available) [ 155.518955][ T908] [ 155.519228][ T908] Freed by task 0: [ 155.519885][ T908] (stack is not available) [ 155.520452][ T908] [ 155.520729][ T908] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880608a6ac0 [ 155.520729][ T908] which belongs to the cache names_cache of size 4096 [ 155.522387][ T908] The buggy address is located 512 bytes inside of [ 155.522387][ T908] 4096-byte region [ffff8880608a6ac0, ffff8880608a7ac0) [ 155.523920][ T908] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 155.524552][ T908] page:ffffea0001822800 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88806c657cc0 index:0x0 compound_mapcount:0 [ 155.525836][ T908] flags: 0x100000000010200(slab|head) [ 155.526445][ T908] raw: 0100000000010200 ffffea0001813808 ffffea0001a26c08 ffff88806c657cc0 [ 155.527424][ T908] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000070007 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 155.528429][ T908] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 155.529158][ T908] [ 155.529410][ T908] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 155.530060][ T908] ffff8880608a6b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 155.530971][ T908] ffff8880608a6c00: fb fb fb fb fb f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f2 f2 f2 f3 f3 f3 [ 155.531889][ T908] >ffff8880608a6c80: f3 fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 155.532806][ T908] ^ [ 155.533509][ T908] ffff8880608a6d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 [ 155.534436][ T908] ffff8880608a6d80: f2 f3 f3 f3 f3 fb fb fb 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ ... ] Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin